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           This dissertation examines how the German expellees have represented and 
commemorated their experiences of World War II and its aftermath in the form of 
local monuments. More specifically, it presents a critical, interpretive analysis to 
investigate the historical narratives articulated by these vitally important, yet 
overlooked memorials. Erected in every decade following the war, more than one 
thousand local expellee monuments dot the landscapes of every Bundesland in 
reunited Germany, are located in small numbers throughout the former “German 
East”, and can be found as far away as the USA and Africa. Drawing its material 
from the monuments’ individual elements—their forms, inscriptions, 
iconographies, locations, initiators—this study also explores the commemorative 
ceremonies held at the monuments, which bring these objects to life.  
           Fusing historical, art-historical, sociological, and cultural-anthropological 
approaches, I contend that the monuments make profound statements about their 
initiators’ understandings of the past and disprove the notion that German 
wartime suffering has been unmentionable or was not permitted in the postwar 
era. Moreover, while expellee activists suggest that the local monuments construct 
innocuous, parallel narratives which augment prevailing Holocaust-centered 
narratives, this dissertation demonstrates the ways monuments dedicated “to our 
dead”—that is, to German victims of the expulsion rather than to the victims of 




memories of the war. In fact, I argue that expellee organizations have used the 
monuments to shape postwar discussions of victimization by constructing one-
sided, de-contextualized narratives of German suffering based on the loss of 
Heimat (homeland) and on assertions of collective innocence.  
          This dissertation is the first all-encompassing exploration of expellee 
monuments. The multifaceted approach it employs contextualizes and categorizes 
thematically the methods and motifs chosen to represent the fates of the roughly 
12 million Germans forced to resettle at the end of and after WWII and casts new 
light on this under-analyzed aspect of German postwar memory culture. Thus, the 
study contributes to larger debates over German wartime suffering and to the 











I can understand the pain over what was lost 
very well. But it must be pain about what we 
did to ourselves, not what others did to us. 
 




The horrors of war, the mothers’ tears, the 
suffering of the expellees are the same for 
all sides but the causes and the 
consequences of the war are not the same. 
 




[N]o one takes their memorials more 
seriously than the Germans. 
 




EXPELLEE MONUMENTS—BLANK SPOTS IN GERMANY’S MEMORY 
CULTURE? 
 
          In the late 1990s and the early part of this century, non-Jewish German experiences 
of the Second World War became a topic of public debate in a way hitherto unseen in the 
Federal Republic.4
                                                           
1 All translations, unless otherwise noted, are my own. 
 Unleashing the societal discussions were the works of some leading 
I took this quotation from an interview with Joschka Fischer published as “Was haben wir uns angetan?” in 
Die Zeit, #36, August 28, 2003, p. 6. Fischer’s parents were among the Hungarian Germans who fled their 
homes and settled in what became the Federal Republic of Germany after WWII.  
2 Interview conducted by Der Spiegel published as “Ein Paradox der Geschichte,” in Stefan Aust and 
Stephan Burgdorff (eds.) Die Flucht. Über die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten. (Munich: 
Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2005), pp. 168-169. 
3 James E. Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning. (New Haven: Yale 
University Press), 1993, pp. 19-20. 
4 This development was presciently forecasted by Andrei S. Markovits and Simon Reich who rightly 
predicted that the continuing historicization of Auschwitz would unleash a cavalcade of sentiment on 
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literary and cultural figures who probed postwar German responses to the war, or who 
explored subjects and framed their findings in ways long considered improper in light of 
the Holocaust.5 Much of the discussion centered on if and why the topic “Germans as 
victims” had been “taboo” and how best to commemorate German wartime suffering 
without overshadowing Nazi crimes. The efforts of a private foundation called the 
Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen (Center Against Expulsions) have doubtlessly been a part 
of this debate. Since its inception in 2000, the foundation has marshaled a campaign to 
construct a homonymous, large-scale memorial and documentation center in Berlin 
dedicated to twentieth-century victims of forced migration in Europe. Operating under 
the auspices of the Bund der Vertriebenen (BdV—League of Expellees)—the umbrella 
organization and chief political lobbying force for all major German expellee groups—
the foundation proclaims on its website that “All victims of genocide and expulsion need 
a place in our hearts and in historical memory.”6
                                                           
German victimhood. No longer “crowded out” by the enormity of the Holocaust, the authors surmised, 
German collective memory would become much more self-centered. Markovits and Reich, The German 
Predicament: Memory and Power in the New Europe. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1997. 
  
5 The secondary literature on this resurgence is vast and is growing. Some notable examples include: 
Robert G. Moeller’s War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
(Berkeley: University of California Press), 2001, Moeller, “Sinking Ships, the Lost Heimat and Broken 
Taboos: Günter Grass and the Politics of Memory in Contemporary Germany,” Contemporary European 
History. 12, 2; 2003, pp. 147-181, as well as Moeller, “Germans as Victims? Thoughts on a Post-Cold War 
History of World War II’s Legacies,” History and Memory 17, ½, Spring/Summer 2005, pp. 147-194. See 
also Eric Langenbacher, “Changing Memory Regimes in Contemporary Germany?” German Politics and 
Society. Issue 67 Vol. 21, #2, Summer 2003, pp. 46-68, and Langenbacher, “The Return of Memory—New 
Discussions about German Suffering in World War II,” German Politics and Society. Issue 68, Vol. 21, #3, 
Fall 2003, pp. 74-88. Other examples include: Bill Niven (ed.) Germans as Victims: Remembering the Past 
in Contemporary Germany. (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Laurel Cohen-Pfister and Dagmar 
Wienroder-Skinner (eds.) Victims and Perpetrators: 1933-1945: (Re)Presenting the Past in Post-Unification 
Culture. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2006); Helmut Schmitz (ed.) A Nation of Victims? Representations of 
German Wartime Suffering from 1945 to the Present. (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007); and Gilad Margalit, 
Guilt, Suffering, and Memory: Germany Remembers its Dead of WWII. Tr. Haim Waltzman. (Blomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2010). 
6 As cited in the “Aufgaben und Ziele” section of the foundation’s website <www.z-g-
v.de/aktuelles/?id=35> Accessed January 30, 2010. 
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          Both the foundation and the BdV have sought the German government’s official 
sanction and financial support of the project. Perhaps not surprisingly, the venture did not 
enjoy much success under the Red-Green government. In a 2002 vote, the Social 
Democrat-led Bundestag approved merely the initiation of a Europe-wide discussion on 
the emplacement of an international memorial in a location to be determined.7
          Because the debate over the Center Against Expulsions touches on so many of 
aspects at the heart of discussions of Germans as victims—such as the proper forms, 
methods, and locations of such commemorations—the idea of a national monument to the 
expulsion has been contentious from the start. Not only have the opponents of the 
proposal feared a self-absorbed, revisionist presentation of the German experience in 
WWII, they have also not been able to forget the long-standing revanchist policies 
 However, 
the BdV has remained adamant that the center be located in Berlin. After a change in 
government in 2005, the foundation and its advocates had grounds for renewed optimism 
when the creation of a Center Against Expulsions was made a stipulation of the coalition 
treaty which formed the new administration. Indeed, the Grand Coalition headed by 
Chancellor Angela Merkel of the Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU—Christian 
Democratic Union) passed legislation in late 2008 which opened the door for a state-
sponsored center in the German capital and granted the BdV an advisory role as well as a 
legitimate say in the ultimate form the memorial will take. Nearly two years later, though 
not yet a fait accompli, and in spite of continued squabbling over the personnel 
composition of the executive committee, the foundation and its sponsors have basically 
achieved their goal, and plans to create the center are moving forward.  
                                                           
7 For reasons discussed below, the BdV has had an antagonistic relationship with the Left for decades. In 
addition to Berlin, less “offensive” cities like Wrocław (Breslau) and Priština were proposed. 
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espoused by some members of the BdV, which included vociferous opposition to the 
recognition of the Oder/Neisse border.8 Seeking to assuage the concerns of their 
opponents, the BdV and the foundation have stated repeatedly their combined desire to 
include representations and documentation of all European expulsions of the twentieth 
century, not just that of the Germans. In fact, the foundation considered an exhibition it 
organized and held in Berlin in the summer of 2006, which displayed cases of forced 
migration in Europe starting with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and ending with the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, as evidence of how this contentious topic could be presented 
in a balanced, international context. The exhibits—proclaimed by most reviewers a 
success—served as a model for the eventual permanent exhibition.9 Nevertheless, even a 
cursory look at the objectives on the Center’s website indicates the preponderance of the 
German experience.10
                                                           
8 For an investigation of the expellee lobby’s influence on West German foreign policy, see Pertti Ahonen, 
After the Expulsion: West Germany and Eastern Europe, 1945-1990. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003). Other critics remember the involvement in National Socialism of many of the BdV’s founding 
members, including its first chairman Hans Krüger, who resigned in 1964 from his cabinet post as expellee 
minister because of his Nazi past. For more on the organisation’s nefarious connections to National 
Socialism, see Hans Michael Kloth and Klaus Wiegrefe, “Unbequeme Wahrheiten,” Der Spiegel, 33:2006, 
p. 46, as well as Erich Später’s examination of the Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft: Kein Frieden mit 
Tschechien. Die Sudetendeutschen und ihre Landsmannschaft. (Hamburg: KVV Konkret, 2005). 
  
9 See for example, Heinrich Wefing, “Die Probe. Was kann das Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen ausstellen?” 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. August 8, 2006, p. 31; Klaus-Peter Schwarz, “Anker der Erinnerung. Die 
Ausstellung ‘Erzwungene Wege’ in Berlin zeigt die europäische Dimension der Vertreibung,” Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung. August 10, 2006, p. 4; and “Erinnerung und Geschichte zusammenführen,” 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. August 11, 2006, p. 1; Regina Mönch, “Es gibt kein fremdes Land. 
‘Erzwungene Wege.’ Die Berliner Ausstellung des Zentrums gegen Vertreibungen vergleicht, ohne 
aufzurechnen,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. August 11, 2006, p. 33; “Was bleibt ist Heimweh: Die 
Ausstellung über ‘Flucht und Vertreibung’ im Berliner Kronprinzenpalais,” Süddeutsche Zeitung. August 
11, 2006, p. 11; Thomas Schmid, “Die Furcht vor der Wucht der Erinnerung. ‘Erzwungene Wege.’ Die 
Berliner Ausstellung über die Vertreibungen im 20. Jahrhundert ist sehr vorsichtig. Das schadet ihrer 
Wirkung,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. August 13, 2006, p. 5; Thomas Urban, “Der Henker darf nicht 
Opfer werden,” Süddeutsche Zeitung. August 16, 2006, p. 11; Piotr Semka, “Der Henker soll jetzt Opfer 
sein,” Süddeutsche Zeitung. September 14, 2006, p. 2. 
10 According to its website, the foundation has four tasks: the first calls for the creation of a museum 
dedicated to the experience of the German expellees. Deeming this act a “task for the whole of Germany,” 
the first task foresees a museum/research center with “additional space for sadness, sympathy and 
forgiveness […] to be accommodated in a requiem rotunda.” The second task is to “illuminate the changes 
in Germany as a result of the integration of millions of uprooted compatriots” which “has had its effects on 
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          As could be expected, the BdV’s reaction to the legislation passed in 2008 by the 
Grand Coalition was positive. Nevertheless, in a statement released to the press the day 
after the German parliament’s decision, BdV president Erika Steinbach declared that the 
government’s resolution of this issue “comes late, but not too late.” For those who 
experienced the expulsion firsthand (the so-called “Erlebnisgeneration”), the 
pronouncement continued, the building of the center would provide comfort “that their 
fate is not forgotten, and instead occupies a firm place in the collective memory of our 
Vaterland.”11
          Overlooked in this argumentation, however, are the ubiquitous local monuments 
already commemorating flight and expulsion. Erected in every decade following the war, 
more than one thousand monuments dot the landscapes of reunited Germany, are located 
in small numbers throughout the former “German East,” and can even be found as far 
away as the United States and Africa. The monuments are key components of the 
expellee organizations’ visual and discursive repertoire, and it is clear that with them they 
 The statement was in keeping with the argument consistently deployed by 
the BdV that the commemoration of flight and expulsion had been “a blank spot” in 
German and European history, and that the expellees have had no place in German 
memory culture. The proposed Center Against Expulsions would thus fill a significant 
commemorative lacuna in the Federal Republic’s understanding of World War II and its 
aftermath.  
                                                           
all areas of life.” Task three aims at providing a space “in our hearts and in historical memory” for all the 
victims of genocide and displacement. Interestingly, in undoubtedly another concession to potential 
opponents of the Center, the foundation does include a (very brief) mention of European Jews in their lists 
of representative groups. However, this trite reference ostensibly equates the systematic extermination of 
the Jews with the forced migration of the Greek Cypriots and other oppressed minorities on the list. The 
fourth task calls for the bestowal of a prize to individuals or groups who work against human rights 
violations. 
11 Erika Steinbach, Bund der Vertriebenen. Press Release: “Wir haben viel erreicht,” December 5, 2008 
<http://www.bund-der-vertriebenen.de/presse/index.php3?id=802> Accessed August 26, 2010.  
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have sought to ensure that their side of history will never be discounted. Taken as a 
whole, these concrete examples of cultural production constitute an important and 
substantial part of Germany’s memory culture and make unequivocal but overlooked 
statements about the expellees’ understanding of their war experience. These monuments 
and their contribution to discourses on German suffering in the Second World War are 
the focus of this dissertation. 
 
CENTRAL ARGUMENTS & KEY QUESTION 
          It is a common notion that monuments “say” a lot more about the time in which 
they are established than about the person(s) or event(s) they commemorate. Local 
expellee monuments are no different. They reflect the political moods, conceptions of 
history, and general modes of thinking which prevailed at the time of their erection. Put 
differently, the monuments provide a snapshot of how the recent past was understood at 
specific moments and narrated on the local level in a variety of locations—in urban/rural 
areas, in differing geographic locales, in spite of religious cleavages, and despite any 
conflicting political allegiances. The purpose of my analysis is, therefore, to evince the 
original commemorative intention of the monuments. To do so, I present synopses of the 
historical interpretations presented by the monuments (and their initiators) at the time the 
monuments were unveiled. Though some of these monuments have been amended or 
even removed (for a number of reasons, not just because of political opposition) in the 
years since their dedications, the majority still stands and remains unchanged. Whether 
the monument still exists is not of great consequence here because my analysis does not 
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aim only at exposing today’s memory culture.12
           Moreover, with this dissertation, I will provide a “big picture” analysis of local 
expellee monuments while also getting to the heart of this expansive subject. However, I 
do not intend to catalogue these crystallization points of German memory.
 Instead, I intend to track over time the 
evolution of how Germans have memorialized the expulsion at the local level. I want to 
investigate what was commemorated in addition to when and how. 
13
           It is my contention that the monuments, taken as a whole, make profound 
statements about their initiators’ understandings of the past—understandings which in 
many cases deviate substantially from standard postwar historical narratives that have 
 Instead, I 
seek to categorize expellee monuments thematically. To accomplish this, I conduct a 
critical, interpretive examination—including evaluations of aesthetics, history, and 
politics—which fuses together historical, art-historical, sociological, and cultural-
anthropological approaches to provide informed interpretations of the monuments. 
Ultimately, I seek to answer the following question: What historical narrative(s) do local 
expellee monuments articulate?  
                                                           
12 That said, the fact that most of the monuments still stand as designed and many still host commemorative 
ceremonies (the focus of Chapter Ten) suggest that some people still adhere to the original beliefs 
expressed by these commemorative objects.  
13 There have been two major efforts to document all the examples of this public art. The first is a catalogue 
listing a large but incomplete number of the monuments. The list was compiled privately and independently 
by the amateur historian Kurt Schmidt, who, starting in the mid-1980s, set out to document expellee 
memorial sites as a hobby. Himself an expellee born in Silesia who then settled in Wuppertal, Schmidt felt 
compelled to record the monuments’ whereabouts because they had come under fire from left-wing parties 
in various locales, particularly from the Greens, who had called for the removal and destruction of the 
monuments due to their “untimeliness.” These facts were ascertained through personal correspondence with 
Mr. Schmidt in the autumn of 2007. Schmidt died the next year. The results of Schmidt’s work are housed 
at the Martin-Opitz-Bibliothek Herne (ed.) Gedenkstätten und Mahnmale der deutschen 
Heimatvertriebenen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Beiträge zu einer Bestandnahme. Registerband zur 
Dokumentation. Arbeitsberichte 4. (Herne: Stiftung Martin-Opitz-Bibliothek, 2004). Based in large part on 
the Schmidt collection, the second major effort to document expellee monuments has been conducted by 
the BdV. Starting in the late 1960s, has attempted several times without success to compile a complete list. 
An accurate total is unknown but the number is believed to be around 1,400-1,500. The BdV solicits 
information from the public on the locations of hitherto undiscovered monuments. For the documentation 




focused on Nazi crimes. This study strives to recover that narrative by elucidating and 
recapitulating the conceptions of history unveiled by the monuments and by examining 
the contributions the monuments make to memory culture in Germany. The results of my 
examination will allow me to make three larger arguments.  
          First, I will show that local expellee monuments debunk the thesis that German 
wartime suffering was taboo as a subject of postwar discussion and commemoration, at 
least in the sense that discussion of the topic was not permitted or nonexistent (Central 
Argument #1).14 The monuments prove that the victimization of Germans, particularly of 
the expellees, has been an ever-present topic on the minds and in the private and public 
memories of significant numbers of Germans. While this study is not the first that has set 
out to demystify the notion of postwar commemorative taboos, it is the first major study 
of expellee monuments that does so.15
                                                           
14 The suggestion that German suffering in WWII was unmentionable and unacceptable except in the most 
radical circles is widely shared. Writing about the taboo was, for example, Günter Grass, who lamented in a 
novella that moderate Germans of a certain generation faced a self-imposed restriction when discussing 
German experiences of war because of the shame over what their parents had done or overlooked during 
the Third Reich. See Grass, Im Krebsgang. Eine Novelle. (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2001). 
W.G. Sebald, in seeking to explain the paucity of literary representations of the destruction of German 
cities as a result of the Allied air war, wrote that “There was a tacit agreement, equally binding on 
everyone, that the true state of material and moral ruin in which the country found itself was not to be 
described. The darkest aspects of the final act of destruction, as experienced by the great majority of the 
German population, remained under a kind of taboo like a shameful family secret, a secret that perhaps 
could not even be privately acknowledged.” See Sebald, On the Natural History of Destruction. Tr. Anthea 
Bell. (New York: Random House, 2003), p. 10. Even earlier, director and author Helke Sander purported 
the existence of a taboo regarding the rape of German women by Allied soldiers. She commented, “The 
film and the book BeFreier und Befreite are about the mass rapes in Germany in the last weeks of World 
War II and the immediate postwar period. I am often asked how I came up with this topic. I, on the other 
hand, ask myself why it wasn’t a topic for nearly fifty years.” See Sander, “Erinnern/Vergessen,” in Sander 
and Johr (eds.) BeFreier und Befreite: Krieg, Vergewaltigungen und Kinder. (Munich: Kunstmann, 1992), 
p. 9. 
  
15 Indeed, the number of attempts to refute this position involving various modes of cultural representation 
including literature and film continues to grow. Much of the secondary literature exploring the shifts in 
memory culture cited above was produced with the aim of dispelling the taboo thesis. See Footnote 5 
above. More specific attempts to disprove certain aspects of the thesis also exist. For example, on the 
purported taboo about the rape of German women, see Atina Grossmann’s convincing rebuttal of Helke 
Sander’s claim about taboos surrounding rape: Grossmann, “A Question of Silence: The Rape of German 
Women by Occupation Soldiers,” October. Vol. 72, Berlin 1945: War and Rape “Liberators Take 
Liberties”; Spring 1995, pp. 42-63. In response to W.G. Sebald, Susanne Vees-Gulani contests both the 
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          Second, these local monuments have been part and parcel of a deliberate and 
sustained effort to shape discussions of victimhood resulting from the Second World War 
(Central Argument #2).  That significant numbers of the memorials were erected within 
the first decade after the war demonstrates the immediate but also persistent attempts to 
assert the preeminence of German victimization in the face of Nazi atrocities and official 
measures of reconciliation and reparation undertaken by the federal government. 
Hundreds of monuments dedicated since then, including many erected after reunification 
in the former GDR, show, in fact, how this endeavor has continued, at least on the local 
level. Though the ongoing debate over the proposed Center Against Expulsions 
demonstrates that these efforts have endured on the national level as well, the purpose of 
my study is to go “beyond Berlin” (though there are several expellee monuments in the 
German capital too) to illuminate historical narratives at the grassroots.16
                                                           
lack of literary depictions of the air war and provides psychological reasons for why aerial bombardment 
was such a difficult topic to tackle: Vees-Gulani, Trauma and Guilt: Literature of Wartime Bombing in 
Germany.  (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2003). Lastly all the contributors to Niven’s edited volume “test the 
relative validity,” as Niven puts it, of the taboo thesis. In my estimation, most succeed. Niven, Germans as 
Victims.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 This is because 
I believe the local monuments to be a very public expression of popular memories “from 
below” (as opposed to official discourse and proper behavior imposed “from above”) and 
16 Gavriel D. Rosenfeld and Paul B. Jaskot (eds.) Beyond Berlin: Twelve German Cities Confront the Nazi 
Past. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007). The point of the collection of essays contained in 
this work, according to its editors, was to test whether Berlin’s “fervent engagement with the Nazi 
experience” is the exception or the rule in postwar Germany. (p. 2) Therefore, the contributions in their 
edited volume investigate a wide range of local debates over the Nazi past.  They write, “By analyzing a 
wide range of buildings, memorials, and urban spaces that have sparked heated debates over the Nazi past 
in various towns and cities outside of the German capital, we intend to develop a more nuanced 
understanding of the dynamic interaction between local and national trends within Germany’s broader 
culture of memory.” (p. 2) These citations are taken from the editors’ introductory essay, “Urban Space and 
the Nazi Past in Postwar Germany,” pp. 1-21. 
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a clear and concrete (figuratively and literally) example of how German-centered postwar 
narratives have persisted despite the emergence of Holocaust-centered narratives.17
           Third, local expellee monuments facilitate the construction of de-contextualized 
German-centered narratives based on (A) the loss of Heimat and the concomitant 
territorial claims this forfeiture engendered; and (B) exculpatory assertions of victimhood 
and collective innocence (Central Argument #3). As discussed below, these two 
“thematic clusters” form the basis for my analysis. However, instead of constructing—as 
their defenders might contend and as the proponents of the Center Against Expulsions 
would argue—an innocuous, more inclusive, parallel narrative that merely augments 
official, Holocaust-centered narratives, my examination of local monuments unveils the 
building blocks of counter-narratives that set out instead to match and, at times, 
supersede official narratives. Indeed, expellee monuments reveal historical interpretations 
that go beyond simple commemoration and instead reflect the concrete and symbolic 
political objectives of the expellee organizations.  
  
 
SOURCES & METHODOLOGY 
          This dissertation is composed of an all-encompassing examination of local expellee 
monuments. The main sources are the individual expellee monuments themselves. 
Empirical analysis of their forms, inscriptions, locations, and materials provides a solid 
basis from which to draw conclusions. Unfortunately, there is some discrepancy as to the 
                                                           
17 No less important, this point further illustrates the multi-leveled nature of a nation’s memory culture, an 
argument which echoes the work of John E. Bodnar, who persuasively uncovers this inherent tension in the 
American context through examination of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. See John E. Bodnar, Remaking 
America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1992). Bodnar exposed the incongruities that existed in the United States on the 
“vernacular” and “official” levels of memory. In this specific case, vernacular memory trumped official 
memory of the Vietnam War, which resulted in Maya Lin’s mournful, individualized memorial, rather than 
in a traditional war memorial that glorified the nation. 
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total number of expellee monuments.18 For this reason, and in order to work from a finite 
amount, I have limited my a analysis in all but a few cases to the collection of expellee 
monuments contained in a BdV publication from December 2008, which coincided with 
the early stages of my dissertation writing.19 The booklet contains 1,365 monuments 
(Table 1).20 Kurt Schmidt’s catalogue and the BdV’s online documentation are helpful 
starting points when examining expellee monuments, but neither provides analysis of the 
monuments themselves, or of the specific methodology used to locate and enumerate 
them. Surprisingly, other examples of scholarship exclusively on this topic are rare and 
generally limited in scope.21
 
 
                                                           
18 As stated above, the BdV is actively soliciting information as to the whereabouts of expellee monuments 
unaccounted for as of yet. As a result, the online monument documentation project is updated regularly. Of 
course, this means that the totals frequently change.  
19 Bund der Vertriebenen –Vereinigte Landsmannschaften und Landesverbände (ed.) Mahn- und 
Gedenkstätten der deutschen Heimatvertriebenen. (Bedburg: Druckpunkt Offset, 2008). According to the 
BdV’s website, since this booklet was published, new monuments have been recorded bringing the total 
number to over 1,400. For the purposes of this dissertation, however, the more finite number of 1,365 will 
be used. 
20 Though not always complete or uniform, the booklet provides information on the type of monument, the 
inscription, the location, and the date of erection. There is some question as to what constitutes a local 
expellee monument. One answer is that expellee monuments are those the BdV includes in its collections. I 
provide another definition in chapter one. 
21 For example, Kathrin Panne’s sketch of expellee monuments in Landkreis Celle, “Erinnerungspolitik—
Erinnerungspuren: Zur Funktion symbolischer Erinnerung an Flucht und Vertreibung im öffentlichen 
Raum. Eine Skizze,” in Rainer Schulze, Reinhard Rohde and Rainer Voss (eds.) Zwischen Heimat und 
Zuhause: Deutsche Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in (West-)Deutschland 1945-2000. (Osnabrück: Senoco, 
2001), pp. 201-15. Other examples are the articles by Hans-Werner Retterath, “Geschichtsbilderkampf und 
zwiespältige Beheimatungsversuche—Vertriebenendenkmale in Südbaden,” Jahrbuch für deutsche und 
osteuropäische Volkskunde, 47 (2005), pp. 83-121, and “Gedenkstein und Wegweiser. Zur Symbolik von 
zwei Vertriebenendenkmalen in Lörrach/Südbaden,” Jahrbuch für deutsche und osteuropäische 
Volkskunde, 48 (2006), 1-33. More recently, Stephan Scholz investigated the use of religious symbols in 
the monuments in“‘Opferdunst vernebelt die Verhältnisse’—Religiöse Motive in der bundesdeutschen 
Gedenkorten der Flucht und Vertreibung,” Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Religions- und Kulturgeschichte, 
102 (2008), pp. 287-313. Scholz also produced an article called “‘Heute erinnert nicht mehr dran?’ 
Vertriebenedenkmäler und Denkmalsinitiativen in Oldenburg 1951-2008,” Oldenburger Jahrbuch 2009. 
Band 109 Sonderdruck. (Oldenburg: Isensee Verlag, 2009), pp. 167-199. Publications in English are even 
more uncommon. See Hans Hesse and Elke Purpus, “Monuments and Commemorative Sites for German 
Expellees,” in Bill Niven and Chloe Praver (eds.) Commemoration in Germany Since 1945. (Houndsmills: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 48-57, as well as Jeffrey Luppes, “‘Den Toten der ostdeutschen Heimat’: 
Local Expellee Monuments and the Construction of Post-war Narratives,” in Helmut Schmitz and Annette 
Seidel-Arpaci (eds.) Discourses of ‘German Wartime Suffering.’ (Amsterdam: Rodopi, forthcoming). 
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Table 1 Monuments Erected By Decade, By Land 






        
  
Baden-Württemberg 2 63 28 23 65 18 9 38 246 
Bavaria 16 94 25 26 53 31 13 74 332 
Berlin  0 1 0 1 0 1 1 2 6 
Bremen 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Hamburg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Hessen 11 78 29 12 44 20 6 38 238 
Lower Saxony 3 36 13 6 28 17 2 28 133 
North Rhine-Westphalia 2 39 26 14 43 16 5 37 182 
Rhineland Palatinate 0 8 3 0 7 4 1 12 35 
Saarland 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Schleswig-Holstein 0 20 10 3 17 8 0 32 90 
Total West Germany 34 340 134 87 257 115 37 264 1268 
  
        
  
Former GDR 
        
  
Brandenburg 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 0 7 
Mecklenburg-West 
Pomerania 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 6 
Saxony 0 0 0 0 0 7 3 1 11 
Saxony-Anhalt 0 0 0 0 0 6 2 1 9 
Thuringia 0 0 0 0 0 25 2 0 27 
Total Former GDR 0 0 0 0 0 47 11 2 60 
  
        
  
International 
        
  
Austria 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 2 5 
Former Yugoslavia 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 1 7 
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 5 
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 0 6 1 0 7 
Hungary 0 0 0 1 0 7 1 0 9 
Namibia 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
South Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
USA 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Total International 0 0 0 1 3 17 12 4 37 
  
        
  
Grand Total 34 340 134 88 260 179 60 270 1365 
 
           For this reason, I have relied primarily on additional primary materials—such as 
manuscripts of speeches, dedication ceremony programs, newspaper clippings, and other 
archival material—collected during two research trips to Germany, in 2007 (North Rhine-
Westphalia) and in 2009 (Baden-Württemberg), respectively. During each trip I visited 
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the headquarters of the BdV, which houses a small monument archive from which I 
obtained a number of materials. At those times, I also personally visited and 
photographed 90 expellee monuments. (See Appendix) I use my own images as well as 
some from the BdV monument archive to illustrate my arguments.22
           With help from these materials, I am able to provide informed “readings” of 
expellee monuments. As a methodological model for my study, I have chosen James E. 
Young’s landmark study of Holocaust memorials.
 Much of the other 
materials I acquired came from personal collections or from the archives of local BdV 
affiliates in North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-Württemberg. As a result, many—
though certainly not all—of the examples from which I draw are located in those two 
Länder.  
23
                                                           
22 I would like to express my gratitude to the Bund der Vertriebenen for permission to use its photographs 
in this dissertation. 
 Young took a multidimensional 
approach to depict the “biography” of each memorial site emphasizing: 1) “the aesthetic 
contours;” 2) “the memorials’ place in contemporary artistic discourse;” 3) “the activities 
that brought the memorial into being;” 4) “the give and take between memorial and 
viewers;” and 5) “the responses of viewers to their own world in light of the 
memorialized past.” Differing subject matters, sources, scales, and sheer numbers of 
monuments prevent a completely parallel study; nevertheless, I have sought to mimic 
Young’s innovative approach. Young went beyond a mere formal or historical 
investigation to examine both “the physical and metaphysical qualities of these memorial 
texts,” as well as their “tactile and temporal dimensions,” to reveal what he calls, “the 




          Young’s analysis of Holocaust memorials is a solid point of departure for my 
study. However, I aim to transcend his work. His otherwise authoritative survey fails to 
consider a vital aspect of monuments that makes my analysis distinct and more thorough. 
That is, he does not examine the commemorative ceremonies which regularly occur at the 
monuments. In the case of expellee monuments, this includes their unveiling ceremonies 
and consecrations, but also the annual Tag der Heimat and Volkstrauertag 
commemorations which happen there.
 I seek to shed light on the “texture of memory” of expellee 
monuments. 
25
          Moreover, Young’s approach inadequately addresses the delicate issue of 
constructing a truly representative sample when dealing with an inaccessibly large 
number of memorial sites. His solution is too simple. He writes, “Rather than writing a 
comprehensive survey of these memorials, or attempting merely to cull the ‘good’ 
monuments from the ‘bad,’ I have focused on a selected handful in ways that will suggest 
a larger critique of all such memorials.”
 Thus, in addition to exploring the monuments 
themselves—with Young’s work as model—I add another dimension to the analysis and 
place special emphasis on the elements of commemorative practices which take place at 
the monuments. 
26
                                                           
24 Ibid., p. ix. 
 With over one thousand local expellee 
monuments to evaluate, I too am unable to offer an exhaustive examination. 
Nevertheless, a sound and systematic analytical toolkit is crucial. While not perfectly 
25 These holidays constitute the expellees’ two chief days of commemoration. I provide a thorough analysis 
of them in Chapter 10. 
26 Young, The Texture of Memory, p. ix. 
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representative, I have developed a thematic/temporal scheme to cluster together expellee 
monuments based on their dominant themes.  
           Indeed, what is most striking and interesting about these disparate monuments is 
the similarity of the narratives they put forth. In fact, while one does notice some general 
stylistic variations depending on geography, one does not encounter significant 
differences in the monuments’ themes whether they were erected in Schleswig-Holstein 
or Bavaria or anywhere else in the Federal Republic. There is, however, a clear temporal 
divide. This schism marks a key thematic shift that is central for my analysis. For 
example, prior to the 1970s, when the monuments were parts of campaigns advocating 
the redrawing of postwar boundaries, the vast majority of monuments displayed texts and 
images pertaining to the homelands the East Prussians, Pomeranians, Silesians, and 
Sudeten Germans were forced to vacate after the war. The bulk of the monuments erected 
since then, however, usually display other motifs in order to address different political, 
cultural, and commemorative needs. The causes of this shift are vital for the purposes of 
my study and will be discussed at length below.  
           Even more importantly, however, the shift forms the basis for two thematic 
clusters of monuments. Indeed, these clusters comprise the two dominant thematic 
strands of historical narratives centering on the expulsion at the local level. For this 
reason, I subdivide local expellee monuments based on the object of their 
commemoration, i.e. those that commemorate the loss of Heimat and raise territorial 
claims and those which make exculpatory assertions of victimhood and collective 
innocence. I label them (A.) “Loss of Heimat and Territorial Claims,” and (B.) 
“Aesthetics of Collective Innocence.” This approach allows me to highlight these 
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hegemonic tendencies and draw conclusions on the basis of the predominant patterns. I 
then break down each cluster further into several more specific categories. Though I have 
tried not to cherry-pick only the most extraordinary monuments, those I have chosen in 
the chapters below are some of the most striking and salient examples. Clearly, they were 
not selected at random, but instead constitute ideal types. Nevertheless, my interpretive 
scheme does not capture all local expellee monuments. As will be apparent, some 
monuments fit into more than one category. Others defy simple categorization. However, 
it should not be assumed that those not considered here will not be included because they 
radically contradict these broad categories. 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS 
           In a critique of the proposed Center Against Expulsions, the journalist Kurt 
Nelhiebel wrote that, “No group within the German populace has experienced as much 
political attention (Zuwendung) after WWII as the expellees—not the bombing victims, 
not the war widows, much less the political victims of the National Socialist dictatorship. 
Yet the expellees have always felt disadvantaged.”27
                                                           
27 Kurt Nelhiebel, “Die Entkoppelung von Krieg und Vertreibung. Zu Manfred Kittels Deutung der 
jüngeren europäischen Geschichte.” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft. Vol. 1, 58, 2010, p.54. 
 By dint of their large numbers and 
organization, but also because of the implications of their political and cultural goals, 
none of the other groups Nelhiebel mentioned has possessed the political sway or 
garnered media attention like the expellees. Indeed, they have been and still are primus 
inter pares amongst the German victims of WWII. Moreover, local expellee monuments 
give a good indication of how some Germans at the grassroots have conceived of and 
memorialized the recent past. As has been the case on the national level with the Center 
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Against Expulsions, it is clear that the expellees have tried with their local monuments to 
secure their place on Germany’s “postwar memory map.”28
          This study looks at how some Germans—particularly the expellees—have 
commemorated and represented their experiences of WWII in the form of local 
monuments. Consisting of three parts, its layout is as follows. Part I—“Literature Review 
and Historical Context” consists of two chapters which situate and contextualize my 
analysis. In Chapter One, “Monuments and Narrating the Past,” I step away momentarily 
from expellee monuments to present an analysis of relevant secondary literature on 
monuments in a primarily non-German context to explore broader definitions of these 
commemorative objects and review how scholars from several fields have theorized 
monuments’ complex functions, in particular, their practical functions, as well as how 
they operate as mnemonic devices. By discussing current debates on the efficacy of 
monuments, this chapter addresses some points of contention regarding the place and 
capabilities of monuments in contemporary society and highlights their position as a 
 The permission and the 
financial support of the monuments often (but not always) granted by local governments 
for the monuments has validated the views espoused by the expellee organizations and 
has reflected communities’ commemorative priorities. More importantly, the monuments 
demonstrate how historical narratives centering on the experiences of Germans have 
survived and persisted despite the emergence of other historical narratives based on the 
Holocaust. 
                                                           
28 On this enlightening concept, see Markovits and Reich, The German Predicament, pp. 34-42. According 
to the authors, different variations of four memory clusters—the Weimar cluster, the Nazi cluster, the 
Bundesrepublik cluster, and the GDR cluster—are pitted against each other in a “memory war” for 
supremacy of Germany’s memory map. They write, “At this moment we can observe only the 
deconstruction of existing collective memories; we are still far from the establishment of a permanent 
memory map in which one cluster of memories will enjoy a dominant position.” (p.41).  
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battlefront in memory conflicts. In addition, by briefly mentioning monuments to the 
Civil War in the American South, I draw a parallel to those erected by the expellees to 
demonstrate how militarily defeated and politically disenfranchised regimes have 
employed monuments to construct and transmit historical narratives.  
          Ultimately, my dissertation is an investigation of the historical narratives local 
expellee monuments express. At different times and different places, however, these 
narratives have varied, both in tone and in resonance. As a result, the monuments take 
different forms, bear altered inscriptions, and were erected at different locations. In 
Chapter Two, “From Consensus to Contestation: The Place of Flight and Expulsion in 
Postwar Commemoration,” I present the political and cultural explanations for why 
expellee monuments took the shapes and employed the rhetoric they have. Put 
differently, I seek in this chapter to periodize perceptions of the expellees and the 
expulsion in Germany in light of changing political and cultural contexts. While this 
approach allows for some commentary on expellee monuments, its main purpose will be 
to delineate the important societal developments, such as Ostpolitik and the emergence of 
Holocaust-centered narratives, which have shaped the understandings of the past expellee 
monuments articulate. That is, I set the stage for further analysis by providing a historical 
framework into which I embed my more thorough examination of expellee monuments.  
           Part II—“The Monuments” constitutes the empirical core of my study and 
contains my interpretive work on local expellee monuments. I divide Part II into two 
thematic clusters. Cluster A, “Loss of Heimat and Territorial Claims,” looks at 
monuments that bemoan the forfeiture of German territory as a result of WWII and 
express the keen desire to reacquire it. Here, the suffering of the expellees was over the 
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loss of their homeland and not over the brutalities they experienced. Cluster A contains 
four chapters based on four distinct monument categories, all of which celebrate territory 
more than people. Chapter Three, “Großdeutschland and the Right to the Heimat,” 
features monuments that maintain the Germanness of the territory the expellees left 
behind; Chapter Four, “Cold War Conflation,” illuminates the monuments that couch the 
expellees’ territorial demands in the language of the Cold War; Chapter Five, “Germans 
as ‘Kulturträger’—Accomplishments of German Settlement,” examines the monuments 
that propound a deep connection to a Heimat created by Germans within the boundaries 
of other states and extol the perceived cultural contributions that the Germans claim to 
have bequeathed the world; and Chapter Six, “Unseren Toten—Ceremonies and 
Territorial Claims,” looks at the monuments that link the expellees to their former 
territory through their burial grounds. All the monuments examined in this chapter are 
related in that they were erected in the pursuit of “concrete politics”: societal recognition 
and legal definitions of the expellees, material compensation for their losses, and 
ultimately, the revision of the postwar territorial status quo.  
          At around the same time as Willy Brandt’s rise to power as chancellor, a noticeable 
change in interpretations of the Nazi past occurred in West Germany. In addition, 
Brandt’s foreign policy made territorial reacquisition virtually impossible. The 
commemoration of the expulsion persisted, however. As a result of these social and 
political changes (discussed below), expellee organizations used different motifs to 
reflect the new realities. In fact, a perceptible shift in emphasis emerged in the forms and 
inscriptions of local expellee monuments, which is reflected in the monuments of cluster 
B, “Aesthetics of Collective Innocence.” These monuments employ exculpatory 
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iconography to address the physical suffering of the expellees and purport their collective 
innocence. Cluster B contains three chapters based on three distinct monument 
categories. Chapter Seven, “Christian Symbolism and Collective Innocence,” looks at 
how expellee organizations have used religious motifs to link the experience of the 
expellees with that of Christ. Though this was not widespread, the ramifications of such 
assertions are worthy of closer inspection. Chapter Eight, “Mutterliebe—Allegory of the 
Female Form,” examines the growing numbers of monuments which feature women, 
particularly mothers, accompanied by small children, as the emblematic figures of flight 
and expulsion. Chapter Nine, “Subsuming Victims,” explores monuments dedicated to all 
victims of the war. These monuments lump together all war dead in one overarching 
victim collective. In almost all cases, however, the expellees are the only victim group 
mentioned by name. The undifferentiated commemoration occurring on these 
monuments, like all the rest of cluster B, are indicative of the “symbolic politics” pursued 
by the expellee organizations in the post-Ostpolitik, post-Holocaust era. No longer about 
emphasizing the lost Heimat, the expellee organizations erected these monuments in the 
pursuit of societal acknowledgment of the expellees’ innocent suffering.  
          Part III—“Commemorative Ceremonies” contains the final chapter, “Local 
Expellee Monuments as Loci of Remembrance: Tag der Heimat and the Commemorative 
Ceremonies of the Expellees” (Chapter Ten). Adding another layer to their mnemonic 
capabilities, expellee monuments have played host for decades to regular commemorative 
ceremonies: first at their dedications and consecrations, and annually on Volkstrauertag 
and other days of mourning, as well as on the most important expellee day of 
commemoration, Tag der Heimat. This chapter provides a brief history of these two 
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yearly commemorative days and examines key rituals, symbols, and other remembrance 
practices performed on them. It is during the events on Volkstrauertag and Tag der 
Heimat that the narratives the monuments unveil are literally put into motion and brought 
to life. 
         The study ends with a short conclusion in which I recapitulate my main arguments 















         On June 17, 1980, the Day of German Unity, a tall, thin commemorative stone with 
the terse inscription DER OSTDEUTSCHEN HEIMAT – DIE VERTRIEBENEN (To the 
East German Homeland – the Expellees) was unveiled in a park in the Garath district of 
Düsseldorf (Figures 1 & 2).1 Flags of the Landsmannschaften (regional associations) of 
the former eastern provinces as well as a group of Sudeten Germans in traditional 
costumes ringed the podium. As the opening remarks of the local BdV-chairman Fritz 
Arndt made clear to an audience of hundreds—including local public officials and 
representatives from expellee organizations and other German victim groups (e.g. the 
Association of Victims of Stalinism)—the sharp edges and fissures of the two-ton quarry 
stone made of gneiss, chosen instead of a boulder (a more traditional material for German 
monuments) were to represent “our presently jagged (zerklüftetes) fatherland.”2
                                                           
1 In the interest of uniformity, I spell out all monument inscriptions in capital letters followed by my 
translation from the German.  
 Arndt’s 
2 To many expellees, the division of Germany into two states—the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 
and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as part of the postwar settlement—represented but two-thirds 
of German territory. In fact, some today still speak of Germany’s “Dreiteilung” or “triple partitioning,” 
meaning the two states which emerged and the former territory in the German East, today a part of Poland 
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later comments, and the address given by the guest of honor, Ingrid von Loebell, deputy 
chairwoman of the local branch of the CDU, further elucidated the symbolic, memorial 
purpose the otherwise speechless, lifeless monument was to have.    
         
 Figure 1 Düsseldorf. Photo: J.L.                           Figure 2 Düsseldorf (close-up). Photo: J.L. 
 
          Though dedicated to the lost homeland of Germany’s former eastern provinces, the 
inconspicuously adorned monument’s design had a very specific function from the 
beginning that went beyond the commemoration of any loss of life, property, or territory. 
As Arndt stated, the stone’s “intentionally dispassionate” inscription revealed the real 
motivation behind its erection. It was chosen, he elaborated, “to proclaim to the all too 
easily forgetful public,” first, that “there is a German East” (my emphasis—note the 
usage of the present tense); second, that “the Germans were forcibly driven from their 
homeland in the German East with 2.1 million victims to mourn”; and third that “we will 
                                                           
and Russia. As a result, expellee celebrations of the “Day of German Unity” not only expressed the desire 
for reunification of the two German states in the context of the Cold War but also included the missing and 







never give up our right to our East German homeland.”3
          In the only slightly more diplomatic words of a politician, von Loebell reiterated 
these sentiments: “The erection of this stone, along with the other cultural activities of the 
expellee associations, is a small but important contribution to the preservation of our 
historical consciousness, our identity as German Volk, our cohesion, and our desire for 
unity—lastly, our desire for freedom, which, we are commonly convinced, there will be 
only when the German Volk is given back the right to self-determination.” Speaking more 
about the present state of affairs in divided Germany than about the immediate postwar 
era, von Loebell continued. “May this stone be a wake-up call to all the citizens of this 
city, that we will never resign ourselves to the fact of Germany’s division…”
 Moreover, Arndt linked the 
plight of German expellees with the contemporary worldwide refugee problem. “[The 
German expellees’] right to homeland and self-determination is equally as inalienable as 
that of other peoples and ethnic groups. There is no statute of limitations!” In addition to 
demanding compensation for the expellees’ material losses, Arndt appealed to the 
German federal government and the country’s political parties “not to accept the 
expulsion of the Germans as a consequence of the lost war, but rather to re-establish 
[their] rights with peaceful means.”  
4
         At first glance, this solitary monument—like all others—was designed simply to 
mark publicly and permanently certain memories as well as to remind passersby of 
specific historical events. The site also provided a gathering place for people to grieve 
and remember. As discussed below, these aspects constitute two of the fundamental roles 
played by all types of memorials. That is, this brief account provides examples of some 
  
                                                           
3 It is unclear to whom the pronoun “we” refers here. 
4 Again, it is unclear to whom the speaker refers. 
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essential qualities of monuments. In addition, it sheds light on the possible functions of a 
monument. For example, it appears that the monument’s initiators sought to imbue it with 
more meaning than what the stone’s vague inscription alone conveys.  
           In addition, the remarks uttered at the monument’s dedication ceremony expose a 
one-sided historical interpretation seemingly at odds with standard postwar narratives in 
Germany.5
          The commemorative stone in Düsseldorf-Garath illustrates furthermore how a 
monument can be a place where the past intersects with the present with meaningful 
implications for the future. In fact, along with reflecting historical memory, this example 
contains a richer, deeper message, including the achievement of political objectives. 
Indeed, the monument was created as a clarion call for further action. In other words, this 
episode embeds this and all local expellee monuments into a larger, ongoing discourse on 
monuments but also sheds initial light on how the sponsors of monuments employ these 
commemorative objects to create narratives of the past in locations where interpretations 
of events or the actions of leaders and other heroes are in dispute. I present an exploration 
of these issues, a discussion of major debates surrounding them, and make other general 
remarks about monuments below. 
 Investigating formal aspects (e.g. shape, inscription, material, location) and 
evaluating other available evidence (e.g. archival materials, dedication speeches and 
other commemorative activities) can indicate how this monument and others are 
established with quite narrow and seemingly innocuous commemorative qualities but also 
laced with meaning and intentions that go beyond mere remembrance. Simply put, what 
appears commemorative in tone is often political in intent. 
                                                           
5 For example, there is no mention in the monument’s terse inscription or in the speakers’ comments about 
the millions of Germany’s victims of World War II. 
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WHAT MONUMENTS ARE 
          While this dissertation is the first attempt to assess local expellee monuments in a 
systematic, interpretive way, the literature on other monuments and their connection to 
memory—in various geographic, temporal, and formal contexts—is vast. Providing a 
complete overview of this extensive topic would exceed the limits of this study. Instead, I 
offer here a review of some major theoretical works on monuments, their function(s), and 
the motive(s) of those who seek to erect them. Concomitantly, I identify major threads in 
recent noteworthy scholarship and in older, seminal contributions on monuments in 
general in order to shed light on key debates within this field, as well as to situate local 
expellee monuments into a larger discourse on the role these structures play in narrating 
the past. In what follows, I make an effort to avoid prolonged discussion of specific 
monuments in order to evince the commonalities all possess. Thus, I cite general works to 
underscore universal applicability. In some cases, however, references to particular 
monuments are unavoidable.    
 
Definitions of “Monuments” 
           Most works start with the etymological origin of the word “monument,”6
                                                           
6 According to Helmut Scharf, the source of the German term “Denkmal” was none other than the “Head of 
the German Reformation,” Martin Luther. Kleine Kunstgeschichte des deutschen Denkmals. (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1984), p. 8. 
 or its 
definition, coupled with a discussion of what a monument “is.” As to the former, the term 
“monument” comes from the Latin root monere which means to remind, recall, inform, 
teach, admonish, or warn. Many definitions exist to address the latter. For example, the 
first two of the “Nine Points on Monumentality” (1943) compiled by architecture and art 
historians José Luis Sert, Fernand Léger, and Sigfried Giedion call monuments “human 
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landmarks which men have created as symbols for their ideals, for their aims, and for 
their actions. They are intended to outlive the period which originated them, and 
constitute a heritage for future generations. As such, they form a link between the past 
and the future.” Their second point refers to them as “the expression of man’s highest 
cultural needs.”7 The art historian Hans-Ernst Mittig provides an oft-cited (at least in the 
German-language literature) and more succinctly formulated meaning. He defines a 
monument as, “an independent work of art erected in perpetuity by a certain group of 
people at a certain location that is supposed to commemorate people and events. The 
monument as symbol in political-historical conflicts in society is the manifestation of 
historical consciousness.”8
Monuments and memorials are formatted abstractions or, to put it differently, 
materializations of intellectual concepts. They are public facilitators around which a 
collective memory is created, endeavoring to use their overt themes as a subject for the 
memory of the future, or, in other words, attempting to create a space in the collective 
memory of the community to which they are exposed. Once established, they themselves 
become representations of their public’s collective memory. […] Monuments are erected 
to promulgate their subject to the present, to transfuse it into the future and to assure the 
present that the monument’s durability ensures the longevity of the act of 
commemoration and, thus, also its perpetual validity.
 Axel Lapp offers an elaborate and perhaps more captivating 




Radically divergent definitions of the term do not exist. Interestingly, all of these 
meanings highlight the fundamental temporal yet diachronic connotations monuments 
                                                           
7 J. L. Sert, F. Léger, and S. Giedion, “Nine Points on Monumentality,” in Sigfried Giedion. Architecture, 
You, and Me: The Diary of a Development. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 48. After 
defining the term, the authors proceed to list reasons for the “decline and misuse of monumentality”—a 
topic discussed in further detail below.  
8 Cited in Jochen Spielmann, “Stein des Anstoßes oder Schlußstein der Auseinandersetzung?” in Mai, 
Ekkehard, et al. (eds.) Denkmal, Zeichen, Monument: Skulptur und öffentlicher Raum heute. (Munich: 
Prestel, 1989), p. 112. 
9 Axel Lapp, “Rodin’s Bourgeois de Calais: Commemorating a French Nation Ideal in London,” in 
William Kidd and Brian Murdoch (eds.) Memory and Memorials: The Commemorative Century. 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 15-16. 
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intrinsically possess. Monuments refer to the past but have implications for both the 
present and the future.10
 
  
Intentionality of Monuments and Their Traditional Forms 
          Writing in 1903, art historian Alois Riegl came up with a similar definition. More 
significantly though, he identified three classes of monuments based on the original 
deliberateness of commemoration: “intentional,” “historical,” and those with “age-
value.”11 Although his attention was devoted primarily to the latter two categories 
(historical and age-value) in the interest of architectural preservation, Riegl made a 
pertinent point about the former (intentional) also worth mentioning. He wrote, “In the 
case of the intentional monument, its commemorative value has been determined by the 
makers, while we have defined the value of the unintentional ones.” (original emphasis)12
          Though these definitions and classifications indicate how theorists have conceived 
of monuments over the past century and as such shed some initial light on local expellee 
monuments, different forms of such memorials have been erected since antiquity. All 
contemporary monuments are part of a much older tradition. In fact, James Stevens Curl 
 
Unlike historical monuments then, which require “our modern perception” to make works 
of art and architecture “monumental,” intentional monuments (like local expellee 
monuments) are erected with a calculated commemorative purpose. 
                                                           
10 On this point, see for example, Andrei S. Markovits, “The Story of the National World War II Memorial 
on the Mall in Washington, DC: A Major Controversy over America’s Last Uncontroversial War,” (Paper 
presented at the international conference “Changing Memories of War 1945 + 60,” Mishkenot Sha’ananim, 
Jerusalem, May 9, 2005).  
11 Alois Riegl, “The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its Character and Its Origin,” Oppositions 25 (Fall 
1982[1903]), pp. 21-50. Tr. Kurt W. Forster and Diane Ghirardo. 
12 Riegl, “The Modern Cult of Monuments,” p. 23. 
29 
 
traces current trends in European memorials, monuments, and funerary architecture back 
to the tombs of the ancient Egyptians and Greek war graves. He writes,  
Permanent memorials to the dead have been desired by generations of people in Western 
European culture. The wish to make a structure that will withstand the worst that time 
and the elements can do has existed since the beginning of history. This wish is 
connected with a need for a permanent record as well as the need to make some visible 
symbol to express what society feels it should remember.13
 
  
Curl attributes the impulse to create monuments to mankind’s awareness of its own 
mortality. “The knowledge that every human being must die has undoubtedly contributed 
to man’s desire to commemorate his existence by building monuments, erecting funerary 
architecture, and otherwise celebrating death.”14
          In the same vein, Reinhart Koselleck wrote “commemoration of the dead belongs 
to human culture; commemorating the fallen, those who died violently, those who died in 
battle, in a civil war or war, belongs to political culture.” He stated, “Monuments with 
their symbols and inscriptions have become hallowed places, which, when assiduously 
cultivated, serve their initiators and their descendants as a place where they can find 
themselves in remembrance of the dead.” The urge to create and maintain these places of 
commemoration, according to Koselleck, has remained constant. Indeed, throughout 
history, people have felt the need to justify violent death. It should come as no surprise 
 Thus monuments in most cases—above 
all, those which commemorate events and people related to armed conflict—serve, 
according to Curl, as a memento mori. As we shall see, literature on monuments and 
memorials related to the dead—above all to the victims of war, particularly soldiers—
comprise a substantial portion of the theoretical works on these commemorative objects 
in general.   
                                                           
13 James Stevens Curl. A Celebration of Death: An Introduction to Some of the Buildings, Monuments, and 
Settings of Funerary Architecture in the Western European Tradition. (London: Constable, 1980), p. 315. 
14 Curl, A Celebration of Death, p. 1. 
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then that the forms and iconography of political memorials have remained 
“comparatively stable even into our own century, irrespective of historical 
circumstances.” More specifically, he ascertained, 
Certainly, the styles and parameters of iconographic interpretation change but the 
triumphant or dying warriors always rise again; the helpful gods, angels, and saints are 
invoked as well as the many roles women play; crosses are erected, mythically charged 
animals are symbolized or allegorized; weapons are immortalized; the architectural 
symbols—from pyramids to obelisks and triumphal arches—reappear again and again; 
the colonnades, sarcophagi and cenotaphs, chapels or other places of commemoration as 
well. Expressions of pathos as well as verses from both testaments of the Bible or from 
classic authors are passed on over generations.15
 
 
          Koselleck is not the only observer who noticed this ongoing tradition. In fact, art 
historian Alan Borg points out the same formal and iconographic continuities but in an 
energetic effort to “redeem” war memorials of the twentieth century. Borg firmly 
believes these monuments have been unfairly maligned aesthetically by critics. “We have 
no difficulty in seeing Assyrian palace friezes, Greek temples, or Roman triumphal 
arches as works of art, but many still find it difficult to treat the official art of our own 
century with an equally open mind.” By situating contemporary war memorials in a 
historical trajectory reaching back to antiquity, Borg hopes to demonstrate that, “modern 
memorials deserve as much attention, and certainly derive from man of the same precepts 
as those of the past.”16 Furthermore, “If we begin to appreciate war memorials as part of 
an ancient and continuing artistic tradition, it becomes easier to assess how well they 




                                                           
15 Reinhart Koselleck. “Einleitung,” in Koselleck and Michael Jeismann (eds.) Der politische Totenkult: 
Kriegerdenkmäler in der Moderne. (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1994), p. 9. 
16 Alan Borg, War Memorials: From Antiquity to the Present. (London: Leo Cooper, 1991), p. xi.  
17 Borg, War Memorials, p. xiii. 
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What Local Expellee Monuments Are 
         In defining what expellee monuments are, I do not consider them “war memorials” 
in the traditional sense described above. Instead, I see them as monuments which 
commemorate events that happened to the Germans from the East who suffered as a 
result of flight and expulsion, retributive deportation for forced labor in the Soviet Union, 
and national division, as well as the loss of life, property, culture, and homeland the 
previous occurrences implied—as as a result of the war initiated by the Nazi government. 
These monuments take many forms and employ a wide variety of symbols and 
inscriptions which I describe greater detail in Part II. Not all expellee monuments possess 
direct references to the expulsion, however. That is why I call them “expellee 
monuments” rather than “expulsion monuments.” Thus, in a way, I disconnect them from 
the war. Nevertheless, I contend these monuments reveal how a significant segment of 
the German people has understood and narrated a part of the war experience.  
          In addition, before moving on to what monuments do, a clarification of terms is 
necessary. Many scholars use the terms “monument” and “memorial” interchangeably. 
While some might argue that “monuments” are erected to express triumphalism and to 
extol great men and their achievements, and “memorials” are created to express loss and 
mourning—following James E. Young’s path-breaking work on Holocaust memorials—I 
do not believe there is an intrinsic difference between the two concepts. As Young 
convincingly points out, memorials can be many things, but they need not be a 
monument. A monument, however, is always a kind of memorial.18
                                                           
18 For more on this distinction, see Young, The Texture of Memory, pp. 3-4. As should be clear, Young’s 
pioneering work on Holocaust memorials serves as the methodological backbone of this dissertation. 
 For the purpose of 
this study, the concept “memorial” is more inclusive and could potentially denote a host 
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of commemorative objects or other sites, or even a national day of remembrance (e.g. 
Yom Hashoah in Israel or Memorial Day in the United States, as mentioned by Young) 
but has no significance in describing a monument’s specific tenor. Nevertheless, the 
focus of this study is on expellee monuments and the forms they take, not, however, on 
the scores of other commemorative sites—for instance, Heimatstuben or the innumerable 
street names—associated with the German East and expulsion, all of which would be 
considered memorials.  
          Moreover, the monuments under analysis here need not be, and in most cases are 
not, grandiose in size or message. While I would concur in general with Lars Berggren’s 
observation that, “the heterogeneity of the concept of the monument, its variability with 
time and place, and its varying application in recent studies,” leads to analytical 
uncertainty and difficulties of creating frameworks for comparison, I do not come to the 
conclusion he reaches in examining monuments of the nineteenth century: namely, that 
size and complexity determine whether a commemorative object fits the bill as a 
monument or constitutes something of lesser value.19 As Nelson and Olin simply state, 
“A monument is what art history chooses to celebrate and proclaim a monument.”20
                                                           
19 Lars Berggren. “The ‘Monumentomania’ of the Nineteenth Century: Causes, Effects, and Problems of 
Study,” in Wessel Reinink and Jeroen Stumpel (eds.) Memory & Oblivion. (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), pp. 561-66. 
 I 
concur. The Washington Monument on the National Mall in Washington, D.C. and a 
commemorative plaque hanging on the wall of the Rathaus in a North Rhine-Westphalian 
village clearly do not have much in common in terms of size, form, or the place each 
occupies in public perception. This notwithstanding, both link the past with the present 
and future, are intentional, based formally on historical traditions, and finally, 
20 Robert S. Nelson and Margaret Rose Olin. “Introduction,” in Nelson and Olin. (eds.) Monuments and 
Memory, Made and Unmade. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), p. 2. 
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commemorative and evocative. In other words, both are “tangible markers of memory,” 
as Cynthia Mills calls the “monuments of the Lost Cause” in the American South.21
 
 
WHAT MONUMENTS DO 
          Rather than positing a new definition of what a monument “is”—a somewhat 
unrewarding endeavor for my purposes—my project seeks to move beyond the works 
cited above to expound what monuments “do”; in other words, I am more interested in 
exploring the “how” and “why” of monuments than the “what.” The commemorative 
objects under examination here are “monuments” as defined in the previous section. 
Furthermore, as many scholars have made abundantly clear, monuments say at least as 
much about the present as they say (or are purported to say) about the past. In addition, 
according to Riegl’s classification, expellee monuments are incontrovertibly intentional 
by dint of their initiators’ desire to create with them the capacity to commemorate, garner 
attention, and trigger affect with publicly displayed memorial objects. As stated 
repeatedly, however, my project sets out to investigate whether and how local expellee 
monuments reflect German-centered interpretations of the past and whether they have 
helped engender and perpetuate them. As Marianne Doezema points outs, “Public 
monuments not only reflect but also contribute to a culture, and in so doing, have the 
potential to influence thought and experience.” It seems local expellee monuments have 
done just that. Doezema’s observation nicely encapsulates monuments’ potential and 
highlights why they can be so controversial. How then do monuments function, both as 
reflectors and generators of popular conceptions of history? 
                                                           
21 Cynthia Mills. “Introduction,” in Mills and Pamela H. Simpson (eds.) Monuments to the Lost Cause: 




Practical Functions: Physical Spaces, Identity Formation, Justifying & Glorifying 
          Before tackling this complex question, a brief look at some other crucial but more 
practical functions of monuments in the twentieth century and beyond is in order. In his 
examination of private and public expressions of mourning following WWI, Jay Winter 
shows how war memorials became part of the “languages of mourning.” He states,   
[Monuments to the “Great War”] were built as places to mourn. And be seen to mourn. 
Their ritual significance has often been obscured by their political symbolism which, now 
that the moment of mourning has long passed, is all that we can see. At the time, 
communal commemorative art provided first and foremost a framework for and 
legitimation of individual and family grief.22
 
 
In short, monuments provided, in this particular case, the physical space necessary to 
mourn publicly the massive loss of life and physical destruction suffered by family after 
family and community after community in Europe during the First World War. 
Obviously, due to their very nature as tangible commemorative objects, all monuments 
create this physical space. But Winter continues, “War memorials marked the spot where 
communities were reunited, where the dead were symbolically brought home, and where 
the separations of war, both temporary and eternal, were expressed, ritualized, and in 
time, accepted.”23
          For at least a short time, these “sites of mourning” possessed the “aura of unity, 
universality, and timelessness” that comes with the erection of monuments.
 Thus, monuments create a physical space for commemoration which in 
turn facilitates unified mourning. 
24
Their initial charge was related to the needs of a huge population of bereaved people. 
Their grief was expressed in many ways, but in time, for the majority, the wounds began 
 Yet 
according to Winter, this is short-lived. He writes,  
                                                           
22 Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 93. 
23 Winter, Sites of Memory, p. 98. 
24 Lisa Maya Knauer and Daniel J. Walkowitz, “Introduction,” in Walkowitz and Knauer (eds.) Memory 
and the Impact of Political Transformation in Public Space. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), p. 5. 
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to close, and life went on. When that happened, after years or decades, then the objects 
invested with meaning related to loss of life in wartime become something else. Other 




 Thus, although the physical sites of commemoration provided by the monuments we 
build are supposed to be permanent, the meanings we ascribe to them are often ephemeral 
and as such clearly subject to change.   
          In addition to providing the physical space to mourn in public, monuments also 
bestow opportunities for identification. In an essay published in 1979,26 Koselleck wrote 
how war memorials help identify and classify: “First the deceased, the ones killed, and 
the ones killed in action are identified in a particular respect: as heroes, victims, martyrs, 
victors, kin, possibly also as the defeated; in addition, as custodians or possessors of 
honor, faith, glory, loyalty, duty; and finally, as guardians and protectors of the 
fatherland, of humanity, of justice, of freedom, of the proletariat, or of a particular form 
of government.”27 Monuments categorize those they seek to commemorate. They create 
groups and collectives and assign ex post facto the goals and virtues for which the dead 
fought and gave their lives, whether or not they were aware of it at the time. As 
Koselleck noted, “…the sense that the deceased may have rested from their dying eludes 
our experience.”28
          Not only is this classification germane to the “objects” of a monument’s 
remembrance but also to those who do the commemorating. Koselleck continued,  
 
                                                           
25 Winter, Sites of Memory, p. 98. 
26 Reinhart Koselleck. “Kriegerdenkmale als Identitätsstiftungen der Überlebenden,” in Odo Marquard and 
Karlheinz Stierle (eds.) Identität: Poetik und Hermeneutik. (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1979), pp. 255-
276. The citations here are taken from the English-language version of this essay (“War Memorials: 
Identity Formations of the Survivors” translated by Todd Samuel Presner) which appeared in Koselleck, 
The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts. (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press), 2002.  
27 Koselleck, “Kriegerdenkmale als Identitätsstiftungen der Überlebenden,” p. 287. 
28 Ibid., p. 288. 
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Secondly, the surviving observers are themselves put in a position where they are offered 
an identity: an offer to which they should or must react. The maxim “Mortui viventes 
obligant” (“The living are obliged to the dead”) is variously applicable depending on the 
classifications given above. Their cause is also ours. The war memorial does not only 




Though Koselleck was writing about traditional war memorials—i.e., monuments 
dedicated to armed combatants who fell in actual conflict—his observation holds true in 
other contexts as well, in particular, in the case of local monuments dedicated to civilian 
deaths (and loss of homeland) as a result of the flight and expulsion of Germans after 
WWII. Furthermore, and here he echoed Winter and many other observers, Koselleck 
noted the fleeting nature of these categorizations. “Yet over the course of time, and this is 
what history teaches, the intended identity similarly eludes the control of those who 
established the memorial. More than anything else, memorials erected permanently 
testify to transitoriness.”30
          For George L. Mosse, however, monuments function in a different way.
  
31 Focusing 
on the numerous war memorials constructed throughout Western Europe after WWI, he 
writes how monuments were key contributors in the “cult of the fallen” which served to 
propagate the “Myth of the War Experience,” which, as the author describes, “was 
designed to mask war and to legitimize the war experience; it was meant to displace the 
reality of war.”32 Fallen soldiers became martyrs who died for their nations, and their 
gravesites became “shrine[s] of nation worship.”33
                                                           
29 Ibid., p. 287. 
 As martyrs, the horrific mechanized 
deaths of the fallen gunned down or gassed in blood-filled trenches were to be 
30 Ibid., p. 288.  
31 George L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars. (New York: Oxford 
University Press), 1990. 
32 Ibid., p. 7. 
33 Ibid., p. 35. 
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overlooked. Instead, the dead soldiers were to be honored and emulated for making the 
ultimate sacrifice.34 Although some WWI monuments were decidedly anti-war or 
pacifist,35
But the fallen as symbols would have had much less impact if it were not for the public 
spaces and memorials which bore witness to their deeds and their heritage. The purpose 
which the fallen were made to serve was given true meaning when their resting places 
became shrines of national worship and when monuments erected in their honor became 
the focus of the public’s attention. The fallen were transformed into symbols which 
people could see and touch and which made their cult come alive.
 the vast majority—particularly in Germany—were not. Certainly, many 
cultural objects were utilized in spreading this “cult” but monuments played a central role 




Moreover, the monuments were constructed to bolster the citizen’s attachment to the 
nation by justifying and even glorifying death in its name. More importantly, these 
monuments functioned in a visible way to make waging war and falling as a soldier more 
palatable and indeed honorable. Whether local expellee monuments function in a similar 
way—either to justify somehow the efforts of Germany’s fallen soldiers of WWII or to 
elevate the expellee dead in order to offset the millions killed by the Nazis—is debatable 
and will be investigated in later chapters. 
 
Monuments as Mnemonic Devices 
          More central to my argument than these “practical” functions of monuments—yet 
more difficult to pinpoint perhaps—is their function as mnemonic devices. Certainly, one 
                                                           
34 Ibid., p. 59. 
35 The well-known figures at the German war cemetery in Vladslo, Belgium entitled “Trauerndes Ehepaar” 
(“The Grieving Parents”), created by the celebrated artist Käthe Kollwitz, whose son Peter was killed in the 
fighting, immediately come to mind. In general, all of Ernst Barlach’s work was proclaimed “modernist” 
and “offensively un-German” by rightists and other conservatives, but it was above all his memorial 
sculptures in Güstrow and Magdeburg, which emphasized grief and loss due to death in war rather than the 
glorification of death in service of the fatherland, that drew the ire of National Socialists. For an English-
language account of Barlach’s battles with the Nazis, see Peter Paret, An Artist Against the Third Reich: 
Ernst Barlach, 1933-1938. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
36 Mosse. Fallen Soldiers, p. 80. 
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could argue that providing a site of commemoration, figuring prominently in the 
formation of identity, or justifying and glorifying death in war are all inextricably 
interwoven with memory. The following sections, however, address more specifically the 
function monuments play in catalyzing and reifying memory, and more importantly, how 
monuments become building blocks in the construction of historical narratives. 
          It seems everything about monuments—from their form, motif, and inscription to 
their building material and location—is chosen by their initiators and designers to evoke 
certain memories and convey particular messages. Monuments are where historical 
narratives are rendered visible. But what to some appears quite simple—monuments 
reflect society’s memories—is actually rather complex and has political and cultural 
ramifications of great consequence, particularly where memories are contested. For 
Kristin Ann Hass, a monument’s connection to memory is straightforward. “The work of 
any memorial is to construct the meaning of an event from fragments of experience and 
memory. A memorial gives shape to and consolidates public memory: it makes 
history.”37 Likewise, Kirk Savage claims, “Monuments serv[e] to anchor collective 
remembering, a process dispersed, ever changing, and ultimately intangible, in highly 
condensed, fixed and tangible sites. Monuments embod[y] and legitimat[e] the very 
notion of common memory, and by extension, the notion of the people who possessed 
and rallied around such a memory.”38
                                                           
37 Kristin Ann Hass. Carried to the Wall: American Memory and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), p. 9. 
 In short, memories can be articulated in the form of 
a monument because they coalesce there.  
38 Kirk Savage, “The Politics of Memory: Black Emancipation and the Civil Rights Monument,” in John 
Gillis (ed.) Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1994), pp. 130-131. 
39 
 
          At the same time, people have always used commemorative architecture and 
monuments to conjure up the images that facilitate recollection. “The ancients knew very 
well, as we also know, that we are able to remember only a very low percentage of what 
we hear, whereas if we see something, we can remember it better. […] [T]o remember we 
must bear images in mind, and these images must be organized with order and regularity 
and the human product in which order and regularity appear best is architecture.”39 
(original emphasis) The question may arise, however, whether monuments themselves 
generate historical narratives, and the memories of which they are comprised, or whether 
they simply reflect them. Nelson and Olin answer this quite succinctly and, for the 
purposes of this study, satisfactorily, “Memory and monument are to each other as 
process and product, although not necessarily as cause and effect, for circularity often 
obtains.”40
          But, as Young points out, monuments should not be considered expressions of 
“collective memory.”
 Monuments neither simply generate memories nor simply reflect them but do 
both in a kind of mnemonic cycle. 
41
                                                           
39 Umberto Eco, “Architecture and Memory,” in Via. Vol.8, 1986, p. 90. 
 Instead, he advocates examining them as representatives of 
society’s “collected memory” (my emphasis). According to Young, monuments collate 
the dissimilar and separate memories held by members of society and provide a common 
meaning. “By maintaining a sense of collected memories, we remain aware of their 
disparate sources, of every individual’s relation to a lived life, and of the ways our 
40 Nelson and Olin, “Introduction,” p. 4. 
41 A large and ever-growing body of literature tackles the topic of collective memory. Most treatments of 
the subject commence with a discussion of sociologist Maurice Halbwachs’ landmark text On Collective 
Memory. Edited and translated by Lewis A. Coser. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) first 
published posthumously in French in 1952. In it, Halbwachs posits that collective memory is socially 
constructed. He elucidates the importance of the social group as context for recollecting and recreating the 
past. An individual’s memory does not belong to oneself, Halbwachs notes, it belongs to everyone in 
his/her particular social group. His exploration of the frameworks and structures of collective memory 
includes analyses of those provided by the family, religious society, and by social class. 
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traditions and cultural forms continuously assign common meaning to disparate 
memories.”42
          The memories encapsulated by a monument need not be limited to those of the 
events or people commemorated therein. Writing about a colossal monument erected by 
Saddam Hussein to commemorate Iraq’s triumph over Iran in the first Persian Gulf 
War,
 Much like the circularity of memory, we project meanings onto monuments 
and extract from them at the same time.  
43
Monuments are more than aesthetic objects. In their deepest essence they are about 
memories, memories that constitute the very marrow of a city’s identity, bestowing 
personality and character upon a city just as they do upon an individual. The form, shape, 
size, and way of making a monument, the story of how it came to be there, the trials and 
tribulations of those who made it the manner of its placement in its city, all of these 
contribute to crystallizing the workings of memory. For these purposes it does not matter 
whether these memories are good or bad. But it does matter how they relate to their city, 
and which monuments survive to represent them. It is here that the question of 
responsibility—individual or collective—arises.





As this case indicates, the memories “crystallized” by the monument can include and 
have much to do with the deliberations, planning, and other events involved with its 
erection. Clearly, the monuments emplaced by despots face a less arduous path than those 
erected in a pluralistic, democratic, and thus, more contentious memorial landscape. 
Nonetheless, this example showcases the importance of a particular monument’s initiator 
and of the discussions surrounding its origin for understanding its meaning.  
                                                           
42 Young, The Texture of Memory, pp. xi-xii. 
43 Baghdad’s well-known, gigantic “Victory Arch” features two outstretched forearms and hands modeled 
after Saddam Hussein’s own, enlarged forty times. They each hold intersecting swords which arc over the 
wide boulevard where Hussein’s army held its victory parades. 2,500 Iranian soldiers’ metal helmets are 
contained in netting at the base of each side. For a brief history of the arch in the post-Saddam era, see Kirk 
Semple, “Iraq Confronts Hussein Legacy Cast in Bronze.” New York Times. April 8, 2007.  
44 Samir al-Khalil [Kanan Makiya], The Monument: Art, Vulgarity, and Responsibility in Iraq. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1991).   
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          Most assuredly, the meanings of the memories conveyed can and will change over 
time. Though their constructions of the past are usually selective, as will be discussed 
below, their messages often evolve over time in spite of the certitude they display and the 
nuances they seemingly disallow. As William Hubbard writes, “What monuments have 
traditionally done is embody an idea important to those who erected them. (…) But a 
monument endures beyond its time, holds that idea before us, in our time, and asks us to 
contemplate that idea—turn it over in our heads, stand next to our own experiences and 
ask if it still applies.”45
 
 In sum, monuments provoke and encourage reconsideration of 
how we view the past. But is it the monuments themselves that change or the historical 
narratives encapsulated there? More importantly, do these changes lead to clearer 
recollection and “better” commemoration or do they lead merely to more forgetfulness?  
THE EFFICACY OF MONUMENTS 
          Though it may seem prima facie counterintuitive, commemorative objects like 
monuments—intentionally constructed explicitly to evoke society’s memories—are also 
intimately associated with forgetting. In fact, forgetting is at the heart of many of the key 
debates over monuments. First of all, monuments must contend with diminishing public 
interest that comes as a result of the inevitable passage of time. As Robert Musil, in his 
short, frequently cited essay “Denkmale” piquantly observed, “[M]onuments are 
conspicuously inconspicuous. There is nothing in this world as invisible as a monument. 
They are no doubt erected to be seen—indeed to attract attention. But at the same time 
they are impregnated with something that repels attention, causing the glance to roll right 
                                                           
45 William Hubbard, “A Meaning for Monuments,” Public Interest 74, Winter (1984), p. 28. 
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off, like water droplets off an oilcloth, without even pausing for a moment.”46
          Secondly, it is impossible to remember everything. In fact, remembering perforce 
begets forgetting. As David Lowenthal writes, “For memory to have meaning we must 
forget most of what we have seen.”
 Over time, 
goes this argument, monuments as physical objects can become part of the landscape and 
hence unnoticeable, thus vitiating their commemorative capabilities. Due to the passage 
of time, monuments—and even more dramatically, the people and events they were 
created to commemorate—become “inconspicuous” and are forgotten.  
47 He continues: “Memories must continually be 
discarded and conflated; only forgetting enables us to classify and bring chaos into 
order.”48
 
 Without question, inscriptions can only convey one original message, which 
usually comprises a synthesis of many disparate, individual experiences and attitudes. 
Because monuments are constructed to prompt affect and reflection as well as to trigger 
particular memories, they almost always discriminate against opposing views or are left 
intentionally nebulous to put forth one overarching historical narrative. For this reason, 
some contend commemorating with monuments engenders forgetting as well. Selectivity 
breeds exclusion; that which is excluded is probably forgotten. Of what use then are 
monuments?  
 
                                                           
46 “[D]as auffallendste an Denkmälern ist nämlich, daß man sie nicht bemerkt. Es gibt nichts auf der Welt, 
was so unsichtbar wäre wie Denkmäler. Sie warden doch aufgestellt, um gesehen zu warden, aber 
gleichzeitig sind durch etwas gegen Aufmerksamkeit imprägniert, und diese rinnt wie Wassertropfen – auf 
Ölbezug – artig an ihnen ab, ohne auch nur einen Augenblick stehen zu bleiben.” In Robert Musil, 
Nachlass zu Lebzeiten. (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1962), p. 59-60. This pithy quotation is cited virtually 
everywhere in the literature on monuments. The English citation is taken from: Musil, Posthumous Papers 
of a Living Author. Tr. Peter Wortman. (Hygiene, Colorado: Eridanos Press, 1987), p. 61. 
47 David Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 
204. 
48 Ibid., p. 205. 
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Monuments and Forgetting 
          Corresponding to the two positions mentioned above, two opposing approaches 
comprise the debate about the overall efficacy of monuments, in the modern world, in 
terms of memory or the lack thereof. The first group believes that monuments are either 
the result or the cause of forgetting. The second group—discussed in detail in the next 
section, and representing the scholarship to which I adhere—foregrounds monuments as a 
battlefront in national and local conflicts over remembering.  
          While some critics find fault with the monuments themselves,49 other critics 
address more directly the connection society makes between monuments and memory. 
Pertaining not only to monuments, Pierre Nora’s concept of “lieux de mémoire” is the 
best example of this position.50
                                                           
49 For instance, Lewis Mumford pronounced the “death of the monument” and viewed the immutability of 
monuments as a characteristic of relics from a bygone era, incompatible with modern society. See 
Mumford, The Culture of Cities. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938), p. 435. Decades later, 
others sought to build on Mumford’s ideas. H.W. Janson, for example, notes the “tide of oblivion and 
indifference that has engulfed the public monument.” Also pronouncing monuments “dead,” he ascribes 
this to the lack of societal consensus in singling out noted personalities, such as great kings and other great 
rulers, or ideas, such as the nation, worthy of commemoration. This suggests, of course, that fewer 
monuments were constructed in the twentieth century and beyond than in what Janson calls “the Age of the 
Public Monument par excellence,” i.e. the nineteenth century. See Janson, The Rise and Fall of the Public 
Monument. (New Orleans: Tulane University, 1976). Helmut Wohl also notes the “problem of erecting 
plausible contemporary monuments,” but dates the rise of this predicament back to the American and 
French Revolutions and the post-Napoleonic era. Equally damaging for monuments has been the rise of 
mechanical reproduction. Wohl argues, “One reason for the problems of erecting believable contemporary 
monuments […] is that photography, film, and television, through their capacity to represent the 
momentary and to repeat it at will, have transposed the forms in which memory or commemoration are 
recorded from the palpable physicality of real objects to the virtual reality of the mechanical reproduction, 
or of the cinema or television screen, and have thereby rendered memory commonplace, banal, and 
forgettable. Memory’s ubiquity waters down the commemorative effects of monuments. This is, however, 
merely one part of the equation. More troublesome still, Wohl claims, is that modern monuments no longer 
are able to “transmute the everyday, to raise it to a level beyond habit, routine, and the backdrop of our 
consciousness.” See Wohl, “Memory, Oblivion, and the ‘Invisibility’ of Monuments,” in Reinink and 
Stumpel (eds.) Memory and Oblivion, pp. 925-928. 
 Indeed, according to Nora, “technologized” society’s 
myriad “sites of memory,” “originate with the sense that there is no spontaneous 
memory, that we must deliberately create archives, maintain anniversaries, organize 
50 Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire,” Representations 26, Special Issue: 
Memory and Counter-Memory, Spring (1989), pp. 7-24. 
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celebrations, pronounce eulogies, and notarize bills because such no longer occur 
naturally.”51 Real memory is no longer preserved and passed on and cannot evolve as it 
did in primitive societies because of how modern society organizes the past—the 
“acceleration of history.”52 Moreover, because of the antagonistic relationship between 
“real memory” and “history”—merely a partial rendering of what is no longer, as Nora 
describes it in this often (mis)quoted but seminal essay, the subject of a much larger 
project53—we must create sites to institutionalize and select what we deem worthy of 
remembrance. Rather than a natural process then, what we remember is a calculated, 
artificial creation. What today constitutes “memory” is not really memory at all. We 
create monuments and other lieux de mémoire to do the memory legwork for us, and we 
keep them deliberately ambiguous so that they “only exist because of their capacity for 
metamorphosis, an endless recycling of their meaning and an unpredictable proliferation 
of their ramifications”54
          In a similar vein, Adrian Forty and Susanne Küchler, co-editors of The Art of 
Forgetting, look at the link between objects and memory to expose how cultural objects 
(especially memorials and monuments) contribute to society’s process of forgetting.
—hardly a ringing endorsement for the erection of more 
monuments.  
55
                                                           
51 Ibid., p. 12. 
 
This is, of course, contrary to most peoples’ expectations. Forty reiterates this view in the 
book’s introduction, “It has generally been taken for granted that memories, formed in 
52 Ibid., p. 8. According to Nora, monuments are perfectly compatible with, and a hallmark of, modern 
society. Indeed, they are one of its defining characteristics, at least in relation to memory. Because nearly 
everything in modern society is deemed commemoration-worthy, the number of lieux de mémoire has 
increased exponentially. “In just a few years, then, the materialization of memory has been tremendously 
dilated, multiplied, decentralized, democratized.” (p. 14) 
53 Nora’s project spawned a German imitation, the three-volume Deutsche Erinnerungsorte. (Munich: Beck, 
2001), edited by Etienne François and Hagen Schulze. 
54 Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire,” p. 19. 
55 Adrian Forty and Susanne Küchler (eds.) The Art of Forgetting. (Oxford: Berg, 1999). 
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the mind, can be transferred to solid material objects, which can come to stand for 
memories and, by virtue of their durability, either prolong or preserve them indefinitely 
beyond their purely mental existence.”56 He then argues that this is not the case and that 
this is due to monuments’ and memorials’ selectivity. In fact, he maintains, “But it is 
surely an inevitable feature of memorials—and this is true not only of war memorials, but 
of all commemorative artifacts—that they permit only certain things to be remembered, 
and by exclusion cause others to be forgotten.”57 Even Young—author of some of the 
most innovative, incisive and widely cited recent work on memorials—has noted 
monuments’ capabilities “to efface as much history from memory as they inscribe in 
it.”58
          In delineating his argument, Forty mentions the creation of what Young calls 
“counter-monuments” to the Holocaust
 
59
                                                           
56 Forty, “Introduction,” in Forty and Küchler (eds.) The Art of Forgetting, p. 7.  
 as proof that “commemorative artifacts” lead to 
forgetting. This coincides with a significant shift in the purposes of monuments, 
according to Young, “from the heroic, self-aggrandizing figurative icons of the late 
nineteenth century celebrating national ideals and triumphs to the antiheroic, often ironic, 
and self-effacing conceptual installations that mark the national ambivalence and 
57 Ibid., p. 9. 
58 James E. Young, “Memory and Monument,” in Geoffrey H. Hartman (ed.) Bitburg in Moral and Political 
Perspective. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), p. 105. In spite of this observation, Young’s 
confidence in the efficacy of memorials and monuments and the role they play in establishing and 
demonstrating the contours of a nation’s memory is obvious. 
59 Young defines the term as “memorial spaces conceived to challenge the very premise of the monument.” 
See James E. Young, “Against Redemption: The Art of Countermemory in Germany Today,” in Peter 
Homans (ed.) Symbolic Loss: The Ambiguity of Mourning and Memory at Century's End. (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 2000), p. 129. For even more on the idea of counter-monuments, see once 
again James E. Young, “The Counter-Monument: Memory against Itself in Germany Today,” Critical 
Inquiry 18.2 Winter (1992); pp. 267-96. 
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uncertainty of late twentieth-century postmodernism.”60 At the forefront of this 
movement are a handful of young German sculptors and artists—about whom Young has 
written extensively—who renounce conventional monumental forms to commemorate the 
Shoah.61
[C]ontemptuously reject the traditional forms and reasons for public memorial art, those 
spaces that either console viewers or redeem such tragic events, or indulge in a facile 
kind of Wiedergutmachung or purport to mend the memory of a murdered people. Instead 
of searing memory into public consciousness, they fear, conventional memorials seal 
memory off from awareness altogether. For these artists such an evasion would be the 
ultimate abuse of art, whose primary function, to their mind, is to jar viewers from 
complacency and to challenge and denaturalize the viewers’ assumptions.




This tendency is problematic particularly in the case of Holocaust commemoration. 
Indeed, it could be argued that Young’s perspicacious observations apply exclusively 
thereto. He goes on, “To the extent that we encourage monuments to do our memory-
work for us, we become that much more forgetful. In effect, the initial impulse to 
memorialize events like the Holocaust may actually spring from an opposite and equal 
desire to forget them.”63 Gavriel D. Rosenfeld supplies a response to this assertion. He 
states, “While such claims serve as a useful caveat against naively viewing monuments as 
healthy signs of active memory, the absurdity of the converse—that the absence of 
monuments reflects a strong engagement with memory—suggests it should not be 
overemphasized.” 64
                                                           
60 James E. Young, “Memory, Countermemory and the End of the Monument,” in Young (ed.) At 
Memory's Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary Art and Architecture. (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2000), p. 93. 
 
61 Some of Young’s examples include Jochen Gerz and Esther Shalev-Gerz’s disappearing “Monument 
against Fascism” in Hamburg, Horst Hoheisel’s proposed “Blow Up the Brandenburger Tor” in Berlin, and 
Shimon Attie’s installment in Berlin called “The Writing on the Wall.”  
62 Young, “The Counter-Monument,” p. 272. 
63 Young, “The Counter-Monument,” p. 273. 
64 Gavriel D. Rosenfeld, Munich and Memory: Architecture, Monuments, and the Legacy of the Third 
Reich. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p. 108. 
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          While this prospect is especially acute in the case of Holocaust memorials, which 
beseech their viewers not only to remember but also never to forget, there is a glaring 
discrepancy between these positions. On the one hand, Forty argues that monuments lead 
to forgetting because what gets commemorated comes at the expense of all other aspects 
of the past. A monument’s selectivity and exclusiveness limit all other interpretations. 
With nothing to mark the other overlooked aspects of history, they are forgotten. In other 
words, that which is excluded is forgotten. Young, on the other hand, contends that the 
person or the event commemorated by the monument itself will be forgotten because the 
public leaves all remembering up to the monument. Unburdened with remembering 
thanks to the ever-faithful commemorative capabilities of the monument, the public can 
go about its daily life. The “uncommemorated” aspects of the past, however, are not 
taken into consideration. That which is included is forgotten. 
          Taken to the extreme, according to these views, nothing commemorated with a 
monument—neither that which is excluded nor included—is remembered at all. To be 
sure, there is certainly more to recall than what monuments memorialize. Without 
question, history encompasses more than what is inscribed for perpetuity on the face of 
bronze or stone. And similarly, while Young’s stance may be accurate in the case of 
public remembrance with monuments erected by the “perpetrators” (rather than by the 
victims themselves) and their descendants, it seems unlikely when the monument is 
emplaced by partisan advocates seeking to garner attention and propagandize particular 
historical narratives.  
          Young’s and Forty’s views, however, endow monuments with an all or nothing 
commemorative quality that is inherently problematic. It belies the fact that opposing sets 
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of monuments are often used as “social agents”65 in contested memorial landscapes—like 
those under examination here—to “compete” against other narratives by propagating 
opposing ones. After all, sometimes out of solemn remembrance and sometimes out of 
bitter resentment, and for a multitude of other reasons, monuments continue to be 
constructed. As Rosenfeld continues in his response to Young, “Rather, monuments are 
erected with varying intentions towards preserving memory, at times with solid 
conviction, at times with ambivalence or reluctance.”66
 
 
Monuments as a Battlefront in Memory Debates 
          If one reads only the work by most of the aforementioned authors, one gets the 
impression that the status of monuments is nothing but precarious and that they are no 
longer of much use. Maligned by critics, inconspicuous or invisible, monuments have 
been deemed the discriminatory producers of forgetting incompatible with modern times. 
One would expect to have seen “the end of the monument” long ago. Yet, they remain. In 
fact, Andreas Huyssen has cogently dispelled the supposition that the passage of time or 
the profusion of “lieux de mémoire” in the information age—as the preceding authors 
surmised—has lead to the weakening of the memorial clout of monuments. Instead, he 
notes the possibility of the opposite. First, however, he acknowledges, “[T]he museum, 
the monument, and the memorial have […] been declared dead many times during the 
history of modernism.”67
                                                           
65 Nelson and Olin, “Introduction,” p. 5. 
 But Huyssen then remarks that the monument is “experiencing 
a revival of sorts” and “benefiting from the intensity of our memorial culture.” He 
66 Rosenfeld, Munich and Memory, p. 108. 
67 Andreas Huyssen, “Monument and Memory in a Postmodern Age,” in James E. Young (ed.) The Art of 
Memory: Holocaust Memorials in History. Exhibition Catalogue for the Jewish Museum. (Munich: Prestel 
Verlag, 1994), p. 9 & p. 12. 
49 
 
attributes this to the very qualities which previously drew criticism, the “material quality 
of the object.” “The permanence of the monument […], formerly criticized as deadening 
reification, takes on a different role in a culture dominated by the fleeting image on the 
screen and the immateriality of communications.”68 According to this view, the 
permanence of a monument and its ability to “set” memory, once considered by some its 
downfall, is now its most redeeming quality. With this, Huyssen has endeavored to 
rehabilitate modern public monuments, albeit with a caveat. “This said, the success of 
any monument will still have to be measured by the extent to which it connects with the 
multiple discourses of memory provided to us by the very electronic media to which the 
monument, as solid matter, provides an alternative.”69
          Whether they meet Huyssen’s high standard or not, monuments—newly proposed 
or long since erected—are recurrently the source of cacophonous contemporary debate.
  
70
                                                           
68 Ibid., p. 11 & p. 12. 
 
That the erection of new monuments and the messages of old ones remain controversial is 
a testament to their staying power and the symbolic position they occupy within society. 
Fraught with apparent shortcomings and inherent tensions, but with the potential for 
concretizing memory by making it visible and palpable and by putting historical 
narratives on display in a world of flickering images, monuments remain a vital means of 
representing the past and a highly contested front in memory battles at all levels, 
especially when the objective is constructing narratives which call into question standard 
understandings of the past.  
69 Ibid., p. 12. 
70 The most recent controversy is over the statue of Martin Luther King Jr. slated for erection on the 
National Mall in Washington D.C. The statue’s design has come under fire in many circles for a slew of 
reasons including its purported “Socialist Realist” style, its depiction of a too “confrontational” King, the 
origin of its material, as well as the provenance of the sculptor selected to execute it. For a brief summary 
of the debate, see Shaila Dewan, “Larger than Life, More to Fight Over,” New York Times. May 18, 2008. 
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          Rather than fighting these battles on one prominent, national front, they are often 
carried out locally. Particularly relevant for the purposes of this study, John E. Bodnar 
shows how clashes arise when discrepancies exist on the two levels of memorial culture, 
the official and the vernacular.71
[R]epresents an array of specialized interests that are grounded in parts of the whole.  
[…] Defenders of such cultures are numerous and intent on protecting values and 
restating views of reality derived from firsthand experience in small-scale communities 
rather than the ‘imagined communities’ of a large nation. […] But, normally, vernacular 
expressions convey what social reality feels like rather than what it should be like. Its 
very existence threatens the dogmatic and timeless nature of official expressions.
 Where the two intersect, he argues, is where public 
memory emerges. Using memorials in the United States as examples, Bodnar declares, 
“Official culture relies on “dogmatic formalism” and the restatement of reality in ideal 
rather than complex or ambiguous terms. It desires to present the past on an abstract basis 
of timelessness and sacredness. […] Normally, official culture promotes a nationalistic, 
patriotic culture of the whole that mediates an assortment of vernacular interests.” This he 




While Bodnar’s juxtaposition corresponds nicely to the two levels on which memory 
culture operates in the German post-WWII context, it is interesting and necessary to point 
out that expressions of vernacular memory in the form of expellee monuments are much 
more nationalistic and uphold the “timelessness and sacredness” of German territorial 
claims in the lost homeland.73
 
 Nonetheless, Bodnar’s contribution to understanding the 
bifurcation of memorial culture is of paramount importance for this project. 
                                                           
71 See Bodnar, Remaking America, as well as his contribution “Public Memory in an American City: 
Commemoration in Cleveland” in Gillis (ed.) Commemorations, pp. 74-89.  
72 Bodnar, “Public Memory in an American City,” p. 75. 
73 Bodnar borrows his terms “official” and “vernacular” from Susan G. Davis’s work, Parades and Power: 
Street Theatre in Nineteenth-Century Philadelphia. (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1988). Although 
the terms to do not align perfectly in the context of expellee monuments, I will use “national” or “official” 






CONSTRUCTING NARRATIVES WITH MONUMENTS 
      On all levels, memory battles involving monuments rage on. In his far-reaching 
study, Sanford Levinson also documents a number of cases of such disputes.74 Above all, 
it is the power to organize public space and the ability to “promote privileged narratives” 
that enflames passion over monuments.75 As another indication of their contemporary 
power and meaning in society—thus again challenging the positions held by the 
monument naysayers cited in the previous section—he cites the urge so commonly held 
by a liberated populace, for example, those in Eastern Europe after the fall of 
communism, to tear down the discredited political symbols of regimes overthrown and 
de-legitimized.76
          But it is still the construction (not the deconstruction) of “public art” that carries 
the most weight. Focusing on the commemoration of the American Civil War, Levinson 
defines the concept “public art” as “the art chosen self-consciously by public institutions 




                                                           
74 Sanford Levinson, Written in Stone: Public Monuments in Changing Societies. (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1998).  
 Through this public art, various groups compete for the hegemony of their 
interpretation of the past—an especially salient point for local expellee monuments. 
Protagonists view gaining the upper hand in memory clashes as a must, particularly when 
75 Ibid., p. 10. 
76 For a collection of essays with examples drawn from French and German history on this topic, see 
Winfried Speitkamp (ed.) Denkmalsturz. Zur Konfliktgeschichte politischer Symbolik. (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1997). See also Katherine Verdery, The Political Lives of Dead Bodies. 
Reburial and Postsocialist Change. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). 
77 Levinson, Written in Stone, p. 28. 
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interpretations of the past vary, which is almost always the case. As Levinson writes, by 
virtue of their erection the message of a monument is treated “as an authoritative 
enunciation of the meaning of the commemorated event.”78
          Permission to erect a monument in public space is thus tantamount to receiving 
official imprimatur for the memories the initiator seeks to convey there. But there is 
more. Art historian Kirk Savage—also writing about U.S. Civil War memorialization—
claims the erection of monuments is not only about official approval but also about 
societal legitimization. “Public monuments do not arise as if by natural law to celebrate 
the deserving; they are built by people with sufficient power to marshal (or impose) 
public consent for their erection. In this respect, […] the public monument represents a 
kind of collective recognition—in short, legitimacy—for the memory deposited there.”
 Displaying the object in a 
place of prominence confers the message contained therein with even more authority.  
79 
As Savage’s sinister examples illustrate, the implications of this acknowledgement can be 
profound, especially in terms of race relations and civil rights.80
          The acrimonious debates surrounding the Civil War monuments to which both 
Levinson and Savage refer are related to the monuments dedicated to the “Lost Cause.”
 
81
                                                           
78 Ibid., p. 49. 
 
79 Kirk Savage, “The Politics of Memory,” pp. 135-136. 
80 In brief, Savage writes, “The commemoration of the Civil War in physical memorials is ultimately a 
story of systematic cultural repression, carried out in the guise of reconciliation and harmony.” Ibid., p. 
143. 
81 Space constraints preclude a full elaboration of this concept. Cynthia Mills, however, very succinctly 
explains the “Lost Cause” as, “the name given to a whole body of writings, speeches, performances, prints, 
and other visual images that presented a certain version of Confederate history—as told from a southern 
white perspective. This sentimental narrative said the war was fought to defend states’ rights and to protect 
a chivalrous antebellum way of life from northern aggression. It pictured an Old South in which genteel 
white men protected their beautiful and virtuous women and children, fighting with dignity and pride. 
While Lost Cause advocates did not seek to reinstate slavery, they often argued that it had been a 
benevolent institution in which southern whites gave guidance and nurture to a simple, dusky people who 
needed Christian help and were loyal to their masters. They emotionally contended that slavery was not the 
main reason for the war. According to this retelling, southern men suffered no shame in military defeat, 
because the war was lost only because of the industrial might and overwhelming numbers of the North, not 
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These monuments to the Confederacy present a captivating analogous case study for 
examining how monuments have been utilized in politically-charged, highly emotional 
campaigns orchestrated at the grassroots level by fervent partisans with the desire to “set 
the record straight.” Like local expellee monuments, not only were these monuments 
constructed to commemorate the past, but, more significantly, they were erected to 
provide a very conspicuous counter-narrative to the standard postwar depiction of the 
past “imposed” upon the defeated.82
For Confederate veterans, continued idealization helped minimize defeat, the moral 
implications of which (in a society associating success with righteousness and godly 
purpose) imposed a considerable psychological burden. At the same time, for the 
thousands of families that had lost men in the war, the commemoration would attempt to 
make meaningful their loss. Finally, publicizing the virtues of the Confederate soldier 
countered American derogations, which some Southerners feared would dictate the many 
historical accounts of the war yet to be written.
 Motivation for this multi-decade, postwar effort, 




To be sure, monuments were but one of many instruments in spreading the Lost Cause 
ideology. Nevertheless, they were one of the most visible and prominent. Moreover, it 
should be noted that the parallel I seek to highlight is not the historical content of what 
actually is commemorated but rather the effort to subvert official memory culture via the 
erection of a network of local monuments. 
                                                           
because of mistakes, lack of bravery, or a false cause. Above all, the Lost Cause sought a restoration of 
respect.” See Mills, “Introduction,” pp. xvii-xviii. For a contemporary account of the cult of the Lost 
Cause, see Tony Horwitz’s entertaining Confederates in the Attic: Dispatches from the Unfinished Civil 
War. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1998). 
82 A similar argument could be made using the narrative of World War II put forth in some Japanese 
museums, memorials, and shrines, which diminishes Japan’s culpability and justifies the nation’s actions at 
that time. For accounts of the debates in a comparative context see Ian Buruma The Wages of Guilt: 
Memories of War in Germany and Japan. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1994).  For brief accounts of specific 
Japanese commemorative sites, see John Nelson, “Social Memory as Ritual Practice: Commemorating 
Spirits of the Military Dead at Yasukuni Shinto Shrine,” The Journal of Asian Studies Vol. 62, No. 2 (May 
2003), pp. 443-467; and Daniel Seltz, “Remembering the War and the Atomic Bomb: New Museums, New 
Approaches,” in Walkowitz and Knauer (eds.) Memory and the Impact of Political Transformation in 
Public Space, pp. 127-145. 
82 Stephen Davis, “Empty Eyes, Marble Hand: The Confederate Monument and the South,” Journal of 
Popular Culture. 16, 3 (Winter 1982), p. 2. 
54 
 
          In this particular case, in opposition to what we would today view as the standard, 
northern interpretation of the Civil War, no longer were the hostilities carried out by 
seditious, dishonorable southern whites to maintain the ignominious institution of 
slavery—the lifeblood of the southern economy—the monuments portrayed an 
interpretation of history that instead emphasized the worthiness of the southern cause and 
the nobility of the South’s sacrifices. The war, so the argument goes, and as represented 
by southern Civil War memorials, was fought simply to preserve states’ rights. Slavery, if 
mentioned at all (it usually was not), was presented in altruistic terms as if the southern 
whites had civilized and Christianized the slaves.84
          In most cases, southern whites were not depicted as individuals but as ideal types. 
In the statues erected throughout the South, the soldiers of the Confederate army were 
presented as dignified, virtuous, and valorous.
  
85 Women, when commemorated at all, 
were also idealized. “[T]he form chosen is also that of the anonymous white southern 
woman assuming nurturing roles, whether as guardian of culture and family or as nurse 
and source of strength for southern men.”86
                                                           
84 Savage describes what he claims to be the first and only monument that commemorates “faithful slaves” 
erected in Fort Mill, South Carolina over forty years after the end of the Civil War.  
 Furthermore, the monuments romanticized 
the now lost cultural heritage of the halcyon antebellum South destroyed by the 
victorious North as a result of the war and the tumultuous period of Reconstruction that 
followed. Southerners felt they were the victims of a slanderous misinformation 
campaign emanating from the overly moralizing North and sought to counter it. Above 
85 David Currey, “The Virtuous Soldier: Constructing a Usable Confederate Past in Franklin, Tennessee,” 
in Cynthia Mills and Pamela H. Simpson (eds.) Monuments to the Lost Cause, pp. 133-134. 
86 H. E. Gulley, “Women and the Lost Cause: Preserving a Confederate Identity in the American Deep 
South,” Journal of Historical Geography. 19, 2 (1993), p. 137. 
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all, proponents of the “Lost Cause” ideology sought vindication of their way of life and 
what they had fought for.87
          Initially, memorials were constructed by veterans groups simply to commemorate 
the war dead in cemeteries where they were unlikely to meet disapproval from the 
occupying northern authorities. Decades after the war, brazen citizens groups, led by the 
United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC), spearheaded a more demonstrative and 
strident commemorative effort that soon went beyond mere rituals of mourning to 
propagate the cult of the Lost Cause. By then, the monuments sprang up in areas which 
ensured greater accessibility and higher visibility for larger numbers of the citizenry, e.g. 
on battlefields, near courthouses, and on public squares. This was not an isolated 
phenomenon, however, but could be seen throughout all the former Confederate states. 
What appeared to be an entire memorial network arose, indicative of a united, regional 
campaign. Savage observes, “The rise of a more or less uniform vernacular monument at 
the local level indicates that towns wanted to participate in a shared and standardized 
program of memory; while each town fixed and deposited a permanent record of its own 
involvement in the war, the commemorative grammar imposed such a strong linkage 
between memorials that they constituted a kind of coordinated front.”
 
88 This is exactly 
the point. The coordination and the essentially standardized historical interpretation 
contained in the monuments effectively implied that everyone shared in the views 
espoused there.89
                                                           
87 Indeed, the large-scale monument to Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederacy, on Monument 
Avenue in Richmond, Virginia, contains the openly revisionist inscription “DEO VINDICE” (“God Be Our 
Vindicator”). The story of this monument and a bevy of other Confederate memorials are told in the 
contributions contained in Mills and Simpson (eds.) Monuments to the Lost Cause. 
    
88 Savage, “The Politics of Memory,” p. 131. 
89 Gulley, “Women and the Lost Cause,” p. 134. 
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          The point of this case study is not to draw parallels based simply on the historical 
events depicted in Civil War monuments and those in local expellee monuments. Rather, 
my aim is to illustrate how monuments have been used in loosely or tightly organized 
campaigns to cast history in a light that differs from standard narratives. In these specific 
cases, the narratives generated by and reflected in the monuments certainly challenge and 
even undermine the respective authoritative historical interpretations.  
          Again, there is more to this story. In fact, the circumstantial coincidences in the 
methods employed to counteract the standard narratives are striking. First of all, in both 
cases the initiators of monuments clearly share the belief that without their side of the 
story, narratives of the past would not only be incomplete but also inaccurate. Hence, the 
strong desire to present their versions of what happened. The verisimilitude of their 
assertions or the legitimacy of their grievances is, of course, irrelevant. Nevertheless, the 
monuments are imbued with the desire to set the record straight, as it were. Secondly, in 
both cases, the causality of the events depicted is ignored, obfuscated, or altered. Losses 
are decried (e.g. of the previous way of life) but not the loss of war. Also, the majority of 
monuments do not commemorate individuals in either case. Instead, the monuments 
utilize vague ideal types and indeterminate idealized concepts to symbolize and 
commemorate all.  
           Thirdly, consistent patterns exist in each memorial group’s basic messages, despite 
the fact that a veritable cornucopia of monuments had been erected at different times and 
different places. This is of course indicative of coordinated networks of partisans who 
wished to convey a united message. This leads to the fourth striking similarity, namely, 
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the respective roles played by partisan groups in sponsoring, financing, and crusading for 




LOCAL EXPELLEE MONUMENTS AND NARRATING THE PAST 
          There can be little question whether the local expellee memorials under 
examination in this study, like the one in Düsseldorf-Garath described at the opening of 
this chapter, can and should be considered “monuments.” Though they are not necessarily 
grandiose in size or prominence, they fit the bill, both in terms of raison d’être and in 
structural terms, according to almost every definition put forth by the scholars cited 
above. Like all monuments, they have been erected to commemorate people and events. 
Constructed of stone, metal, and wood, these monuments follow the traditions of the 
memento mori built throughout the history of western civilization and have been designed 
with posterity in mind. That is, the actual objects are expected to outlive their initiators, 
leave a permanent mark on the landscape, provide a space for grieving and 
commemoration, and transmit their commemorative message to future generations.      
           Moreover, that which is memorialized—captured in the form, inscription, etc. of 
the object—connects events of the past to the present and to the future. No less important, 
the monuments are not the remnants of what once was, i.e. they are not ruins of structures 
made historically significant by the passage of time, but were emplaced in specific 
locations with precise commemorative purposes. Similarly, the forms, motifs and 
materials were not selected by chance, but were chosen deliberately. Every aspect of the 
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monuments was intentional, and was utilized to evoke certain mnemonic and ideological 
responses. In this sense, local expellee monuments—like all monuments—are memory 
conduits which contribute to shaping the contours of historical understanding.  
           But these monuments seem to go beyond mere commemoration and solemn 
mourning. More importantly—as pointed out by Koselleck—monuments categorize and 
assess normatively the people and events they commemorate. In this particular case, the 
monuments lament the extraordinary loss of life, property, and Heimat as a result of the 
Second World War. In order to make this loss meaningful, those who suffered it (i.e. 
those commemorated by the monuments)—regardless of the cause—are designated as 
“victims.” Concomitantly, as Koselleck also noted, monuments also make an offer of 
identity for the survivors. Here, “Mortui viventes obligant” (“The living are obliged to the 
dead”), has permitted the survivors, through their affiliation with those memorialized, to 
identify themselves as victims as well, and has spurred them to agitate for the causes the 
expellee organizations hold dear.90
           The expellee monument in Düsseldorf-Garath, still standing nearly thirty years 
after its official unveiling, typifies these points. Though the monument is slowly 
 Expellee monuments thus appear to have created an 
entire collective of victims: both those who perished and those who survived. For many 
in Germany, but especially for those in neighboring countries who suffered at the hands 
of the Nazis, this is a seemingly paradoxical but extremely profound declaration.  
                                                           
90 This brings up an important point, also addressed by Koselleck. Whether or not one chooses to accept the 
identity provided and how one responds to a monument in general is left up to the individual observer. 
Furthermore, the specific memories the commemorative objects conjure up, and whether passersby even 
take notice of the monument, are, of course, nearly impossible to ascertain. In this sense, a monument is a 
medium that relays to the entire public what some segments of the population already hold to be true. 
Though it may be very difficult to disentangle entirely, one could certainly argue that monuments reflect 
and galvanize the memories of those who share the sentiments expressed there (and choose to identify with 




becoming overgrown by the trees and shrubs that surround it, it remains highly visible, 
and is prominently placed along a path in a tranquil public park. Its exact message, 
however, remains as vague today as in the past. Indeed, its ostensibly inoffensive 
inscription allows more leeway for interpretation now than then. One would think the 
additional meanings imbued in the monument from the start, as enumerated in the 
addresses given by the political representatives at the dedication ceremony, would no 
longer resonate. After all, Germany has reunited and all legal questions regarding the 
borders and territorial claims vis-à-vis the nation’s former eastern provinces have been 
irreversibly settled. No additional information, however, has been added to deconstruct or 
re-contextualize the original meaning or reformulate its message for the future. The 
monument does, however, show signs of remaining contentious.91
           What then is this monument commemorating today? Is it the loss of Heimat alone, 
or the loss of life and possessions as a result of the expulsion? Does the large stone call 
for restitution of property or border revisions? What does this monument really say? 
Without stating what the monument should say, we can only examine what it does, or 
rather, does not say. In this case, the monument is selective. Only German suffering and 
loss is commemorated here. Germany’s victims are not included. As such, it presents a 
one-sided interpretation of the past and remains part of the widespread network of 
memorials that express similar sentiments. These monuments were expressions of 
German-centered postwar narratives, which, as Chapter Two demonstrates, were once 
predominant but fell out of favor in the 1970s and 1980s before reemerging at the end of 
the century. 
  
                                                           
91 At some point, someone vandalized the monument. It is difficult to say, however, whether the vandal’s 
motivation was political or wanton destructiveness. My photo (taken in July 2007) shows that someone had 












FROM CONSENSUS TO CONTESTATION:  





           My goal with this dissertation is to investigate and expose the historical narratives 
local expellee monuments articulate. At different times and different places, however, 
these narratives have varied, both in tone and resonance. Nevertheless, discourses on 
German victimhood, particularly the suffering of the expellees, have persisted throughout 
the postwar era. Indeed, the topic “flight and expulsion” has been a constitutive part of 
national and local narratives, on the political agenda at all levels, and publicly 
commemorated in every decade after the war. In many ways, it could be argued that the 
expellees were primus inter pares amongst the victims of WWII in Germany. Flight and 
expulsion has been represented in various forms, including monuments, and was an 
omnipresent topic—from (West) Berlin to Bad Oeynhausen, and most cities, towns, and 
villages in-between—throughout the postwar era. Though the numbers have varied 
widely by decade, the erection of local expellee monuments has continued unabated 
throughout the postwar era and into the present time. What follows is an exploration of 
the political and social factors that explain these disparities.  
           Rather than jumping in with an in-depth analysis of the monuments, I seek in this 
chapter to periodize perceptions of the expellees and the commemoration of flight and 
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expulsion in Germany in the postwar era. I begin my analysis this way because of the 
keen importance of temporality and scope of contestation in determining the themes and 
forms expellee monuments have taken. Thus, the periodization that follows serves two 
purposes. First, it demonstrates that German wartime suffering was never “taboo” as a 
topic of discussion in the sense the concept has been used recently in debates over 
Germany’s past; that is, that assertions and discussions of German victimhood were 
disallowed or nonexistent (Central Argument #1). Second, it provides essential 
background material for interpreting local expellee monuments. While this approach 
allows for only brief commentary on the monuments, the main purpose is to outline the 
important political and societal battles that have shaped perceptions of what happened to 
the Germans from the East. That is, I seek to provide an historical framework into which 
a more thorough examination of expellee monuments will be embedded and to set the 
stage for further investigation in Part II. 
 
AFTER THE EXPULSION: INITIAL COMMEMORATIVE EFFORTS OF THE 
1940s 
 
          Like so many other things involving the expellees, the exact numbers of 
bedraggled, dispossessed forced migrants from the German East—as well as the precise 
number of deaths resulting from violent confrontation, infectious diseases, 
malnourishment, exposure, etc. during the expulsion—are politicized and controversial. 
As for the former, estimates range from a total of eight million to more than double that. 
As for the latter, the informed guesses range from several hundred thousand to 
approximately four million. Robert G. Moeller and Pertti Ahonen presume that roughly 
twelve million Germans survived the expulsion with two-thirds of them settling in West 
63 
 
Germany, slightly over sixteen percent of the Federal Republic’s total population.1 In the 
GDR, around four million newly arrived expellees comprised just under a quarter of the 
total population. That the numbers are enormous is, however, beyond dispute. Moreover, 
the long-term logistical effort to accommodate this massive influx was unparalleled in 
German history. In fact, many consider the expellees’ successful integration to be among 
the greatest achievements of both postwar German states.2
          Two factors played a significant role as to where the expellees ended up after the 
war. First, there were the points of origins of these now homeless Germans—be it East 
Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia, Bohemia and Moravia, or further stretches of eastern and 
southeastern Europe, e.g. the Siebenbürgen region of Romania or the Batschka region in 
Hungary and Yugoslavia (today, Serbia). Second, there was the timing of the forced 
departure—some new arrivals had either been evacuated by order of the Nazi authorities 
or had fled on their own accord before the war’s end. Others had been driven out by 
vengeful, anti-German local partisans during the “wild expulsions” in the summer of 
1945. Still others were forced to relocate as a result of border settlements and the 
population transfer decreed by the Allies at Potsdam.
  
3
                                                           
1 See Moeller, War Stories, p. 3 and Ahonen, After the Expulsion, pp. 20-21. 
 What is clear is that no two 
experiences of flight and expulsion were the same and a multitude of factors were 
involved in determining how later events unfolded. This will be especially important 
when we look at how these experiences have been represented in monuments.  
2 Recent scholars have undertaken studies to show, in fact, that despite official rhetoric, the integration of 
the expellees was far from harmonious and despite superficial and momentary successes created social and 
cultural problems that have lasted into the present. See Ulrich Völklein, “Mitleid war von niemand zu 
erwarten.” Das Schicksal der deutschen Vertriebenen. (Munich: Droemer, 2005) and Andreas Kossert, 
Kalte Heimat. Die Geschichte der deutschen Vertriebenen nach 1945. (Munich: Siedler, 2008). 
3 Georg Müller and Heinz Simon, “Aufnahme und Unterbringung,” in Eugen Lemberg and Friedrich 
Edding (eds.) Die Vertriebenen in Westdeutschland: Ihre Eingliederung und Ihr Einfluss auf Gesellschaft, 
Wirtschaft, Politik und Geistesleben. Vol. 1 (Kiel: Ferdinand Hirt, 1959), p. 303ff. Most of the following 
historical recounting is based on this text. 
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          The first order of business for the Allies was halting the massive two-directional 
flow of refugees within the zones of occupation: heading westward, hundreds of 
thousands of Germans from the East sought to leave the Soviet Zone for the American 
and British Zones; at the same time, similar numbers of refugees moved eastward in an 
attempt to reach their homes but were held up by Polish militias at the Oder/Neisse line 
and not allowed to return.4 Müller and Simon point out that it was here that “those who 
fled” (die Geflohenen) became “expellees.”5
          An estimated 2.5 million citizens from Germany’s eastern provinces were already 
in western Germany prior to the Potsdam conference. With the country’s major and even 
its smaller cities in ruins, the German refugees had been directed before the cessation of 
hostilities to rural areas where they were accommodated in factories, schools, 
guesthouses, and military barracks. Those fortunate enough to have relatives in the West 
stayed with them. After the Potsdam Accord, however, large transports of East Prussians, 
Silesians, and other Germans compelled to leave their homes were received first at 
Durchgangslager (transit camps),
 As the former term makes clear, many 
viewed their refugee status and homelessness as provisional and expected to return home 
in the near future. Some expellees held this belief for decades and did not relinquish it 
until forty-five years after the war when the newly reunited Federal Republic officially 
recognized the integrity of its eastern border with Poland.  
6
                                                           
4 These authors remind their readers that the refugees from the German East were amongst millions of 
others (hundreds of thousands of released Wehrmacht soldiers, evacuees from bombed out German cities, 
as well as former prisoners of war held in German territory, millions of foreign forced laborers, and other 
displaced persons [DPs]) passing through the zones of occupation at this time.      
 where they were registered by local authorities, given 
5 Müller and Simon, “Aufnahme und Unterbringung,” p. 306. 
6 The most famous Durchgangslager was Friedland in Lower Saxony, which, due to its location near the 
line of demarcation with the Soviet Zone received hundreds of thousands of expellees, evacuees, returning 
German soldiers and POWs, concentration camp survivors, and other displaced persons. Wilfried F. 
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medical examinations (including delousing), and temporarily housed before the allocation 
of more permanent housing. Those unable to find permanent homes often remained in the 
camps for several years. In 1950, Lower Saxony provided shelter for more than one 
hundred thousand expellees and others in over 1,200 camps. Five years later, more than 




Local Reactions to the Expellees 
          Though many Einheimische (locals) accommodated their homeless compatriots 
from the East, offering them food and shelter, others were less generous in sharing their 
already scarce resources. Due to the acute housing shortage, and despite vociferous 
protests, occupation authorities and local officials frequently requisitioned extra rooms 
which were then apportioned to expellees. In such cases, as Müller and Simon write, 
which were not rare, expellees had to be accompanied by armed escorts to access their 
new homes.8
                                                           
Schoeller calls Friedland the “waiting room of the uprooted.” See Schoeller, Deutschland vor Ort. 
Geschichten, Mythen, Erinnerungen. (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 2005). 
 As could be expected, this massive influx—in some rural areas the number 
of newcomers soon surpassed that of the local population—sparked intense competition 
for housing, employment, and food, and upset the traditional religious composition of 
many areas (e.g. communities historically comprised of Catholic majorities soon were 
inundated with Protestants and vice versa). Kossert cites a public-opinion poll from 1949, 
the results of which concluded, “The expellees make excessive demands, are arrogant, 
backwards, indifferent, and unreliable; they are another Volk with different ways of life 
7 Müller and Simon, “Aufnahme und Unterbringung,” p. 324 & p. 417. 
8 Müller and Simon, “Aufnahme und Unterbringung,” p. 320. 
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and thinking, and frequently of another religious confession; they are envious of the 
locals and are, therefore, unsatisfied.”9
          Compounding the problems of this abrupt demographic and social shift was the 
discriminatory—and borderline racist—stereotypes held by the Einheimischen against 
their countrymen from the East. Locals referred to the expellees as “Flüchtlingsschweine” 
(refugee swine), “Polacken,” “Rucksackdeutsche” (backpack Germans), and “40-kg-
Zigeuner” (40 kg gypsies, a reference to the amount of belongings, in kilograms, they 
were allowed to take with them when forced to leave their homes in the East). Though 
such prejudices had been long held in Germany, Kossert attributes this particular view to 
the widespread internalization of Nazi propaganda regarding the innate inferiority of 
Germany’s eastern neighbors,
 
10 and points out that “degrees of rejection [existed] 
according to the origin of the expellees.” As examples, he notes the general acceptance of 
the Pomeranians in the Lüneburg Heath while the Silesians and East Prussians faced 
greater difficulties. Germans from regions farther east were most likely to be confronted 
with rejection.11
   God in heaven, see our despair 
 In sum, the attitudes held by many locals toward their new neighbors are 
reflected in this mock prayer circulating in Württemberg in 1946/1947: 
   We farmers have no lard and no bread 
   Refugees are eating like pigs 
   and steal our last bed. 
   We starve and suffer great torment, 
   God, send the rabble home. 
   Send them back to Czechoslovakia, 
   God, free us from these good-for-nothings. 
   They have no faith and no good name,                                                           
   The three-times cursed, in eternity, amen.12
                                                           
9 Kossert, Kalte Heimat, p. 84. 
 
10 Kossert, Kalte Heimat, p. 71. 
11 Kossert, Kalte Heimat, p. 84. 
12 In the original German, the prayer reads as follows: 
Herrgott im Himmel, sieh unsere Not, 
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In many cases, expellees faced discrimination, were homeless, impoverished, and hungry. 
As a result, it is not surprising that many expellees felt compelled not only to verify their 
“Germanness” but also to prove their social status, as well as the material and cultural 
wealth they once held in their lost homelands. One means of expressing these sentiments 
was the local expellee monuments soon to spring up throughout West Germany.  
 
Official Responses of the Allies and the Emergence of Expellee Organizations 
          The distrust of so many locals vis-à-vis the expellees was matched by the 
suspicions of the Allies, who from the start explicitly forbade the formation of expellee 
organizations. Viewing the expellees as particularly susceptible to extremism, either in 
the form or renewed National Socialism or Communism, the occupying powers instituted 
what was called the Koalitionsverbot for fear that this large constituency might become 
radicalized. In addition, the Allies were keen to maintain the status quo of the postwar 
settlement. In other words, they proscribed the Koalitionsverbot to prevent the formation 
of political movements based on territorial revisionism. The solution to the expellee 
problem, in the eyes of the Allies, was not a return to their homes beyond the Oder-
Neisse line but rapid integration and assimilation into western society.13
                                                           
wir Bauern haben kein Fett und kein Brot,  
  
Flüchtlinge fressen sich dick und fett  
und stehlen unser letztes Bett.   
Wir verhungern und leiden große Pein,  
Herrgott, schick das Gesindel heim.  
Schick sie zurück in die Tschechoslowakei,  
Herrgott, mach uns von dem Gesindel frei  
Sie haben keinen Glauben und keinen Namen,   
die dreimal Verfluchten, in Ewigkeit Amen.  
Cited in Kossert, Kalte Heimat, p. 78. 
13 Ahonen, After the Expulsion, p. 25. 
68 
 
          Nevertheless, the expellees formed collectives based on familial ties and church 
communities which remained under the Allies’ radar.14 Aid organizations emanating 
from the religious groups were the first major expellee associations but they drew 
unwanted attention from the Allies and were promptly shut down when members dabbled 
in political activities. Stickler claims the expellees sought from the start to circumvent the 
Koalitionsverbot by founding substitute organizations and by renaming and re-
establishing banned groups to cozen Allied observers.15 For example, Boehm writes of a 
large regional grouping of expellees from Silesia in North Rhine-Westphalia who evaded 
British authorities by using the cover “Wir Usinger” (“We Usinger,” an old nickname for 
Silesians).16 In time, the British and American occupation authorities17 lifted their 
prohibition18
                                                           
14 Max Hildebert Boehm, “Gruppenbildung und Organisationswesen,” in Lemberg and Edding (eds.) Die 
Vertriebenen in Westdeutschland. Vol. 1, pp. 523-530.  
 and the humanitarian associations that had managed to avoid Allied censure 
and other local groups that had sprung up were given free rein to coalesce on a larger 
scale on higher levels. Making up for lost time, grassroots expellee organizations began 
15 Matthias Stickler, “Ostdeutsch heißt Gesamtdeutsch.” Organisation, Selbstverständnis und 
heimatpolitische Zielsetzungen der deutschen Vertriebenenverbände 1949-1972. (Düsseldorf: Droste 
Verlag, 2004), p. 34. 
16 Boehm, “Gruppenbildung und Organisationswesen,” p. 556. 
17 The French Zone was the home until later in the decade to a much smaller population of expellees (under 
50,000). The occupying authorities there did not allow for the large-scale transfer of expellees into its zone 
until 1948. In all, the French Zone became home to approximately 200,000 Germans from the East whereas 
the British and American Zones accommodated several million each. See Müller and Simon, “Aufnahme 
und Unterbringung,” p. 309 and p. 393ff. and Ahonen, After the Expulsion, p.25n. 
18 According to Ahonen, the prohibition was repealed due to the breakdown in relations between the 
Western Powers and the Soviet Union. Soviet non-compliance with the Potsdam Accords provoked the 
Americans to call into question the permanence of the Oder/Neisse border. Instead of forbidding the 
possibility of border revisions as American acceptance of the territorial status quo implied, they now held 
open the possibility, a stance that proved popular with the expellees. Ahonen writes, “In changing their 
public position on the Oder/Neisse line, American policymakers were primarily motivated by two tactical 
objectives: winning over German loyalties on the one hand and embarrassing the new enemy, the Soviet 
Union, on the other.” Thus prohibiting groups who advocated official U.S. policy (even though the 
probability that the Americans would move to change things was slim at best) proved hypocritical and 
politically inexpedient. The ban was lifted in 1947 in the American Zone and in 1948 in the British Zone 
(where the prohibition had never been as strict anyway). Nevertheless, the proscription of overtly political 
organizations (as opposed to cultural and economic associations) remained in effect until the late 1940s.  
See Ahonen, After the Expulsion, p. 26-28. 
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to organize on a national level as well. By 1950, all the major individual 
Landsmannschaften had formed.19 The desire for political and social structures within the 
multifarious expellee community is truly remarkable. In addition to these large groups, 
smaller occupational committees and unions formed, among them the Society of Former 
Sudeten German Movie Theater Owners and Federal Association of Expellee Doctors 
and Dentists.20
          Another important development was the establishment of a separate 
Bundesministerium für die Angelegenheiten der Vertriebenen (Federal Ministry for 




                                                           
19 The Landsmannschaften were associations based on the regional origins of the expellees. Boehm’s text 
offers a fascinating summary of each of these important expellee groups’ formative years. See 
(“Gruppenbildung und Organisationswesen,” pp. 535-579). According to Boehm, though the homeland 
societies originally set out to meet the psychological needs of their isolated and alienated members 
scattered about occupied Germany, the core of their mission became – above all – political. More than just 
a cure for homesickness and the cultivation of local traditions from the former homeland, members of the 
Landsmannschaften saw themselves politically responsible for the lost Heimat and its fate in the future (p. 
595). 
 The ministry oversaw the preparation of legislation and the 
20 As a result of the Allied proscription of a singular movement, however, the road to a unified, nationwide 
expellee organization was much more complicated. As an umbrella organization for the twenty homeland 
societies, the Vereinigte Ostdeutsche Landsmannschaften (VOL—United East German Homeland 
Societies) was organized in 1949 (and rechristened Verband der Landsmannschaften—VdL, Association of 
Homeland Societies in 1953). Not desiring to speak for the expellees as a whole, the VOL/VdL instead 
actively sought the retention of the power and influence of the individual Landsmannschaften. On the 
selfsame day in 1949, a competing organization came about in an effort to represent all expellees regardless 
of origin: the Zentralverband vertriebener Deutscher (ZvD—Central Organization of Expelled Germans)—
renamed the Bund vertriebener Deutschen (BvD—League of Expelled Germans) in 1954. Although the 
goals of the rival groups were supposed to differ—the VOL/VdL’s explicit aim was the reunification of 
Germany and, concomitantly, the reacquisition of Germany’s lost eastern territories; the ZvD/BvD 
addressed economic and sociopolitical concerns—the division proved to be less than fruitful as the 
overlapping objectives led to internecine squabbling and inefficiency. (See Stickler, “Ostdeutsch heißt 
Gesamtdeutsch,” pp. 41ff.) Nevertheless, these associations—which would merge in 1957 to form the so-
called “Avantgarde des deutschen Volkes” (Avantgarde of the German people—Ibid., p. 99), the Bund der 
Vertriebenen – Vereinigte Landsmannschaften und Landesverbände (BdV—League of Expellees – United 
Homeland Societies and State Associations)—were instrumental in articulating the interests, both political 
and cultural, of the expellees on all levels and were responsible for initiating a large number of local 
monuments throughout the postwar period. 
21 The name was changed to the Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte 
(Ministry for Expellees, Refugees and War-Damaged) in the early 1950s. The “Refugees” referred to in the 
ministry’s title were those Germans who fled the Soviet Zone and the German Democratic Republic. 
According to some estimates, roughly one third of those who fled the GDR for West Germany were 
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coordination of policies pertaining to the expellees. More specifically, it organized 
measures to provide a legal definition of expellees, coordinated expellees’ ongoing 
economic and social integration, resolved the expellees’ resettlement issues within the 
Federal Republic, and provided support for those fleeing the GDR.22
          It should be pointed out, however, that setting up the ministry was not a Right or 
Left issue. Indeed, all three of the largest parties (the CDU, the Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands [SPD—Social Democratic Party of Germany], and the Freie 
Demokratische Partei [FDP—Free Democratic Party]) had campaigned on this issue 
  Even though the 
responsibilities of the ministry could have been addressed more efficiently perhaps by 
other ministries and agencies of the new government, it was viewed as politically 
expedient to set up a distinct cabinet-level institution.  
                                                           
expellees despite the fact that the expellees accounted for just under one quarter of the entire population. 
Cited in Philipp Ther, “The Integration of Expellees in Germany and Poland after World War II: A 
Historical Reassessment,” in Slavic Review. 55, 4 (Winter 1996), p. 800. 
22 One of the ministry’s notable achievements was publishing several hundred firsthand accounts of the 
expulsion in the colossal, multivolume Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-
Mitteleuropa. The project provided vivid depictions of German suffering with scant mention of the 
suffering they inflicted on others. See Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und 
Kriegsgeschädigte, (ed.) Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa. Vol. 1: Die 
Vertreibung der deutschen Bevölkerung aus den Gebieten östlich der Oder-Neiße. 3 Parts. (Munich: 
Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1984 [1954 (pts. 1&2), 1960 (pt. 3)]). Vol. 2: Das Schicksal der Deutschen 
in Ungarn. (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1984 [1956]).  Vol. 3: Das Schicksal der Deutschen 
in Rumänien. (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1984 [1957]). Vol. 4: Die Vertreibung der 
deutschen Bevölkerung aus der Tschechoslowakei. 2 Parts. (Augsburg: Weltbild Verlag, 1984 [1957]. Vol. 
5: Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien. (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1984 [1961]). I. 
Beiheft. Käthe von Normann, Ein Tagebuch aus Pommern, 1945-1946. (Groß-Denkte/Wolfenbüttel: 
Grenzland-Druckerei, 1955). 2. Beiheft. Margarete Schell, Ein Tagebuch aus Prag, 1945-1946. (Kassel: 
Herbert M. Nuhr, 1957). 3. Beiheft. Hans Graf von Lehndorff, Ein Bericht aus Ost- und Westpreussen, 
1945-1947. (Düsseldorf: Oskar-Leiner-Druck, 1960).  
The overt aim of the series was twofold. First, the personal testimonies and government documents 
contained in the volumes and supplementary texts (“Beihefte”) were to serve as official documentation of 
what happened to Germans in their former homelands. Second, they were to be used as evidence in 
negotiations to settle border issues at an expected international peace conference. To be fair, the 
Dokumentation does indeed contain some material contextualizing the expulsion and shedding light on the 
Nazi occupation of Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, as Mathias Beer contends, the sponsors of the project had 
political goals that went beyond balanced analysis: in terms of domestic policy, to support the integration of 
expellees in their new homes; and, in terms of foreign policy, to relativize German guilt. See Beer, “Im 
Spannungsfeld von Politik und Zeitgeschichte: Das Großforschungsprojekt ‘Dokumentation der 
Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa,’” in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte. 46, 3, Juli 1998, 
pp. 345-390; see also Moeller, War Stories, pp. 51-87. 
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prior to the 1949 election.23 Clearly, all the parties sought to curry the favor of this 
formidable voting bloc and crucial constituency. Despite the pre-election consensus, an 
independent expellee ministry was not a foregone conclusion and was not a top priority 
of the new Adenauer government. In fact, Mathias Beer notes that Adenauer hoped that 
the ministry would draw the potential dissatisfaction of the expellee organizations away 
from his administration and deflect it toward the Ministry for Expellee Affairs instead.24 
Quite possibly, however, the ministry’s most important function was its role as what Beer 
calls, “the institutional expression of symbolic politics,” which “underscored for the 
expellees the high significance attributed by the federal government to their concerns.”25
          Based on these historical developments, it is safe to assume that this period (the 
late 1940s) would see the fewest number of new expellee monuments. Besides the shorter 
duration of this period, this assumption is premised on two major factors. The first is the 
expellees’ precarious financial situation. For most expellees, due to the lack of a 
permanent place of residence
 
Such symbolic concessions vis-à-vis the expellees encouraged their continued activism 
and further cemented, for the time being, the place of the expellees, their organizations, 
and their interests within the Federal Republic’s public sphere. 
26 and the inability to procure gainful employment27
                                                           
23 Moeller claims the ministry is another indication of Germans’ “selective memory” of their recent past. 
As he points out, there was no equivalent “Ministry for Survivors of Nazi Persecution.” Moeller, War 
Stories, p. 85. In this important book, Moeller responds to the notion that Germans were unable to mourn 
the recent past, and more broadly, to the belief that Germans avoided any recollection of Nazi rule during 
the 1940s and 1950s. Moeller asserts that German remembrance then focused exclusively on German 
suffering in an exaggerated amount. As he writes, “remembering selectively was not the same as 
forgetting.” (p. 16) 
 the 
24 Mathias Beer. “Symbolische Politik? Entstehung, Aufgaben und Funktion des Bundesministeriums für 
Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte” in Jochen Oltmer (ed.) Migration steuern und verwalten. 
Deutschland vom späten 19. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart. (Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2003), p. 311.  
25 Beer, “Symbolische Politik?” p. 322. 
26 Transports of expellees continued to stream into the western zones and the Federal Republic until the end 
of the decade. For those dwelling in temporary camps, the resettlement programs to alleviate the problems 
of high concentration of expellees in the Aufnahmeländer (receiving states, i.e. Schleswig-Holstein, Lower 
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situation in immediate postwar era—even compared to that of their “ordinary” German 
neighbors—was a period of extraordinary flux. In this state of instability, the resources to 
fund commemoration of the expulsion in most cases were nonexistent. Secondly, 
although they gained political clout after the end of the Koalitionsverbot, the expellee 
organizations at this time were comparatively weak. Under these circumstances, it seems 
likely that establishing themselves into West German society socially, economically, and 
politically was more of a concern for expellees than constructing monuments. In the 
small number of expellee monuments that did appear, however, one might expect to see 
open assertions of “Germanness” due to the prejudices held against expellees by local 
populations. To be sure, the Allies were paying attention to all kinds of German 
memorials,28
 
 so the probability that the tone of expellee monuments would be overtly 
revanchist, nationalistic, or even particularly political, was slim.  
                                                           
Saxony, and Bavaria) did not begin in earnest until 1949 and continued into the 1950s. For more on the 
Umsiedlung (resettlement) of the expellees within West Germany, see Müller and Simon, “Aufnahme und 
Unterbringung,” pp. 391-410. The authors of this text (published in 1959) point out that although the 
resettlement efforts were generally judged a success, questions remained whether the further dispersal and 
distribution of the expellees to areas based merely on current labor shortages would be a long-term 
solution. 
27 In 1949, expellees constituted more than one-third of all the unemployed in the Federal Republic even 
though they constituted just over sixteen percent of the total population. See Ian Connor, “Die Integration 
der Flüchtlinge und Vertriebenen in den Arbeitsprozeß nach 1945.” Jahrbuch für ostdeutsche Volkskunde. 
32 (1989), p. 190. Cited in Kossert, Kalte Heimat, p. 94. 
28 In addition to banning the political organization of expellees via the Koalitionsverbot, the Allied Control 
Council promulgated Directive No. 30 on May 13, 1946, the first paragraph of which declared illegal, “the 
planning, designing, erection, installation, posting or other display of any monument, memorial, poster, 
statue, edifice, street or highway name, marker, emblem, tablet, or insignia which tends to preserve and 
keep alive the German military tradition, to revive militarism or to commemorate the Nazi Party, or which 
is of such a nature as to glorify incidents of war, and the functioning of military museums and exhibitions, 
and the erection, installation or posting or other display on a building or other structure of any of the 
same…” Enactments and Approved Papers of the Control Council and Coordinating Committee. Available 
online, Library of Congress Homepage: <www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Enactments/03LAW28.pdf> 
Accessed December 18, 2008. This is not to suggest that the expellees at any time employed Nazi insignias 
to commemorate and decry their losses. Nonetheless, it is not likely that the Allies would have tolerated 
openly revisionist monuments during this period (which arguably would appear later). 
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THE NARRATIVE ESTABLISHED: PUBLIC COMMEMORATION IN THE 
1950s  
 
          On the five-year anniversary of the Potsdam Agreement, thousands of expellees 
packed the courtyard of the Neues Schloss in Stuttgart29 to protest the Allies’ partitioning 
of German territory after WWII and to hear the proclamation of the Charta der deutschen 
Heimatvertriebenen (Charter of the German Expellees).30
          For the writers of this seminal declaration (often cited in the inscriptions of 
expellee monuments), the Charter was to serve as the “Basic Law” (Grundgesetz) for the 
expellees and elucidated what they considered their “duties and rights”—such as the 
renunciation “of revenge and retaliation…in memory of the infinite suffering brought 
upon mankind particularly during the past decade,”  and avowals to “
 The Charter—signed by all the 
leaders of the major expellee organizations of the time—was read before members of the 
federal government, the churches, and other expellee dignitaries.  
                                                           
29 A memorial plaque was emplaced here in 2002 to commemorate this historic event.  
support with all our 
strength every endeavor directed towards the establishment of a united Europe in which 
the nations may live in freedom from fear and coercion,” as well as to “contribute, by 
hard and untiring work, to the reconstruction of Germany and Europe.” The Charter also 
contains passages which provide key insights into the way the expellees understood their 
experiences of flight and forced migration at the end of and after WWII during the 1950s. 
For example, it states:  
30 The (non-gender-neutral) translation of the Charter I use here comes from the English version provided 
on the BdV’s website. The original document in German, as well as translated versions (English, Polish, 
Romanian, Russian, and Czech), are also available there:  <http://www.bund-der-
vertriebenen.de/derbdv/charta-dt.php3> Accessed January 12, 2009.  
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We have lost our homeland. The homeless are strangers on the face of the earth. God 
himself placed men in their native land. To separate a man forcibly from his native land 
means to kill him in his mind.31
We have suffered and experienced this fate. We therefore feel called upon to demand that 
the right to our native land be recognized and realized as one of the basic rights of man, 
granted to him by God. 
  
[…] 
The nations of the world should become sensitive of their co-responsibility for the fate of 
the expellees who have suffered most from the hardships of our times. 
[…] 
The nations must realize that the fate of the German expellees, just as that of all refugees, 
is a world problem the solution of which calls for the highest moral responsibility and for 
a commitment to tremendous effort. 
 
          Obviously, the text is problematic for several reasons. As Samuel Salzborn points 
out, the Bund der Vertriebenen has always emphasized the expellees’ magnanimity 
(menschliche Größe) in denouncing violent retribution as a response to what befell them. 
Primarily interested in the Charter’s implications for German foreign policy, Salzborn 
also criticizes the way the declaration “relativizes Germany’s war guilt” and objects to its 
“double function”: The first being the attempt by the expellees to portray themselves as 
victims of the Nazis and to protest the Potsdam Agreement; and the second being the 
demand for an expellee “say” in matters regarding the political power constellations in 
Europe.32
                                                           
31 This key passage (Original German: “Den Menschen mit Zwang von seiner Heimat trennen, bedeutet, 
ihn im Geiste töten”) is the inspiration for the inscription on the monument in Hagen, North Rhine-
Westphalia. The monument is discussed more thoroughly in Chapter Three. 
 Equally critical of the declaration—particularly of the self-pitying total 
dissolution of cause and effect and of the self-centered assertion that the expellees 
“suffered most from the hardships of our times”—I view the Charter as a time capsule 
which summarizes not only the general attitudes held by the expellees but also the 
sentiments expressed by the monuments in the 1950s, arguably the most important era of 
32 See Samuel Salzborn, Grenzenlose Heimat: Geschichte, Gegenwart und Zukunft der 
Vertriebenenverbände. (Berlin: Elefanten Press, 2000), pp. 56-57, as well as his Heimatrecht und 
Volkstumskampf. Außenpolitische Konzepte der Vertriebenenverbände un ihre praktische Umsetzung. 
(Hanover: Offizin, 2001), pp. 21-25. For other notable critiques of the Charter, see Micha Brumlik, Wer 
Sturm sät. Die Vertreibung der Deutschen. (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 2005), and Ralph Giordano, Die zweite 
Schuld, oder von der Last Deutscher zu sein. (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2000). 
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all. Again, this decade was marked by a number of key political and societal 
developments, the most important of which will be sketched out below, which helped 
shape local expellee monuments and the historical narratives they articulated during this 
period.  
 
Politicizing German Suffering 
          In terms of politics, the expellee organizations spent the early years of the 1950s 
campaigning for compensation for their property losses in the East. In the years 
immediately following the war, when such discussions commenced, some expellees had 
been reluctant to enter into such debates over restitution (called the Lastenausgleich or 
“equalization of burdens”—in essence, a legislative act that would provide expellees and 
others reimbursements for material losses during the war) because they considered a 
financial settlement of this nature tantamount to a rejection of the possibility of a return 
home.33
          At first, the expellee organizations were unsure how best to articulate their political 
interests. At issue was whether the expellees should join the already established political 
parties (in particular, the CDU, the SPD, or the FDP) or originate their own.
 Still yearning for the acknowledgement of their material wealth and a return to 
their former social status in the East, however, many expellees came to view themselves 
as entitled to compensation—though not in the form of welfare or charity—that provided 
the sought-after societal recognition and distributed the burdens of the war amongst the 
entire West German populace.  
34
                                                           
33 Michael L. Hughes, Shouldering the Burdens of Defeat: West Germany and the Reconstruction of Social 
Justice. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press), 1999, p. 79. 
 To be sure, 
34 Enjoying short-lived success in the 1950s, the Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten (BHE) 
was founded by Waldemar Kraft in Schleswig-Holstein in 1950. In the state parliament election there in 
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none of the major parties at this point advocated (publicly, at least) giving up the 
formerly German eastern provinces. In another key area considered vital by the expellees, 
the need for some form of compensation for material losses in the eastern territories, the 
major parties did not differ.35
          What ensued in the initial years of the new decade amounted to an expanded 
competition of victimhood between the expellees and their organizations and the other 
“war-damaged” German peoples.
 Foreign policy would eventually settle the issue for them. 
By the 1970s, most expellees, especially those reluctant to recognize the Oder/Neisse 
border, would be firmly ensconced in the corner of the Christian Democrats and 
Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU—Christian Social Union). In the 1950s, however, 
expellee votes were much more up for grabs and all the parties sought to garner the 
support of this large voting bloc.  
36
                                                           
1950, the party earned nearly a quarter of the votes and helped form the ruling coalition. In 1953, after 
renaming itself the Gesamtdeutcher Block/Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten (GB/BHE) to 
make a stronger appeal to non-expellees, the party surpassed the 5% hurdle in the federal elections and 
entered the Bundestag. Though the party experienced moderate success at the state level, it fell short of the 
5% hurdle in the 1957 federal elections and was for all intents and purposes dissolved in 1961 when it 
merged with the Deutsche Partei to form the Gesamtdeutsche Partei. For more on the BHE, see Franz 
Neumann, Der Block der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten, 1950-1960: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte 
und Struktur einer politischen Interessenpartei. (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1968). 
 Through some legislative acts discussed below, the 
expellees became primus inter pares amongst German victims of WWII. To make their 
case, the expellee organizations painted their members and supporters as passive victims 
of injustice. This required, of course, overlooking any involvement in National Socialism. 
35 Though all the parties agreed on the need for what Ahonen calls “the principle of redistributive justice” 
(After the Expulsion, p. 54), they differed widely in their approaches to implementing this policy. For more 
on the political wrangling between the parties, see Hughes, Shouldering the Burdens of Defeat, pp. 129-
150. 
36 It is imperative to recall that Germans possessed a limited view of who could make such claims. Hughes 
notes, “Significantly, postwar West Germans did not accept every claim to victim status or compensation. 
They were disinclined to accept Jews and political persecutees as victims and they refused recognition and 
recompense to various other groups who suffered because of Nazi persecution or war, for example, Sinti 
and Roma, homosexuals, and so-called asocials. In each case, West Germans did not see these people as 
fellow members of a mutually obligated moral community.” Ibid., p. 99. 
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As Hughes notes, “Any suggestion that individual war-damaged shared responsibility for 
their losses undermined their demands for recompense—as victims or legal claimants.”37
Organized expellees were more numerous and, having generally lost everything, more 
committed to a Lastenausgleich than were their bomb-damaged counterparts. They were 
convinced that they had suffered more than the bomb-damaged and were entitled to 
privileged treatment. […] Fearing potential expellee radicalism, the government and the 
political parties tended to privilege the expellees over the bomb-damaged.
 
In the end, though some complain to this day about the shortcomings of the resulting 
legislative efforts at restitution, due to their organization, dogged determination, and the 
political sway they held, the expellees were more successful than other groups in securing 




The Lastenausgleichsgesetz (LAG—Law to Equalize the Burdens) was promulgated on 
August 14, 1952.39
          The next year, another crucial law was passed which had a significant impact on 
the status of expellees within West German society during this period (and beyond) and 
played an important role in promoting (indirectly) the erection of local monuments. The 




                                                           
37 Ibid., p. 100. 
 The law’s Paragraph 96 (the so-called Kulturparagraph, referred to by Manfred 
38 Ibid., p. 170. 
39 It is interesting to note that in the preamble of the LAG, it is stated that the law has been passed with “the 
emphatic proviso that obtaining and accepting the benefits of the law does not mean a renunciation of the 
assertion of restitution claims on the assets left behind by the expellees.” As cited in the appendix to Eugen 
Lemberg and Friedrich Edding (eds.) Die Vertriebenen in Westdeutschland: Ihre Eingliederung und Ihr 
Einfluss auf Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft, Politik und Geistesleben. Vol. III. (Kiel: Ferdinand Hirt, 1959), p. 
665. In other words, the legislation was crafted in such a way as to keep the door open for a return home 
and claims for compensation vis-à-vis Germany’s eastern neighbors. 
40 The law’s formal title is the Gesetz über die Angelegenheiten der Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge (Expellee 
and Refugee Affairs Law). Its main purpose was to define legally the status of “expellee” and differentiate 
juristically between those Germans forced to leave their homes in Eastern Europe and the “refugees” who 
fled the Soviet Zone of occupation (and later, the GDR) in order to regulate the rights and benefits for 
which they were eligible. (For more on this aspect, see Salzborn, Grenzenlose Heimat, p. 63.) Less 
concretely, the legislature provides insights into the way the federal government viewed this important 
political constituency. That the law defined them as “expellees” and not “re-settlers,” “migrants,” or any 
other designation corroborated the view that Germans from the East had suffered more than others and 
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Kittel as “fundamental to the memory culture of the German East”)41
Corresponding to the responsibilities given them by the Grundgesetz (Basic Law), the 
federal government and the states are to maintain awareness of the cultural assets 
(Kulturgut) from the areas of expulsion vis-à-vis the expellees, the entire German Volk, 
as well as internationally; to ensure and evaluate archives, museums and libraries as well 
as to secure and promote institutions of artistic creation and education. They are also to 
promote science and research in order to fulfill the tasks resulting from the expulsion and 
the integration of expellees and to support the further development of cultural 
achievements of the expellees.
 also explicitly 
stated the federal and respective state governments’ role in advancing the culture of the 
German East. It states:  
42
 
    
          Likely inspired by the Kulturparagraph, the German Associations of Cities 
(Deutscher Städtetag) and the German Association of Counties (Deutscher Landkreistag) 
called for guidelines for the formal establishment of Patenschaften (patronages)43
                                                           
deserved some legal recognition. Interestingly, the law officially allowed the extension of those perquisites 
to the non-expellee spouses of the truly expelled as well as to expellees’ progeny. According to West 
German law then, the children and grandchildren of expellees—conferred this special status regardless of 
their birthplace—were thus entitled to the same rights as those adversely affected by the expulsion.   
 of 
eastern German localities by cities and counties in the West to boost consciousness and 
knowledge of expellee cultures and nurture their local traditions. The concept of the 
Patenschaft entailed much more than a typical partnership between equal sister cities. 
Writing about this arrangement between cities of North Rhine-Westphalia and the eastern 
41 Manfred Kittel, Vertreibung der Vertriebenen? Der historische deutsche Osten in der Erinnerungskultur 
der Bundesrepublik (1961-1982). (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2007), p. 81. Though the title contains a 
question mark, there is little question Kittel’s expellee-friendly text clearly argues—though in my opinion 
not entirely persuasively—that commemoration of the expulsion was marginalized and successfully halted 
over the course of the two decades of his analysis.  
42 Cited in Ibid., pp. 81-82. As a result of Paragraph 96, Kittel reports, military barracks and rest areas 
along the Autobahn were named after cities of the German East, and a series of stamps was produced 
depicting formerly German landmarks beyond the Oder/Neisse (pp. 87-89) More significantly, the West 
German federal and state governments financially supported expellee cultural centers, regional museums, 
and scores of local Heimatstuben throughout the Federal Republic. The Heimatstuben are particularly 
noteworthy. Even smaller than the museums dedicated to the commemoration of local cultures and 
traditions (i.e. Heimatmuseum), a Heimatstube, in connection to the expellees, contained extant cultural 
artifacts, photographs, artwork, traditional costumes, books, flags, coats-of-arms, etc. commemorating and 
celebrating the local cultures of municipalities and regions in the former eastern provinces. For more on 
Heimat museums and the important role they have played in German history, see Alon Confino, The 
Nation as Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871-1918. (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), pp. 134-157. 
43 Patenschaft means literally “sponsorship” as of a child by godparents. 
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provinces, Alfons Perlick noted that through a Patenschaft, an East German city was still 
“spiritually in existence.” Because the German cities of the East were themselves unable, 
due to the political situation at the moment, to maintain their traditions and culture, West 
German cities were to assume that responsibility for them.44
          The first Patenschaft was set up in 1950—three years before the aforementioned 
official guidelines were established—and linked the city of Goslar in Lower Saxony to 
the Silesian city of Brieg, then and now in Poland. The total number of such 
arrangements reached approximately 350 by the end of the 1960s.
   
45 Patenschaften were 
typically established between cities or counties of similar size or with historical, cultural, 
geographical, and economic ties. They also came about when large numbers of expellees 
from a particular locale in the eastern provinces congregated in a specific area in the 
West. Not just cities and counties adopted eastern counterparts, however. For example, 
Baden-Württemberg took over sponsorship of all Danube Swabians (Donauschwaben) in 
1954. The renowned West German soccer club Schalke 04 (Gelsenkirchen, North Rhine-
Westphalia) adopted the Allenstein (East Prussia—today Olsztyn, Poland) Sports Club 
(Allensteiner Sportverein).46




                                                           
44 The responsibilities of the West German cities were to sponsor gatherings of expellees from certain cities 
and counties, which would demonstrate to the whole world, according to Perlick, that the adopted cities and 
counties now in Polish territory remained “unequivocally German.” In addition, these special relationships 
between cities were to foster the integration of expellees by creating opportunities for exchange between 
locals and their new neighbors from the East. For more on this arrangement, see Alfons Perlick, “Die west-
ostdeutschte Patenschaftsbewegung in Nordrhein-Westfalen,” in Perlick (ed.) Das west-ostdeutsche 
Patenschaftswerk in Nordrhein-Westfalen. (Düsseldorf: Wegweiserverlag, 1961), pp. 9-18. 
45Kittel, Vertreibung der Vertriebenen? p. 99. As in the case of local expellee monuments, a precise total is 
uncertain. Kittel cites an Expellee Ministry report from 1969 which addresses this issue. The lack of a 
central organizing body, overlaps, unannounced changes, abrogation of the relationship due to lack of funds 
or waning interest—all were all to blame for this missing total. 
46 Ibid., p. 98. The city of Gelsenkirchen had adopted the city of Allenstein as well.  
80 
 
The Inception of the Cold War and the Commemoration of the Expulsion  
          Less than a month after the promulgation of the Federal Expellee Law, Soviet tanks 
violently suppressed a workers’ uprising in East Berlin and throughout the GDR. That 
day, June 17, 1953 was momentous for all (West) Germans, including the expellees, as 
Edgar Wolfrum persuasively argues, because (West German) interpretations of events 
surrounding that day rehabilitated the notion of the “nation” as such, and made it possible 
“to speak of [the German nation] without speaking of National Socialism.”47 What is 
more, in addition to what Wolfrum identifies as the main interpretations of the unrest, i.e. 
as an expression of anti-authoritarianism against the SED-state, or as a reestablishment of 
national dignity, the open rebellion was viewed as an attestation of Germans’ indomitable 
will to reunify.48
          With most still clinging to the hope of revisiting the border question (and, 
concomitantly of course, returning to their homes in the East), June 17, 1953 and its 
subsequent political interpretations were understood by the expellee organizations and 
  
                                                           
47 Edgar Wolfrum, Geschichtspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Der Weg zur 
bundesrepublikanischen Erinnerung, 1948–1990. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1999), 
p. 7. 
48 For more on the readings of this historic event, see Ibid., p. 76ff. In agreement in principle over these 
larger interpretations, the major political parties differed as to the event’s implications for German-German 
policy, and foreign policy in general. For the CDU the uprising served as confirmation of Konrad 
Adenauer’s policy of western integration. National unity, according to the chancellor, would only come 
about if Germany was free, democratic, and firmly entrenched in Western European and American security, 
economic, and political structures. Furthermore, the events of June 17, 1953 further discredited the SED 
regime and bolstered Adenauer’s claim of the Federal Republic as the sole representative of the German 
nation. For the SPD, the unrest was first and foremost a workers’ rebellion that demonstrated the Left’s 
long-standing claim as the true representative of the nation’s best interests. Even more importantly, for the 
Social Democrats, the events were a revolution both against the totalitarianism in the East as well as against 
Adenauer’s “restorative” government and the virtual impossibility of reunification promoted by Adenauer’s 
western integration. (Ibid., p. 89 & p. 92). Nevertheless, both major political parties viewed the events of 
June 17, 1953 as worthy of official recognition and commemoration. And remarkably, all the major parties 
were in agreement (except for the Communists [KPD]) with declaring the date a national holiday. 
Henceforth, June 17th was celebrated as the Tag der deutschen Einheit (Day of German Unity).For more on 
the parliamentary discussions on June 17th as West Germany’s national holiday, see Margarete Myers 
Feinstein, State Symbols: The Quest for Legitimacy in the Federal Republic of Germany and the German 
Democratic Republic, 1949-1953. (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2001). 
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their members as a vociferous call—not unlike their own—for the end of Germany’s 
division. Undoubtedly, this and other key moments of the embryonic Cold War kept 
questions of the finality of Germany’s borders in the public eye even though reunification 
in any circumstances was becoming less realistic politically by the day. For the expellees, 
of course, reunification meant not only the end of the division between the two German 
states, but also the reacquisition of their lost Heimat and the reestablishment of Germany 
in its 1937 borders, i.e. before the Anschluss of Austria and the annexation of the 
Sudetenland.  
          Nevertheless, June 17, 1953 refocused attention, albeit briefly, on the issue of 
overcoming German division in a new and more immediate way particularly germane for 
the expellees. In general during the early Cold War, the expellees could couch their 
rhetoric about the right to homeland and the desire for a return home in the rhetoric of 
German reunification usually reserved for the two German states. In fact, some local 
expellee groups, with the assistance of other organizations opposed to division, erected 
monuments to reflect this Cold War conflation; these markers referred not only to the 
expulsion and the lost cities and regions of the East but also to the lost cities and regions 
of the GDR.49
                                                           
49 What I call “Cold War Conflation” as a motif of local expellee monuments is discussed in detail in 
chapter 4. Many local expellee monuments—not all of which display this motif—were dedicated on 
subsequent commemorations of the Tag der deutschen Einheit, June 17th throughout the postwar decades.  
 Moreover, the Cold War cemented for many West Germans, not least of 
which the expellees, steadfast anti-Communist attitudes. As Wolfrum points out, expellee 
organizations pounced on the opportunity presented by June 17, 1953 to inveigh against 
the brutality of the Soviets and their cronies in the rest of the Eastern bloc, who had not 
only crushed the uprising in the GDR but also murdered, raped, violently expropriated, 
and ruthlessly expelled the Germans who had lived in some cases for centuries in their 
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new territory.50 Reflecting this attitude, the Communists bore the sole responsibility for 
the expulsion, according to many members of the expellee organizations, and not the 
Western Allies (who obviously had also signed off on the borders and population 
transfers established by the Potsdam Accord).51
          A final major event in this decade occurred in 1957 when the two major expellee 
umbrella organizations, the Verband der Landsmannschaften (VdL—Association of 
Homeland Societies), merged with its rival, the Bund vertriebener Deutschen (BvD—
League of Expelled Germans) on October 22, 1957 to form the largest, most powerful, 
vocal, and visible advocacy group for the interests of the expellees on the national, state, 
and local levels, the Bund der Vertriebenen - Vereinigte Landsmannschaften und 




          In the 1950s, the expellees were at the height of their political and social influence. 
With the improvement of their socioeconomic status, the expellees’ sheer numbers 
dictated that the major political parties would take their concerns seriously. The increase 
in power of the expellee organizations also helped their cause. Furthermore, political 
developments domestically and internationally seemed to be going in the expellees’ 
favor, which kept the prospect of returning home realistic for many of them. Moreover, 
most West Germans shared the basic tenets of the expellees’ understanding of history and 
 The BdV has played a crucial role in initiating local expellee 
monuments up to the present time.  
                                                           
50 Wolfrum, Gechichtspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, p. 151. 
51 Christian Lotz, Die Deutung des Verlusts. Erinnerungspolitische Kontroversen im geteilten Deutschland 
um Flucht, Vertreibung und die Ostgebiete (1948-1972). (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2007), p. 101. 
52 For a much more detailed account of the internal machinations, debates, and negotiations between the 
two key protagonists and their representatives during the “long road” to a united expellee organization, see 
Stickler, “Ostdeutsch heißt Gesamtdeutsch,” pp. 33-97. 
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their fate: namely, that the eastern provinces were rightfully German and that the 
expulsion had been an unprecedented tragedy and a singularly unjust action. The 
monuments of the 1950s were thus erected in an environment where talk of German 
suffering was not exceptional and was indeed the norm.53 For these reasons, one can 
presume that this decade witnessed the largest number of dedications of local expellee 
monuments for most Länder of the Federal Republic. Moreover, one might expect in 
general to see more expellee monuments in the public domain, and that they would 
become less mournful and more unabashedly political in tone with the goals of garnering 




WANING EXPELLEE INFLUENCE AND SHIFTING MEMORY PARADIGMS: 
COMMEMORATING THE EXPULSION IN THE 1960s & 1970s 
 
          Though most look at the 1960s—with its highly publicized trials of Nazi 
perpetrators, the rise of the student movement, and the election of the social-liberal 
coalition headed by Willy Brandt of the SPD—as the key period in which the shift away 
from the German-centered narrative happened, changes were already afoot in the 
                                                           
53 See, for example, Moeller, War Stories. 
54 This intention is not unprecedented in the history of German monuments. In fact, expellee monuments 
mirror German colonial monuments after the First World War. Though Joachim Zeller’s examination of 
colonial monuments encompasses their entire lifespan, it is above all the monuments erected after 
Germany’s defeat in WWI and the loss of colonies as a condition of the Versailles Treaty which is most 
fruitful for drawing parallels. No longer dedicated to the fallen German soldiers of the colonial wars, post-
1918 colonial monuments were used to agitate for and articulate revisionist territorial demands. Zeller 
shows how partisan activists—just like the initiators of expellee monuments—defiantly emplaced colonial 
monuments to maintain awareness of what had once been Germany territory and garner support for the 
reacquisition of their homelands.  Joachim Zeller. Kolonialdenkmäler und Geschichtsbewusstsein. Eine 
Untersuchung der kolonialdeutschen Erinnerungskultur. (Frankfurt: IKO-Verlag für Interkulturelle 
Kommunikation, 2000). Zeller divides his analysis into three phases (1884-1914, 1918-1945, and post-




          With both German states fully integrated militarily into the two-block system by 
the middle of the decade, Christian Lotz marks the inception of the paradigm shift in 
1956. In time, as a result of everything from de-Stalinization to the Cuban missile crisis 
in 1962, German reunification was effectively removed from the list of most pressing 
issues for the superpowers.
 By the latter half of the 1950s, the decade in which public 
memorialization of the expulsion reached its peak, the first signs of the expellees’ waning 
influence had in fact appeared. Within a few years, a significant shift in emphasis would 
be perceptible and large numbers of West Germans, particularly the young people, started 
to question the preponderance of the German experiences of WWII—above all, those of 
the expellees—in the Federal Republic’s historical narratives. By the 1970s, the key 
events shaping the commemoration of flight and expulsion with monuments would in fact 
be going against the expellees. As a result, expellee organizations and their interpretation 
of the past began to be pushed to the periphery as foreign policy matters and 
remembrance of the Holocaust took precedence. Nevertheless, and this is pivotal, their 
messages remained the same and in some cases became more radical.  
56
          Closer to home, Lotz identifies four developments that would have more direct 
relevance for the continued preeminence of the expellee organizations’ interpretation of 
 In other words, the likelihood of ending the division 
between East and West Germany—let alone of the hoped-for final peace treaty planned at 
Potsdam in 1945 which would restore Germany’s territorial integrity entirely and enable 
the expellees to return home—was growing slimmer.  
                                                           
55 It is important to note that the paradigm shift described here was a drawn out process taking place over 
years, not a clean break that occurred overnight. Despite the move away from a German-centered narrative, 
it would be years before one could speak of a narrative centering on the Holocaust. In any case, discussions 
over the recent past in Germany remained contentious throughout this entire period. 
56 Lotz, Die Deutung des Verlusts, pp. 127-128. 
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the past and maintenance of their somewhat privileged societal position as the most 
important victims of WWII. First, the “economic miracle” had alleviated the most 
pressing material needs of the expellees and had furthered their integration into West 
German society to an extent unforeseeable in the first years after the war. With the 
economic situation improving for most expellees, fewer of them saw a return home as the 
only possibility of reestablishing their prior existence. Second, the plausibility of 
expellees’ hopes and demands was questioned. Every day away from the old Heimat 
meant further consolidation of Polish (or Czechoslovak or Soviet) control over the 
formerly German territory. Years after the end of the war, the chance that this state of 
affairs would simply revert to old times became less realistic. Third, as touched on above, 
the likelihood of an easy resolution of the border issue in the confrontational international 
political climate of the period was also minimal. In time, the German federal government 
saw the expellees and their territorial demands as an albatross around its neck that limited 
its diplomatic options. Moreover, the expellees grew to be seen by the rest of the 
population as a hindrance to détente between East and West. Finally, the revelations of 
criminal atrocities at the high profile trials of Nazi perpetrators in the early 1960s 
weakened the morally-based arguments of the expellees about the unprecedented 
brutality they had faced and bolstered the case of those who maintained the expulsion 
was directly connected to Nazi war of aggression.57
 
 Though all of these continued 
throughout the period and are important, the last two are crucial for the purposes of this 
study and will be elucidated here.  
 
                                                           
57 Ibid., pp. 127-208, especially 201-202. 
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“Verzicht ist Verrat”: Foreign Policy Considerations in the Cold War 
          As the decisive European front in the Cold War, West German foreign policy 
considerations played a substantial role in diminishing support for the expellee 
organizations’ accounts of the past. For over a decade, the Adenauer government 
envisioned the achievement of state sovereignty through western integration while 
simultaneously not recognizing the GDR and pursuing the reunification of Germany in its 
1937 borders.58 The first part of the strategy was a success as West Germany regained 
(nearly) full autonomy through the Paris Treaties of 1954/1955. When the Berlin Wall 
emerged over night on August 13, 1961, however, the efficacy of the second part of the 
plan was challenged. Prominent West German commentators, according to Ahonen, 
viewed the erection of the Wall as a “decisive break” which “sounded the death knell for 
previous reunification concepts and necessitated a painful re-examination of the Federal 
Republic’s policies.”59 The expellee organizations, on the other hand, viewed the crisis in 
Berlin much as they had viewed the uprising on June 17, 1953. As Ahonen continues, “In 
their opinion, the latest Berlin crisis had merely confirmed the correctness of Bonn’s 
hard-line anti-Communist stances of the 1950s by once again spotlighting the relentless, 
probing aggression characteristic of ‘Soviet-Russian imperialism.’”60
          Instead of siding with the expellees’ version of the latest Cold War crisis, as had 
been the case in 1953, the general populace seemed to side more with those who called 
for a rethinking of West German foreign policy. Starting around this time the events of 
  
                                                           
58 For an excellent summary of Adenauer’s policies regarding foreign policy and reunification, see Timothy 
Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent. (New York: Random House, 1993), 
pp. 48-53. 
59 Ahonen, After the Expulsion, p. 165. For more on the media’s role in the changes to West Germany’s 
Ostpolitik and memory culture in the 1960s, see Kittel, Vertreibung der Vertriebenen? pp. 31-57.  
60 Ahonen, After the Expulsion, p. 167. 
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Cold War were becoming a double-edged sword for the expellees. On one hand, they 
once again refocused the world’s attention on communist brutality against Germans and 
on the human cost of division. On the other hand, the emblematic events of the recent 
past were June 17, 1953 and the erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, not the loss 
of Heimat. Simply put, the political realities of the Cold War precluded a border revision. 
Even worse for the expellees, for more and more West Germans, the focus was on the 
partition of Germany into the two extant states, not on the former German territory 
beyond the Oder/Neisse. Thus “Germany” in the minds of many became the Federal 
Republic and the GDR as the real possibility of reunification diminished.61
          Most top government officials in the early 1960s were also increasingly dissatisfied 
with the hard-line stance advocated by the expellee organizations, which the officials 
began to view as an impediment to larger foreign policy goals. The Western Allies also 
exhorted the West German government to soften its obdurate position toward the GDR 
and to accept the border status quo in the interest of worldwide détente.
  
62
                                                           
61 For a more concrete example of this phenomenon, see Lotz, Die Deutung des Verlusts, pp. 212-213. 
 Nevertheless, 
the fear of alienating the expellee voting bloc in upcoming elections prevented the major 
parties from significant foreign policy modifications. Ahonen writes, “In the midst of an 
unprecedentedly intense bidding war for the hearts and minds of the expellee electorate, 
none of the major players wanted to be the first to begin demolishing the revisionist 
illusions which they had all nurtured for years and thereby risk forfeiting millions of 
62 Ahonen, After the Expulsion, p. 181.  
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expellee votes.”63 Caught in this tug-of-war, the parties’ propagandistic outreach efforts 
to the expellees reached their zenith in the first half of the decade.64
           In spite of the political parties’ continued championing of the expellees’ cause, 
calls from outside the government for a new approach vis-à-vis the East persisted. One of 
the most notable examples was a memorandum (Denkschrift) published by the 
Evangelische Kirche Deutschlands (EKD—Protestant Church of Germany) in 1965 




                                                           
63 Ibid., p. 175. 
 This fascinating document sheds light on the paradigmatic shift 
underway within most of West German society concerning the expulsion and its 
historical context. Although the text contains many passages supportive and sympathetic 
to the expellees, the memorandum was at its core an appeal to all West Germans, above 
all, to the expellees, for a new approach in dealing with their neighbors to the East. In the 
name of reconciliation between Germany and Poland in particular, and in the interest of 
peace, the document also called for the acknowledgement of German guilt for the 
expulsion as a result of initiating the Second World War. Furthermore, the memorandum 
stated that Germans must make responsibility for their self-inflicted wounds and the 
acknowledgment of guilt in the deaths of millions of non-Germans key components of 
German foreign policy vis-à-vis the Eastern bloc.  In sum, the text suggested that real 
peace and stability could only be achieved with a new beginning in the relationship of the 
Germans with their eastern neighbors—in other words, when the expellees recognized the 
64 Ibid., p. 171. For more details on the political parties’ deliberate manipulation of the expellee electorate, 
particularly on the part of the CDU/CSU and the SPD, see Stickler, “Ostdeutsch heißt Gesamtdeutsch,” pp. 
212-279.   
65 “Die Lage der Vertriebenen und das Verhältnis des deutschen Volkes zu seinen östlichen Nachbarn – 
Eine evangelische Denkschrift“ Mit einem Vorwort von Präses D. Kurt Scharf, 1965: 
<http://www.ekd.de/EKD-Texte/45952.html> Accessed November 29, 2008. 
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Oder/Neisse border and gave up their territorial demands. Predictably, the memorandum 
of this Lutheran organization active in both Germanys drew intense criticism from the 
expellee organizations, who sought in vain to counter the symbolic mood swing the 
document represented.66
          The new government fused together in December 1966 between the Christian 
Democrats and the Social Democrats, the Grand Coalition, was forced to accommodate 
these views while still pursuing its main goal, German reunification.
 
67 While most credit 
is usually given to the next government for the decisive changes in West German foreign 
policy towards the East, Ahonen labels the Grand Coalition the “turning point” in the role 
played by the expellee lobby in determining West German foreign policy vis-à-vis 
Eastern Europe.68 Though ultimately a failure due in part to events influenced by the 
superpowers and thus out of the government’s control—but also due to the ruling parties’ 
unwillingness to resist the pressure of the expellee organizations—the Kiesinger 
government’s Ostpolitik laid the groundwork for the dramatic foreign policy 
achievements of its immediate successor.69
          After a hotly contested campaign and a victory by the slimmest of margins, a 
social-liberal coalition between the Social Democrats and Free Democrats, headed by 
Willy Brandt of the SPD was formed in October 1969.
  
70
                                                           
66 For more on the negative reactions of the BdV and other expellee organization to the Denkschrift, see 
Lotz, Die Deutung des Verlusts, pp. 212-213 and Stickler, “Ostdeutsch heißt Gesamtdeutsch,” pp. 112-116. 
 The parties’ shared objectives in 
eastern policy—namely, Wandel durch Annäherung (change through rapprochement)—
67 Ahonen, After the Expulsion, p. 209. 
68 Ibid., pp. 203-242. Ahonen undergoes a thorough exploration of the influence of the expellee 
organizations on the eastern policy of the Grand Coalition.  
69 As Timothy Garton Ash points out, “A great deal of the “new” Ostpolitik was thus already in place, as a 
set of premises and intentions, in 1967. (It was at this point, indeed, that it was christened “new”). See Ash, 
In Europe’s Name, p. 55. 
70 The CDU/CSU had actually won the largest number of votes but was unable to find coalition partners 
who would have kept the party in power.  
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provided the basis for this somewhat unlikely union.71 Key components of this policy 
were recognition not only of the GDR but also of Poland’s western border on 
Oder/Neisse—a change of course made public by Brandt at the SPD’s Nuremberg 
convention in March 1968, where it was above all the Young Socialists (Jungsozialisten, 
or “Jusos”) who had been calling for this break.72
          Even before the diplomatic events reflecting this changed philosophical approach 
made the division of Germany and the sundering of its eastern territories a fait accompli, 
the Brandt government laid bare the new place of the expellees and their interests in the 
eyes of the social-liberal coalition. Foreshadowing the final transformation to come, in a 
“symbolically significant move, the new government summarily closed down the 
Expellee Ministry, and transferred the relevant tasks to the Ministry of Interior, thus 
signaling that it viewed the expellee problem as a matter of domestic policy alone.”
 Not surprisingly, this proposed move 
was a source of great consternation for the expellee organizations.  
73 For 
some time, critics had viewed the Ministry as not only “superfluous” due to the 
expellees’ ongoing economic integration, but also considered its continuing institutional 
support of the expellee organizations a roadblock to international détente, particularly 
between West Germany and its eastern neighbors.74
          To an increasing number of West Germans, the importunacy of the expellee 
organizations in their insistence on their Recht auf Heimat (Right to Heimat or homeland) 
was inimical to peace and stability in Europe. Many inside and outside the two German 
 
                                                           
71 Ash, In Europe’s Name, p. 69. 
72 For more on this strategic shift, including excerpts from Willy Brandt’s address delivered at the party 
congress as well as the expellee reaction to it, see Stickler, “Ostdeutsch heißt Gesamtdeutsch,” pp. 260-263.  
73 Ahonen, After the Expulsion, p. 243. Recall the “institutional expression of symbolic politics” embodied, 
according to Matthias Beer and cited above, by the Ministry for Expellee Affairs.  
74 Lotz, Die Deutung des Verlusts, p. 226. 
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states found the expellees’ unceasing territorial claims anachronistic in a progressive era 
in which the SPD-FDP government’s aims at détente and rapprochement had grown in 
popularity and in which most had come to terms with the border status quo. As a result, 
the expellees’ dogged demands for a border revision were seen as one more hindrance to 
improved relations with the Eastern bloc instead of a pre-condition, as they had always 
seen them. Willy Brandt’s foreign policy directly reflected this. 
          The precise details of the series of treaties between the Federal Republic and its 
eastern neighbors—namely, the Soviet Union, Poland, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia—
have been documented elsewhere.75 Suffice it to say what started with the Moscow 
Treaty in August 1970 and ended with the Prague Treaty of 1973, resulted in a sea 
change in West German foreign policy: Bonn now recognized the other German state and 
confirmed the “inviolability” of the existing borders in Europe, i.e. it acknowledged the 
Oder/Neisse as Poland’s western border and thus renounced expellee territorial claims on 
their former homeland.76 Put another way, the Brandt-government’s eastern treaties 
(Ostverträge) rendered the Heimat-political goals to which the expellee organizations had 




                                                           
75 Frank Fischer’s “Im deutschen Interesse:” Die Ostpolitik der SPD von 1969-1981. (Husum: Matthiesen 
Verlag, 2001), particularly pp. 29-57, provides a fine summary of Brandt’s new Ostpolitik. For a more 
extensive presentation of the diplomatic history of the eastern treaties, see Ash, In Europe’s Name, 
especially pp. 48-215. 
76 The wording of the Warsaw Treaty (1970) stated that West Germany, not united Germany, recognized 
the permanence of the Oder/Neisse border. The treaty stipulated that in the event—unlikely at the time, of 
course—that the GDR and the Federal Republic would reunite, a new border agreement would have to be 
reached. Needless to say, the expellee organizations were adamantly opposed to the signing of these treaties 
and campaigned vigorously against their ratification. 
77 Ancillary repercussions of the new Ostpolitik were the Nobel Peace Prize for Willy Brandt in 1971 as 
well as a more decisive victory for the SPD at the polls the next year. In addition, the chief expellee 
organization, the BdV, which had conceived of itself hitherto as nonpartisan, became firmly entrenched in 
the camp of the Union parties (CDU/CSU). 
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“Taboos” Imposed & the Protracted Emergence of Holocaust-Centered Narratives  
          It is unlikely that the sweeping changes in Bonn’s foreign policy of the early 
1970s—at least the aspects germane to the expellees—would have occurred without the 
equally sweeping changes amongst wide swaths of the West German population’s 
understanding of the past. Concomitant to the shift in attitudes in the Federal Republic 
about the former German territory in Eastern Europe over the course of the 1960s was an 
astonishing shift in attitudes about German culpability for World War II, and, above all, 
for the atrocities against millions committed in Germany’s name during the Third 
Reich.78
          Just as the shift in West German public opinion regarding the Oder/Neisse was not 
immediate or wholesale, attitudes on German guilt did not change overnight. Prior to the 
1960s, in fact, discussions of responsibility had facilitated the widespread popularity of 
the narratives of the past focusing on German victimhood, including those put forward by 
the expellees. The Nuremberg Trials in the fall of 1945 and the successor trials from 1946 
to 1949, as well as the Allies’ broader efforts to denazify German society did little to 
implicate the rest of the populace in the crimes of the Nazis.
 This transformation will be briefly discussed here.   
79
                                                           
78 The two were inextricably linked in Willy Brandt’s historical visit to the Warsaw Ghetto Memorial in 
December 1970, at which time he dropped to his knees in a symbolic gesture of contrition. On this vital 
connection and its ramifications, Markovits and Gorski write, “Along with Willy Brandt’s justly famous 
kneeling at the memorial to the Jewish victims of the Warsaw ghetto revolt, and his rapprochement with 
Germany’s eastern sufferers through his Ostpolitik, the New Left’s massive criticism of German national 
socialism and the Bonn republic’s quiescence about it helped—perhaps indirectly, though no less 
decisively—to create an atmosphere of contrition, if not repentance, about the German past.” Andrei S. 
Markovits and Philip S. Gorski, The German Left: Red, Green and Beyond. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1993), p. 22. For more on the “Kniefall” itself, see Brandt’s memoir Erinnerungen. (Berlin: Propyläen 
Taschenbuch, 1989), pp. 186-197 and Wolffsohn Brechenmacher’s full-length monograph Denkmalsturz? 
Brandts Kniefall. (Munich: Olzog, 2005). 
 Indeed, one could argue 
they had done the opposite. Writing about the Nuremberg Trials, Jeffrey Herf notes, 
79 A full examination of denazification and the “rehabilitation” of former Nazis into West German society 
would exceed the parameters of this study. A good starting point, however, is Norbert Frei’s 
Vergangenheitspolitik. Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit. (Munich: Deutscher 
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1996).  
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“Nuremberg […] represented rejection of the collective guilt of the entire German people 
and the reaffirmation of the principle of individual political and moral responsibility.”80 
Much the same way, the denazification of the rest of the German population as a whole, 
an enormous bureaucratic undertaking, produced similar results. Alf Lüdtke maintains 
that the entire project “tended to stimulate the notion that the masses were not 
responsible, allowing the Mitläufer to perceive themselves as much closer to the victims 
than to the perpetrators.”81 In other words, rejection of collective guilt opened up a space 
rapidly filled by German-centered memory.82 Overall, as Moeller argues, the move away 
from any suggestion of German culpability to German victimization had the purpose of 
“ma[king] it possible to talk about the end of the Third Reich without assessing 
responsibility for its origins, to tell an abbreviated story of National Socialism in which 
all Germans were ultimately victims of a war that Hitler started but everyone lost.”83
          Most attribute the beginning of the more widespread readiness to reassess 
remembrance of the German past to a series of high profile criminal trials starting with 
the Einsatzgruppe trial held in Ulm in 1958 at which the mass killing of Jews in Poland 
and the Soviet Union was comprehensively presented in public for the first time.
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80 Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys. (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1997), p. 208. 
 Based 
on the desire for justice born out of the trial, the Zentrale Stelle der 
81 Alf Lüdtke, “Coming to Terms with the Past: Illusions of Remembering, Ways of Forgetting Nazism in 
West Germany,” The Journal of Modern History. 65, 3, September 1993, p. 549. 
82 For a more in-depth analysis of collective guilt as a topic, see Karl Jaspers, The Question of German 
Guilt. Tr. E.B. Ashton (New York: The Dial Press, 1947). Jaspers distinguishes between four kinds of guilt: 
criminal, political, moral, and metaphysical. Using this typology, he ascertains that one can be guilty even 
if s/he did not personally commit a crime. 
83 Robert G. Moeller, “War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany,” 
The American Historical Review. Vol. 101, No. 4 (Oct. 1996), p. 1013. 
84 Detlef Siegfried, “Zwischen Aufarbeitung und Schlußstrich. Der Umgang mit der NS-Vergangenheit in 
den beiden deutschen Staaten 1958 bis 1969,” in Axel Schildt, Detlef Siegfried and Karl Christian 
Lammers (eds.) Dynamische Zeiten: Die 60er Jahre in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften. (Hamburg: 
Christians, 2000), p. 79.  Much of the following synopsis of this key period is taken from this text. 
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Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklärung von NS-Verbrechen (Central Office of the State 
Justice Ministries for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes) in Ludwigsburg was 
established to promote the prosecution of Nazi criminals and expose the details of their 
murderous campaigns. Even more prominent was the trial of Adolf Eichmann held in 
Jerusalem in 1961.85 Two years later in Frankfurt, a case against camp personnel at 
Auschwitz brought even more attention to the industrialized evils committed by Germans 
during the Third Reich. Not only was this trial extraordinary because the accused were 
“regular people” and not Nazi elites, but also because, as Detlef Siegfried points out, 
“From the start, the trial was not seen as purely a penal, legalistic matter at which merely 
individual guilt was to be investigated, but rather as a constitutive part of an historic 
project of enlightenment at which the entire complexity of National Socialist 
extermination policies was exposed.”86 By the middle of the decade, trials had been held 
for personnel of all the major extermination camps.87
          Though Siegfried rightly downplays the role of the student movement—the so-
called “68ers”—as the societal impetus behind the new self-critical approach to the past 
   
                                                           
85For more on this trial and Eichmann’s role in the machinery of genocide, see Hannah Arendt’s seminal 
classic, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. (New York: Penguin Books, 1994 
[1963]).  
86 Siegfried, “Zwischen Aufarbeitung und Schlußstrich,” p. 94. 
87 In revealing to the world the full extent of Nazi crimes, the trials played an important didactic role that 
altered the opinions of many on the fundamental nature of the Third Reich and challenged West German 
attitudes on culpability in general. Though a distinction must be made between the attitudes of the political 
class and other elites and the rest of the population, the trials inevitably led to more confrontation with and 
contemplation about the role played by ordinary Germans in the annihilation of European Jews. Through 
them, Siegfried writes, “Eichmann [became] a symbol of the nondescript Schreibtischtäter, the bloodthirsty 
potentiality of bureaucracy; Auschwitz [was an] anthropological symbol for that what human beings can 
do.” (Siegfried, “Zwischen Aufarbeitung und Schlußstrich,” p. 96) This is not to say that the West German 
government had hitherto completely ignored its responsibility for the victims of National Socialism. While 
not always popular, official steps had also been taken by the Adenauer government to make amends for the 
crimes committed in Germany’s name, such as Bonn’s support of the state of Israel, and 
Wiedergutmachung (restitution) for Jewish survivors initiated by the Luxembourg Agreement of 1952. (See 
Herf, Divided Memory, especially pp. 267-333). For much of the public, however, the trials began to shift 
perceptions about German suffering during and after the war, including that of the expellees, by shining the 
spotlight more brightly on the victims of Nazi crimes rather than on German victims.  
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in West Germany, its role was undeniable, he argues, in “radicalizing the already 
intensive discourse which had occupied West German society for over ten years.” The 
radicalization of discourse in this context entailed, above all, indignation over the double 
standards and hypocrisy with which older West Germans dealt with their past and their 
dubious efforts “to come to terms” with it.88 Though it would go too far to claim the 
68ers were protesting for the centrality of the Holocaust in historical narratives, the 
antiauthoritarianism and antifascism of many members of this age cohort was fueled in 
part by dissatisfaction with their parents’ generation’s response to Germany’s recent 
history and its eagerness to forget and willingness to suppress what actually happened 
during the Nazi epoch. “[The 68ers] charged that the failure of their parents’ generation 
to resist National Socialism was tantamount to complicity.”89
          This view of the Nazi past also affected the expellees by diminishing the 
palatability of their claims of victimization. As Schneider states, “The student 
revolutionaries of 1968 simply banished from their version of history all stories about 
Germans that did not fit in with the picture of the ‘generation of perpetrators.’”
  
90 The 
expulsion came to be viewed as the result of Nazi Germany’s war of aggression and the 
intertwined extermination of the Jews rather than as an act long wished for and planned 
by the Poles and Czechs.91
                                                           
88 Siegfried, “Zwischen Aufarbeitung und Schlußstrich,” p. 104. 
 As this generation assumed positions of authority over time, 
its stance that “what Germany had lost [e.g. the eastern territories] was the price Germans 
had to pay for the crimes of the National Socialist regime” became the norm. 
89 Moeller, “Germans as Victims?” p. 170.  
90 Peter Schneider, “In Their Side of World War II, the Germans Also Suffered,” New York Times, Jan.18, 
2003. 
91 For more on this long-held argument of the expellees, see Hans Henning Hahn and Eva Hahn, “Mythos 
‘Vertreibung,’” in Heidi Hein-Kircher and H.H. Hahn (eds.) Politische Mythen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert 
in Mittel- und Osteuropa. (Marburg: Verlag Herder Institut, 2006), pp. 167-188. 
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Furthermore, as Moeller notes, those who, “claim[ed] victim status [were] immediately 
suspect because [such claims] implied the denial of responsibility for German crimes.”92 
From now on, as Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider observe, one could not speak publicly 
of German victimization, “without a direct causal reference to German crimes coming 
before the expulsions.”93
          When people talk about “taboos” imposed on discussions of German victimhood, it 
is these developments to which they refer. The trend continued throughout the 1970s as 
the expellee organizations, and their historical interpretation, grew more and more 
isolated. Kittel catalogs a number of examples from the 1970s—everything from the 
weather map on the news program of Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF—Second 
German Television), which until 1976 included formerly German cities in the eastern 
territories, to the appellations used by sports announcers for the opponents of German 
soccer clubs—when now passé references to the former German territory were 
eliminated.
       
94 In terms of social acceptance, it certainly did not help that the right-wing 
extremist Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD—National Democratic 
Party of Germany) had adopted the expellees’ position on the Oder/Neisse as a plank in 
its political platform. Even though the NPD had long since reached its peak as a 
mainstream political force by the early 1970s, and never made a significant impact at the 
federal level, in the minds of many, their presumed association with right-wing 
radicalism further tainted the expellees.95
                                                           
92 Moeller, “Germans as Victims?” p. 170 & p. 171. 
 In the face of these tremendous changes—
93 Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, “Memories of Universal Victimhood: The Case of Ethnic German 
Expellees,” German Politics and Society. Issue 75, Vol. 23, No. 2, Summer 2005, p. 20. 
94 Kittel, Vertreibung der Vertriebenen? p. 147ff. 
95 Stickler analysis of the relationship between the expellees and the NPD is inconclusive as to the 
profundity of the connection. To wit, he notes the electoral successes of the NPD at the state level 
particularly in the Länder with larger numbers of expellees but also remarks on the BdV’s efforts to keep 
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considered by most as “progress”—and with some unyielding expellees still raising 
territorial claims and focusing purely on their own suffering, it is no coincidence that the 
sobriquets “revanchists” and “Ewiggestrige” gained currency at this time.96
          It would be an exaggeration to say that the astounding changes of the late 1960s 
and early 1970s regarding views of the past led to the increased assumption of guilt or 
responsibility on a widespread, personal level. More accurate would be to say that 
Brandt’s foreign policy and the broader awareness of the Nazi genocide led for many 
West Germans to a new readiness to engage with the past. I would argue that the events 
of this period mark one of the central “crises” in the Federal Republic which have 
occurred repeatedly throughout the postwar era in the “constant seesaw,” identified by 
Saul Friedlander, “between learning and forgetting, between becoming briefly aware of 
the past and turning one’s back on it.” It is my contention that the slow paradigm shift 
that was taking place during this period was the pivotal upswing of this “near automatic 
process,” at least for the expellees.
 
97
          The extermination of the Jews became a linchpin in interpretations of recent 
German history after the airing of the American mini-series Holocaust in January 1979. 




                                                           
the party at a distance, citing a study that shows that the expellees did not vote over proportionately for it 
despite the NPD’s stance on the border issue. See Stickler, “Ostdeutsch heißt Gesamtdeutsch,” pp. 336-346.  
 Even though the program was panned by critics, this watershed event is 
96 Kossert, Kalte Heimat, p. 191 (caption). 
97 Saul Friedlander, Memory, History, and the Extermination of the Jews of Europe. (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1993), p. 8. 
98 For a contemporaneous look at the reception of Holocaust in West German society and the lasting 
changes its airing unleashed, see New German Critique Special Issue 1 Germans and Jews. No. 19, Winter 
1980, especially the essays by Jeffrey Herf (“The Holocaust Reception in West Germany: Right Center and 
Left,” pp. 30-52), Andrei S. Markovits and Rebecca S. Hayden (“Holocaust Before and After the Event: 
Reactions in West Germany and Austria,” pp. 53-80), and Siegfried Zielinski (History as Entertainment and 
Provocation: The TV Series Holocaust,” pp. 81-96). Another essential resource is the anthology co-edited 
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“frequently cited as a high point in West Germans’ confrontation with the individual face 
of mass extermination.”99 According to Siobhan Kattago, the massive response to the 
film was sparked by the “emotional appeal instead of abstract appeal common in 
traditional monuments and museums.”100 Most importantly, the film introduced on a 
large scale the word “Holocaust” to the German vernacular.101
          Virtually all the events on the national level during the 1960s and 1970s went 
against the expellee organizations and their interpretation of the recent German past. It 
would seem likely that the slowly changing postwar narrative precipitated by Ostpolitik 
and the increased societal awareness of Nazi atrocities which led to this marginalization 
would have a profound effect on the local expellee monuments erected during this period. 
Presumably, one would observe a precipitous decline in the construction of new 
monuments, those proposed would face rising opposition, and those already standing 
would draw more scrutiny, particularly from young people and left-wing critics. At 
question too is whether and how long it would take for the political and social changes 
described above to trickle down through society and be reflected in the monuments. 
 By now the emergence of 
other postwar narratives had undermined the salience of German suffering and the loss of 
the German East and discredited those who harped on it. Holocaust-centered memory, 
though not unchallenged, was now hegemonic on the national level. Whether the same 
can be said about historical narratives on the local level was debatable.   
                                                           
by Anson Rabinbach and Jack Zipes entitled Germans and Jews Since the Holocaust: The Changing 
Situation in West Germany. (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986), especially the Markovits and Hayden 
essay “Holocaust Before and After the Event: Reactions in West Germany and Austria,” pp. 234-257.  
99 Moeller, “War Stories,” p. 1035. 
100 Siobhan Kattago, Ambiguous Memory: The Nazi Past and German National Identity (Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 2001), p. 45. 
101 Atina Grossmann states that prior to the mini-series most references were to the Endlösung (“Final 
Solution”). See Grossmann, “The ‘Goldhagen Effect:’ Memory, Repetition, and Responsibility in the New 
Germany,” in Geoff Eley (ed.) The Goldhagen Effect: History, Memory, Nazism—Facing the German 
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These historical developments also suggest that whether or not the expellee monuments’ 
tone and message would change after the time of campaigning for tangible political goals 
had concluded, the resonance thereof certainly would.  
 
SEEKING “NORMALIZATION,” REUNIFICATION, AND THE RETURN OF 
GERMAN SUFFERING: COMMEMORATING THE EXPULSION SINCE 1982 
 
          The political Wende of 1982 which engendered the CDU/CSU’s resumption of 
power—with Helmut Kohl as chancellor and the FDP as coalition partner—sparked 
renewed optimism for expellee activists that changes of policy vis-à-vis the East might be 
imminent. Any glimmers of hope the expellee organizations might have harbored were 
snuffed out after it became clear that there would be no radical breaks in foreign policy 
and no reversals on the border issue. This is not to say the Kohl government did not play 
the border revision card or make token gestures of solidarity to the expellee organizations 
throughout the 1980s. For example, Kohl appointed the last chief of the Expellee 
Ministry, Heinrich Windelen, to his first cabinet in 1982 as Minister for Inner-German 
Relations and himself addressed expellee congresses—the first time the highest-ranking 
member of the West German government had done so since Ludwig Erhard some twenty 
years prior.102
                                                           
102 A minor scandal arose at the end of 1984 over the participation of Helmut Kohl at an annual 
Deutschlandtreffen of the Silesian Landsmannschaft to be held the next summer. Kohl accepted the 
Landsmannschaft’s invitation to speak before the assembly’s theme became public. When it was 
announced the motto would be “40 Jahre Vertreibung – Schlesien bleibt unser” (40 Years Expulsion – 
Silesia Remains Ours) Kohl’s silence on the matter drew international attention. Under pressure from the 
Kohl government, the Silesian Landsmannschaft ultimately selected a slightly more politically correct title 
(“40 Jahre Vertreibung – Schlesien bleibt unsere Zukunft im Europa freier Völker”—40 Years Expulsion – 
Silesia Remains Our Future in a Europe of Free Peoples) and Kohl attended and spoke as planned. For 
interesting insight into Kohl’s management of the scandal, see Karl-Rudolf Korte, Deutschlandpolitik in 
Helmut Kohls Kanzlerschaft: Regierungsstil und Entscheidungen 1982-1989. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-




          None of these developments led to either a resurgence of the expellee organizations 
or to any real effort to re-address the territorial status quo, despite the CDU/CSU’s 
protests against the recognition of the Oder/Neisse while in the opposition in the 
1970s.103 Instead, the federal government’s overtures to the expellees were part of what 
Timothy Garton Ash calls a “neo-Adenauerian domestic political strategy”104 which, as 
historically had been the case, proved effective in shoring up the still crucial expellee 
vote and garnering the support of right of center voters of all stripes, including extremists 
and nationalists. Overall, however, the expellee organizations’ political and cultural 
influence continued to erode in the 1980s—a development best illustrated in their 
ineffectual efforts to impede official recognition of Poland’s western border after German 
reunification in 1990.105
          The contradictory nature of the new government’s relationship with the expellee 
organizations mirrored the paradoxical nature of the major public debates—some 
involving Kohl himself, as well as his administration—over memory and the past in West 
Germany leading up to reunification. But just as the Wende of 1982 did not precipitate a 
transformation in eastern policy, the switch to a conservative administration did not 
precipitate a departure from the Holocaust-centered memory prevalent since the 1970s 
either. It should be remarked that the most significant cultural and political events of the 
first part of this period were only tangentially related to German suffering. Indeed, 
commemoration of the expulsion itself factored minimally in these national memory 
 (Reunification will be discussed in greater detail below). 
                                                           
103 Ahonen writes “Kohl and the other responsible top-level leaders of the CDU/CSU knew perfectly well 
that territorial changes in Germany’s favor in Eastern Europe were neither possible nor desirable…” (After 
the Expulsion, p. 257. Pages 256-260 provide more on the CDU/CSU’s delicate balancing act during the 
1980s). 
104 Ash, In Europe’s Name, p. 229. 
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contests. The victimization of Germans in WWII, moreover, was not directly weighed 
against victimization perpetrated by Germans, at least not how it had been in the past. To 
be sure, the primacy of the Holocaust as centerpiece of postwar history and national 
identity would be challenged. But instead of countering this fact with rehashed, one-sided 
arguments of the 1950s and early 1960s, disputes ensued over how best to incorporate 
normatively the important changes in memory culture of the 1970s into present-day 
culture in West Germany.     
 
“Normalization” and the Holocaust Moments of the 1980s 
          The mid-1980s were replete with a series of significant public events and 
incidents—what Grossmann calls “Holocaust moments”106—which spawned highly 
publicized debates in academic circles, the public sphere, and beyond, over the meaning 
of the Third Reich and Judeocide in contemporary (West) Germany. Although it would 
far exceed the parameters of this study to explore these acrimonious incidents in-depth—
all of which have been subject to book-length analyses—it is definitely worthwhile to list 
and comment on some of the major impetuses for the contentious discussions that 
followed. For instance, the topics of collective guilt and Wehrmacht complicity in Nazi 
atrocities was reintroduced via the controversial visit of Ronald Reagan and Chancellor 
Kohl to the military cemetery at Bitburg in 1985. In addition to being the final resting 
place for Germany’s “regular” fallen soldiers, the cemetery was discovered also to 
contain the graves of a several dozen members of the Waffen-SS.107
                                                           
106 Grossmann, “The Goldhagen Effect,” p. 89. 
 Kohl hoped to use 
the meeting at Bitburg, held in conjunction with the ceremonies celebrating the forty-year 




anniversary of the end of WWII, to rehabilitate his country in light of its dark past. 
Through this act of reconciliation between erstwhile enemies—supported by all the 
parties of the Bundestag except the Greens—West Germany’s “ordinariness” in the 
present was to be emphasized and acknowledged by making its disreputable past less 
relevant. As Kattago notes, the event was to “symbolize the normalcy of the Federal 
Republic and its firm participation in the Western fight against communism. Bitburg 
would more importantly symbolize the end of German guilt and a German national 
identity unencumbered and unburdened by the Nazi past.”108 Thus, Andrei S. Markovits 
and Simon Reich state, the incident at Bitburg represented, “the first concerted effort to 
revive a dormant and partially illegitimate collective memory.”109
          This attempt to tweak the national narrative was overshadowed days later by 
German President Richard von Weizsäcker’s noted address before the German parliament 
on May 8, 1985. During this moving and nuanced speech, Weizsäcker touched on an 
array of topics concerning the meaning of the end of the war for the Federal Republic, 
including the experience of flight and expulsion. Forty years hence, Germany’s surrender 
did not mean defeat and catastrophe, according to the federal president, but should be 
considered the country’s liberation. He made note, however, that for many—and here he 
was obviously referring to the expellees—the end of the war meant the beginning of 
suffering and loss. However, he adroitly added in a clear reflection on the changes that 
had taken place since the 1950s that the actual cause of that misery could not be 
decoupled from the start of the Hitler dictatorship. Furthermore, Weizsäcker made 
reference to the special hardships the expellees had faced—including in many cases the 
  
                                                           
108 Kattago, Ambiguous Memory, p. 49. 
109 Markovits and Reich, The German Predicament, p. 35. 
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lack of empathy on the part of the locals vis-à-vis the newcomers—but also implored the 
expellees to relinquish their claims in the interest of common understanding. What is 
more, in an unusual reversal, the officially neutral chief of state (though a Christian 
Democrat) proclaimed a long list of victim groups to be commemorated. This list 
commenced with Germany’s victims and concluded with German victims, and—
presaging the next major debate over public memory in the Federal Republic—
accentuated the uniqueness of the Holocaust.110
         Needless to say, this rhetorical tour de force was extraordinary for many reasons—
not least of which was the last point. Acknowledging German suffering while 
undercutting the expellee organizations’ one-sided historical interpretation of what had 
befallen them, Weizsäcker established a causal link between the Nazis’ seizure of power 
and the expulsion of the Germans—a first for a Christian Democrat at the national level. 
The speech counteracted moreover the tendency to “normalize” the past embodied by 
Chancellor Kohl and the debacle at Bitburg. Mary Nolan writes, “In its political and 
moral range, its willingness to accept historical responsibility in combination with 
authentic personal memories and emotions, its refusal to engage in over-simplifications 




                                                           
110Richard von Weizsäcker. “Ansprache von Bundespräsident Richard von Weizsäcker anlässlich der 
Gedenkstunde zu 40 Jahren Kriegsende im Plenarsaal des Deutschen Bundestages.” 08.05.1985 in Bonn 
<www.bundespraesident.de> Accessed March 19, 2009. See also, Ulrich Gill and Winfried Steffani (eds.) 
Eine Rede und ihre Wirkung. Die Rede des Bundespräsidenten Richard von Weizsäcker vom 8. Mai 1985 
anlässlich des 40. Jahrestages der Beendigung des Zweiten Weltkrieges: Betroffene nehmen Stellung. 
(Berlin: R. Röll, 1986). 
 Even more sensational though, was Weizsäcker’s public, 
by-proxy assumption of Germany’s enduring responsibility for the crimes committed in 
its name during the Third Reich. Helmut Dubiel observes the “heretical quality” of this 
111 Mary Nolan, German National Identity after the Holocaust. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 99. 
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particular declaration and claims the main arguments of the speech are an assault on the 
“interpretive framework utilized by the conservative elites of the republic to keep their 
guilt at bay for forty years.”112 Above all, the speech articulated the changes in historical 
understandings since the late 1960s, further undergirding the centrality of the Holocaust 
for understanding the recent German past.113
          Despite its significance, to say that Weizsäcker’s address forged a consensus in 
matters surrounding the German past and its proper place in the present and future would 
be erroneous. In fact, not long after the speech, the infamous Historikerstreit (historians’ 
dispute) broke out with battle lines drawn along ideological lines, with conservative 
revisionists pitted against left-wing opponents.
 That Weizsäcker—a Christian Democrat, 
but also the son of a prominent Nazi diplomat indicted at the Nuremberg trials, and 
himself of the “generation of perpetrators” not blessed with the Gnade der späten Geburt 
(mercy of a late birth) à la Helmut Kohl—gave the address only added to its authenticity 
and profundity.  
114
                                                           
112 Helmut Dubiel, Niemand ist frei von der Geschichte: Die nationalsozialistische Herrschaft in den 
Debatten des Deutschen Bundestages. (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1999), p. 211. 
 Characteristic of the major public 
discussions of recent history in West Germany in the 1980s, the Historikerstreit was 
highly political (though as Wulf Kansteiner points out, politicians for the most part were 
113 Wulf Kansteiner, In Pursuit of German Memory. History, Television, and Politics after Auschwitz. 
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006), p. 257. 
114 Much has been published on the Historikerstreit. Challenging the notion that the Nazi genocide was a 
sui generis and inexplicable occurrence unequaled in modern history, conservative historians, most notably, 
Ernst Nolte, Andreas Hillgruber, and Michael Stürmer, tried to draw parallels between the Holocaust and 
other deliberate mass killings of entire groups of peoples in an effort to normalize the German past. They 
were accused by the liberal side (with Jürgen Habermas and Micha Brumlik at the forefront) of seeking to 
relativize Nazi crimes and exculpate all Germans from collective guilt over WWII in order to revitalize a 
traditional German national identity based on a healthy, uninhibited relationship with the past—an idea that 
for many on the Left was anathema. For more on the debate, see Charles S. Maier, The Unmasterable Past: 
History, Holocaust, and German National Identity. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), which 
offers an incisive overview and analysis of the debates. Peter Baldwin’s edited volume is also an essential 
compendium of outstanding essays by world-class scholars on the themes and broader implications of the 
Historikerstreit. Peter Baldwin (ed.) Reworking the Past: Hitler, the Holocaust, and the Historians’ Debate. 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1990).  
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not directly involved) and focused on the meaning of the past in the present. Specifically 
at issue were questions of the singularity and comparability of the Holocaust.115
          The discussions of the Nazi past at this time were more about its proper place in the 
present and future historical consciousness of West Germans. Moishe Postone saw in the 
attempts to “normalize” the past “a conscious conservative campaign […] to reverse 
many political-cultural developments that had occurred in the Federal Republic after 
1968-1969 […] by establishing a greater degree of continuity with elements of the 
German past that had been discredited.” This “normalization” of Germany’s past was 
intended to make it more usable in the present. But Postone saw something more sinister 
at play: “It appears perfectly straightforward—an attempt by the Right to regain cultural 
and political hegemony by affirming continuity with the past. Nevertheless, aspects of 
that conservative campaign suggest that, behind its apparently straightforward character, 
a level of historical repression continued to operate.”
 
116
          To be sure, some historians and conservative politicians had challenged the 
primacy of the Holocaust in West German memory culture. But they failed to dislodge it. 
To reintroduce Friedlander’s seesaw metaphor, the memory squabbles in the 1980s 
swung decidedly in the opposite direction of the late 1960s and 1970s, but they did not 
represent a full downswing in the direction of forgetting or ignoring the Nazi past. 
  
                                                           
115 Though the right-wing protagonists in the debate did not endeavor to equate the Holocaust to the 
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Indeed, the efforts to draw a line under the past—a so called (Schlußstrich)—were 
forcefully rebuffed. Lars Rensmann has written about the paradoxical outcome of 
drawing a line under the past. In what he calls the “Dialektik der Schlußstrich-Ideologie” 
(dialectic of finalization ideology) Rensmann notices that repeated calls for a 
Schlußstrich often do the opposite of their intent. Instead of ending discussions, they 
engender even more and refocus public attention on the issues at hand in new ways. 
Debates over the past become more about the present than about what happened during 
the Third Reich, thus amplifying the meaning of this history rather than silencing it.117
          While they certainly downplayed the importance of the Holocaust, right-wing 
ripostes to the changes of the 1960s/1970s did not reintroduce German suffering to public 
consciousness in a big way. Interestingly, neither the expulsion of the Germans as a 
historical chain of events nor the expellees as political actors figured prominently in the 
major debates of the 1980s. Expulsion was for the most part an afterthought. German 
victimhood in WWII was not in competition with the suffering inflicted by Germans, nor 
was it reasserted in an effort to equate, and thereby diminish, the potency of the 
Holocaust as the centerpiece of official memory in Germany.
 It 
seems the uproars thus solidified Auschwitz even further as a central tenet of German 
identity and as a key to understanding German history. 
118 As their absence from 
these debates suggests, the 1980s were a period of weakness for the expellee 
organizations.119
                                                           
117 Lars Rensmann, “Baustein der Erinnerungspolitik,” in Micha Brumlik, Hajo Funke and Rensmann (eds.) 
Umkämpftes Vergessen: Walser-Debatte, Holocaust-Mahnmal und neuere deutsche Geschichtspolitik. 
(Berlin: Verlag Das Arabische Buch, 2000), pp. 135-167. 
  
118 Though one might argue the legislation passed in 1985 which made Holocaust denial a punishable 
offense, and also contained a provision making denial of the expulsion illegal, did just that. 
119 Dietrich Strothmann’s short piece touching on the scandal over Chancellor Kohl’s participation at the 
congress of the Silesian Landsmannschaft sheds some light on the activities of the expellee organizations in 
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          Their inability to influence political decision-making was highlighted during the 
run-up to German reunification in 1990. Whether through Chancellor Kohl’s deft 
political maneuvering to shore up the right-wing electorate in upcoming elections or his 
risky mismanagement qua brinksmanship potentially jeopardizing the reunification 
entirely,120 the possibility of revising Poland’s western border had been broached even 
before the fall of the Berlin Wall. The expellee organizations, whose chief objective, 
according to Ahonen, remained the “chimera of territorial revisionism,”121 pounced. 
Kohl’s avoidance of the issue and the wishy-washy proclamations he repeatedly uttered 
on it throughout the fall of 1989 and into 1990,122 rejuvenated the expellees (albeit 
fleetingly), befuddled allies on the continent and overseas, and stoked Polish fears that 
Germany might once again be tempted to implement aggressive policies toward its 
eastern neighbor.123
                                                           
the 1980s. See Dietrich Strothmann, “‘Schlesien bleibt unser.’ Vertriebenenpolitiker und das Rad der 
Geschichte,” in Wolfgang Benz (ed.) Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten: Ursachen, Ereignisse, 
Folgen. (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1985), pp. 209-218, but a more thorough overview of 
their activities and role in the debates over memory in the 1980s would be a welcome addition to the 
literature on expellee organizations. 
 Instead of helping to shape the policies ultimately carried out, 
however, the expellees and their hope of a final decision in their favor on the border issue 
were once again viewed as a roadblock to national unity. Two bilateral pacts—the 
German-Polish border treaty from November 14, 1990, and a treaty the following year 
based on mutual respect and amicable relations—officially and irrevocably settled the 
120 Ahonen and Ash both lean toward the former. 
121 Ahonen, After the Expulsion, p. 261. 
122 As is well known, Kohl’s 10-point program of late November 1989, which enumerated steps leading to 
unification, did not mention the border question at all. 
123 Markovits and Reich write that as a result of Kohl’s evasiveness and hesitance to take a clear stand on 
the border issue, the Polish Prime Minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, requested Soviet troops remain in Poland 
“to protect against a potentially expansionist Germany.” See Markovits and Reich, The German 





 Instead of concrete politics, all that was left for the expellee organizations 
were symbolic politics. 
“Umsiedler” and the Commemoration of the Expulsion in the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) 
 
          To this point, this chapter has only looked at West German memory culture and the 
commemoration of the expulsion with monuments in the Federal Republic. There is a 
simple reason for this: by the mid-1950s the topic was no longer a part of public 
discourse in the GDR, and no local expellee monuments were erected in East Germany 
until after German reunification in 1990. 
          By 1949, over 4.3 million “Umsiedler” (re-settlers, not expellees125) had been 
registered in the Soviet Zone (and later the GDR) comprising nearly a quarter of the total 
population.126
                                                           
124 The third and final episode of the 2001 documentary miniseries Die Vertriebenen: Hitlers letze Opfer 
(Dir. Sebastian Dehnhardt) depicts the outrage felt by many expellees over the finality of the Oder/Neiße 
border. The film shows Helmut Kohl’s speech before a large audience at an expellee gathering. When Kohl 
announced there would be no new border negotiations his statement was greeted by a cacophony of boos 
and derisive whistles. Some angry audience members rose and disgustedly vacated the large hall in which 
Kohl’s address occurred. 
 For fear of upsetting diplomatic relations with their new benefactors, 
however, the East German political authorities quickly ended the privileging of the 
expellees and effectively denied them victim status. The authorities’ motivation for this 
was clear. They believed that making their socialist brethren—and the Soviet Union, in 
particular—guilty for the expulsion of the Germans from the East would be politically 
125 Kossert deemed this moniker a “language manipulation decreed by the Soviets” (Kalte Heimat, p. 215). 
Ther explains the term “Umsiedler” was selected because, “With this word [authorities in the Soviet Zone] 
wanted, for one thing, to demonstrate to indigenous Germans and to expellees, who were at this time 
usually labeled “refugees,” that their flight was over and their acceptance in the locality final, and to 
underpin the choice of words used in the Potsdam agreement, according to which it was not a question of 
cruel expulsion contrary to international law, but of a legal and planned resettlement.”  See Philipp Ther, 
“Expellee Policy in the Soviet-Occupied Zone and the GDR,” in David Rock and Stefan Wolff (eds.) 
Coming Home to Germany? The Integration of Ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe in the 
Federal Republic. (Oxford: Berghahn, 2002), p. 60. 
126 In Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, expellees comprised over 40% of the total population. Cited in 
Kossert, Kalte Heimat, p. 196. 
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harmful for the newly established GDR.127 After all, Germany’s socialist liberators could 
hardly have been responsible for German suffering.128
          Even more than in West Germany, however, the political authorities viewed the 
expellees with skepticism and greatly feared their potential to destabilize the fragile new 
social structure. Their rapid integration into the new system was thus a paramount goal 
for the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD—Communist Party of Germany, 
KPD), and after 1946, for the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, (SED—
Socialist Unity Party of Germany, SED). All policies regarding the expellees were crafted 
to meet this objective and demonstrate the SED’s superior capability (compared to the 
West’s) to integrate the expellees. For example, the aid provided to newly arrived 
expellees in the Soviet Zone was more generous than in the western zones. In fact, 
Philipp Ther notes, East German authorities carried out the economic and social 
integration of the expellees more efficiently than their counterparts in the Federal 
Republic. They redistributed land, closed refugee camps, and arranged new 
accommodations, economic and social integration more quickly than was occurring in 
West Germany.
 In other words, the political 
situation in the GDR was much less propitious from the start for public commemoration 
of the expulsion. 
129
                                                           
127 Kossert, Kalte Heimat, p. 215. 
 Furthermore, during the period of de-Nazification, the socialist 
128 Clearly, Cold War considerations played a central role in these decisions. Just as the Federal Republic 
downplayed the western Allies’ role in the air war in favor of the expulsion in the interest of 
“Westbindung,” the GDR played up the “imperialistic” actions of the “Anglo-American air gangsters” who 
laid waste to Dresden in the firebombing of February 1945. The bombing was commemorated regularly 
with anti-American, anti-imperialist speeches decrying the deliberate efforts of the Americans and British 
air fleets to hinder anti-fascist rebirth in Germany. See Olaf B. Rader, “Dresden,” in Etienne François and 




leadership considered an expellee’s future value as a contributor to the new society more 
decisive than his or her Nazi past.130
          Another key aspect of integrating expellees in the Soviet zone and the early GDR 
was the very early recognition of Poland’s western border.
 
131 Since 1946 or 1947, the 
Soviet Union had recognized the permanence of the then officially provisional border. 
The Görlitz Treaty of July 6, 1950, a prerequisite to the accession of East Germany into 
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), ended all territorial 
ambiguity vis-à-vis the GDR’s eastern neighbors by acknowledging the Oder/Neisse as 
Poland’s western border. According to Kossert, the pact had a two-pronged purpose. 
First, it normalized relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia, which simultaneously 
improved the SED’s economic maneuverability. Second, the treaty furthered the 
integration of the expellees by eliminating with one fell swoop the hope for a border 
revision.132 Simply put, for the expellees residing in the GDR, the treaty meant there 
would be no “return home” and the “right to Heimat” would not be instrumentalized to 
mobilize voters. To be sure, this decision was not made without dissent. Even within the 
party leadership, some officials, including at first Wilhelm Pieck, the first president of the 
GDR,133
                                                           
130 Damian van Melis, “Angabe nicht möglich – Integration statt Entnazifizierung der Flüchtlinge in 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern,” in Dierk Hoffmann and Michael Schwartz (eds.) Geglückte Integration? 
Spezifika und Vergleichbarkeiten der Vertriebenen-Eingliederung in der SBZ/DDR. (Munich: R. 
Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999), p. 165. 
 questioned the decision to recognize what became known as the 
“Friedensgrenze” (peace border). In time, those who expressed their misgivings about the 
134 Ther, “Expellee Policy in the Soviet-Occupied Zone and the GDR,” pp. 56-76. 
131 The most thorough examination of this topic comes from Andreas Malycha, “‘Wir haben erkannt, dass 
die Oder-Neiße-Grenze die Friedensgrenze ist’: Die SED und die neue Ostgrenze 1945 bis 1951,” 
Deutschland Archiv 33, 2000; pp. 193-207. 
132 Kossert, Kalte Heimat, p. 219. 
133 Pieck was born in the city Guben, through which the Neisse River directly flowed. The border between 
the GDR and Poland literally split the original city in two. After the Oder/Neisse line became the border, 
the city center, renamed Gubin, became a Polish city. The western suburbs became the German city Guben.  
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border were expelled from the SED. Early recognition allowed the SED to cast 
opposition to the territorial status quo—particularly by the West German government and 
the expellee organizations—as reckless warmongering. According to East German 
propaganda, only those opposed to peace and stability would dare resist the “peace 
border.”134
          As a result, street and place names with connections to Germany’s eastern 
provinces were changed and songs from the East were no longer permitted on East 
German radio. Moreover, the SED criminalized revisionist claims on the land beyond the 
Oder-Neisse and came to view the activities of expellee groups in the GDR as sedition. 
Although expellee organizations had emerged in the Soviet zone even earlier than in the 
western zones, the SED disbanded the largest and most important, the Zentralverwaltung 
für deutsche Umsiedler (ZVU—Central Administration for German Resettlers) in July 
1948, and disallowed all Landsmannschaften akin to those in the West. The oppression of 
expellees was particularly harsh. Kossert writes of two “resettlers” who were sentenced 
to over ten years imprisonment in the former concentration camp Sachsenhausen for 
unlawful assembly because they had regularly met with fellow expellees from their home 
region.
 
135 By 1949, the SED had decreed that the term “resettler” was no longer to be 
used. Just months later, the party leadership declared the “naturalization” of the expellees 
complete.136 By the middle of the 1950s, the East German media no longer mentioned the 
expellees as such.137
                                                           
134 Manfred Wille, “SED und ‘Umsiedler’ – Vertriebenenpolitik der Einheitspartei im ersten 
Nachkriegsjahrzehnt,” in Hoffmann and Schwartz (eds.) Geglückte Integration? p. 103. 
 Simply put, the expulsion did not play a part in the postwar narrative 
135 Kossert, Kalte Heimat, p. 217. 
136 Michael Schwartz, “Vertreibung und Vergangenheitspolitik: Ein Versuch über geteilte deutsche 
Nachkriegsidentitäten,” in Deutschland Archiv. 30 (1997), p. 195. 
137 Wille, “SED und ‘Umsiedler,’” p. 104. 
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told by the GDR, which from the start had centered exclusively on antifascism.138
 
  
Needless to say, the SED did not permit the construction of local expellee monuments in 
East Germany during its reign—not until after the fall of the Berlin Wall did they appear. 
Post-Reunification Memory Squabbles  
          While reunification irrefragably answered questions about Germany’s borders, it 
raised new questions about how the collective memory of the past of this “economic giant 
but political dwarf” would shape its future policies, particularly vis-à-vis its neighbors.139
          Closer to home, on the other hand, the massive transformation brought about 
during Europe’s annus mirabilis did little to squelch issues over the correct place of the 
Nazi past in Germany’s present. In fact, the post-reunification years witnessed another 
round of highly publicized Holocaust moments which enflamed public passions and 
initiated embittered intellectual exchanges over efforts to reshape the contours of 
 
For nearly two decades, reunited Germany has for the most part pursued international 
cooperation and diplomacy in both its economic and foreign affairs. Indeed, concerns 
over the answer to the burning question, the new “German Question,” of the early days—
quo vadis the new powerhouse in Central Europe?—have proven largely unfounded.  
                                                           
138 Antifascism not only justified the socialist regimes of post-WWII Central and Eastern Europe, it also 
liberated citizens of the GDR from engagement with Germany’s National Socialist past. As Kattago puts it, 
antifascism “provided a collective exculpation of East Germans.” Since according to state doctrine, she 
goes on, “socialists were by nature antifascist,” they “bore no responsibility for the Nazi past.” As such, 
Kattago observes, “The East German official representation of the Nazi past universalized National 
Socialism into fascism and did not attempt to confront the social, political, and moral consequences of 
National Socialism in the GDR.” For more on the East German postwar narrative, see Kattago, Ambiguous 
Memory, pp. 81-116 and Herf, Divided Memory, particularly pp. 162-200. Though antifascism dominated 
the GDR’s approach to the Nazi past, East German memory culture was less monolithic than some might 
presume. Kattago’s work explores the shifts and turns—not unlike those in the Federal Republic—taken in 
the GDR’s self-understanding and its approach to the past, as does Harald Schmid’s compelling study of 
the East German memorialization of “Reichskristallnacht” (November 9, 1938). See Schmid, 
Antifaschismus und Judenverfolgung. Die ‘Reichskristallnacht’ als politischer Gedenktag in der DDR. 
(Dresden: V&R Unipress, 2004). 
139 The authoritative work on the implications of Germany’s collective memory on its foreign policy is 
Markovits and Reich, The German Predicament. 
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Germany’s memory landscape. A few highlights: In the political realm, and of some 
consequence for the expellees, Helmut Kohl pushed through the reconfiguration of the 
Neue Wache as the Central Memorial to the Victims of War and Tyranny in 1993.140 
Critics contested everything from the lack of parliamentary imprimatur for the project to 
the size of the pietà that the chancellor personally selected to serve as the memorial’s 
centerpiece. In particular, however, detractors opposed the “implied equality of victims” 
suggested by the memorial’s nonspecific title.141 Thus all the dead of WWII are marked 
as victims—whether German, Jew, Pole, homosexual, soldier, or civilian. The critics saw 
in this equalization an expression of Kohl’s desire “to create single category of victims as 
an expression of national unity,” and, as in the controversy over Bitburg, his wish to 
forge a sense of normalization.142
          In 1994, the motion picture Schindler’s List, based on a real-life industrialist’s 
efforts to save Jews during the Holocaust, was a smashing success seen by some 5.7 
million German spectators. The film painted a different, albeit not entirely untainted 
picture, of individual resistance during the Third Reich.
  
143 In Gedenkjahr 1995, the fifty-
year anniversary of the end of WWII—a Holocaust moment in and of itself144
                                                           
140 Located on Berlin’s main thoroughfare Unter den Linden, the Neue Wache has a long history as a 
showplace of German memory culture. Originally designed as an actual guardhouse in the 19th century, the 
structure was used as a memorial to the dead of WWI after 1918, remained basically unchanged during the 
Third Reich, and was reconstituted and rededicated as the Memorial to the Victims of Fascism and 
Militarism in 1960 by the SED government of East Germany.  
—a highly 
141 Brian Ladd, The Ghosts of Berlin: Confronting German History in the Urban Landscape. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1997), p. 220. 
142 See Ladd, The Ghosts of Berlin, p. 219. Ladd writes that as a concession to his opponents on this issue, 
Kohl had commemorative plaques put up which specifically list victim groups including both German 
victims, including the expellees, and victims of the Nazis. It also incorporates those killed “because they 
resisted totalitarian dictatorship after 1945.” 
143 See Bill Niven, Facing the Nazi Past: United Germany and the Legacy of the Third Reich. (New York: 
Routledge, 2002), pp. 91-92. 
144 See Klaus Naumann, Der Krieg als Text: Das Jahr 1945 im kulturellen Gedächtnis der Presse. 
(Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1998). For this text, Naumann poured over the reportings of 436 
newspapers in Germany to evaluate the diversity of approaches to six thematic clusters in the “Year of 
114 
 
controversial and correspondingly well-attended exhibition staged throughout Germany 
and Austria by the Hamburg Institute for Social Research entitled “Vernichtungskrieg. 
Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941–1944” (“War of Annihilation. The Crimes of the 
Wehrmacht, 1941-1944”) attracted thousands of visitors. The purpose of the exhibit was 
to demonstrate the complicity of the Wehrmacht in atrocities on the eastern front and 
thereby debunk long-held myths upheld in Federal Republic in which the valor of 
German soldiers in the Second World War had always remained unblemished.145
          A year later, even before the German edition appeared in bookshops, Daniel 
Goldhagen’s study Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust 
set off yet another heated debate about anti-Semitism in German society as well as 
individual culpability and collective guilt during National Socialism. Although some 
historians discounted Goldhagen’s research methods or disagreed with his central 




                                                           
Commemoration 1995”: 1. Allied aerial bombardment of German cities; 2. Flight and expulsion; 3. 
Liberation of concentration camps; 4. Conduct of the Wehrmacht; 5. Meaning of the end of the war in 
localities; and 6. End of the war on May 8, 1945.   
 In October 1998, noted author Martin Walser instigated another Holocaust 
moment when he was awarded the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade (Friedenspreis 
des Deutschen Buchhandels). During an incendiary public address at the famed 
Paulskirche in Frankfurt, Walser blasted the memory culture of united Germany, 
145 Running until 1999, the contentious exhibit was cancelled when it was discovered that a small portion of 
the captions of the photographs were not accurate. A revised, second exhibition,“Verbrechen der 
Wehrmacht. Dimensionen des Vernichtungskrieges 1941–1944” (The Crimes of the Wehrmach. 
Dimensions of the War of Annihilation, 1941-1944)) was unveiled to the public in 2001. 
146 See Daniel Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York: 
Knopf, 1996). For a broader, more detailed discussion of the reactions to Goldhagen’s book see Julius 
Schoeps (ed.) Ein Volk von Mördern? Die Dokumentation zur Goldhagen-Kontroverse um die Rolle der 
Deutschen im Holocaust. (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe Verlag, 1996). Of particular interest in this book 
is the contribution by Andrei S. Markovits (“Störfall im Endlager der Geschichte,” pp. 228-240), who 
forcefully defends the merits of Goldhagen’s scholarship and convincingly counters the biased and 
otherwise faulty argumentation of many of the book’s critics.  Geoff Eley’s edited volume also contains 
important essays on the topic. See Eley (ed.) The Goldhagen Effect. 
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particularly its still Holocaust-centered form as constructed by the Left. He decried the 
metonymic usage of Auschwitz as a “moral cudgel” and called the future Holocaust 
memorial in Berlin—the debate over which also constituted a drawn-out Holocaust 
moment—a “football field-sized nightmare.” Walser claimed to be expressing what 
everyone already thought but no one dared to say and basically blamed Jews for the 
animus they face. His subtext was that Jews bring anti-Semitism upon themselves 
through their criticism of Germans. Above all, Walser renounced what he called, the 
“instrumentalization of our disgrace for present ends.”147
          While the names and topics in the debates over memory had changed after 1990, 
the overarching themes remained the same. Like the debates of the 1980s, the post-
reunification memory conflicts focused on normalization, national identity, presumed 
individual and purported collective guilt, as well as efforts to counteract such assertions, 
possibilities of resistance, and probing the overall meaning of the Nazi past in the present. 
Once again, what Rensmann calls the dialectic of finalization came to the fore: efforts to 
draw a line under the past and thereby conclude discussions of it “once and for all” in 
order to “move on” were sure to do the opposite and instead initiate round after round of 
new discussions. Indeed, while the repeated attempts to quell the fixation with the past, 
such as Walser’s, might be disconcerting, the inevitable backlash that followed could be 
interpreted as a testament to the staying power of the Holocaust-centered narrative that 
was characteristic of the 1990s. Moreover, it should be added that, as in the 1980s, 
  
                                                           
147 Direct quotations are cited from Niven, Facing the Nazi Past, pp. 175-193 and from Brumlik, Funke and 
Rensmann (eds.) Umkämpftes Vergessen. The latter is also an outstanding exploration of the debate which 
ensued as a result of the speech. According to one of its authors, Lars Rensmann, Walser’s words were not 
what ignited the controversy. His speech was considered by most observers as “food for thought” 
(“Denkanstoß”—p. 30). It was not until Ignatz Bubis, then President of the Central Council of Jews in 
Germany, in his response called the speech “intellectual arson” that the controversy commenced.  
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German wartime suffering, and the expulsion in particular, were not the primary topics in 
these highly publicized discussions of the Nazi past. This was still to come. 
 
The Return of German-Centered Memory? 
 
          Two weeks prior to Martin Walser’s inflammatory speech, national elections drew 
the curtain on the Kohl era and ushered in a new, SPD-led government, the “Red-Green 
coalition.” Just months later, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s government approved 
German participation in NATO air strikes against Serbia without a UN Security Council 
resolution. The erstwhile dictum of the pacifist Left “nie wieder Krieg”  (Never again 
war)—considered by many the most important lesson of WWII—no longer seemed to 
apply, at least not as formerly conceived. Recent conflicts in the Balkans, especially the 
mass murder in Srebrenica, had given rise to new thinking amongst many on the Left 
encapsulated by the slogan: “nie wieder Auschwitz” (Never again Auschwitz). As 
construed by the Red-Green coalition, the dictum now meant that the use of German 
military force as ultima ratio was on the table in some cases, such as the human rights 
abuses in Kosovo. Such decisions were sure to unleash discussions over the place of the 
Nazi past in the “Berlin Republic.” What lessons were to be drawn when dealing with 
current circumstances?  
          Much of the transformation that followed can be attributed to a “conversion” of the 
Left. “Before Kosovo,” as Levy and Sznaider put it, “only German Conservatives wanted 
to universalize the Holocaust. Leftists were dedicated to its uniqueness—any assault on 
that uniqueness, including any form of comparison, was perceived as a diminishment of 
German war guilt and collective responsibility for the Holocaust.”148
                                                           
148 Levy and Sznaider, “Memories of Universal Victimhood,” p. 8. 
 This was decidedly 
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no longer the case. Instead of requiring reticence, as the Left began to see it, the Nazi past 
now compelled Germans to stand up to genocide.149 Langenbacher suggests that the 
volte-face “represent[s] the Left coming to terms with the memory of German suffering, 
just as conservatives came to terms with the memory of German crimes in the 1980s and 
early 1990s.”150 Even more importantly, Levy and Sznaider argue this move blurred 
distinctions between conservative and leftist interpretations of the past. Moreover, the 
authors contend that the metamorphosis “[lent] legitimacy to mourn German victims” and 
“reopened the national floodgates” that once marginalized discourse on German 
suffering.151
          Nevertheless, it is unclear exactly how much of the switch back to German-
centered narratives we can attribute to the change of government and its policies.
 This drastic shift had a far-reaching impact on all of German society, most 
especially on Germany’s memory landscape, as it unleashed a wave of representations of 
German victimhood in all forms in the mainstream media by leading literary and cultural 
figures on a scale not seen for over three decades.  
152 Of 
course, other exogenous and endogenous factors were involved which accompanied the 
conversion of the Left. Heidemarie Uhl mentions four:153
                                                           
149 For more on this incredible transformation within the Left, particularly by the Greens, the coalition’s 
junior partner, see Markovits and Reich, The German Predicament, especially, pp. 137-149. The changes 
had been underway since the UN engagement in Bosnia earlier in the decade but did not fully come to 
fruition until the Red-Green coalition came to power. 
 1) Scenes of forced migration 
in Kosovo conjured up images of expelled Germans’ own experiences during and after 
150 Langenbacher, “Changing Memory Regimes in Contemporary Germany?” p. 62. 
151 Levy and Sznaider, “Memories of Universal Victimhood,” p. 8. 
152 As laid out above, solely attributing the change to the change in government overlooks the efforts of 
Chancellor Kohl and other conservatives over the past decade and a half to normalize the German past. 
153 Heidemarie Uhl, “Deutsche Schuld, deutsches Leid – Eine österreichische Perspektive auf neue 
Tendenzen der deutschen Erinnerungskultur,” Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte. 33, 2005, p. 
169. Besides exploring the reemergence German victimhood in political and cultural discourse there, Uhl 
makes a larger point about the memory cultures in Germany vis-à-vis Austria. She finds that no equivalent 
“return to memory” has occurred in Austria even though expulsion has remained a valent topic in some 
political circles there. Furthermore, she argues that Austrian case proves the return of memory in Germany 
was not automatic or inevitable. 
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WWII. 2) The impending enlargement of the European Union would soon eliminate 
barriers and reopen discussions of restitution between Germany and its eastern neighbors 
as a condition of accession. 3). The efforts to pass on a positive picture of the past 
between generations.154
          Seemingly legitimated by all sides, the number of fictional and non-fictional 
accounts dealing with German suffering reached unparalleled heights. One of the most 
celebrated examples was a book by Günter Grass, winner of the 1999 Nobel Prize for 
Literature. The expulsion and the sinking of a German ship overflowing with civilian 
refugees from the eastern provinces near the end of WWII served as a key backdrop in 
his bestselling novella, Im Krebsgang.
 4) The search for a new national myth linking East and West 
Germans in the common bond of victimhood, such as Kohl wanted to achieve with his 
rededication of the Neue Wache. I would argue that pinpointing the actual cause of this 
cultural phenomenon is complex. What is clear, however, is that the final period under 
examination here has witnessed an explosion of examples—different quantitatively and 
qualitatively—of cultural representations of German victimhood. 
155
                                                           
154 On this point, Uhl cites the fascinating study conducted by Harald Welzer, Sabine Moller, and Karoline 
Tschnuggnall and published in “Opa war kein Nazi”: Nationalsozialismus und Holocaust im 
Familiengedächtnis. (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2002). The authors’ research reveals how 
“family memory” is passed on and how the past is filtered intergenerationally. Especially intriguing is their 
finding that, “The more comprehensive the knowledge of war crimes, persecution and annihilation, the 
stronger the obligations of family loyalties to promote the development of stories which reconcile the 
crimes of the Nazis or the Germans and the moral integrity of the parents or grandparents” (p. 53). 
 In what was obviously a pointed self-criticism, 
Grass lamented the fact that moderate Germans of a certain generation faced a self-
imposed restriction when discussing German experiences of war because of the shame 
over what their parents had done or overlooked during the Third Reich. Around the same 
time, writing from very different normative perspectives about the Allied aerial 
bombardments, W.G. Sebald and Jörg Friedrich were said to have finally spoken out 
155 Grass, Im Krebsgang. Eine Novelle. 
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about the enormous loss of architectural wonders and cultural goods through the massive 
destruction of German cities.156 The news magazine Der Spiegel ran a series on the 
expulsion and cover stories about the Allies’ air war against Germany. Two big-budget, 
multi-part documentaries on the expulsion aired on Germany’s state-owned television 
networks.157
          In addition, a new literary genre appeared. Having less to do with the first-hand 
experience of victimization and more to do with the psychological repercussions on 
second and third generations, a number of authors born after the war published works 
dealing with the “postmemory”
  
158 of German wartime suffering. Some of the notable 
authors of this new genre who have thematized the legacy of the expulsion include Hans-
Ulrich Treichel,159 Reinhard Jirgl,160 and Tanja Dückers.161
                                                           
156 W.G. Sebald’s Luftkrieg und Literatur: Mit einem Essay zu Alfred Andersch. (Munich: C. Hanser, 
1999) appeared in English as On the Natural History of Destruction and Jörg Friedrich, Der Brand. 
Deutschland im Bombenkrieg 1940-1945. (Munich: Propyläen Verlag, 2002). In this highly controversial 
and equally popular book, Friedrich, by dint of his word choice in describing various aspects of the 
bombings, equates the German victims of the aerial bombardments with the victims of Nazi extermination 
camps. For an overview of the international debate that ensued, see Lothar Kettenacker (ed.) Ein Volk von 
Opfern? Die neue Debatte um den Bombenkrieg 1940-45. (Berlin: Rowohlt, 2003). 
 Their works feature personal 
157 The films were Guido Knopp’s Die Große Flucht. (Dirs. Christian Deick and Anja Greulich); 2001 and 
Die Vertriebenen: Hitlers letzte Opfer; (Dir. Sebastian Dehnhardt); 2001. Although both films were more 
inclusive in terms of perspectives offered than earlier documentary accounts of the expulsion, they still 
“cleanly separate the Volk from Hitler and the Nazis,” as Gerd Wiegel puts it. See Wiegel, 
“Familiengeschichte vor dem Fernseher: Erinnerte NS-Geschichte in den Dokumentationen Guido 
Knopps,” in Michael Klundt (ed.) Heldenmythos und Opfertaumel: Der Zweite Weltkrieg und seine Folgen 
im deutschen Geschichtsdiskurs. (Cologne: PapyRossa Verlag, 2004), pp. 82-102. Indeed, both films 
attempt to draw parallels between the Jewish and German experience of WWII and in some cases intimate 
that Germans had it worse. They do this, for example, by highlighting the fact that Germans received worse 
rations than the Jews had under the Nazis in the internment and work camps located in Czechoslovakia 
immediately after WWII. 
158 For more on “postmemory,” see Marianne Hirsch, Family Frames: Photography, Narrative and 
Postmemory. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).  
159 See Ulrich’s semi-autobiographical trilogy consisting of: Der Verlorene. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1998), 
Menschenflug. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2005), and Anatolin. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2008).  
160 Reinhard Jirgl, Die Unvollendeten. (Munich: Carl Hanser, 2003). 
161 Tanja Dückers, Himmelskörper. (Berlin: Aufbau Taschenbuch Verlag, 2005). 
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crises, intergenerational conflicts, and family dramas based on the uprootedness caused 
by the forced migration.162
          Clearly, the public wanted to read and see depictions of Germans as victims of 
WWII. Despite this renewed interest, however, the topic has remained controversial. At 
issue for many was usually not whether but why the topic had supposedly been taboo, as 
well as who had imposed this purported moratorium. In addition, critics have feared that 
overly emphasizing German experiences of WWII could potentially overshadow Nazi 
victims’ fates and that recognition of German victims—for example, of the expellees 
with the Center Against Expulsions in Berlin
  
163—might in a way exculpate German 
perpetrators. Moeller, for example, has expressed these sentiments. He believes 
acknowledgement of this type could lead to equalization—a development that would 
continue down the slippery slope toward effacing and forgetting. He notes that accounts 
of German suffering have often contained an “implicit ‘too,’ […] and from ‘too’ it has 
sometimes been a short step to ‘like’ and the equation of German and Jewish 
suffering.”164
           Of all the challenges faced by Holocaust-centered memory since the 1980s, the re-
emphasis of German wartime suffering has probably been the greatest. Though things 
have seemed different, Friedlander’s “constant seesaw between learning and forgetting” 
has not teetered decisively to one side. In fact, marking the culmination of changes in 
society underway since the late 1950s, the continued importance of the Holocaust was 
cemented (literally) as a centerpiece of official postwar historical understandings 
  
                                                           
162 For a broader view of the new literature on this topic, see the essays contained in Stuart Taberner and 
Karina Berger (eds.) Germans as Victims in the Literary Fiction of the Berlin Republic. (Rochester, NY: 
Camden House, 2009). 
163 For more on this particular debate, see the Introduction. 
164 Moeller, “Germans as Victims?” p. 172.   
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precisely at this time in the form of the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe 
dedicated in Berlin in 2005.  
 
CONCLUSION 
           Despite all the recent controversy, the widespread discussion of German wartime 
suffering in the late 1990s and 2000s was not new, and has, in fact, never been taboo. As 
I have shown here, for more than two decades following WWII, discourses on the 
victimization of the Germans—particularly the expellees—were quite common, if not 
predominant, at both the national and local levels. Indeed, because of the importance of 
the expellees as a voting bloc and the strength of the expellees as a lobby group, the West 
German government paid an inordinate amount of attention to the expellees’ political, 
economic, and cultural concerns. Domestically, the first Adenauer government created a 
separate ministry and passed two major pieces of legislation in the first four years after 
the founding of the Federal Republic to serve expellee needs. In terms of foreign policy, 
all the major political parties at this time (at least officially) supported a revision of the 
postwar territorial status quo. Bonn crafted and pursued policies to right the political 
wrongs of the war’s aftermath and the Potsdam Agreement.  
          While the improving economic situation alleviated many of the expellees’ 
immediate social problems, and the power of the expellee organizations gradually 
decreased, it was not until Willy Brandt’s SPD-led coalition took power in the late 1960s 
that this kind of catering to the expellees ended. The political change coincided with a 
profound social change. By the end of the 1970s, many West Germans, if not most, 
viewed Nazi crimes, especially the Holocaust, as the key events of WWII, and as the 
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essential characteristics of the Third Reich. Although it certainly did not happen 
overnight, and was not uncontested, historical narratives based on this understanding of 
the past became standard at the national level.  
           Without question, these political and social changes have shaped how German 
experiences of WWII—particularly, the expulsion—have been remembered and 
represented. While the purpose of this chapter was in part to address my dissertation’s 
first central argument, namely, that the commemoration of German wartime suffering has 
never been taboo, it has also been to periodize perceptions of the expellees and the 
expulsion in light of changing political and cultural contexts. Thus I have sought to 
delineate the most important societal developments which have shaped understandings of 
the Nazi past and establish a historical framework into which I will embed my 
interpretations of local expellee monuments in Part II. It is to the monuments—which so 










ORGANIZATIONAL OVERVIEW           
          This segment contains my interpretive work on local expellee monuments and 
addresses this dissertation’s second and third central arguments. Here, I explore how the 
monuments have functioned and seek to answer the following questions: what historical 
interpretations have they expressed? What elements do they employ to represent the past? 
Finally, whose memories do they articulate and to what end? As stated in the 
Introduction, it is my contention that expellee monuments have operated as elements of a 
sustained effort to shape discussions of victimization as a result of WWII (Central 
Argument #2). With these monuments the expellee organizations have sought to ensure 
that their interpretations of WWII and its aftermath find an enduring place in public 
memory, at least on the local level. However, instead of constructing, as their defenders 
would argue, an innocuous, more inclusive, parallel narrative that augments other 
postwar narratives, close readings of the local monuments reveal the building blocks of a 
counter-narrative that foregrounds German wartime suffering and contests the centrality 
of the Nazi war of aggression and the Holocaust in representing the past.  
           More specifically, I contend that local expellee monuments facilitate the 
construction of de-contextualized, ahistorical, German-centered narratives (Central 
Argument #3). In fact, it appears in many cases as if the initiators erected the monuments 
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not simply to commemorate the dead but also to obfuscate causal links between the war 
started by the Nazis and the forced migration of Germans. To demonstrate this, I have 
constructed an interpretive framework for analyzing expellee monuments that organizes 
them by theme. In fact, virtually all expellee monuments can be grouped into two 
overarching but closely related thematic clusters. I open both with a section called 
“Context & Background,” which highlights and contextualizes each cluster’s dominant 
theme. In order to conduct a more detailed analysis, however, I sub-divide the broad 
clusters into more precise categories, which form the basis of individual chapters.  
           What immediately follows is an elucidation of cluster A, which I call “Loss of 
Heimat and Territorial Claims.” Here, I look at monuments that commemorate the 
expellees’ loss of Heimat and the concomitant territorial claims that forfeiture 
engendered. The vast majority of these monuments were erected before the expellees’ 
full assimilation into West German society and prior to Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik in the 
early 1970s. Thus, they were part of campaigns orchestrated by the expellee 
organizations in the pursuit of what I call “concrete politics”—that is, the tangible 
benefits the expellees desired in the first quarter century after WWII (above all, territorial 
reacquisition, but also compensation for material losses and accelerated economic, social, 
and political integration). This cluster is comprised of four individual chapters: Chapter 
Three—“Großdeutschland and the Right to the Heimat;” Chapter Four—“Cold War 
Conflation;” Chapter Five—“Germans as Kulturträger: The Accomplishments of 
Settlement;” and Chapter Six—“Unseren Toten in der Heimat—Cemeteries & Territorial 
Claims.” It is these monuments, which assert the “Germanness” of the lands the expellees 






A. LOSS OF HEIMAT AND TERRITORIAL CLAIMS 
 
Why does one love the Heimat? Because the 
bread tastes better there, the sky is higher, 
the air is zestier, voices ring out louder, and 





Leaving the Heimat is the greatest burden 
faced by gods and men. Agnes Miegel 
 
--Inscription of monument at the Heimathaus  
in Warendorf, NRW  
 
CONTEXT & BACKGROUND: THE INVOCATION OF HEIMAT 
           On November 18, 1956—Volkstrauertag2—a monument to the expulsion was 
dedicated in Lippstadt, North Rhine-Westphalia (Figure 3). The monument, standing on a 
central plot in a local cemetery provided by the city government, features a sandstone 
sculpture of three expellees—a “Flüchtlingsfamilie”—clutching one another in obvious 
fear with their eyes turned toward heaven, and a separate commemorative block bearing 
the inscription NIE VERGESSEN 1945 (Never forget 1945) and the cross of the 
Teutonic Knights over an outline of Germany’s eastern territories in 1937. Atop the 
block, a bronze basin was to shelter an eternal flame.3
                                                           
1 Cited in Gordon Lueckel and Johannes Thiele (eds.) Deutschland, das Buch. Erleben, was es bedeutet. 
(Munich: Thiele Verlag, 2009), p. 34. 
 During the unveiling ceremony’s 
main address, a local expellee functionary delivered a pledge of allegiance to the German 
East, the land to which “the greatest injustice in the history of the world” had occurred. 
2 I detail this day of commemorative day’s history in Part Three. 
3 The flame had been doused when I visited the monument in July 2007. 
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According to this functionary, freedom and the right to homeland were the highest goods 
in all of humanity. Though they renounced retaliation for the injustices they suffered, the 
speaker maintained, the expellees would never renounce their right to their Heimat. Love 
of the homeland (Heimatliebe) and homesickness (Heimweh) were amongst the deepest 
and primordial roots of human feeling.4 To consecrate the monument further, a capsule 
filled with sacred Heimaterde (soil from somewhere in the eastern territories) was buried 
at the memorial site.5
  
  
                                                 Figure 3 Lippstadt. Photo: J.L. 
 
                                                           
4 The direct quotation and subsequent paraphrasings are taken from “Ein Mahnmal mit heiliger 
Heimaterde,” Der Patriot. November 20, 1952. 
5 Two contributions in Elisabeth Fendl (ed.) Das Gedächtnis der Orte. Sinnstiftung und Erinnerung. 
(Freiburg: Johannes-Künzig-Institut für ostdeutsche Volkskunde, 2006) describe the powerful symbolic 
role played by Heimaterde in the post-expulsion commemorative and funerary culture of the expellees. 
Traditionally, according to Ulrike Zischka, who was writing about the private practice of sprinkling the 
sacred soil on personal graves, a packet of Heimaterde taken along while traveling ensured a return home 
and provided the opportunity of being buried in the traveler’s home soil if s/he died while away. See 
Zischka, “Fremde Heimat Friedhof,” p. 39.  Fendl describes the political meaning ascribed to Heimaterde, 
particularly by the expellee organizations, after the expulsion. So precious and valuable did it become that 
it was often given as a wedding and Christmas gift. She writes the soil often originated from farmers’ fields 
in the eastern territories or, when possible, from graves of relatives from the local cemetery left behind. In 
such instances, Fendl writes, the soil was doubly sanctified. See Fendl, “Beerdigung und Totengedenken in 
der ‘neuen Heimat,’” pp. 96-100. 
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           The statue in Lippstadt is not the only expellee monument consecrated by 
Heimaterde, nor is it the only one erected to attest and commemorate the seemingly 
preternatural connection to their homelands many expellees felt and the anguish inflicted 
upon these Germans as a result of the expulsion. Scores of expellee monuments 
memorialize, venerate, celebrate, and swear loyalty to the former German East. Indeed, 
monuments have invoked the concept of Heimat throughout the postwar period, but 
especially in the first decade after the end of WWII, when border revision seemed 
possible. 
          The expellees were not the first Germans to idealize and extol the virtues of the 
Heimat.6 As is well known, what Alon Confino calls the “Heimat idea” has circulated 
widely since Germany first unified in 1871. Confino maintains that particularistic 
Germans concocted the notion to forge a common bond as a response to the 
unprecedented social, political, and economic upheaval brought about after national 
unification. “The invention of the local and national Heimat ideas was a symbolic 
response to the post-1871 temporal and spatial demands of the Homeland. The Heimat 
idea provided a symbolic national common denominator among different regions, their 
inhabitants and territories.”7
                                                           
6 A large number of scholars have endeavored to theorize, define, and probe the concept of “Heimat” in 
various cultural and historical contexts. Some of the most innovative and important interventions of recent 
years include: Celia Applegate, A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1990); Confino, The Nation as a Local Metaphor, and his Germany as a 
Culture of Remembrance: Promises and Limits of Writing History. (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2006); Peter Blickle, Heimat: A Critical Theory of the German Idea of Homeland. 
(Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2002); and Johannes von Moltke, No Place Like Home: Locations of 
Heimat in German Cinema. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). 
 Accordingly, the Heimat idea allowed for a new national 
identity that did not require the shedding of local and regional affiliations. One could 
7 Confino, The Nation as Local Metaphor, p. 126. 
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uphold one’s deep connection to Württemberg, to use Confino’s example, and still 
consider oneself German.  
           Few would argue that the interconnectedness between the local, regional, and 
national provided by the “Heimat idea” forms an essential part of German identity. But 
why has this concept been so crucial for the expellees’ understanding of the recent past? 
And why is it invoked on so many expellee monuments? I contend it has to do with the 
implicit Germanness ascribed to the concept. If we accept Confino’s observation that 
“Germans like to think of the Heimat idea as unfathomable, mysterious, and, above all, 
peculiarly German” (my emphasis), then the loss of Heimat would have been especially 
traumatic because it implies the involuntary shedding of a key source of identity.8
          Recall as well that upon arrival in the West, many Germans from the East were 
viewed with skepticism or discriminated against by the local populations. In the eyes of 
many locals, the expellees’ origins in the far reaches of the Reich and beyond marked 
them as insufficiently German. Potentially Slavic (“Polacken”), and deemed, at any rate, 
inferior because of their strange customs and dialects (and their privation), Silesians, East 
Prussians, Bessarabian Germans, and other groups were perceived by the Einheimischen 
 As one 
sees with their monuments, for the expellees, the loss of Heimat—regardless of the 
cause—was on par with death. Obviously, the expellees who erected the monuments 
were the survivors of the expulsion yet they considered themselves as much the victims 
as those who had perished. Moreover, this “human dimension” of Heimat was part of a 
common vernacular. The nationwide prevalence of the concept made the significance of 
losing the Heimat easily understandable for all Germans. It could be invoked to garner 
sympathy and make the expellees worthy of recognition and restitution.  
                                                           
8 Ibid., p. 97. 
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as competitors and intruders. The invocation of this “peculiarly German” concept 
therefore amounted in the early days to an assertion of Germanness. Laying claim to a 
Heimat conveyed to locals that despite having different, distant birthplaces, the expellees 
were Germans too.9
          In addition to its human dimension, the invocation of Heimat has also contained a 
political dimension. Thus, by invoking the Heimat, expellees were asserting not only the 
Germanness of the people from the eastern territories but also the Germanness of the 
lands they left behind. If the people were German, the land must be too; especially if the 
Germans had created a flourishing Heimat out of what was once a desolate, uncivilized, 
barren landscape. Because the land had been made into a Heimat, it was by rights 
German. Much of the territory beyond the Oder/Neisse claimed by the expellees had in 
fact been inhabited by Germans for centuries. The graves of Germans still lying in the 
cemeteries of the eastern territories made the expellees’ territorial claims—centering on 
the German Reich in its 1937 borders—all the more unassailable. For these reasons, the 
“Right to the Heimat” (Recht auf die Heimat) became central in narrating the past and 
formulating the postwar territorial claims of the expellees. Though ultimately fruitless, 
invoking the Heimat thus bolstered the territorial claims of the expellee organizations.  
            
           I turn once again to the Charter of the Expellees from 1950, which offers key 
insights into the self-perceptions of the expellee organizations and their understanding of 
their fate, particularly with regards to the loss of the eastern provinces. In one of the 
text’s key passages, the composers of this document wrote,  
                                                           
9 Based on this sort of thinking, groups like the Siebenbürger Saxons and the Danube Swabians 
(Donauschwaben), neither of whom ever inhabited German territory and yet were coerced to leave their 
respective homelands because of their ethnic heritage, could conceive of themselves, by tapping into the 
concept of Heimat, as equally German. 
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We have lost our homeland. The homeless are strangers on the face of the earth. God 
himself placed men in their native land. To separate man forcibly from his native land 
means to kill him in his mind. 
We have suffered and experienced this fate. We therefore feel called upon to demand that 
the right to our native land be recognized and realized as one of the basic rights of man, 
granted to him by God. (my emphasis)10
 
 
According to this central document, which is cited routinely to this day by expellees in 
any number of areas, including in the inscriptions of monuments, in public addresses, and 
in other examples of expellee literature, just to name a few places, the uprooting of the 
Germans from their Heimat was an unparalleled act of barbarity that led to immense 
suffering worthy of special acknowledgement and recompense. The recognition the 
expellees yearned for had two dimensions: first, recognition vis-à-vis their compatriots in 
West Germany. That is, the expellees believed their fate warranted restitution and the 
West German federal government complied, resulting in individual financial support 
provided by the Lastenausgleichsgesetz (LAG) and the cultural funding and special status 
conferred by the Federal Expellee Law. The second dimension targeted an international 
audience and dealt with the fundamental Recht auf die Heimat and the right to return 
home.11
                                                           
10 This version is taken from the official English translation available on the BdV website 
<http://www.bund-der-vertriebenen.de/derbdv/charta-en.php3> Accessed October 13, 2009. The original 
German reads, “Wir haben unsere Heimat verloren. Heimatlose sind Fremdlinge auf dieser Erde. Gott hat 
die Menschen in ihre Heimat hineingestellt. Den Menschen mit Zwang von seiner Heimat trennen, 
bedeutet, ihn im Geiste töten. 
 Moreover, the expellee organizations argued that aside from any violent acts the 
processes surrounding the expulsion might have engendered—and they were, of course, 
legion—the removal of the Germans from their homelands was itself not only a breach of 
international law but also a violation of a God-given right that caused long-lasting 
suffering and permanent despair, even for those expellees who survived the ordeal and 
Wir haben dieses Schicksal erlitten und erlebt. Daher fühlen wir uns berufen zu verlangen, daß das Recht 
auf die Heimat als eines der von Gott geschenkten Grundrechte der Menschheit anerkannt und verwirklicht 
wird.” 
11 See Heinrich Rogge, “Vertreibung und Eingliederung im Spiegel des Rechts,” in Lemberg and Edding 
(eds.) Die Vertriebenen in Westdeutschland. Vol. 1, p. 234. 
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were able to reestablish themselves in West German society. With their spirits crushed, 
the anguish that resulted from the expulsion, according to the Charter of the Expellees, 
was equally if not more severe for those who survived than for those who actually 
perished. 
          My point in revisiting the expellees’ Grundgesetz (Basic Law)—as they called it—
is to illuminate the vital role played by Heimat and the loss thereof in the self-
understanding of many expellees and their organizations. As the text makes clear, for 
most of the first decades following the end of the war, the emphasis was much more on 
the suffering inflicted on the expellees because of the forfeiture of their eastern territories, 
not on the violent acts associated with the expulsion. The Charter itself only mentions the 
expulsion when referencing the people expelled, the “Heimatvertriebenen.” Aside from 
in this self-defining moniker, the term “Heimat,” on the other hand, appears four times in 
the brief text. Of course, the belief at that time was that a peaceful final resolution of the 
border issue was imminent and that a return home was possible if not even likely.12
                                                           
12 It is worth emphasizing that many expellees did not view a border revision as chimerical at this time. The 
expellees endeavored to gather support and lobby for their cause. In fact, many expellees considered those 
who advocated official recognition of the border to be a either a communist or a traitor to his country 
(Landesverräter). See Lotz, Die Deutung des Verlusts, p. 125. 
 
Apparent to all, however, was the injustice of the forced migration. Whereas in the early 
days (the 1940s), the invocation of Heimat proved fruitful in demonstrating the 
Germanness of the expellees, later it was invoked to underline the Germanness of the 
territory they left behind. Therefore, the loss of Heimat—not the violence of the 
expulsion—justified the expellees’ territorial claims and they formulated their demands 
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accordingly. The steadfast insistence on the “right to the Heimat”13 has served as one of 
the major causes for the expellee organizations since the Charter.14
           As all the monuments in the following four chapters will show, the expellees 
sought to demonstrate with them that the Heimat was more than just a mystical, mythical, 
idyllic place. The invocation of Heimat—and the commemorative practices at the 
unveiling ceremony of the monument in Lippstadt—were carried out to demonstrate the 
unquestionable Germanness of the eastern provinces. The Heimat was real and the 
expellees wanted theirs back.
 
                                                           
13 The inclusion of the definite article in “die Heimat” (“the homeland” or “the Heimat”) suggests this right 
was not an abstract principle or a high-minded, universally applicable ideal. It contained very specific 
connotations. The right to the Heimat that the expellee organizations were fighting for was not the right to 
any old homeland. It was the right to the land and the homes they hastily fled under duress before the end 
of WWII or were forced to leave under a variety of circumstances thereafter. 
14 According to Ahonen, the right to the Heimat, in tandem with the right to self-determination, became 
over time “the most important and most widely used concept through which the expellee lobby sought to 
promote its revisionist interests.” See Ahonen, “German Expellee Organizations: Between Revisionism and 













           That the territory east of the Oder/Neisse was once the Heimat of millions of 
expellees marked the land as indelibly German. The accentuation of the suffering caused 
by the loss of Heimat is, however, but one facet of the territorial claims (in this case, 
moral and cultural) raised by the monuments in this chapter. The other is the closely 
related belief repeatedly espoused that, despite the Potsdam Agreement, a Germany 
existed that was larger than the existing borders and that the expellees had a divine right 
to the parts of it they once occupied. That is, beyond the moral and cultural claim to the 
Heimat, the expellees staked additional legal and political claims which were based 
primarily on the two key agreements made by the Allies, the London Protocol of 1944 
and the Potsdam Agreement.2
                                                           
1 The term “Großdeutschland” has taken several historically specific meanings over the past two centuries. 
I use it here not as a reference to nineteenth century efforts to unify all German lands, including the 
German-speaking areas of the Habsburg Empire, into one state. Nor am I referring to the extreme version 
based on the concepts of “Heim ins Reich” or “Lebensraum” undertaken by the Nazis. Instead, I refer 
simply to the beliefs shared by many expellee and the leaders of their organizations in the existence of an 
imaginary Germany that was larger than the two postwar German states or later the reunited Federal 
Republic. A bumper sticker available at expellee events captures this sentiment perfectly. It reads 
“Deutschland ist größer als die Bundesrepublik” (Germany is larger than the Federal Republic). It is this 
sentiment that I seek to capture with this admittedly problematic term. 
 As Matthias Stickler points out, however, the 
2 As for the former, the expellees based their juridical claims on the decisions reached by an Allied 
advisory council which settled on December 31, 1937—that is, before Nazi Germany’s Anschluss of 
Austria in March 1938 and its annexation of the Sudetenland later that year—as the starting point for 
discussions of the establishment of occupation zones upon the conclusion of the war. Germany in its 1937 
borders included the eastern territories of East Prussia, Pomerania, and Silesia but did not comprise the 
Sudetenland, which at that time belonged to the still sovereign state Czechoslovakia; parts of West Prussia 
and Danzig, which, respectively, constituted sections of the Polish Corridor and which existed as a “Free 
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recommendations made by the council in London did not in any way guarantee the 
territorial integrity of Germany in the 1937 borders.3 Nevertheless, the expellees were 
fixated on Germany in its 1937 boundaries, and reacquisition of this territory, at 
minimum, became the goal.4
           Based on these ideas, according to the expellee organizations, the territorial 
integrity of Germany in its 1937 borders remained intact. Leaving the territory of West 
Germany and the GDR aside, the belief in this “Großdeutschland,” as I define it, 
expressed the conviction that the lands of the German East are, were, and always would 
be German, despite the decisions made by foreign powers and in spite of any other 
temporary political setbacks. With indefatigable patience, unflagging loyalty, and clever 
campaigning, many hoped the expellees would win back their homelands. Though this 
belief waned over time due to the integration of the expellees into West German society 
on one hand and the increasingly obvious political realities engendered by détente and the 
new Ostpolitik on the other, a number of expellees did not abandon this hope for decades. 
 As for the latter, in spite of the rancor provoked by the 
Potsdam Agreement, which provided the legal sanction of the expulsion and the 
sundering of the eastern territories, its precepts, which included a final peace agreement 
to settle the border issue permanently, were often cited by the expellees as further 
grounds for the provisional character of the territorial status quo. 
 
                                                           
City” after the Versailles Treaty and until 1939; or, of course, the areas of German settlement along the 
Danube and points further southeastward. This historical inconvenience led to efforts led in particular by 
the large and powerful Sudeten German lobby to alter the starting point for making claims to a later date 
when the Sudetenland was a part of the internationally recognized German state. 
3 For more a more thorough discussion of the debates over the 1937 borders, see Stickler, “Ostdeutsch heißt 
Gesamtdeutsch,” pp. 397-401. 
4 Some passages of the Basic Law buttressed the point of view of the expellee organizations. For example, 
as Stickler points out, the validity of the 1937 borders was further attested by its inclusion in Article 116 of 




          The beliefs in the singular agony caused by the loss of Heimat and in a Germany 
beyond current borders were articulated in a large number of local expellee monuments, 
which conveyed the widespread umbrage taken by the expellee organizations and their 
members with the Potsdam Agreement. Most arresting and germane, however, is that the 
monuments go beyond merely lamenting the loss of lives and instead boldly establish 
permanent links to the former German East.5
                                                           
5 On this point, Eva Hahn and Hans Henning Hahn write, “The personal memories of suffering experienced 
[by the expellees] and the loss of Heimat were mixed from the start with the construed context of the 
collective loss of the ‘German East;’ thus the individual victims of ‘flight and expulsion’ became 
instruments of revisionist politics. The Heimatvertriebenen as supporters of the successful expellee 
politicians became part of a quasi memory construction (Gedächtniskonstruktion) had as its object not the 
suffering experienced by the expellees but the ‘German East.’” Hahn and Hahn, “Flucht und Vertreibung,” 
in François and Schulze (eds.) Deutsche Erinnerungsorte, p. 341. 
 With them the expellees did not set out to 
mourn the dead of the expulsion but instead to bemoan the territorial status quo and to 
avow the reality-defying continuity of a Großdeutschland greater in size than the divided 
postwar remnants. This aspect constitutes the defining characteristic of the monuments in 
this chapter. The monuments celebrate and perpetuate a Heimat in the German East that 
no longer existed. They were created therefore to remind the local population that the 
lands beyond the Oder/Neisse—parts of which were labeled “under Polish 
administration” on the West German maps of Central Europe of the time—still belonged 
to Germany, and were designed to garner support for their reacquisition. In contrast to the 
symbolic politics of victimization which seemed to be the focus of expellee organizations 
after West Germany’s recognition of Poland’s western border in 1970, these monuments 
were articulating the concrete politics of border revision. That is, they expressed real 
territorial claims openly and directly.   
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           In addition to memorializing the land rather than the people, the monuments in this 
chapter share other immediately recognizable attributes. First, some communicate what 
Maruška Svašek has written about a poem composed by a Sudeten German expellee 
called “Lost Heimat”: namely, “the idea that forced migration is a disturbance of a God-
created order in which peoples’ identities are inextricably bound up with their natural 
place of birth and residence.”6 The regular invocation of the Heimat idea meant the 
territory referenced was without question German. Second, others exhibit revisionist 
iconography and motifs, such as displaying maps of the lost provinces or Germany in its 
1937 borders, or marking the anniversaries of the founding of the centuries-old, formerly 
German towns and communities of the eastern territories. Third, they employ 
nationalistic motifs and/or traditional Germanic forms such as the coats-of-arms of the 
eastern regions or the “erratic boulders” (Findlinge) commonly found in northern 
German areas, respectively.7
                                                           
6 Maruška Svašek, “Narratives of ‘Home’ and ‘Homeland:’ The Symbolic Construction and Appropriation 
of the Sudeten German Heimat,” Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power. 9: 2002, p. 495. 
 Because the Reichsdeutschen (East Prussians, Pomeranians, 
7 Christian Fuhrmeister has written extensively on the importance of material in the German context—and 
the ideological connotations various materials possess—for interpreting monuments. Analyzing several 
examples from Weimar-era and Nazi Germany, he links the usage of synthetic, modern material cement 
with the left wing, and “ur-German,” natural, erratic boulders with the conservative, nationalistic side of the 
political spectrum. See Fuhrmeister, Beton. Klinker. Granit: Material Macht Politik. Eine 
Materialikonographie. (Berlin: Verlag Bauwesen, 2001). More specifically on “erratic boulders,” see his 
“Findlinge als Denkmäler: Zur politischen Bedeutung erratischer Steine,” Museumsdorf Hösseringen 
Landwirtschaftsmuseum Lüneburger Heide Materialien zum Museumbesuch. 32, 2000, as well as his “The 
Advantages of Abstract Art: Monoliths and Erratic Boulders as Monuments and (Public) Sculptures,” in 
Charlotte Benton (ed.) Figuration/Abstraction: Strategies for Public Sculpture in Europe 1945-1968. 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 107-26. In his full-length study, Fuhrmeister acknowledges the ideological 
dimension, particularly for the Findlinge, became less pronounced after 1945. Nevertheless, it appears that 
the initiators of some local expellee monuments sought to tap into long-held Germanic traditions by 
erecting, for example, groups of several boulders in formations reminiscent of ancient burial sites or 
“Ehrenhaine” (Heroes Groves) such as at the Ehrenhain der Vertriebenen (Expellee Heroes Grove) in 
Rendsburg, Schleswig-Holstein. A different kind of example is the expellee monument in front of a local 
city hall in Dorsten, North Rhine-Westphalia which features an unpolished, free-standing boulder and a 
plaque with the inscription: FEST WIE URGESTEIN SOLL DIE DEUTSCHE TREUE SEIN. DEN AUS 
DER STADT RYBNIK, OBERSCHLESIEN STAMMENDEN BEWOHNERN, DIE IN DER 
BUNDESREPUBLIK LEBEN VON IHRER PATENSTADT DORSTEN GEWIDMET. 7.9.1958 (German 
loyalty shall be firm/staunch like prehistoric stone. Dedicated to the residents of the Federal Republic from 
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Silesians—i.e. expellees from territory recognized as belonging to the German Reich 
before the Nazi annexations and expansions) settled primarily in these same northern 
regions after the expulsion, these monuments are found predominantly in the north of 
West Germany as well, the fourth commonality. Fifth, these monuments occupy some of 
the most prominent and visible locations of any expellee monuments.8
 
 Sixth, many 
monuments of this category commemorate the establishment of the special link between 
West German cities with their adopted brethren from the East in the form of 
Patenschaften. Finally, most (though surprisingly not all) of the most arresting, i.e. 
openly revisionist, monuments were erected in the 1950s and early 1960s; that is, prior to 
détente and before the Federal Republic’s formal recognition of the Oder/Neisse border. 
Obviously, the temporal dimension is crucial here. Expellee monuments allow us, 
however, to observe and trace the sometimes subtle shifts over time in the expellees’ 
formulations of territorial claims, which will also be explored briefly. For this reason, I 
divide the chapter into pre-Ostpolitik and post-Ostpolitik monuments. 
 
                                                           
Rybnik, Upper Silesia by their adoptive city, Dorsten. 7.9. 1958). These are but a few of several such 
examples. Writing over a decade before Fuhrmeister, Meinhold Lurz saw the continued use of such old 
materials differently. In his massive study of German war memorials, Lurz called erratic boulders in post-
WWII German monuments “relics of nationalism” (p. 32) that, when used by the expellee organizations, 
embodied their “persistent [territorial] claims” (“hartnäckige Ansprüche,” p. 187). Lurz writes, “With 
erratic boulders for the German Heimat in the East, […] thoughts of defiance and resistance are at the 
forefront.” (p. 206-207). See Lurz, Kriegerdenkmäler in Deutschland. Vol. VI Bundesrepublik. 
(Heidelberg: Esprint, 1987). Echoing Lurz, because of the ongoing pertinence of these traditions, it would 
be irresponsible to overlook the factor of material and formation when examining the monuments. For that 
reason, the material of each monument is listed when relevant and available. However, it cannot be ruled 
out that cost and ready availability—particularly in the north, where such erratic boulders are more 
abundant—played bigger roles than Germanic traditions for the initiators of the monuments. 
8 For instance, the 1950s and early 1960s witnessed the move away from the less visible cemeteries to more 
prominent or easily accessible locations, particularly the high crosses. Retterath writes the 1950s was the 
“time of the “crosses of the German East” (see Retterath, “Geschichtsbilderkampf…” p. 108), for example, 
the oversized cross emplaced over Bad Harzburg, Lower Saxony high in the Harz Mountains, overlooking 
the border to the GDR. 
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Großdeutschland: Pre-Ostpolitik Territorial Claims 
           One of the most extraordinary examples of the monuments of this type is the two-
meter-tall stone slab standing in the small, mostly Protestant Westphalian city, Lengerich 
(Figure 4). Erected in September 1956, the monument possesses a number of noteworthy 
aspects. On the front side of the monument hang five coats-of-arms from four of the 
eastern provinces (East and West Prussia, Silesia, Pomerania, the Sudetenland) plus the 
city seal of Berlin. Obviously, the addition of the Sudeten German plaque indicates the 
belief in an even larger Großdeutschland than is typically the case (i.e. larger than 
Germany in its 1937 borders) but it is most likely explained by the financial involvement 
of the area’s Sudeten German Landsmannschaft which contributed to the monument’s 
design and construction. The stone itself was paid for by donations of the other local 
Landsmannschaften as well as by assistance from the state and local governments. Sitting 
atop the tapered block was a stone bowl for the burning of small “admonitory fires” 
(Mahnfeuer), a tradition hearkening back to the national movements in the early 
nineteenth century.9
                                                           
9 Wolfrum writes that the use of fire as a symbol of freedom was a widely used practice in the post-1945 
German context. He describes torchlight processionals that functioned as protests against the division of 
Germany and the sundering of the eastern territories. See Wolfrum, Geschichtspolitik in der 





                                                        Figure 4 Lengerich. Photo: BdV Archive 
 
           The monument contains no direct reference to the human suffering brought about 
by the expulsion. Instead the focus is on expressing grievances with the borders as 
imposed by the Allies with the “dubious” Potsdam Agreement. Indeed, most notable and 
instantly striking about the monument is its inscription: EWIG DEUTSCHER OSTEN 
(Eternal German East). Not only does such a statement look retrospectively at the past, it 
also fervently asserts an everlasting territorial claim that extends into the future. The 
German East memorialized here still existed regardless of the current political situation. 
The forthrightness of the monument’s inscription was matched by the openness of the 
speakers at the dedication ceremony. According to contemporary newspaper reports,10
                                                           
10 My paraphrases of the speeches were taken from contemporary articles appearing in the regional 
newspapers Westfälische Nachrichten and Westfälische Rundschau as well as the local daily Tecklenburger 
Landbote. 
 
virtually all who spoke during the festivities commented on the specific role the 
monument was to play. The opening speaker said the monument was to announce to all, 
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both on that day and in perpetuity, that twelve million Germans from the East had been 
unlawfully forced out of their Heimat and that with the unscrupulous dismemberment of 
their territory a grave injustice had been perpetrated against all Germans. The monument 
was not put up to commemorate the dead but to inspire and inflame the living. Another 
speaker stated this explicitly. He declared the monument was not constructed to 
memorialize the past or to honor the victims but to remind passersby of the injustice of 
the postwar border settlement. In addition to the financial support, the participation at the 
events by local elected representatives, including the mayor of Lengerich and other local 
administrators, along with the fact that custodial care of the monument was 
ceremoniously handed over to the city government, signaled the widespread approval of 
the monument’s message. The large attendance (in the press reports the number of 
spectators varies significantly from roughly 1,000 to 5,000 in a city which today has a 
population of approximately 22,000) and the prominent location at the intersection of two 
major streets ensured that the monument was highly visible and that many of the city’s 
inhabitants were well aware of its existence.11
          The monument in Lengerich is typical in that it employs the historic coats-of-arms 
(Wappen) of the eastern provinces and of their Landsmannschaften to affirm further the 
Germanness of the territory. On monument after monument throughout the Federal 




                                                           
11 The monument was moved from the crossing of Tecklenburgerstraße and Schulstraße to the parking lot 
on Bodelschwinghstraße near the sports stadium.  
 The monument was also not alone in pledging undying loyalty to the 
12 Interestingly, the red and black insignia of the Sudetenland, which features on the left side an eagle (an 
expression of the area’s connection to the German Confederation of which it was a part until 1806) and on 
the right side a cross (the sign of the German Order of Knights who colonized Eastern Europe centuries 




           The participation of local government officials at the dedication ceremony in 
Lengerich—and of state and even national officials at unveilings elsewhere in the 
1950s—was nothing unusual as the expellees were at the height of their political and 
social influence. Compared to the 1940s, when they were unable to organize legally, the 
membership rosters of the expellee organizations swelled to their highest numbers in the 
 Arguably, it was matched by a commemorative plaque erected across 
from a church in Giessen, Hessen, also in 1956. The plaque was emblazoned with the 
Silesian coat-of-arms, listed distances to various Silesian cities, and bore the inscription: 
SCHLESIEN IST DEUTSCH. SCHLESIEN WAR DEUTSCH. SCHLESIEN BLEIBT 
DEUTSCH. (Silesia is German. Silesia was German. Silesia remains German). Other 
milder vows of loyalty to the former homeland in the form of monuments also were 
constructed, such as the commemorative crosses in Kammerbach and Kesselbach, Hessen 
with the inscriptions, HEIMAT WIR BLEIBEN DIR TREU (Heimat, we remain loyal to 
you) and DER HEIMAT DIE TREUE (Loyalty to the homeland). Erected throughout the 
entire postwar period, a large number of monuments memorializing the “unforgotten 
Heimat” (Unvergessene Heimat) also decry more the forfeiture of territory than the loss 
of lives. Though not comparable with the monument in Lengerich in terms of fervor and 
virulence, I would argue these monuments raise restrained territorial claims nonetheless 
and signal an enduring disinclination to accept the territorial status quo. 
                                                           
and had only been in use after the expulsion. See Peter Fliegl (ed.) Kleine Wappenkunde. (Karlsruhe: Haus 
der Heimat e.V. BdV-Kreisverband Karlsruhe, 1998). 
13 The monument in Lengerich is not the only one to feature the bold statement EWIG DEUTSCHER 
OSTEN. The medieval defense tower (Wehrturm) in Osnabrück, Lower Saxony was transformed in 1954 
into the Mahnmal des Deutschen Ostens (Monument of the German East) and featured the same 
inscription. Though the tower still stands, the script was removed.  
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first half of the decade.14 With their socioeconomic status improving, the expellees’ sheer 
numbers dictated that the major parties took seriously their political concerns at all levels. 
They had no choice. None of the major parties openly supported recognition of the 
current borders. What is more, though certainly not everyone agreed with their 
“oftentimes aggressive rhetoric,” Lotz notes that most West Germans shared the basic 
tenets of the expellees’ understanding of history and their fate; namely, that the eastern 
provinces were rightfully German and that the expulsion had been an unprecedented 
tragedy and a singularly unjust action.15 Indeed, Leo Kreuz cites poll results from 
throughout the decade in which solid majorities in the Federal Republic (two-thirds or 
more) rejected the imposition of the Oder/Neisse border.16
          It is probably no coincidence that this decade also witnessed the largest number of 
dedications of local expellee monuments in most Länder of the Federal Republic, in 
addition to their move from local cemeteries to more conspicuous places in the public 
domain. In fact, nearly one-third of all expellee monuments were erected in the 1950s.
 Majorities of all West 
Germans, not just of the expellees, favored a border revision.  
17
                                                           
14 According to statistics cited by Stickler (“Ostdeutsch heißt Gesamtdeutsch,” p. 147), at the beginning of 
1956 there were 2,152,785 members of the two largest expellee umbrella organizations, the ZvD/BVD and 
the VdL, which constituted almost 24% of the entire expellee population of West Germany and West 
Berlin. 
 
It is clear that many of them were erected with the intention of openly agitating for 
revising postwar borders, such as the monument dedicated initially in 1955 and expanded 
in 1980 in Schelklingen, Baden-Württemberg (Figure 5). The monument consists of a 
15 Lotz, Die Deutung des Verlusts, p. 123. 
16 Not until 1969 did a majority of West Germans favor recognizing the border status quo. Prior results 
show strong (though declining) opposition to the German-Polish border established by the Potsdam 
Accord: 1951 (80%), 1956 (73%), 1959 (67%) and 1964 (59%). See Leo Kreuz, Das Kuratorium 
Unteilbares Deutschland: Aufbau, Programmatik, Wirkung. (Opladen: Leske Verlag + Budrich GmbH, 
1980). Here, p. 53. Kreuz cites surveys initially published in Gebhard Schweigler, Nationalbewußtsein in 
der BRD und DDR. (Düsseldorf: n.p., 1973). 
17 Hans Hesse and Elke Purpus, “Monuments and Commemorative Sites for German Expellees,” p. 52. 
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commemorative cross atop a stone plinth and is flanked on each side by three similarly 
shaped though smaller hewn stone blocks, each of which bears the name or names of 
eastern provinces, including those in Southeast Europe never a part of the German Reich 
either in 1871 or in 1937. From left to right, the stones read 1.) OSTPREUSSEN 
DANZIG WESTPREUSSEN 2.) POMMERN OSTBRANDENBURG POSEN 3.) 
SCHLESIEN 4.) SUDETENLAND 5.) BANATER-SCHWABEN 
DONAUSCHWABEN 6.) BUCHENLAND SIEBENBÜRGEN. The inclusion of the 
Southeast European regions is an indication of the composition of expellees in the area, 
which included far more Volksdeutsche than in northern regions. Again, it is the blunt 
main inscription that makes this monument notable. It reads: WIR FORDERN UNSERE 
HEIMAT (We demand our homeland).18
                                                           
18 According to information compiled by Heinrich Eich and Hans Vastag, the original monument has been 
expanded or renovated more than once. The site now contains benches for contemplation, stones with the 
names of the eastern regions, including those in Southeast Europe never a part of the German Reich, as 
well as another stone with the inscription: “Memorial (Mahnmal) for the German Victims of WWII. 
Wanderers pause and consider: 11,570,000 Germans were expelled from their homeland. 2,200,000 lost 
their lives as a result, among them thousands of Germans from Russia. 1,7000,000 found a new homeland 
in Baden-Württemberg. They helped in the reconstruction of this state. The dead admonish us to preserve 
peace, to stand up for justice and freedom, and to complete the unification of our fatherland.” Cited in Eich 
and Vastag, Dem Vergessen entrissen. Gedenkstätten und Mahnmale der Vertriebenen, Flüchtlinge und 
Aussiedler in Baden-Württemberg. (Stuttgart: Bund der Vertriebenen – Vereinigte Landsmannschaften, 
Landesverband Baden-Württemberg, 2002). 
 Built into a hill by a bike path outside this small 




        Figure 5 Schelklingen. Photo: J.L. 
 
           In addition to the directness of the inscription, I find the invocation of Heimat in 
Schelklingen particularly intriguing. Certainly, the reference to the Heimat here makes 
the monument more inclusive. The reader will recall that insisting solely on the return of 
the eastern territories from 1937 excluded the territorial demands articulated by Sudeten 
Germans and all the other Southeast European Germans. By demanding the Heimat 
instead of unser Territorium, unsere Region, unser Land, etc. the monument vindicates 
the expellees’ cultural, emotional, and spiritual connection to these areas; this elevates the 
expellees’ attachment to their homelands and renders it more than a purely material or 
commercial attachment. It went well beyond that.  
           Other monuments of this type also mobilize this kind of pathos. They suggest that 
the uprooting of the Germans from their Heimat was an unparalleled act of barbarity that 
led to immense suffering worthy of special acknowledgement and recompense. One of 
the best examples that shows what the loss of Heimat meant to the expellees consists of 
three commemorative stones erected by the city government in a park in Hagen, North 
Rhine-Westphalia (Figure 6). The monument bolsters territorial claims by referencing, on 
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the stone at left, the referendum of 1920 with which the inhabitants of Kreis Lyck 
(County Lyck) voted overwhelmingly to remain a part of Prussia instead of becoming 
part of Poland. It bears the city seal of Lyck and the inscription 1920 FÜR 
DEUTSCHLAND UNVERGESSENE HEIMAT (1920 For Germany Unforgotten 
Heimat). The stone on the right reads 1955 LYCK OSTPREUSSEN PATENSTADT 
HAGEN and commemorates Hagen’s adoption of the city Lyck (known today as Ełk, 
Poland) in a Patenschaft in 1955.19 The three-stone monument was designed to resemble 
a monument at the train station in Lyck.20
 
   
      Figure 6 Hagen. Photo: J.L. 
 
          In a speech at the unveiling ceremony in August 1963, Hagen’s Oberbürgermeister 
expressed his hope that the city could someday erect a fourth stone memorializing the 
                                                           
19 Numerous monuments were erected throughout West Germany to commemorate the anniversaries of the 
establishment of other Patenschaften as well. Recall that a Patenschaft provided for the financial and 
political support of an eastern city’s or county’s cultural traditions. Much like the monuments of this 
category which purport the existence of Germany in its 1937 borders, the special relationship sealed by a 
Patenschaft was conceived to demonstrate the continuing spiritual existence of the eastern cities and 
counties regardless of the political situation on the national level, which is why I include them in this 
chapter as well.  
20 For a brief history of the monument, see Beate Hobein and Dietmar Osses (eds.), “Bis in die fernste, 
fernste Zeit.” Hagen und seine Denkmäler. Hagener Stadtgeschichten Bd. 6. (Hagen: Lesezeichen Verlag 
Dierk Hobein, 1996). 
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expellees’ return to their homeland.21 The inscription on the monument’s center stone is, 
however, the most illuminating of the three. It reads, DEN DEUTSCHEN MIT ZWANG 
VON SEINER HEIMAT TRENNEN HEISST IHN IM GEISTE ZU TÖTEN (To 
separate the German forcibly from his native land means to kill him in spirit). The text is 
easily recognizable as being based on a passage from the Charter of the Expellees.22
 
 But 
what does it really say? First, it seems to say that even if the expellees managed to elude 
the dangers associated with the war and forced migration, the loss of their Heimat 
rendered them dead in spirit. Secondly, it conveys the message that because the survivors 
of the expulsion had lost their beloved homelands, they had suffered as much as any other 
victims of the Second World War and its aftermath, including those who actually were 
killed. The sentiments expressed here echo the statement made by the East Prussian 
writer Agnes Miegel, and seen on two monuments in North Rhine-Westphalia (Ahlen and 
Warendorf): VON DER HEIMAT GEHEN IST DIE SCHWERSTE LAST, DIE 
GÖTTER UND MENSCHEN BEUGT (To leave the Heimat is the greatest burden faced 
by gods and men). 
Großdeutschland: Post-Ostpolitik Territorial Claims 
           The monument in Hagen was erected several years after the earlier, more 
vociferous and revisionistic examples from the 1950s. For reasons discussed in Chapter 
Two, over the course of the 1960s, the incendiary and intractable rhetoric of the expellee 
organizations began to fall on deaf ears. In fact, many West Germans, particularly young 
people, met the expellee organizations with an a priori skepticism and accused the 
                                                           
21 Hobein and Osses (eds.), “Bis in die fernste, fernste Zeit,” p. 220. 
22 The initiators of the monument in Hagen nationalized the passage by replacing the first words “Den 
Menschen” with “Den Deutschen,” i.e. the text was changed from “the person” to “the German.” 
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organizations of balancing out their dead with Germany’s victims and of not accepting 
German responsibility for their fate. As a result, the expellees and their interests were 
marginalized. While one might suspect that the political and social developments on the 
national level would have led perforce to major alterations in the monuments’ tenor, it 
took a long time for the effects of this tectonic shift to trickle down to the local level. To 
be sure, a gradual change in thematic emphasis began to occur around this time. Of the 
new local monuments emplaced, more and more articulated the symbolic politics of 
recognition and collective innocence (discussed in cluster B) instead of expressing the 
tangible political objectives of territorial claims based on the loss of Heimat. The change 
from concrete to symbolic politics was not wholesale, however and the expellee 
organizations’ claims to their homelands did not abate. Reflecting this, small numbers of 
monuments commemorating the eastern territory more than the dead of the expulsion 
were erected after the Warsaw Treaty of 1970. 
           A monument unveiled in Plüderhausen, Baden-Württemberg in 1980 offers a case 
in point. (Figure 7) The double-beamed stone cross stands in a courtyard next to a 
Catholic church in this small city near Stuttgart. Abutting the courtyard is a wall on 
which hang plaques with the seals of all levels of the government, as well as the coats-of-
arms of the eastern provinces and the text: DIE HEIMAT BLEIBT UNVERGESSEN 
(The Heimat remains unforgotten).23
                                                           
23 The monument’s initiators utilized unusual capitalization for the inscription on the wall. To emphasis the 
lost homeland, it reads: die HEIMAT bleibt unvergessen. 
 Initiated by both the Plüderhausen Catholic church 
community and the local branch of the BdV, the monument consists of a stone cross with 
two horizontal beams, each of which bears an inscription: on the upper beam, 
(VERTREIBUNG AUS DEM OSTEN 1945—Expulsion from the East 1945); on the 
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lower beam, (RECHT AUF HEIMAT—Right to Heimat). Newspaper reports emphasized 
the reiterations of the concept “Recht auf Heimat” in each of the speeches given at the 
dedication ceremony.24 Denying people this “irreproachable legal concept according to 
international law” by forcibly expelling them from their homelands—the keynote speaker 
proclaimed that day—constituted an injustice (Unrecht). Perhaps anticipating critics, the 
speaker also claimed the applicability of the right to Heimat for everyone, not just the 
expellees.25
 
 However, the very specific context provided by the monument’s other 
attributes (inscriptions, plaques, etc.) is difficult to overlook. The “Recht auf Heimat” the 
monument extols was clearly meant to apply to the expellees from the former German 
East.   
                                                           Figure 7 Plüderhausen. Photo: J.L. 
 
                                                           
24 “Stätte der Erinnerung und Zeichen der Versöhnung, Symbol für Recht auf Heimat,” Schorndorfer 
Nachrichten. July 8, 1980.  




           Elsewhere, monuments in various forms were erected which memorialized the 
eastern territories in the traditional ways. The monuments still prominently display the 
coats-of-arms of the eastern provinces and of their Landsmannschaften, and references to 
the territory beyond the Oder/Neisse, and to the Germanness thereof, still abounded. For 
example, in what looks to be a unified effort, in 1989, the Wappen of various eastern 
provinces (East Prussia, West Prussia, Danzig, Pomerania, Silesia, Upper Silesia, and the 
Sudetenland, to be precise) were hung in the foyers of city halls in several cities in North 
Rhine-Westphalia.26
                                                           
26 The seals hang near the entrances of the Rathäuser in Altenbeken, Bad Lippspringe, Borchen, Büren, 
Delbrück, Hövelhof, Lichtenau, Paderborn, Salzkotten, and Wünnenberg. Though I have uncovered no 
specific information suggesting the striking similarities amount to more than a coincidence, the visual 
evidence (the coats-of-arms are identical) and the fact that all appeared in 1989 makes it look as if the 
erection of these monuments was part of an orchestrated campaign.   
 The phrasings on some monuments of this category indicate at 
minimum the tacit acknowledgment of the permanence of the newly confirmed borders. 
In 1975, the BdV erected a monument in Fulda, Hessen at the Platz der Heimat which 
reads WIR GEDENKEN DER VERLORENEN HEIMAT BdV 1975 (We commemorate 
the lost Heimat BdV 1975). With the territory “lost,” monument initiators elsewhere used 
concepts such as “loyalty” (die Treue) and “forgetting” and “not forgotten” 
(“vergessen”/“unvergessen”) to qualify the Heimat and implore spectators to maintain 
their affinity toward and deep bond with their homeland despite the fact that there would 
be no return home. Monuments dedicated to the UNVERGESSENE HEIMAT 
(Unforgotten Heimat), or some similar variation, were erected throughout West Germany 
after 1970. Virtually all of them include the Wappen of the eastern provinces, however, 
and thereby espouse the continuing existence of these political entities in the face of 
political realities to the contrary. 
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           The monument dedicated on June 17, 1988 in Neuss, North Rhine-Westphalia 
stands as one example (Figure 8).27 This Mahnmal für den deutschen Osten (Monument 
for the German East) was erected on the city’s Platz der deutschen Einheit (German 
Unity Square) almost two decades after the ratification of the Warsaw Treaty. 
Nevertheless, it still conveys the expellee organizations’ disinclination to accept the 
territorial status quo. The monument is comprised of a red-brown granite column and a 
fountain, the basin of which is adorned with the coats-of-arms of Silesia, Pomerania, 
Sudetenland, West Prussia, and the insignia of the East Prussian Landsmannschaft, a 
moose antler.28
                                                           
27 The city Neuss was described to me as a very “vertriebenenfreundliche Stadt” (expellee-friendly city). 
The involvement of the city and local businesses in the erection of the monument corroborates this 
assertion, as stated on a commemorative plate behind the actual monument: ERRICHTET VON NEUSSER 
BÜRGERN UND UNTERNEHMEN, DEN OSTDEUTSCHEN LANDSMANNSCHAFTEN NEUSS, 
DER JUBILÄUMSSTIFTUNG DER STADTSPARKASSE NEUSS SOWIE DER STADT NEUSS. 17. 
JUNI 1988. (Erected by citizens and businesses of Neuss, the East German Landsmannschaften Neuss, the 
anniversary foundation of the local city bank, as well as the City Neuss. 17. June 1988). The monument 
stands in front of a local business. I this case and in all these cases, the involvement in any capacity of local 
government and even local merchants indicates at least some approval of the historical interpretations 
offered by the expellees. The sometimes radical views propagated by the monuments therefore were not 
limited to the hardliners of the expellee organizations. In 2002, the BdV, again with the help of local 
businesses, added a Glockenspiel to the square which chimes the Heimatlieder of the eastern provinces 
twice daily. 
 The inscription is again key: VERGEßT EUREN DEUTSCHEN OSTEN 
NICHT (Do not forget your German East). The text indicates that the expellee 
organizations had been fighting an uphill battle since the 1970s to garner the public’s 
sympathy for their plight. Clearly, the inscription addresses the threat that the German 
East might indeed be forgotten and beseeches passersby not to succumb to this seemingly 
inevitable temptation given the passage of time and the dominance of other postwar 
narratives. Simultaneously, however, I find the monument mounts a muted, threefold 
protest against the fruits of Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik. First, the employment of the coats-
of-arms suggests these historical territories still exist. The other two pertain to the 
28 Water trickles down a groove in the stone into the basin. The two sides of which represent the two halves 
of Germany, which at the time of the dedication, was of course still divided.  
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expulsion. Immediately conspicuous is the designation of the territory commemorated as 
the German East. Regardless of the new national boundaries, the territory was still 
German. Finally, the possessive pronoun (Euren) expresses ongoing ownership. While 
visiting the monument in 2007, I was told the possessive plural “you” was selected 
instead of “our” (unseren) to convey that the eastern provinces belonged to all Germans, 
not just to the expellees, and therefore the forfeiture of the German East meant a great 
loss—especially culturally—for everyone.  
 
                                                          Figure 8 Neuss. Photo: J.L. 
 
CONCLUSION 
          The expellee monuments of this chapter purport the continuation of a Germany—a 
“Großdeutschland”—that no longer existed. The eastern territories were still German and 
the expulsion amounted to a singularly unjust action that separated the expellees from 
their beloved Heimat. At the same time, the monuments demonstrate the importance of 
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temporality, international developments, and changes in the national political mood for 
interpreting these commemorative objects. Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik and, specifically, 
West Germany’s recognition of the Oder/Neisse border—which the expellee 
organizations, of course, vehemently opposed—had a lasting impact on the monuments’ 
forms and themes. Although one might expect to see an increase in stridency or a shriller 
tone in the territorial claims after Ostpolitik, this was generally not the case. More 
striking is the decrease of monuments displaying the Großdeutschland motif—the result 
of a far more significant shift in commemorative emphasis that will be explained 
thoroughly in cluster B. For the time being, however, in a few cases, which I have 
highlighted here, the expellee organizations still used local monuments after Ostpolitik to 
pursue concrete politics and raise territorial claims. In this regard, the monuments 
highlight the differences between overblown political rhetoric at the national level and 
public commemoration at the local level. These few post-Ostpolitik cases show that for 















          Some expellees still refer to the Germany’s division after WWII as a Dreiteilung 
(triple partitioning) rather than a Zweiteilung (division) to emphasize the fact that German 
territory constituted an area much larger than the two postwar states. The division of 
rump Germany into the Federal Republic and the GDR and subsequent efforts to protest 
and agitate against the postwar political constellation offered different avenues for the 
expellee organizations to articulate their interests. Instead of claims based specifically on 
the loss of Heimat, the ideological conflict between the superpowers and their allies 
enabled expellee organizations to broaden their appeals for support in reacquiring their 
lost homelands by making border revision a part of the larger struggle of the West against 
Communism and Soviet expansion. The territorial demands of the expellees were thus 
conflated with calls for the reunification of East and West Germany and were couched in 
the language of the Cold War.1
           Campaigning for the reacquisition and reunification of formerly German territory 
by conflating the expulsion with the division of Germany made territorial claims more 
palatable by tapping into widely shared negative attitudes about the Soviet Union. It also 
kept the eastern provinces in the public eye during an era when Germans increasingly 
 The local expellee monuments in this chapter reflect this. 
                                                           
1 The appellation “East Germany” is also problematic for many expellees for whom the GDR remains 
“Mitteldeutschland” (Central Germany). 
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viewed the Federal Republic and the GDR as the sole remnants of the former German 
Reich. Of course, this strategy had major implications for attributions of guilt and 
responsibility as well. Indeed, by extension, I would suggest the conflation was part of an 
effort—undertaken not only by expellee organizations—to put some rhetorical distance 
between the plight of the expellees and the war that had been started by the Nazis and 
underwritten by millions of Germans, including the expellees, for years. Blame for the 
suffering of the expellees therefore was pinned on the Soviets, their communist 
underlings, and other partisans of Eastern Europe and not on the Nazis and those who 
supported them (or on the western Allies, for that matter).  
 
THE MONUMENTS 
          This type of conflation can be seen in a small but important set of local expellee 
monuments. Though the commemorative implications are complex and far-reaching, the 
monuments themselves are more straightforward. The defining characteristic of the 
monuments in this chapter is a reference to the eastern territory as well as to the division 
between West and East Germany. More specifically, these monuments link symbols and 
other iconography seen in Chapter Three (“Großdeutschland and the Right to the 
Heimat”) to the division between the two German states. For example, monuments with 
Germany presented in its 1937 borders also display (with extra emphasis) the inner-
German border. These monuments treat East German cities like Dresden, Eisenach, and 
Magdeburg as “lost” just like the cities of the truly lost eastern provinces, e.g. Danzig and 
Königsberg. Much the same, they include the traditional coats-of-arms of the Länder of 
“Mitteldeutschland” (e.g. Saxony and Mecklenburg) with those from the eastern 
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provinces. References to Berlin are also prevalent. In addition, the monuments employ 
the language used to call for reunification between the Federal Republic and the 
undemocratic GDR (e.g. “Wiedervereinigung” [reunification], “Selbstbestimmung” [self-
determination], “Freiheit” [freedom], and “Einheit” [unity]) to formulate the expellees’ 
territorial demands.  
          Thirty-seven monuments of this type were erected throughout the Länder of West 
Germany.2
                                                           
2 Though the escalation of the Cold War in the 1950s coincided with what Retterath calls the “time of the 
‘crosses of the German East’” (Retterath, “Geschichtsbilderkampf…” p. 108)—that is, when large religious 
symbols commemorating the expulsion were strategically emplaced near the inner-German border—in the 
interest of clarity, I do not necessarily include them in this category. One of them—the oversized cross 
erected in Bad Harzburg, Lower Saxony, high in the Harz Mountains—is especially worth mentioning. 
Visible at the time across the border in the GDR, the monument was dedicated in June 1950 before a crowd 
of 20,000—including prominent government officials such as Expellee Minister Hans Lukaschek and the 
Lord Mayor of West Berlin, Ernst Reuter. The monument, restored after a major storm in 2002, is 
enormous. Including the base, the original structure reached approximately 26 meters high. The cross—
illuminated at night by floodlights—was to be a monument of peace and a symbol of loyalty to the Heimat. 
Affixed to its base were wooden panels engraved with the coats-of-arms of the lost German provinces 
beyond the Oder/Neisse and an urn containing soil from the Heimat immured in the base. (See Hans 
Kuhne, Das Kreuz auf den Uhlenklippen bei Bad Harzburg. (Bad Harzburg: Bund der Vertriebenen 
Ortsverband Bad Harzburg, n.d.) Though obviously an expellee monument, the geographical location—
facing eastward—was selected to underscore its effect and gather further attention. Erected before the 
uprising in East Germany on June 17, 1953, the expulsion is presented here and elsewhere, according to 
Scholz, as a “manifestation of the communist system in Eastern Europe and the GDR.” Tapping into anti-
communist sentiments of the time, the expellees began presenting themselves not only as the victims of 
Bolshevism but also as the Christian West’s bulwark against the atheist east. For more on this religious 
element, see Scholz, “‘Opferdunst vernebelt die Verhältnisse,’” p. 303.   
 Such monuments were located in smaller numbers throughout the Federal 
Republic (though not in Hamburg, Bremen, or Saarland), which indicates the popularity 
of the messages conveyed was widespread and not geographically bound. More than half 
of all of these, however, were in the northern Länder—Schleswig-Holstein led the way 
with nine, followed by Lower Saxony (eight), and North Rhine-Westphalia (seven). 
Particularly striking about all of them is the location. Most were erected in easily 
noticeable areas: large public squares, major intersections, near train stations, by 
municipal buildings, including in and by city halls. This high visibility belies the 
assertion that local expellee monuments served merely as ersatz grave sites for solemn 
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remembrance and quiet reflection and instead were erected to mobilize the public, draw 
attention to concrete political objectives, and shape historical understandings. 
Furthermore, many of the monuments of this category were erected on the Day of 
German Unity, June 17, which memorialized the much-celebrated, though ultimately 
unsuccessful, rebellion in the GDR on that day in 1953.3
           Some examples of this expulsion/division conflation include the signpost in 
Blexen, Lower Saxony (erected in 1957), notable not only for its easily visible location 
near the ferry landing in this city on the North Sea, but also for its listing of distances to 
cities in the German East (Breslau, Danzig, Königsberg, and Stettin) and its large outline 
of the city of Berlin’s symbol, the bear.  In Tornesch, Schleswig-Holstein, a 
commemorative wall (Gedenkmauer) was constructed near the town’s city hall in 1959 
with an outline of Germany’s 1937 border on the Baltic Sea (including the territory of 
Pomerania and East Prussia, at that time in the GDR and Poland, respectively) and the 
inscription: ES GIBT NUR EIN DEUTSCHLAND (There is only one Germany).
 As we have seen, 
commemorations of the revolt, and the desire for unification it was said to have 
expressed, were appropriated and combined by expellee organizations with their hope for 
unification of all former German territory.  
4
                                                           
3 For an outstanding rendering of the instrumentalization of the uprising of July 17, 1953 as the source of 
West German national pride and identity, see Wolfrum, Geschichtspolitik in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland. 
 
Another monument from 1959, unveiled June 17th of that year, was emplaced at the 
market square in Schöningen, Lower Saxony. It bears the seal of Berlin as well as the 
historic coats-of-arms of Germany’s eastern and central (i.e. GDR) provinces and the 
4 The inscription was changed in 1997 to IN GEDENKEN AN UNSERE UNVERGESSENE HEIMAT (In 




assertion: BERLIN SOLL IMMER HAUPTSTADT BLEIBEN 17.6.1959 (Berlin shall 
always remain the capital) as well as: VERGESST DEN DEUTSCHEN OSTEN NICHT! 
(Do not forget the German East!) 
           One of the most illuminating examples, however, is a cube-shaped monument 
erected (not coincidentally) at Berliner Platz in Böblingen, Baden-Württemberg (Figure 
9). The square is located at the corner of Berliner Straße and Steinbeisstraße. The next 
two streets on either side are named for cities in the former German East: 
Königsbergerstraße and Breslauerstraße. Two blocks further, Berliner Straße becomes 
Stettinerstraße, a street named for another city of the lost provinces. Danzigerstraße is 
also nearby. The site was provided by the city government, and the monument was 
erected in the late 1950s.5
                                                           
5 Even after e-mail correspondence with the director of the Agency for Culture in Böblingen, Peter 
Conzelmann, I was unable to ascertain the exact date of the monument’s unveiling. 
 Large plates adorned the four visible sides of the cube—all of 




                                                  Figure 9 Böblingen. Photo: BdV Archive 
 
           Featuring the coats-of-arms of Königsberg, Berlin, and Breslau, the first plate 
made no distinction between the cities beyond the Oder/Neisse and the former capital of 
the German Reich, divided Berlin. The second plate featured the inscription WIR 
WOLLEN SEIN EIN EINIG VOLK VON BRÜDERN (We want to be a united Volk of 
brothers) taken from the “Rütli oath” recorded in Friedrich Schiller’s 1804 play Wilhelm 
Tell.6
                                                           
6 The full stanza reads: 
 According to Edgar Wolfrum, such invocations of the “German spirit” (deutscher 
Geist) and other national symbols from the era of Germany’s Wars of Liberation were 
Wir wollen sein ein einzig Volk von Brüdern,  
in keiner Not uns trennen und Gefahr.  
Wir wollen frei sein, wie die Väter waren,  
eher den Tod, als in der Knechtschaft leben.  
Wir wollen trauen auf den höchsten Gott  
und uns nicht fürchten vor der Macht der Menschen.  
Wilhelm Tell, Act 2, Scene 2 
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part and parcel of 1950s efforts to revive the cult of the German nation-state during the 
first decades of division.7
          Nevertheless, the ultimate goals of the monument’s initiators were similar and were 
succinctly articulated on the third plate’s inscription: FREIHEIT RECHT EINHEIT 
(Freedom Justice Unity). But to whom were these lofty ideals typical of the Cold War to 
apply? To the Germans of the GDR, caught behind the iron curtain? To the expellees in 
the Federal Republic? The fourth plate provided the answer and was, in fact, the most 
telling. It displayed an outline of Germany in its 1937 borders. This fact alone does not 
make this plate noteworthy. What did, however, was the inclusion of the demarcated 
German-German border, i.e. the heavily fortified boundary from the Baltic Sea to Bavaria 
between East and West Germany. Strikingly, East Germany’s border with Poland—the 
Oder/Neisse—was omitted. Those who initiated the monument wished to express that the 
inner-German boundary marked off areas no longer belonging to Germany. It was as if 
the GDR did not exist. In other words, everything lying to the east of democratic West 
Germany, and everyone hailing from those areas, was treated the same—as the victims of 
expulsion, Soviet occupation, and German division. Therefore, the freedom, justice, and 
unity mentioned here applied not only to the Germans residing in the GDR but to those 
from beyond the Oder/Neisse as well. Moreover, the peaceful resolution of the converse 
of these ideals could only be engendered by the reunification of all parts of Germany—
not only between the Federal Republic and the GDR, but the former German East as well.  
 The hope was that hearkening back to another time of German 
disunity and occupation would once again inspire national cohesion. The circumstances 
of the division were different, however.  
                                                           
7 Wolfrum, Geschichtspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, pp. 164-177. 
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         It bears repeating that the municipal government of Böblingen provided the location 
for this monument. It was not situated in the back corner of a tranquil cemetery but stood 
conspicuously at the intersection of major city streets. This monument was created to be 
seen. In addition, the cube was not typical because it was not initiated by the BdV or 
another expellee organization. Instead, it was sponsored by the Kuratorium Unteilbares 
Deutschland (KUD—Curatorium Indivisible Germany), a non-partisan, national 
organization founded in 1954 with the explicit purpose of fostering a grassroots campaign 
to bring about German reunification by mobilizing the public and influencing 
politicians.8 Nevertheless, the obvious allusions to the former German East on the cube’s 
sides allowed for the appropriation of the monument for BdV purposes even after the 
reunification in 1990 and especially after the KUD disbanded in 1992.9 Furthermore, it 
should be added that my usage of the past tense to describe the monument is deliberate. 
The monument was removed with the approval of the BdV in 2006 due to the danger 
posed by the long-term effects of exposure to the elements. The cube was falling apart.10
          Differing in form but not in content, a number of signposts (“Wegweiser”) erected 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s provide other examples of local monuments that employ 
this thematic intermixing. While expellee groups initiated other such signposts with 
references only to cities in the former German East, what set these monuments apart were 
   
                                                           
8 It is very possible that the KUD and the BdV collaborated in initiating this monument. Kreuz writes that 
the two organizations often experienced differences of opinion over ultimate objectives at the national level 
(i.e. the BdV wished to see greater emphasis on the lost eastern territories in the KUD’s rhetoric) but points 
out that the two shared common interests and were often able to find common ground at the local level. See 
Kreuz, Das Kuratorium Unteilbares Deutschland, p. 127. The Böblingen monument’s strong emphasis on 
the German East makes cooperation of some sort seem likely. 
9 The monument is included in a useful compendium of memorial sites regarding the Soviet zone of 
occupation and the GDR edited by Anne Kaminsky called Orte des Erinnerns: Gedenkzeichen, 
Gedenkstätten und Museen zur Diktatur in SBZ und DDR. (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2007). 
10 Böblingen will not be without an expellee monument for long, however. The city has once again 
provided a location for a replacement which was to be unveiled in 2009. This time in a less conspicuous 
area, the city’s Waldfriedhof (forest cemetery). I thank Peter Conzelmann from the city’s Agency for 
Culture for this information. 
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their references to cities both in the eastern provinces as well as to cities in the GDR or to 
Berlin. For many, all the formerly German cities behind the iron curtain were 
administered against the will of the German people by foreign occupiers and thus were 
similarly unreachable. Furthermore, and in spite of the varying distances, the cities were 
equally far away. To wit, the Wegweiser in Springe, Lower Saxony, listed the distances 
of that small city near Hannover to the former East Prussian city Tilsit (today, Sovetsk, 
Russia), Danzig, the former Pomeranian city Stettin (today, Szczecin, Poland), Berlin, 
Breslau, and Dresden.11 Though formally designated a reunification monument 
(Mahnmal der Wiedervereinigung), the wooden post’s references to former German cities 
in the East made clear that reunification would be incomplete without the eastern 
territories. Designed by a local expelled German from Silesia, the signpost in Springe 
was unveiled at a fork in two major streets in the city center on the expellees’ day of 
commemoration, Tag der Heimat, in September, not the national holiday, June 17th, in 
1959.12
                                                           
11 Dresden is an interesting selection for a representative city of the GDR due to its historical significance 
in discussions of German wartime suffering, especially in the GDR, because of the massive destruction 
caused by Allied (i.e. British and American) bombing of the city in February 1945. For more on the GDR 
leadership’s instrumentalization of the bombing of Dresden during the Cold War, see Bill Niven, “The 
GDR and the Memory of the Bombing of Dresden,” in Niven (ed.) Germans as Victims, pp. 109-129. 
 Akin to a number of other monuments throughout the Federal Republic sharing 
this form—for example, in Lörrach, Baden-Württemberg; Kitzingen, Bavaria; 
Wolfhagen, Hessen—this signpost directed its viewers’ attention to the cities of the East 
and to Berlin or the GDR and reminded them that postwar division split German territory 
in three, not in two.  
12 What is also remarkable about the signpost is that it was set at an angle and propped up by a cast-iron 
outline of a human figure. The monument was to be reset to vertical once division was overcome, including 
the reacquisition of the eastern provinces. After the unanticipated events of 1990, however, the signpost 
remained as it was originally designed in part because the reunification did not include the lost territories 
and for fear it might be misunderstood as raising a lasting territorial claim. In need of restoration, the 
monument was removed in 2005. I thank Andreas Lilge from the City Archive of Springe, who provided 
me with this information. 
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          Though more a sign wall than a signpost, the expellee monument in Porta 
Westfalica, North Rhine-Westphalia also displays this conflation by listing the respective 
distances to Königsberg and Berlin (Figures 10 & 11). Like the majority of monuments in 
this category, this one was dedicated in 1965, i.e. between the uprising in the GDR in 
June 1953 and Willy Brandt’s New Ostpolitik of the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 
addition to the city names, city seals and the distances, however, the large brick segment 
more overtly mentions the expulsion. A bronze plaque containing the inscription ZUM 
GEDENKEN DER TOTEN DURCH KRIEG, GEWALTHERRSCHAFT, FLUCHT 
UND VERTREIBUNG (In commemoration of the dead of war, due to tyranny, flight and 
expulsion) seems to thematize all the dead of WWII, including the victims of the Nazis. 
In this context though, the inclusion of the dead due to tyranny might refer to the victims 
of Stalinism instead—amongst whom many expellees counted themselves, but who also 








                             Figure 11 Porta Westfalica (close-up). Photo: J.L. 
 
          One of the most explicit examples of this category, however, is another wall in 
Westphalia, this time in Gescher (Figure 12). Here, a bronze relief with a map of 
Germany in its 1937 borders and the seals of East Prussia, Pomerania, and Silesia hangs 
on a one meter by two meter brick wall. The monument—conceived and dedicated by the 
local branch of the BdV and approved and financed by the city government by a majority 
vote a mere three years before the fall of the Berlin Wall (1986)—is conspicuously 





 Two features of the monument point to the conflation of the expulsion 
with the Cold War that followed. First, along with the map and seals on the bronze plate, 
both the Oder/Neisse border and the inner-German border are demarcated. That 
Germany—according to the expellees in Gescher—underwent an illegitimate “triple 
partitioning” after WWII is evident. This also implies the recognition of the GDR, absent 
in other depictions. These facts alone are not uncommon, except that there is greater 
emphasis on the boundary between the two German states than on the GDR-Polish border 
(i.e., the border is raised and thus more distinct than the Oder/Neisse border which is 
engraved and sunken). Like the others of this category, this monument shows that 
overcoming the division of Germany, and true reunification, could only occur when the 
former German territory in what was then Poland and the Soviet Union was also 
reincorporated.  
                     Figure 12 Gescher. Photo: BdV Archive 
                                                           
13 The commemorative stone from 1955 expresses the dissatisfaction with the territorial status quo typical 
of the period. It features a metal plate affixed to its side with the inscription DENKT AN DEN 
DEUTSCHEN OSTEN (Think about the German East). 
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          A second feature, however, makes an even more potent statement in terms of 
historical narratives. Indeed it reflects the general shift in the objectives of the expellees 
away from the open territorial claims of the first decades of the Cold War, to the strong 
accent on victimhood which occurred after Ostpolitik and the emergence of Holocaust-
centered narratives. The monument bears the generic inscription DEN OPFERN VON 
VERTREIBUNG UND TEILUNG (To the victims of expulsion and division). This 
vague phrasal pairing raises a number of questions, the answers to which provide insight 
into how many West Germans connected the expulsion of Germans with the division of 
Germany. The first question refers to the persons commemorated by the monument. It is 
unclear to whom the designation “victims of expulsion and division” refers. Are those 
victims one and the same—meaning all Germans equally, i.e. West Germans, citizens of 
the GDR, the expellees—who suffered (some more than others) due to the occupation 
and partitioning of their Fatherland? Or, alternatively, are the groups distinct? If the 
groups are distinct, secondly, what do the victims have in common? The Federal Expellee 
Law of 1953 legally defined the expellees, but who were the “victims of division”? 
Would-be escapees shot down at the Berlin Wall? Other refugees from the GDR killed 
attempting to flee westward at the inner-German border? The Germans forced to live 
behind the iron curtain? All Germans? What do they share with the expellees other than 
their ethnic heritage? Third, and most significantly, assuming the groups were indeed 
separate, why was the expulsion disconnected from the Second World War and attached 
to postwar events?  
           Unfortunately, the monument does not provide clear answers. On the other hand, 
the Cold War conflation conveyed by the inscription was not formulated alone to assert 
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some kind of territorial claim or to express the will to reunify, as traditionally had been 
the case. Instead, a new exculpatory dimension was added to the narrative. The victims of 
expulsion and division are combined here, I contend, to form a new cohort of victims. 
The monument commemorates those Germans affected by postwar events, that is, those 
who suffered at the hands of the Allies after WWII, not as a direct result thereof. The 
expulsion and division are disconnected from the Nazi war of aggression and this 




         To demonstrate this conflation a final time, I draw briefly on a monument not 
included on BdV lists. In December 1960, the “Memorial to German Unity” was 
dedicated at the prominent Servatiiplatz near the main train station in Münster, North 
Rhine-Westphalia (Figure 13).14 Designed by the sculptor Anni Buschkötter, the 
monument features two large, trapezoidal concrete blocks linked together by bulky iron 
chains that symbolize “the will of unity and … expression of the fact that the German 
people could not be divided.”15
                                                           
14 For more on this monument, see Godehard Janzing, “National Division as a Formal Problem in West 
German Public Sculpture: Memorials to German Unity in Münster and Berlin” in Benton (ed.) 
Figuration/Abstraction, pp. 127-146, as well as Maren Ullrich, Geteilte Ansichten: Erinnerungslandschaft 
Deutsch-Deutsche Grenze. (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 2006), pp. 38ff. 
 The monument is easily interpreted as a representation of 
the unbreakable bond between the two German states. In no way could one construe this 
as an expellee monument. Indeed, it was initiated and sponsored by the local office of the 
In addition to this unification monument, Münster had a commemorative plaque with the text of the Charter 
of the German Expellees hung near the entry of the city hall in 1975. Addressing the lack of a prominent 
expellee monument in the city, a commemorative stone was placed at an area of Servatiiplatz adjacent to 
the unification monument in 2003. 
15 This quotation comes from a speech given at the dedication ceremony cited in Janzing, “National 
Division as a Formal Problem in West German Public Sculpture,” p. 135. 
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KUD, not by an expellee organization. In fact, local expellee groups were critical of the 
monument’s design from the start because it “formulated the ‘German question’ as no 
more than an inner-German problem, between the Federal Republic and the German 
Democratic Republic.”16
 
 The objection was not short-lived. Nearly thirty years after the 
monument was unveiled, on the Day of German Unity, October 3, 1990, unknown 
protestors chained a third block—representing the former German East—to the original 
structure to express their enduring disapproval of the exclusion of the eastern provinces 
in the original monument and in discussions of the impending German reunification. In 
other words, the expellees in Münster were protesting the lack of conflation of their 
interests with the efforts to overcome the Cold War.  






                                                           
16 Ibid., p. 135. 
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ADDENDUM—AFTER THE COLD WAR: LOCAL EXPELLEE MONUMENTS 
IN THE GDR 
 
         The end of the Cold War for Germany meant that this motif was no longer 
employed in the erection of post-reunification expellee monuments. Like the monument 
in Münster, to which a cast-iron sign with the years “1945-1990” was added, other 
monuments of this type were dismantled or otherwise amended to reflect the drastic 
changes to the political situation.17 After reaching a second highpoint in the 1980s, in 
fact, the numbers of monuments erected in West Germany in general dropped 
precipitously after the fall of the Berlin Wall. No memorials to the expulsion were 
erected in the territory of the GDR until after 1990.18 Nonetheless, newly formed 
expellee organizations quickly began erecting expellee monuments in the new Länder.19
                                                           
17 The debate that ensued in the 1990s over an expellee monument in Bad Arolsen, Hessen provides one 
example. Here, the KUD dedicated a monument on June 17, 1960, which displayed a map of Germany in 
its 1937 borders with emphasis on the inner-German boundary and, to represent Berlin, a small depiction of 
the Brandenburg Gate. The inscription read, DEUTSCHLAND UNTEILBAR (Germany indivisible). City 
representatives from the Green Party protested against the monument already in February 1990 and later 
that year formally proposed a measure to dismantle it, which did not receive a majority and was not passed. 
As a compromise, a plaque was added which states, SEIT DEM 03.OKTOBER 1990 UMFASST DAS 
VEREINTE DEUTSCHLAND DIE GEBIETE DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND DER 
DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIK UND GANZ BERLIN. DAS VEREINTE 
DEUTSCHLAND ERHEBT KEINERLEI GEBIETSANSPRÜCHE GEGEN ANDERE STAATEN UND 
WIRD SOLCHE AUCH IN ZUKUNFT NICHT GELTEND MACHEN. DIE BESTÄTIGUNG DER 
GRENZEN DES VEREINTEN DEUTSCHLANDS IST EIN WESENTLICHER BESTANDTEIL DER 
FRIEDENSORDNUNG IN EUROPA. (Since October 3, 1990, united Germany comprised the territories of 
the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic and all of Berlin. United Germany 
does not raise any territorial claims vis-à-vis other states and will not in the future. The confirmation of the 
borders of united Germany is a considerable component of peace and order in Europe.) The monument was 
removed after repeatedly being defaced. After a failed attempt by local members of the CDU to restore the 
monument at city expense in 1993, the privately organized Kyffhäuserbund Waldeck provided funds for its 
renovation and re-dedication, which took place later that year. For more on this debate, see Kaminsky (ed.) 
Orte des Erinnerns, p. 224.   
 
18 Since 1990, expellee memorials have been erected in a number of East and Central Europeans states. 
According to the registry of the Bund der Vertriebenen, however, only a single memorial was erected in the 
Eastern Bloc during the time of the Cold War, in Hungary in 1979. 
19 No longer fearful of Stasi infiltration or state prosecution, small groups and committees of expellees 
began forming and meeting in the open in the GDR in March 1990. Just over a month after the 
reunification later that year on October 3rd, a state-level organization of the BdV was founded in Thuringia, 
one of the first in East Germany. It is probably no coincidence that the earliest documented monument in 
the former GDR was also erected there, in Gotha, in August 1992—less than two years after reunification.   
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Although they bear no particular thematic resemblance to the monuments of this chapter, 
I will briefly examine these monuments here. 
          While the overall numbers of expellee monuments in the new Länder are not high 
(Thuringia has the most, twenty-seven—more than double that of any other eastern state), 
the monuments present a valuable counterpoint to those in the West. In fact, I contend 
they allow for a worthwhile comparison and for the condensed observation of how a 
certain understanding of Germany’s recent past was developed beyond the ideological 
shadow of the Cold War. One thing is certain—the monuments in the former GDR speak 
emphatically about the strong will still shared by many expellees to memorialize the 
expulsion publicly decades after the event. Echoing the patterns of the West, the desire 
for recognition of their plight and the urge to commemorate it in the form of enduring 
memorials appears not to have been a fleeting trend or merely an epiphenomenon of the 
Cold War. The monuments in the former GDR were constructed nearly half a century 
after the event. Several were erected, in fact, on the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the 
war. While they do not conflate the themes of the Cold War, the historical understanding 
on display there was not a Cold War relic, but rather represented attitudes held since the 
end of WWII. 
          The most notable aspect about the monuments—most of which were erected on the 
major days of commemoration: Tag der Heimat or Volkstrauertag—however, is their 
reiteration of the sentiments expressed for decades by those of the West. For example, a 
simple commemorative stone was erected on a street in Delitzsch, Saxony with the 
                                                           
Research on the activities of the expellee organizations in the former GDR is lacking. The information 
presented on them here is from Bernhard Fisch, “Wir brauchen einen langen Atem.” Die deutschen 
Vertriebenen, 1990-1999. Eine Innenansicht. (Jena: Verlag Neue Literatur, 2001). Fisch’s text, a very 
personal, polemical account of his disappointing experiences as an expellee in one of the new Länder 
(Thuringia), offers some insight into this topic but does not stand up to scholarly rigor. 
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inscription: ZUM GEDENKEN AN DIE VERTREIBUNG UND DAS UNRECHT AN 
DEN DEUTSCHEN NACH DEM 2. WELTKRIEG (In commemoration of the expulsion 
and the injustice against Germans after WWII). Whether the monument in Delitzsch, the 
commemorative stone with deposits containing Heimaterde in Apolda, Thuringia, or the 
monument dedicated to UNSEREN TOTEN (Our dead) in Tabarz, Thuringia, the 
monuments in the former GDR resemble their older counterparts in the West. They rarely 
refer specifically to other victims nor do they provide much historical context.  
          The same applies to a sandstone column located at the main cemetery in the city of 
Erfurt, which features a mother and the common motif of a caravan of refugees fleeing 
from their homes.20
           To be sure, the initiators in the eastern states have had to overcome obstacles not 
regularly seen in the West in order to emplace their monuments. For example, though it is 
difficult to measure the extent to which the SED’s antifascist rhetoric was truly accepted 
and reproduced throughout the larger East German society, and would be equally tough 
to chart the long-term influence of pro-Soviet and anti-Federal Republic propaganda on 
the populace, it seems safe to say that societal approval of the organized expellees’ 
 The column bears the inscription VERTREIBUNG IST UNRECHT. 
DIE HEIMAT BLEIBT UNVERGESSEN. (Expulsion is an injustice. The Heimat 
remains unforgotten) and is surrounded by small stands bearing the coats-of-arms of the 
eastern provinces. The use of Heimat-political symbolism is actually quite rare in 
monuments in the former GDR. The general lack of nationalist symbols on other 
monuments reflects the shift from concrete politics (territorial claims) to symbolic 
politics (exculpation and espousal of victimhood) witnessed in the West.  
                                                           
20 As will be explored more thoroughly in chapter eight, the figure of the mother—an iconic figure of the 
expulsion—is used to assert claims of collective innocence. 
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understanding of their fate was less widespread than in the West in previous decades. 
Expellee monuments in the former GDR were erected in an environment where just years 
before talk of the expulsion had been expunged from public discourse and criminalized. 
The nascent expellee organizations were decades behind their western counterparts in 
terms of organization and social status and were forming at a time of growing 
unemployment and great financial insecurity due to the transformation of the moribund 
East German economy. Nevertheless, the desire to dedicate monuments to the victims of 
the expulsion has been strong. And, as had been the case with so many monuments in the 










GERMANS AS KULTURTRÄGER: 





          Wolfgang Wippermann has shown that the theory of Germans as bearers of culture 
(Kulturträgertheorie) was a significant component of the ideology of the German Drang 
nach Osten (Drive to the East) which, depending on the proponent, was either an anti-
Slavic position justifying the reacquisition of formerly Germanic territory from the Poles 
and other Slavs from the Middle Ages to the Third Reich, or which facilitated the 
integration of Slavic peoples and enhanced in their eyes the legitimacy of their hold on 
formerly German territory (including after the expulsion).1 The focus here, of course, is 
on the German side of the argument. Especially vis-à-vis the Poles, the theory was 
brought to bear historically to legitimate Teutonic possession of lands and dominance 
over Slavic populations. In essence, this view implied that “foreign” control of Polish 
territory was justified because of the cultural, political, and technological superiority of 
the Germans.2
                                                           
1 See Wippermann, Der “deutsche Drang nach Osten:” Ideologie und Wirklichkeit eines politischen 
Schlagwortes. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1981). 
 The emphasis on German cultural and political supremacy more than 
implies the inferiority of others in the same fields.  
2 Wippermann notes five technological, economic, and social innovations introduced by German in the 
time of the settlement of the east which provided the basis for these assertions: in particular, the iron plow, 
the city in the legal sense, agricultural and village layouts, lawful standing of peasants, and, in general, 
German industriousness. Wippermann, Der “deutsche Drang nach Osten,” pp. 101-102. 
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          The theory applied in other geographic contexts as well, particularly southeastern 
Europe. The cultural accomplishments of the Germans who settled there and the 
territorial claims they supposedly legitimized are nicely summarized in a contribution in a 
festschrift compiled for the consecration of an expellee monument in Geislingen, Baden-
Württemberg in 1950.3
but a part of their accomplishments, certainly the most visible, but probably not the most 
important, because in addition to these agricultural and commercial deeds stand those of 
the mind (des Geistes) which first and foremost led to the return of the nomadic 
Southeast—since Roman times overrun by Asiatic mentality (Geisteshaltung) and won 
back after the Turkish Wars (Türkenkriege)—to the Christian West. That was mostly 
German work.  
 First of all, the author of the piece refers to the German settlers as 
“pioneers” who were to be credited with converting the areas of the Carpathians, 
Bessarabia, and the Black Sea regions—until the arrival of the Germans, inhabited only 
by “nomads”—into the flourishing breadbasket of Europe. An important aspect to note is 
the belief that the land was hitherto unexploited, and that earlier inhabitants—if the area 
was not completely unpopulated—were primitive and had no permanent connection to 
the land. While the founding of cities, towns, and villages and the creation of farms were 
certainly worth mentioning, Reimesch notes, those architectural achievements and the 
other “material assets” amassed over generations are,  
 
Never did the original German settlers and their descendants (who today are members of 
various Landsmannschaften), as the author points out, attempt to force their way of life 
on their non-German neighbors but instead, he maintains they “endeavored to be good 
                                                           
3 Fritz Heinz Reimesch, “Die europäische Leistung der Deutschen im Südosten Europas,” in 
Landesverband der vertriebenen Deutschen in Württemberg, Kreisverband Göppingen (ed.) Festschrift zur 
Ostlandkreuz-Weihe am 1. und 2. Juli 1950, Geislingen an der Steige, Württemberg. (Geislingen, n.p., 
n.d.), pp. 37-41. At the time, Reimesch served as chairman of the Association of Siebenbürger Saxons in 
Germany. The Siebenbürgen region lies in present-day Romania. 
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          The monuments I examine in this chapter express this conviction. That is, they 
correspond to the theory’s traditional pattern by commemorating a people who, by virtue 
of their resourcefulness, their exemplary hard work, and their overall stalwartness—i.e. 
because of the innate characteristics associated with their ethnicity and their cultural 
heritage—were able to carve out a flourishing Heimat from a desolate, unfruitful, and 
generally backward region. Forming the basis for a different kind of territorial claim, 
these monuments say that by virtue of the Germans’ cultural contributions, the land—
though governed by others—had become unquestionably German.  
           Significantly, the vast majority of the monuments I discuss in this chapter were not 
erected by the expellees from the northeastern stretches of what was the German Reich 
(today in Poland and Russia—for reasons explored below), but by the expellees from 
Southeastern Europe, especially the Danube Swabians, but also in some cases by Sudeten 
Germans—that is, by expellee groups from regions that were never a part of any 
Germany.5
                                                           
4 Ibid., p. 41. 
 But why did these expellee groups in particular (and not others) employ 
elements of this historical motif? How does one commemorate the loss of lives, land, and 
property incurred by ethnic Germans who lived in other sovereign states and were not 
5 For more on the national self-perceptions of the Germans from Southeastern Europe—particularly prior to 
WWII—see the trenchant essays in Krista O’Donnell, Renate Bridenthal and Nancy Reagin (eds.) The 
Heimat Abroad: The Boundaries of Germanness. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005). 
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citizens of the German Reich? What are the elements of the bearers of culture theory seen 
in expellee monuments, and how do they connect to the larger narrative?  
          The geographical settings of these monuments point toward an interesting aspect of 
expellee culture in the Federal Republic: in general, the Germans from the East initially 
came to reside in areas of West Germany which corresponded geographically to their 
regions of origin. That is, the expellees from northern regions (e.g. Pomerania or East 
Prussia) generally ended up in the northern Länder of the Federal Republic (e.g. 
Schleswig-Holstein or Lower Saxony) while many from central areas of the East (e.g. 
Silesians) settled in the middle of West Germany (e.g. North Rhine-Westphalia or 
Hessen). Accordingly, the vast majority of these monuments are geographically bound, as 
the bulk of expellees from the Southeast found new homes in the south, particularly 
Baden-Württemberg.6
          A good point of departure for analyzing this chapter’s monuments is Ulm—the city 
from which many of the Germans who eventually settled in southeastern Europe 
embarked on their journey down the Danube. For this reason, the city adopted the 
Landsmannschaft of Danube Swabians. The two main expellee monuments in this city of 
approximately 120,000 are situated on the historic city wall along a well-travelled, 
 Baden-Württemberg “adopted” all Danube Swabians in 1954. 
Over ten percent of all local expellee monuments there (26 of 246) fit in this category. 
Though not seen in all parts of Germany, these monuments are more than just a marginal 
phenomenon. Smaller numbers are located in the neighboring southern Länder Bavaria 
and Rhineland-Palatinate as well.           
                                                           
6 According to census data, of the approximately 655,000 expellees from Southeast Europe living in the 
Federal Republic in 1970, 268,000 lived in Baden-Württemberg. Bavaria was home to the second highest 




bicycle path that follows the Southeast European Germans’ “Schicksalsstrom” (river of 
fate) from its source, through neighboring Bavaria, and into Austria, traveling all the way 
to Vienna. The first of the two, the Ahnenauswandererdenkmal (Ancestral Emigrant 
Monument), was dedicated on the occasion of the third Tag der Donauschwaben (Day of 
Danube Swabians), August 8, 1958 (Figure 14). Coincidently, the festivities took place 
the very month the sentences for the defendants in the highly publicized Ulm 
Einsatzgruppen trial were pronounced (the larger implications of which were discussed in 
Chapter Two). 
 
                                 Figure 14 Ahnenauswandererdenkmal in Ulm. Photo: J.L. 
 
          The size of the dedication ceremony and the number of the high-ranking political 
figures who participated that day reveal the commemorative significance of this 
memorial. According to published reports, approximately 40,000 people attended the Tag 
der Donauschwaben festivities that weekend, one of the key events of which was the 
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unveiling of the new monument. Contingents of Danube Swabians from overseas, 
including the United States, made the long journey to Ulm to participate. Underscoring 
the fact that this was no small-scale, insignificant event, the city’s Lord Mayor, Theodor 
Pfizer, spoke at several of the events, including the dedication ceremony, and state-level 
cabinet members were also in attendance. Moreover, telegrams and well-wishes were 
sent by several prominent national and regional government officials, including Eugen 
Gerstenmeier (President of the Bundestag), Ludwig Erhard (Federal Economics Minister 
and later Federal Chancellor) and Gebhard Müller (Minister President of Baden-
Württemberg).     
          Originally bearing a single inscription, VON ULM AUS ZOGEN DEUTSCHE 
SIEDLER IM 18. JAHRHUNDERT AUF DER DONAU NACH DEM SÜDOSTEN 
EUROPAS. IHRE NACHFAHREN, VOM SCHICKSAL NACH DEM ZWEITEN 
WELTKRIEG VERTRIEBEN, KEHRTEN IN DAS LAND IHRER VÄTER ZURÜCK 
(From Ulm, German settlers traveled on the Danube to Southeast Europa in the 18th 
century. Their descendants, expelled by fate, returned to the land of their fathers), the 
four-meter-high, white stele designed by Erich Koch, features a smaller bronze statue of a 
man, woman, and young child in a boat with an oversized cross for a mast which 
symbolizes the arduous river journey to their new Heimat. Beyond the brief clause 
(“expelled by fate”), the actual forced migration of the Danube Swabians is not the 
primary commemorative focus of this monument.7
                                                           
7 The word “Schicksal” (fate) suggests—as usual in expellee monuments—that Germans fell victim to 
events out of their control and that they had no hand in what befell them. 
 In fact, the expulsion usually plays a 
secondary role for monuments in this category. Instead, these memorials celebrate 
origins, and honor both Ulm as the specific site of departure for many of the intrepid 
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original German settlers, and also the region as the source of this migration. In other 
words, the inscription and the intent make clear the origins not only of the settlers (clearly 
labeled “Germans”) but also demonstrates the “Germanness” of those who returned after 
WWII to what became the Federal Republic (“the land of their fathers”—Vaterland) 
despite their prior citizenship in countries outside of the Reich. The monument thus links 
the expellees’ “new Heimat” to the “old Heimat” (referred to elsewhere as the 
“Urheimat”). 
           To further commemorate this historic site on the Danube, the city government 
rechristened the area the “Donauschwabenufer” (Banks of the Danube Swabians) in 
1962. After a renovation in 1974, an additional inscription was added: EINIGE 
TAUSEND ÜBERLEBENDE RÜCKKEHRER WANDERTEN AUS NOT UND 
VERZWEIFLUNG IN ANDERE EUROPÄISCHE LÄNDER UND NACH ÜBERSEE 
AUS. SO ZERSTREUTEN SICH DIE DONAUSCHWABEN ÜBER DIE GANZE 
WELT UND WURDEN ÜBERALL GEACHTETE BÜRGER. AUCH IHRER SEI IN 
EHREN GEDACHT (Several thousand surviving returnees emigrated to other European 
countries and overseas due to hardship and desperation and became respected citizens. 
They are also to be honorably commemorated).  
          As memorialized by the Ahnenauswandererdenkmal, the colonizers who departed 
Ulm for southeastern Europe were part of the civilizing mission discussed above which 
brought German customs to underdeveloped and uncivilized areas. Through their hard 
work, flourishing outposts of western culture were established; these became a bulwark 
against incursions from the East: from Turks (Ottomans), Mongols, Slavs, etc. Little is 
mentioned here, however, of the new Heimat the settlers created. To honor these 
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communities, another monument was created just a short distance away. (Figure 15) 
Fastened onto the ancient city wall, this collection of nineteen plaques dedicated both to 
collectives of southeastern European German settlers (Danube Swabians and Banat 
Germans in particular—the two largest plates) and individual settlements in the region 
has steadily grown in number since the initial unveiling in 1986. The plaques also contain 
the usual visual clues which corroborate the theory of Germans as bearers of culture.  
 
  Figure 15 Commemorative plaques, Donauschwabenufer in Ulm. Photo: J.L. 
 
          The first of the bigger plates was part of the original configuration and features the 
vague inscription which frames it: DONAUSCHWABEN: DEN TOTEN DER HEIMAT, 
DES KRIEGES UND DER VERTREIBUNG (Danube Swabians: To the dead of the 
Heimat, of war, and of the expulsion—Figure 16).  In a smaller font, the names of cities 
of the region (Ulm, Vienna, Buda and Pest, and a handful of new settlements downriver) 
mark points along the Danube. In addition, in slightly larger lettering, the plaque exhibits 
the terms AUSWANDERUNG (Emigration—referring to the departure from Ulm for 
points southeastward along the Danube), ANSIEDLUNG (Settlement—referring to the 
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arrival in and establishment of the “new Heimat” in SE Europe), and RÜCKKEHR 
(Return—referring to the expulsion and the arrival back in Baden-Württemberg) and is 
festooned with symbolic artistic renderings of the aforementioned events and activities 
emblematic for this category. For example, in reference to the emigration, the plaque 
shows an “Ulmer Schachtel”—the elongated, shallow, wooden barges traditionally used 
to carry goods down the Danube but which were also the main modes of transporting the 
Danube Swabians on the precarious journey to their new homes. By their nature, the 
boats enhance the territorial claims of those who sailed on them. Because they were 
unable to sail against the river’s current, they were dismantled upon arrival and either 
sold as lumber or used to create temporary homes for recent arrivals. In other words, 
those who left for Southeast Europe did not plan to return home. What is more, the use of 
this symbol once again celebrates the local origin of many of these Germans by linking 
them historically to Ulm and the region—important for the integration of the expelled 
Danube Swabians back into the “Urheimat” after WWII. The 18th century image of the 
Ulm Cathedral wrapped by the city wall at left serves the same purpose.8
                                                           
8 At 534 feet (161m), the cathedral today boasts the highest church steeple in the world. Pictures from the 





            Figure 16 Donauschwaben commemorative plate in Ulm (close-up). Photo: J.L. 
          The images portraying the settlement on the plaque more directly bear the 
hallmarks of the bearers of culture theory. Representing the creation from scratch of a 
new Heimat, recently arriving figures with few belongings and walking sticks are shown 
joining their countrymen already hard at work together constructing new homes. The 
nearly completed structure in the foreground stands in a row of houses revealing the 
cooperative industriousness and ingenuity of the settlers in adapting German architectural 
styles in a planned and systematic manner. The new homes were to be the first permanent 
reminders of the German imprint on the region, which to that point had supposedly been 
occupied by nomads with no lasting connection to the land. Below this image one sees 
two rows of gravestones in the shape of small crosses. I elucidate the function of 
cemeteries in legitimizing territorial claims in the following chapter. In this context, 
however, the crosses also depict another cultural contribution, namely the expansion by 
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German settlers of Christendom into the area as well as the piety of the deceased. The 
image of gravestones indicates, moreover, the passing of generations and attests to the 
longevity of the settlement. As we will see, many monuments in this category include 
dates of settlement and expulsion or other references to the passage of time expressing 
the prolonged existence and enduring influence of German settlement.9
          Organized geographically with the right side representing the East, the image on 
the plaque’s left side refers to the return of the Danube Swabians to western Germany as 
a result of the expulsion. Defoliated trees in the background reveal the devastation 
wrought by war and the end of the land’s bounty. The bare trees no longer produce fruit. 
A caravan of horse-drawn covered wagons heading west was selected to depict the fate of 
the descendants of the original settlers. To the left is a man carrying an indistinguishable 
person piggyback. To the right, a mother leaves the Heimat on foot cradling a young 
child. Dispossessed, what the Danube Swabians had achieved culturally and 
economically over generations had come to an abrupt end. 
 
          Unveiled ten years after the initial emplacement, I view the other large plate—
dedicated specifically to the Banater Schwaben (Germans of the Banat—the upper 
inscription)—as a complement (Figure 17). The inscription on the plaque’s underside 
reads: EINE HALBE MILLION DEUTSCHE FANDEN IM BANAT FAST 300 JAHRE 
LANG HEIMAT (A half million Germans found a Heimat in Banat for almost 300 
years). As usual, the text contains more than meets the eye. Just as the concept of Heimat 
is invoked to demonstrate the Germanness of a particular region, explicitly stating the 
longevity of German settlement is a method of attesting a temporal connection to the 
                                                           
9 Furthermore, the simple cross as gravestone—a common design in the cemeteries of fallen soldiers—
might also be used here to demonstrate the common burden of all Germans in sacrificing their young men 
in the service of the military for the defense of the Heimat.  
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land. Like the plaque to its left, the plate is organized chronologically and geographically. 
An Ulmer Schachtel and the words 18 JH ULM (Ulm 18th century) on the left side with 
an arrow pointing to the right indicate the direction of the initial migration.  
 
                Figure 17 Banater Schwaben commemorative plate in Ulm (close-up). Photo: J.L. 
 
          Emphasizing their contributions in cultivating a once barren landscape, the plaque 
includes depictions of a settler behind a horse-drawn plow tilling the soil and an 
overfilled cornucopia. The Banat Germans had, after all, turned the region into a 
breadbasket of Europe. In addition, the symbol of iron mining commemorates the wealth 
created by the industrialization of the area. Here as well, one sees further examples of 
superior German architecture: more modest dwellings as well as the Cathedral Church of 
Timişoara. Strikingly, but not surprisingly, the German names for the cities of this 
multiethnic, polyglot area along the Danube are used instead of their contemporary 
appellation (including “Temeschburg” instead of “Timişoara”) even though the plaque 
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was added in 1996. Other inhabitants of the area, e.g. the Romanians, Hungarians, Serbs, 
Croats, and Jews remain unmentioned. Indeed, because of the regular shifting of political 
borders at the hands of neighboring great powers throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, the region’s natural boundaries are emphasized on the plaque (the rivers 
Marosch, Theiss, and the Danube comprise respectively the northern, western, and 
southern flanks; the Carpathian Mountains, also displayed, constitute the eastern edge) 
thus suggesting the insignificance of such political developments. Quite clearly, 
according to the initiators of the plaque—the Landsmannschaft of Banat Danube 
Swabians—because of the duration of the settlement and the cultural contributions their 
ancestors made there, this area was made German and still is claimed to be German 
regardless of the nation-state currently in control. Their coat-of-arms is found in the 
upper left corner. Because the ethnic Germans of the Banat were not formally expelled 
and actually remained in Romania in large numbers until the 1980s and 1990s, the 
expulsion is not depicted.10
          In-depth analysis of each of the rest of the seventeen smaller plaques, which 
commemorate individual settlements in the region, would exceed the boundaries of this 
chapter. Suffice it to say, the other plaques exhibit similar imagery and reiterate the 
themes articulated by the larger plates.
 With an arrow pointed westward, a lone figure carrying a 
rucksack symbolizes their return to the land of their predecessors. 
11
                                                           
10 The winner of the 2009 Nobel Prize for Literature, Herta Müller, was one of the Banat Germans who 
“returned” to the Federal Republic at this time. In a BdV press release issued upon the announcement of her 
award, Erika Steinbach wrote, “At the same time, it is a great day for German literature. With this Nobel 
Prize, the value of the cultural legacy of the Germans from the East becomes clear. We must maintain this 
legacy and continue to promote it.” See “Herta Müller, Gratulation zum Nobelpreis für Literatur,” BdV 
Pressemitteilung, October 9, 2009. <www.bund-der-vertriebenen.de/presse/index.php3?id=912> Accessed 
September 9, 2010 
 For example, renderings of important civic and 




architectural achievements (e.g. city seals, churches and cathedrals, or other significant 
man-made landmarks) and symbols of the rewards reaped thanks to agricultural 
resourcefulness highlight German cultural and economic contributions in establishing a 
new Heimat. Demonstrating the longevity of the German settlement, all feature the years 
the cities and towns were founded. Some provide further description, for instance, the 
plaques for Novo Selo/Neudorf an der Donau (ERSTE DEUTSCHE ANSIEDLUNG IN 
DER BATSCHKA—First German settlement in Batschka12
           The significance of all these observations would be diminished if this phenomenon 
was not so unambiguous and pervasive. An equally striking example of this category is 
the monument to the German community in Billed (Banat—today Biled in Romania) 
) and Torschau (ERSTE 
DEUTSCHE PROTESTANTISCHE GEMEINDE IN DER BATSCHKA—First German 
Protestant community in Batschka). The towns were founded in 1734 and 1784, 
respectively. Accentuating the suddenness and unexpectedness of their ending, the year 
of the communities’ extirpation (either 1944 or 1945) is also included. What precipitated 
the end of these vibrant communities, however, is not. It appears as if they simply ceased 
to exist. The expulsion is sparingly mentioned on just a few. Likewise, and particularly 
worth noting, are the plaques dedicated to the communities in Gakovo (Batschka) and 
Rudolfsgnad (Banat). Both share the typical features described above but also display the 
text: 1944-1948 INTERNIERUNGSLAGER TODESSTÄTTE TAUSENDER 
DONAUSCHWABEN (1944-1948 Internment camp, Place of death for thousands of 
Danube Swabians). No further context was deemed necessary.  
                                                           
12 Today, the Batschka region comprises territory straddling the Hungarian-Serbian border. 
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located at the main city cemetery in Karlsruhe, Baden-Württemberg (Figure 18).13 
Unveiled on Pentecost Sunday and consecrated a few weeks later in 1987, the cross-
shaped monument made of Greek marble was placed in a section of the cemetery 
provided free of charge by the city government. The monument bears telling inscriptions 
on each side. The text on the right is more germane here: BILLED WURDE 1765 
UNTER KAISERIN MARIA THERESIA VON DEUTSCHEN KOLONISTEN 
GEGRÜNDET. NACH SCHWEREM ANFANG WUCHS UND ENTWICKELTE SICH 
DIE GEMEINDE ZU EINEM BLÜHENDEN SCHWABENDORF. UNTER 
VÖLKISCHEM UND POLITISCHEM DRUCK KEHRTEN DIE DEUTSCHEN NACH 
200 JAHREN IN IHR MUTTERLAND ZURÜCK (Billed was founded by German 
colonists under Empress Maria Theresia in 1765. After a difficult beginning the 
community grew and developed into a blooming Swabian village. Due to nationalist and 
political pressure, the Germans returned to their Motherland after 200 years).14
                                                           
13 The unusually tranquil and scenic park cemetery in the city housing Germany’s highest court has another 
monument dedicated to all expellees as well as a memorial to the victims of Allied air raids on the city, 
which includes the graves of those killed.  
 Further 
consecrating the site, soil from both cemeteries, from the war memorial, and from a field 
in Billed was buried in a container at the foot of the monument. Inlaid stones taken from 
the village’s church and from its main landmark, the Kalvarienberg, provide the 
monument’s foundation. 
14 On the left is an engraved image of the war memorial erected after WWI in Billed and the text: WIR 
GEDENKEN IN EHRFURCHT, DANKBARKEIT UND LIEBE UNSERER TOTEN, DER 
GEFALLENEN DER BEIDEN WELTKRIEGE, DER OPFER DER FLUCHT, DER 
RUßLANDDEPORTATION, DER BARAGANVERSCHLEPPUNG, ALLER UNSERER TOTEN IN 
DER HEIMAT UND DER VERSTORBENEN LANDSLEUTE IN ALLER WELT (We commemorate in 
awe, gratitude, and love our dead, the fallen of both world wars, the victims of flight, of deportation to 





                                               Figure 18 Billed Monument, Karlsruhe. Photo: J.L. 
 
          Even more illuminating, however, is the monument’s main feature, the relief 
prominently built into the cross on its front side (Figure 19). This work of art displays all 
the characteristics discussed above and presents a pictorial narrative of what Peter Krier, 
a Banat German functionary in his introduction of the monument at the dedication 
ceremony, called the community’s “Werden-Sein-Vergehen” (“Becoming – Existing – 
Elapsing”).15
                                                           
15 The full text of the speech was published in a festschrift produced on the occasion of the monument’s 
dedication in 1987. I thank Werner Gilde of the Billeder Heimatgemeinschaft for providing me with this 
text.  
 Leaving little to the imagination in his comments that day, Krier described 
in detail what each of the six images signifies. What follows is a brief recapitulation of 
Krier’s most salient points. First of all, the two figures in the upper-left image, a father 
and son, are to be recognized as Germans, according to Krier, by their clothing. With few 
possessions, the two look resolutely upon the desolate land which they intend to turn into 
a new, free, and blessed (segensreiche) Heimat for themselves and their descendants. The 
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second image, labeled by the speaker the central figure of the relief, depicts a man 
plowing the soil in this “desolate, swampy, and uncultivated” land. Krier stated, “With 
the plow our ancestors created a blossoming cultural landscape—a breadbasket, a blessed 
land—in Southeast Europe on the eastern border of the German Reich.” The church in 
the field of wheat, the third image, stands as the symbol of the community’s time of 
prosperity. Eight generations of Germans in Billed were baptized and married in the 
church, according to Krier. In the bottom left, the fourth image, the Calvary 
(Kalvarienberg)—Billed’s most notable landmark—reminds all who see it that the cross 
belongs to the life and history of all people. Billed had its own cross to bear and each of 
the smaller crosses represents a time of hardship in the village’s life. Addressing the 
Second World War and its ramifications for the community more directly, the barbed 
wire fence in the fifth image symbolizes the bondage and disenfranchisement that 
followed for the prisoners of war, for those deported for forced labor to the Soviet Union 
and forcibly transferred by Communist authorities to the Bărăgan Steppe in central 
Romania in the early 1950s. The woman gazing over the fence stands for the mothers and 
women waiting for their loved ones to return home and for those waiting for their 
freedom. The last image, according to Krier, represents the evacuation from their 
homeland. The female figure looks upon the graves the Germans regrettably had to leave 
behind, while the male figure looks at the setting sun in the West, where his family would 




                         Figure 19 Billed Monument (close-up). Photo: J.L. 
 
          One could examine a number of other similar monuments in Baden-Württemberg 
(e.g. Bad Schönborn-Langenbrücken, Beuren, Görwihl, Herrischried, Reutlingen, 
Stuttgart, or Winnenden, to name just a few) or Bavaria (e.g. Munich) or Rhineland-
Palatinate (e.g. Frankenthal or Landau) and come to similar conclusions. In fact, the 
monuments in this category display perhaps the least amount of variation of all. Like the 
others, the Billed Monument provides another example of the visual documentation of 
the cultural contributions made by Germans during the extended period of their 
settlement in this southeast European region. It records an understanding of history in 
which Germans transformed a barren landscape into bounteous fields of plenty and 
transferred German customs to the far reaches of Europe, becoming models of stability 
and achievement for their neighbors. These colonizers created a Heimat, an island of 
exceedingly prosperous German territory in an inhospitable climate, in lands outside of 





          Why did these expellee groups choose the Germans as bearers of culture motifs to 
represent and commemorate their experience of the expulsion and the loss of their 
homeland? Why are monuments of this type so prevalent amongst the southeastern 
European Germans and not amongst the expellees from other regions, especially Poland, 
where the political ideology associated with this theory has traditionally been applied? 
The answers to these questions speak to other commonalities amongst these monuments. 
For instance, with the notable exception of the Ahnenauswandererdenkmal in Ulm 
(1958), these monuments were not erected during the peak period of local expellee 
monument construction in the early 1950s, i.e. at the time, as we have seen, when 
political agitation for a border revision (regardless of its plausibility) was at its peak. Not 
only were local branches of the expellee organizations actively campaigning for it but it 
was also a topic of regular discussion amongst all major political parties at the national 
level. The reestablishment of a German state in its 1937 borders at this time was 
improbable. Nevertheless, it was not viewed as impossible. For Germans from areas that 
had never been a part of the unified Reich, particularly for the Danube Swabians, 
however, a beneficial alteration of the territorial status quo was out of the question.16 
Thus these monuments are devoid of the unconcealed territorial demands seen on 
expellee monuments elsewhere described earlier in cluster A.17
                                                           
16 On this point, see Eugen Lemberg, “Der Wandel des politischen Denkens,” in Lemberg and F. Edding 
(eds.) Die Vertriebenen in Westdeutschland. Vol. III, p. 440f. 
  
17 This is not to say that southeastern Europeans are not included in monuments that make territorial 
demands. For example, with the inscription WIR FORDERN UNSERE HEIMAT (We demand our 
Heimat), the monument in Schelklingen, Baden-Württemberg (erected in 1955) includes the names of the 
eastern provinces of the German Reich as well as the regions in the Southeast. 
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           For many expellees, as the sentiments captured by these monuments indicate, there 
was little question that the former eastern provinces had always been, and would always 
remain, a part of Germany. The same cannot be said about the formerly German 
communities in southeastern Europe. Therefore, as an alternative to the unmistakable, 
overt territorial claims made by Silesians and East Prussians, for example, the 
monuments of this category contain a more understated territorial connectedness. 
Furthermore, the monuments that display the Germans as bearers of culture motifs are 
always dedicated to specific groups or communities and not to all expellees. 
          Similarly, the justification for their connection to this territory is not the injustice of 
the expulsion per se (as it is elsewhere) but rather the creation of a Heimat. In fact, the 
expulsion is not the centerpiece of these narratives of the past but is instead a single 
event—one of several key events—in the historical trajectory of these communities. 
Equally important are the initial arrival of the German settlers, the establishment of the 
communities, and the periods thereafter when these cities and towns thrived. 
Nevertheless, the forced migration of the Germans terminated the once flourishing 
municipalities and marked the abrupt end of German cultural contributions to the area. In 
pictorial form, this is represented by the long caravans westward. In textual form, it is 
oftentimes marked with an inscription of the year 1944 or 1945. The commemorative 
thrust of the monuments is therefore equally on German toil and the settlers’ resultant 
successes recognizable in the renderings of local landmarks and agricultural themes. In 
other words, the justification of the Southeast European Germans’ strong identification 
with this territory is not the expulsion alone but rather the longevity of the settlement and 
the distinctly German cultural and economic achievements they made there. 
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          The monuments of this category then seem to be part of a preemptive effort to 
affirm the Germanness not only of these areas along the Danube—the Heimat created by 
these German settlers—but also in terms of the nationality of those who resettled in what 
became the Federal Republic immediately following the war and in the decades hence. 
Thus, the monuments link the ancestors of the Danube Swabians and others with the 
“Urheimat” while concomitantly connecting them and their descendants both to the 
Heimat they created within the frontiers of other states, and to the new Heimat in what 
became the Federal Republic. Why? To put these “volksdeutsche” expellees on an equal 
footing with other “reichsdeutsche” expellees whose homelands had unquestionably been 
within the boundaries of the German Reich. Of course, this points toward unpleasant 
divisions not only amongst Germans themselves, but also amongst the various expellee 
groups as well.18
                                                           
18 For a host of compelling examples, see Kossert, Kalte Heimat, Völklein, “Mitleid war von niemand zu 
erwarten,” and Albrecht Lehmann, Im fremden ungewollt zuhaus. Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in 
Westdeutschland, 1945-1990. (Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1991). Indeed, while conducting research for 
this dissertation in Baden-Württemberg in 2009, some expellees were unable to contain their dissatisfaction 
over the internecine squabbling in pursuit of their common goals. In particular, the lack of élan on the part 
of Southeast European Germans and Germans from Russia in mobilizing their numerically stronger 










UNSEREN TOTEN IN DER HEIMAT:  





          In a text dealing mostly with the commemoration of individual deaths of Sudeten 
Germans in the new Heimat, Elisabeth Fendl has written that, for the expellees, not 
having access to the graves of deceased ancestors and relatives (das “Kein-Grab-Haben”) 
in the lost eastern territories was a “frequently described, traumatic experience in the first 
years after the expulsion.”1
           This commemorative deficiency, it seems, explains the panoply of local expellee 
monuments—the focus of the present chapter—dedicated to “unseren Toten in der 
 In the years immediately after the war, the virtual 
impossibility of lighting candles, placing flowers, and otherwise mourning dead family 
members at the locations of their burials exacerbated the expellees’ feelings of 
uprootedness and loss. That this inability to visit the cemeteries of the homeland caused 
great anguish for some expellees is incontestable, as was the distress over the inability to 
visit the graves of the hastily interred loved ones who perished due to violence or 
otherwise succumbed on the oftentimes grueling and dangerous treks westward during 
and after WWII. 
                                                           
1 Elisabeth Fendl, “Beerdigung und Totengedenken in der ‘neuen Heimat,’” p. 82. 
194 
 
Heimat” (our dead in the Heimat). According to Fendl, and seconded by others,2 these 
monuments addressed the need for a public place to mourn by functioning as “Ersatzorte 
der Trauer” (substitute mourning sites). Like Fendl, Hans-Werner Retterath notes the 
“private-religious nature” of some, especially early, expellee monuments and, echoing 
Koselleck, stresses their role in creating spaces for the expellees to mourn their dead.3
           I base my argument in part on Katherine Verdery’s study about “dead-body 
politics” and the “symbolic capital” possessed by human remains in the former socialist 
bloc.
 At 
first glance, this seems to be the best rationalization for all these multifaceted 
monuments. In my estimation, however, much more is at play. In fact, I contend that in 
addition to memorializing the dead left behind, the commemorative links they establish 
between the expellees in the new Heimat (i.e. the Federal Republic) and the inaccessible 
cemeteries of the old Heimat (i.e. the former German East) served other, more political, 
purposes both domestically and internationally. They too were raising territorial claims. 
4 While Verdery’s analysis encompasses many facets of the “political lives of dead 
bodies,” including the burials and reburials of famous and infamous as well as nameless 
Eastern European ancestors in the post-socialist context, it is what she observes about 
graves and territory in the Balkans that is especially salient for my work. In particular, 
burials and reburials in the successor states of Yugoslavia have “sacralize[d] and 
nationalize[d] spaces as ‘ours.’”5
                                                           
2 See, for example, Lurz, Kriegerdenkmäler Vol. 6 Bundesrepublik, Retterath, “Geschichtsbilderkampf...” 
and Panne, “Erinnerungspolitik – Erinnerungsspuren,” and Scholz, “‘Opferdunst vernebelt die 
Verhältnisse,’” p. 292. 
 Burying the dead in a certain area is an expression of 
possession that sets up an almost unassailable, spiritual bond between the land and the 
3 Retterath, “Geschichtsbilderkampf...” p. 208. 
4 Katherine Verdery, The Political Lives of Dead Bodies. 
5 Ibid., p. 110. 
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various ethnic groups that live (and die) there. The implications for territorial claims are 
obvious. Verdery quotes a Serbian opposition leader during the reign of Slobodan 
Milošević, Vuk Drašković, who flatly stated, “Serbia is wherever there are Serbian 
graves.”6
           For many expellees, it seems the gravestones of their ancestors and relatives also 
served as border posts or boundary markers, and offered additional proof that the land 
vacated in the East was German. Indeed, though the historical circumstances are not the 
same, much like the gravesites in the Balkans—which helped define and determine the 
boundaries of Serbian (or Croatian, or Bosnian) territory—the monuments dedicated to 
the dead left behind in the no longer accessible Heimat raise veiled territorial claims by 
connecting the expellees to the sacred soil of their cemeteries. In other words, much like 
the Serbian politician cited above said, these monuments seem to indicate that where 
German graves lie was, is, and always will be German territory. To demonstrate the real 
political nature of these monuments of this type, I have chosen seemingly innocuous and 




           The distinguishing characteristic of the monuments in this category is a reference 
to the dead in the Heimat. While the general appearances of the monuments of this 
category have remained fundamentally the same throughout the entire postwar era, the 
political objectives they have enunciated have changed over time. For example, the first 
documented local expellee monuments, from the 1940s, are of this type. The archetypal 
local expellee monuments of the years immediately after WWII were the crosses which 
                                                           
6 Cited in Ibid., p. 98. 
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stood in graveyards of a small towns in Bavaria or Hessen (approximately two-thirds of 
the roughly three dozen monuments from the 1940s are located in these two Länder) with 
the dedication “To the Dead of the Homeland” (DEN TOTEN DER HEIMAT).7
          However, two trademark aspects of the monuments in this category during this 
initial period—both of which were geared in part toward a domestic audience, i.e. vis-à-
vis the local, non-expellee population—point toward a political polyvalence present in 
these monuments from the start. First is the ambiguity of the terse inscriptions. It is 
unclear specifically to whom the monuments are dedicated. Assuming Fendl is correct, 
the “Dead of the Homeland” are the ancestors and relatives of the expellees who lie in 
now inaccessible cemeteries behind the iron curtain, as well as those who died during 
flight and expulsion. Interpreted broadly, however, they might also be the deceased 
expellees buried after the expulsion not in the former eastern territories but in their new 
Heimat in the West, or the fallen soldiers from the eastern provinces.
 They 
were conspicuously austere (and presumably inexpensive), and, with but a few 
exceptions, employed a cross (or, in areas predominated by Catholic expellees, a 
crucifix). They were doleful in tone and expressed grief—all of which lends credence to 
Fendl’s argument that expellee monuments were substitute mourning sites.  
8
                                                           
7 The lack of deviation from this inscription paradigm in the early stage is striking. To wit: DEN TOTEN 
DER OSTDEUTSCHEN HEIMAT (To the Dead of the East German Homeland—Kamen, North Rhine-
Westphalia—discussed in greater detail below), DEN TOTEN DIE WIR IN DER HEIMAT LIEßEN (To 
the Dead We left behind in the Homeland—Hanau, Hessen), WIR GEDENKEN DER LIEBEN 
ANGEHÖRIGEN, DIE IN UNSERER ALTEN HEIMAT RUHEN (We Commemorate our Dear Family 
Members, who rest in our Former Homeland—Lahntal-Göttingen, Hessen), DIE TOTEN UND DIE 
AHNEN DER ALTEN HEIMAT MAHNEN UNS ZUR TREUE! (The Dead and the Ancestors of the Old 
Homeland Exhort us to Loyalty!—Trostberg, Bavaria). With little variance, virtually all of the inscriptions 
on the monuments of the 1940s touch on this theme.  
  
8 The vagueness of the inscriptions raises other questions. For instance, how did these people die? In 
combat? In air raids? Due to exposure, disease, or violence during the expulsion? Of natural causes after 
arriving in the West? Also, the inscriptions are one-sided. Do they apply to the non-Aryan population of the 
East as well? All this remains unclear, though it seems very unlikely that the inscriptions would apply to 
anyone besides non-Jewish German expellees. As will be examined in cluster B, monument initiators’ 
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           The second aspect is the emphasis on the concept Heimat, which, as argued 
throughout cluster A, functioned at this particular time as a vigorous riposte to the 
discrimination and skepticism on the part of the local West German population vis-à-vis 
the expellees. In fact, virtually all monuments in this category, not only those erected in 
the 1940s, refer not only to the dead but also to the homeland itself. Indeed, the 
inscriptions usually do not read UNSEREN TOTEN (To Our Dead) but rather 
UNSEREN TOTEN IN DER HEIMAT (To Our Dead in the Heimat). As always, the 
invocation of the concept of Heimat is crucial. With it in these early cases, the expellees 
were asserting their own Germanness in the face of local prejudice. This sentiment is 
nicely captured in the inscription of a monument in Bückeburg, Lower Saxony: AUS 
DER IRDISCHEN HEIMAT VERTRIEBEN ABER NICHT HEIMATLOS 1946-1947 
(Expelled from the earthly Heimat, but not without a Heimat 1946-1947). Though the 
expellees were indeed homeless, they were equally German. Thus, the invocations of 
Heimat on the very early monuments of this type were intended to “nationalize” the 
expellees.9
          However, the erection of this type of monument continued beyond the early years 
of discrimination even after the integration. Reflecting this, initiators of other monuments 
of this type often added modifiers to the inscriptions (such as “East German” 




                                                           
willful distortion or omission of such facts conveys a sense of collective innocence and distances German 
victims from the atrocities committed by the Nazis.  
 to make known to all who saw it that the monuments referred to the dead from 
9 Later monuments also invoked Heimat, of course, but no longer to attest the Germanness of the 
newcomers themselves, as was the case here, but to assert the Germanness of the areas the expellees left 
behind. 
10 Along with the dozens of monuments dedicated at this time “to the dead of the East German homeland” 
(my emphasis) was, for example, the small commemorative cross erected in Schotten, Hessen, with the 
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indisputably German territory. It is the intrinsic territorial claims that this chapter’s 
monuments have always possessed that sets them apart and makes them decisive for my 
analysis. As we have seen, all the monuments I examine in this cluster also dispute the 
permanence of the newly established borders. But they do it in a much more unabashed, 
demonstrative way. Here the monuments’ political polyvalence is more subtle. These 
monuments establish links between the expellees in West Germany and the unreachable 
cemeteries—as well as the dead who rest there—in the former German East. The 
monuments commemorate the land as much as the people. Above all, it is this viewpoint 
that distinguishes my work from Fendl and the others. 
           Probably the most straightforward example of the territorial claims raised with 
these monuments is a monument in Tuttlingen, Baden-Württemberg (Figure 20). A local 
expellee organization approached the city government in 1953 about erecting a memorial 
to the deceased family members of the area’s expellees. In addition to the local 
government’s financial assistance, the expellees were successful in procuring the 
necessary funding through donations from local businesses and other individual donors. 
Dedicated in November 1956, the organization emplaced a bronze bowl atop a large 
block made of red sandstone under a statue of Christ in the city’s old cemetery.11
                                                           
inscription, VERGEßt DIE TOTEN UNSERER GERAUBTEN HEIMAT NICHT! (Do not forget the dead 
of our stolen homeland!), from 1951. 
 During 
the unveiling ceremony, participants laid wreaths at the foot of the monument while a 
flame burned in the bowl. More than simply memorializing the dead, however, the 
11 The city cemetery is also home to an Ehrenfeld (field of honor) for the victims of the Nazi euthanasia 
campaigns from the area which was erected in 1947. Four stone tablets list the nearly 600 dead under the 
inscription, FERN DER HEIMAT STARBEN SIE DURCH EINEN GEWALTSAMEN TOD (Away from 
their homelands they died a violent death).Two other plates commemorate the local victims of 
concentration camps who were cremated in the city crematorium, 87 of whom were interred here. An 
obelisk with the inscription (in German and Latin): DEN UNGLÜCKLICHEN, DIE FERN DER HEIMAT 
STARBEN. (To the unfortunate ones who died away from their homeland) MISERIS PROCUL PATRIA 
DEFUNCTIS. MORS EORUM SIT FINIS LABORUM, along with the number of dead from the area.  
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monument also established an unbreakable bond between the expellees and their 
monument in the West and the cemeteries in the lost provinces in the East. Its most 
compelling attribute, the inscription, states this clearly. It reads: WO UNSERE TOTEN 
RUHN LIEGT UNSERE HEIMAT. WO WIR UNSERE TOTEN EHREN LIEGT 
UNSERE WÜRDE. UNSEREN IN DER HEIMAT VERSTORBENEN UND DEN 
OPFERN DER VERTREIBUNG ZUM GEDÄCHTNIS. DIE 
HEIMATVERTRIEBENEN. (Where our dead rest lies our Heimat. Where we honor our 
dead lies our dignity. To our dead in the homeland and in commemoration of the victims 
of the expulsion. The Expellees). The additional texts on the monument’s side panels 
complete the territorial linkage. Both sides read respectively: UNSERE 
HEIMATGEBIETE (Our Heimat regions) followed by a list of the former German 
provinces:  Included on the left are Memelland, East Prussia, West Prussia, Danzig, 
Pomerania, and Brandenburg. On the right are Silesia, Wartheland, Sudetenland, Danube 
Swabia, and Siebenbürgen. What was intended to commemorate individuals became but 
another means of lamenting the forfeiture of territory. The Heimat and loss thereof was 
equally if not more worth mentioning by name than the deceased ancestors and relatives 




                                Figure 20 Tuttlingen. Photo: BdV Archive 
 
           In other cases, the connection to territory was less overt. The monument in the 
small city Kamen, North Rhine-Westphalia, provides an example of a monument 
establishing the link with the dead in the East in a more indirect fashion (Figure 21). In 
the form of a high cross (Hochkreuz), the monument is uncommon on two accounts; first, 
it was one of the (percentagewise) few erected in the 1940s. Secondly, its main 
inscription on the horizontal beam DEN TOTEN DER OSTDEUTSCHEN HEIMAT (To 
the dead of the East German Homeland) contains a modifier—“Ostdeutsch”—more 
characteristic of subsequent years. The cross also contains other unconcealed references 
to the territory of the East—stone plates with the names and coats-of-arms of East 
German provinces are situated like gravestones at the base of the cross—which also 
constitute an unmistakable territorial claim. The plates read (at left): Silesia, Pomerania, 
and Sudetenland, Brandenburg. At right: East Prussia, West Prussia, Danzig, and Posen. 
On the other hand, like virtually all others in this category, an expellee organization 





                                                     Figure 21 Kamen. Photo: BdV Archive 
 
          From the start, the monument was to be part of a protest against the postwar 
territorial status quo. In fact, it was dedicated on August 7, 1949, almost four years to the 
day after the conclusion of the Potsdam Conference.12 The date also fell on what was 
called the Tag des deutschen Ostens (Day of the German East)—a precursor to the Tag 
der Heimat which originated with the proclamation of the Charter of the Expellees in 
Stuttgart the next year.13 Obviously, the date chosen for the unveiling was no 
coincidence. According to an internal report held in a BdV archive, organizers had 
planned a “Demonstration for the Right to Heimat” for several months to be held that 
summer weekend. The erection of the monument became a part of these plans, which 
quickly evolved from an intimate local gathering to a full-blown, state-level event.14
                                                           
12 The Potsdam Conference concluded on August 2, 1945. 
 
13 I explain the origins of this key day of expellee commemoration in Chapter Ten. 
14 The events stretched over the entire weekend and included organizational meetings, Catholic and 
Protestant church services, marches, the monument’s dedication ceremony, and a Volksfest. According to 
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Corroborating my argument that the monument was intended to commemorate territory at 
least as much as the dead left behind, furthermore, the cover of the program for the 
weekend’s events featured the monument’s inscription plus a different shaped cross 
casting a shadow over the territory severed from the German Reich.  
          I do not question that the expellees in Kamen sought to memorialize their deceased 
relatives with their cross—one of the first local expellee monuments in all of North 
Rhine-Westphalia. The unpublished report states clearly that, “here, the expellees will 
have the possibility to commemorate their dead.” But combined as it was with these other 
tendentious political acts, the monument conveyed a passionate dissatisfaction with the 
territorial status quo. Though commemorative in tone, the cross in Kamen was clearly 
political in intent. Therefore, reducing this monument’s commemorative capabilities—or 
that of the other monuments of this category—to a substitute site of mourning à la Fendl 
et al., ignores these monuments’ polyvalence and omits the crucial political dimension of 
the dead bodies to which they refer.  
          Another monument in North Rhine-Westphalia—Wermelskirchen—dedicated the 
next year also bespeaks this politicization of mourning (Figure 22). Central in this 
discussion, of course, is the fact that this was not part of a clandestine effort to influence 
surreptitiously the Federal Republic’s foreign policy makers or manipulate public 
opinion. Like the others in this category, the historical interpretation and the political 
goals the monument in Wermelskirchen articulates were unguarded and public. The 
openness with which the monument itself states the one-sided narrative is as forthcoming 
as the speakers at its unveiling. That said, it is not the monument’s formal attributes that 
                                                           
the unpublished report, police estimated that 25,000 expellees took part. The organizers requested from the 
Bundesbahn that extra trains be put into service to transport the people to Kamen. Permission was granted. 
For those unable to attend in person, the monument’s unveiling was also broadcasted on the radio. 
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make it extraordinary. It consists of a large wooden cross atop a stone plinth. One of few 
monuments of this category not situated in a cemetery—the city government provided the 
location at no cost to the monuments’ expellee initiators—the Kreuz des deutschen 
Ostens (Cross of the German East) stands conspicuously at a fork in a major road not far 
from the entrance to a soccer stadium. 
           Once again, the monument’s most striking and revelatory features are the 
inscriptions. Warranting inclusion in this category, the main inscription, at the cross’s 
base, reads DEN TOTEN DER HEIMAT (To the dead of the Heimat) and hints at the 
territorial connotations of the monument. More forcefully expressing the expellees’ bond 
with their homeland, in the middle of the stone plinth, a shield hangs with the smaller text 
FERN DOCH TREU (Though distant, loyal) over the cross of the German Order of 
Knights (Deutscher Ritterorden). The cross itself also bears an inscription. On its 
horizontal beam, the dates “1945” (left of center) and “1950” (center) were engraved with 
space left bare (right of center). The absence stood symbolically for the year the expellees 
would return to their homeland.15
                                                           
15 Much of the information that follows was gleaned from contemporary articles in the local edition of the 
Bergische Morgenpost which the local branch of the BdV compiled and reproduced in the brochure Bund 
der Vertriebenen – Vereinigte Landsmannschaften Ortsverband Wermelskirchen. Tag der Heimat 1990. 40 
Jahre Mahmal “Kreuz des deutschen Ostens.” (n.p., n.d.). The newspapers summarize and recount the 
speeches and the activities that took place at the unveiling ceremony. 
 The first year was the year of flight and expulsion, 
Nazi Germany’s capitulation, and, most importantly, the Potsdam Accord. The next year 
listed on the cross marked the year of the unveiling ceremony, which was deliberately 
scheduled as a protest to coincide with the five-year anniversary of the Potsdam 




                                       Figure 22 Wermelskirchen. Photo: BdV Archive 
 
          Participants’ speeches at the dedication ceremony were equally revealing about the 
monument’s manifold true intentions. The main speaker, an expellee organization 
functionary, acknowledged first and foremost that the monument was to honor the 
memory of the dead left behind, whose graves can no longer be decorated and the 
millions of expellee victims who perished or were murdered.16
                                                           
16 The speaker made no mention of the non-Germans who suffered because of the genocidal policies of the 
Nazis. 
 His comments abruptly 
transcended this one-sided, de-historicized commemorative dimension, however, and 
became political. He reminded the audience that it was the Potsdam Agreement that had 
torn the German Reich asunder and set the expulsion in motion. According to the 
speaker, however, the monument was also a call to action for all Germans, expellees and 
the Einheimischen, to raise their voice to get back the land that had been taken from 
them. If the suffering of the expellees—who were expelled from their homelands because 
of their ethnicity (Volkszugehörigkeit) alone—was to make sense, the speaker noted, it 
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was only to make sure that future generations were spared from similar catastrophes. 
Thus the monument had two functions. The commemoration of the dead of the lost 
Heimat was the first. The second was indicating the task of the “Christian West” in 
preventing another expulsion. Though not a call to arms, the lesson taught by recent 




           I do not deny the strong will these monuments express to mourn the dead, or 
question the expellees’ powerful attachment to the cemeteries of their lost Heimat. Fendl 
describes how ancestors’ gravesites in the East are usually one of the first stops on the 
Heimweh (homesickness) tours taken by many expellees and their descendants to the 
former eastern provinces. She notes that for many expellees, the feelings of intimacy, 
comfort, and belonging associated with Heimat to a large extent has been confined and 
reduced to the cemetery of their old hometown.18
                                                           
17 The words of two local spiritual leaders—one Catholic, one Protestant, both expellees followed these 
remarks. The president of the county government was next. He proclaimed that the monument was not a 
memorial of revitalized nationalism but instead was intended to proclaim that the right to homeland was a 
fundamental human right that may not be denied any person or Volk. Lastly, the final representative of the 
expellees to speak cited Ernst Moritz Arndt in his address and declared that Germans were not from various 
tribes but were one unit, and must together bear the cross. 
 Nonetheless, interpreting the scores of 
these monuments merely as bridges connecting the expellees with their deceased relatives 
overlooks the broader political implications the monuments convey. Like so many issues 
18 See Fendl, “Beerdigung und Totengedenken in der ‘neuen Heimat,’” p. 115. Svašek also writes about the 
enduring link between the expellees—in this case, Sudeten Germans—and their old cemeteries. She writes, 
“The war memorials and the graveyards linked the Sudeten Germans to their deceased kin, their dead 
relatives whom they had been forced to leave behind at the time of the expulsion. Not surprisingly, 
revisiting the graveyards evoked strong emotions, not only because the expellees experienced this as a 
symbolic reunion with their beloved kin, but also because the graveyards were often in a terrible state. 
Especially in the area that had been part of the Cold War defense zone, whole graveyards had disappeared 
along with the villages. In other areas, many Sudeten German graves had been destroyed by the new 
settlers. In Brand, for example, most Sudeten German gravestones had been thrown over the graveyard wall 
into the bushes, or had been used as building material.” See Svašek, “Narratives of ‘Home’ and 
‘Homeland,’” p. 512. 
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involving the expulsion and the expellees, mourning and memorializing the dead was 
politicized from the start. I contend the dead were instrumentalized here to achieve the 
expellee organizations’ chief political objective during the era of concrete politics, the 
reacquisition of lost territory. Just as dead bodies in the Balkans helped determine 
national boundaries in the post-socialist era, the expellees used their dead to raise their 
own territorial claims on moral and cultural grounds. The fact that the expellees’ 
progenitors, in many cases, for generations, had been laid to rest in Silesia, the 
Sudetenland, and in other regions throughout Central and Eastern Europe, was proof 
enough that this territory still belonged to them. Much like border posts or other 
territorial markers, German names on headstones in the East marked the land as German. 
Monuments dedicated to “Our dead in the East German Heimat” were thus used to 
bolster territorial claims. 
           Targeting different audiences at different times and employing vague inscriptions, 
the monuments of this category are among the most complicated and multi-dimensional 
of all expellee monuments. Nevertheless, they allow for a few generalizations. First, the 
majority of them are located in cemeteries. Second, though they are not geographically 
bound—indeed they were erected throughout the Federal Republic—they do appear to be 
somewhat temporally bound.  Perhaps it is not a coincidence then that the initiators of 
these local monuments erected the bulk of them during the 1940s and 1950s, i.e. when 
hopes burned most brightly for a permanent peace agreement that would allow a return 
home. Third, and perhaps most interestingly, specific references to the cause of death or 
to the expulsion itself on the monuments in this chapter are rare. Of course, that most of 
these monuments were erected before Ostpolitik and do not directly mention the 
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expulsion supports my argument that the groups that erected them intended to do more 
than just commemorate. Instead, the monuments contained an inherent political 
dimension. Although supreme suffering was obviously implied when the expulsion 





CONCLUSION--LOSS OF HEIMAT & TERRITORIAL CLAIMS 
 
           All local expellee monuments provide insight into postwar historical 
understandings in Germany. As the examples from these four chapters demonstrate, prior 
to Ostpolitik, the monuments’ central theme was the loss of Heimat. With some 
exceptions, the expellee organizations and their supporters erected most of these 
monuments in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. As these earlier monuments indicate, the 
monuments’ commemorative thrust was not as much the oftentimes violent act of flight 
and expulsion as the actual forfeiture of territory. Indeed, some of these monuments make 
it appear as though the expellees’ loss of Heimat was a fate worse than death. The 
monuments served therefore to illuminate publicly the profundity of this loss, which 
many expellees believed made them worthy of special legal recognition. Furthermore, 
and even more significantly, the monuments disputed the postwar borders and in many 
cases claimed the continued existence of a Germany in its prewar boundaries. Thus, the 
monuments of cluster A were part of the campaigns agitating for the reacquisition of the 
expellees’ homelands. Simply put, the expellees’ fate served as the basis for the pursuit of 
concrete politics. To this end, the expellees repeatedly invoked Heimat on their 
monuments.  
           However, making reference to “Heimat” has served different purposes at different 
times. In the first years after the Potsdam Agreement, the expellees attested their own 
Germanness by referring to it. Later invocations of the concept affirmed the Germanness 
of the lands they left behind. Clearly, maintaining awareness of this fact was of critical 
importance for the expellee organizations and a major impetus for the erection of new 
monuments. Constructed to do much more than console, these monuments were designed 
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to inspire and rouse. They were erected to jar Germans from their complacency and 
galvanize efforts at the local level to push for a border revision. Elsewhere, monuments 
were unveiled which couched the expellee organizations’ territorial claims in the 
language of the Cold War to increase the palatability of their desire for a border revision 
and at the same time shift responsibility for the expulsion and German division to the 
Soviets and their Communist allies.  
           Although the reacquisition of the German territory in Southeastern Europe was 
even less likely than the reacquisition of East Prussia, Pomerania, and Silesia (if not 
completely impossible), monuments were erected avowing the Germanness of the lands 
along the Danube settled by Germans by dint of their cultural achievements there. The 
fact that Danube Swabians, Banat Germans et al. had carved out a Heimat in inhospitable 
areas made the lands German even though they were governed by others. The fact that 
these Southeast European Germans—whose immediate postwar experiences were 
entirely different than those of other expellees—are counted amongst the victims of the 
expulsion—make these monuments all the more problematic. Lastly, the cemeteries filled 
with “Our dead in the East German Heimat” also facilitated subtle territorial claims 
because where German graves lie must be German territory.  
           Besides their invocations of Heimat, what binds these diverse monuments is that 
while often commemorative in tone, they were political in intent. Indeed, they 
commemorate as much the territory as the people who were killed, and bemoan a loss of 
German influence in and over Eastern Europe. What did their continuing pledges of 
loyalty really mean? Why this fixation with Heimat? First of all, making reference to it 
was particularly effective because it was part of a language spoken and understood by all 
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Germans. As Alon Confino points out, “In postwar West Germany, the lost Heimats of 
the East served as a powerful idiom of national victimhood and suffering.”1 But the usage 
of this idiom was not limited to the expellees. In fact, Confino argues that West Germans 
in general were using the Heimat idea to “distance Germany from the Third Reich” and 
“represent Germans as twice victims: of the Hitler regime and of the Allies, especially the 
Russians and other East Europeans.”2
           The implications of this stance for larger discussions of guilt and responsibility are 
crucial. As cluster A’s monuments show, the expellees did not treat the loss of the eastern 
territories as the consequence of the Nazis’ genocidal war. In a concerted effort to 
muddle a strict victim/perpetrator binary, the monuments blur any such causality. Instead, 
throughout the entire postwar period, the monuments purport the indisputable 
Germanness of the eastern territories. As we have seen, even the tacit recognition of the 
new borders did not mean the expellee organizations renounced what they believed to be 
their fundamental right to the homeland. The insistence to this day on the “right to 
homeland” is the case in point for what Alexander Mitscherlich and Margarete 
Mitscherlich saw as the disconnection of causality between the war and the expulsion. 
Writing about the “illusory” territorial demands of the expellee organizations, they noted, 
“Instead, Germany tried to compel the victors, on the basis of the victors’ own moral and 
political standards, to deal with the consequences of Nazi crimes as if the whole thing had 
been a relatively inconsequential military conflict.”
 Having suffered the loss of Heimat, the expellees 
had been just as victimized as any victim of the Nazis.  
3
                                                           
1 Confino, Germany as a Culture of Remembrance, p. 85 
  
2 Confino, Germany as a Culture of Remembrance, p. 83 & p. 84. 
3 In their seminal collective psychological analysis of postwar (West) Germany, Alexander Mitscherlich 
and Margarete Mitscherlich held the prolonged hopes of territorial restitution not as “revanchist” but as 
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          The expellee monuments demonstrate the unwillingness of a significant portion of 
the West German populace to recognize and accept German responsibility for the loss of 
the eastern territories. Acceptance of the territorial status quo would have signaled 
acknowledgement that the border adjustments and population transfer sanctioned by the 
Potsdam Agreement were justified results of the world war Germany initiated. Defying 
social trends concerning perceptions of the Nazi past starting in the late 1960s, none of 
the monuments here intimate even the slightest link between the expulsion and Nazi 
crimes. Moreover, the focus on the loss of Heimat appears to be a one-sided strategy of 
distancing and disconnecting that omits all non-German victims of WWII. As portrayed 
on the monuments memorializing the loss of Heimat, the expellees were the only ones 
who had suffered.  
          By the late 1970s, conceptions of the Nazi past in West Germany had changed 
entirely. Along with West Germany’s recognition of Poland’s western border, new 
Holocaust-centered historical narratives emerged. In response to these changes, 
monuments erected in the pursuit of concrete politics, as in the past, became scarce.4
                                                           
“illusory,” for it reflected in their estimation the incapability of most Germans to recognize the “logical 
consequences of the war.” See Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich, The Inability to Mourn: Principles of 
Collective Behavior. Tr. Beverley R. Placzek. (New York: Grove Press, 1975), p. 4. 
 
4 Overall, the expellee organizations erected fewer monuments, those they proposed faced rising 
opposition, and those already standing drew more scrutiny. Not surprisingly, much of this resistance came 
from young people and left-wing critics. Retterath writes, for example, of a notable two-year debate in the 
mid-1960s in Tübingen over a planned wooden signpost with distances to cities in the German East. 
Students in the university town threatened to chop down the post should the plan come to fruition. The 
proposal was dropped. It is difficult to ascertain whether the students were upset most by the connection to 
the lost territories or that the sculptor selected to create the monument was a high-ranking member of an 
extreme right-wing party (NPD). For more on this debate, see Retterath, “Gedenkstein und Wegweiser,” p. 
31 (66n). In most cases, however, the loudest political opposition came from the Social Democrats. Kittel 
suggests that as far as the commemoration of the expulsion and the eastern provinces went, municipal SPD 
officials attempted to implement at the local level what the social-liberal coalition had done via Ostpolitik 
at the national level. (See Kittel, Vertreibung der Vertriebenen? pp. 136-146). For instance, he lists a 
number of conflicts that arose in municipalities throughout the 1970s over the long-established 
Patenschaften between cities and towns in the Federal Republic and the formerly German cities beyond the 
Oder/Neisse they adopted. In the interest of reconciliation and improved bilateral relations between West 
Germany and its Polish neighbors, local SPD politicians sought to establish new partnerships between 
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Instead, the expellee organizations constructed different kinds of monuments in the 
pursuit of new political and commemorative goals. Associated with what I call “symbolic 
politics,” I examine these more recent monuments in the following chapters.   
  
                                                           
equal West German and now Polish cities rather than Patenschaften. The financial support for 
commemorative activities guaranteed by the Patenschaften—including money for Heimatstuben and 
presumably for the upkeep and erection of new monuments—dried up; authorities removed other 
monuments or moved them to less conspicuous areas; and officials renamed streets and buildings. For 
example, Kittel mentions two signposts in Berlin (on the corner of Mehringdamm and Yorckstrasse in 
Kreuzburg in 1972 and a second on the corner of Gneisenausstrasse also in Kreuzburg in 1976), that were 
removed on two respective initiatives of the SPD. Debates along party lines also ensued over inscriptions 
and locations of new monuments. A squabble between local politicians over the location of a proposed 
expellee monument in Euskirchen, North Rhine-Westphalia in 1976 also illustrates this point. The debate 
pitted SPD officials, who disputed the need of a new monument and who were against the ambiguous 
inscription and the prominent position in the central city cemetery the monument was to occupy, against 
their CDU (and in this case, FDP) counterparts. Because the Christian Democrats had a majority of the 
votes, the city council approved the proposal. Though it would be inaccurate to say the situation was the 
same everywhere, it is apparent that the widespread support of all political parties, had for the most part, 







B. AESTHETICS OF COLLECTIVE INNOCENCE 
 
 
There is no guilt or innocence of an entire 
people. Guilt, like innocence, is not 
collective, but personal. 
 
--Richard von Weizsäcker, speech 





CONTEXT & BACKGROUND: EXPULSION AND EXCULPATION  
 
           In an address given at the dedication ceremony of an expellee monument in 
Karlsruhe on Volkstrauertag in 2000,6
3,250,000 German soldiers as a direct result of combat; 1,000,000 women, children, and 
elderly people as a result of the bombing terror conducted in violation of international 
law (völkerrechtswidriger Bombenterror); 3,242,000 German soldiers held as Allied 
POWs; […] 3,000,000 women, children, and elderly people during the expulsion from 
the Heimat after 1945; 500,000 murdered during the invasion of the Soviets in East and 
Middle Germany (Ost- und Mitteldeutschland); 60,000 murdered during the invasion of 
Austria.  
 the chairman of the local BdV affiliate offered 
insights into many Germans’ historical understandings concerning the place of the 
expulsion—and of the wartime suffering of German people in general—in the memory 
culture of the Federal Republic. The speaker talked at length about the victimization of 
the expellees and other Germans during and after WWII, and went on to mention the over 
eleven million Germans who perished due to the war, amongst whom he counted:  
                                                           
5 Rede von Bundespräsident Richard von Weizsäcker bei der Gedenkveranstaltung im Plenarsaal des 
Deutschen Bundestages zum 40. Jahrestag des Endes des Zweiten Weltkrieges in Europa 
<http://www.bundespraesident.de/Reden-und-Interviews/Reden-Richard-von-Weizsaecker-
,12166.629421/Rede-von-Bundespraesident-Rich.htm?global.back=/Reden-und-Interviews/-
%2c12166%2c0/Reden-Richard-von-Weizsaecker.htm%3flink%3dbpr_liste> Accessed February 13, 2010.  
6 Erected in 1976, the original monument, a 4.4 meter-high wooden cross dedicated to DEN TOTEN DER 
HEIMAT (The Dead of the Heimat) had to be removed due to damage sustained from prolonged exposure 
to the elements.  
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Also on this laundry list of German victims were the “thousands of women, children, and 
elderly who died in the death camps of Tito’s partisans,” and the “thousands of civilians 
who did not return home from forced labor in the Soviet Union.”  
          Moments later, the speaker added, “At this point, we do not want to judge; rather, 
we speak of the suffering of a hard fate and of victims without individual guilt.”  (Opfern 
ohne individuelle Schuld). He went on to decry the way [German] officials are unable, “to 
get away from their habit of dedicating countless hours of remembrance and memorials 
to some [clearly meaning Germany’s victims] and passing over others [German victims] 
either by silence or distortion of the truth.” Before moving on to commentary over the 
purpose of the newly dedicated monument, the BdV functionary took one more jab at 
German memory culture, particularly as practiced by younger elites: “When it is about 
innocent victims and human suffering, the officials in politics and the media play the part 
of judges who, through their distribution of remembrance and grieving, have restored 
earthly justice. The thought that they act equally unchristian and inhumane, that they as 
an up-and-coming generation are simply overbearing, doesn’t enter their minds.”7
          Equally as disquieting as the speech’s many inaccuracies and omissions (the 
inflated numbers, the exclusion of Germany’s victims, the inclusion of Austrians in the 
listing of German war victims) and the last criticism, was the speaker’s proclamation of 
innocence (twice) not only for all the victims of flight and expulsion, but also for all 
German war dead. Though the monument’s inscription only addresses the expellees,
   
8
                                                           
7 All these quotations were taken from the speech as cited in Bund der Vertriebenen – Vereinigte 
Landsmannschaften – Kreisverband Karlsruhe (ed.) Mahnmal-Weihung und Totengedenkfeier am 
19.11.2000, Hauptfriedhof Karlsruhe. (Karlsruhe: n.p., n.d.) 
 the 
8 The monument consists of a stone cross flanked by two large stones which bear the main inscriptions (left 
side) DEN MILLIONEN DEUTSCHEN, DIE DURCH GEWALTSAME VERTREIBUNG, FLUCHT, 
INTERNIERUNG UND VERSCHLEPPUNG IHR LEBEN VERLOREN, ZUM EHRENDEN 
GEDENKEN. (In honoring commemoration of the millions of Germans who lost their lives due to violent 
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presumably guiltless women, children, and elderly forced to leave their homes in the 
German East specifically addressed in the speech are lumped together with their 
compatriots killed by Allied aerial raids in the cities, who were in turn thrown in together 
with fallen soldiers. Not only were the victims of flight and expulsion collectively 
innocent but they were not distinguished from all other German war victims—whom the 
speaker also pronounced innocent. All the German war dead are subsumed into a single 
category. With this speech, the BdV functionary exculpates by extension all Germans 
(and, in a völkisch-racial manner, all Austrians). What begins with assertions of the 
collective innocence of some (usually women, children, and elderly) is quickly expanded 
to include more and more Germans, including soldiers.  
          The monuments of cluster B purport the collective innocence of the expellees. I 
contend they were erected in the expellee organizations’ pursuit of “symbolic politics”—
that is, the desire for the acknowledgement of expellee suffering, and the wish to be 
counted amongst the guiltless victims of WWII. To achieve this recognition, the 
monuments portray the expellees as the collectively innocent victims of events outside of 
their control and focus much more on the physical hardships and deaths connected with 
the expulsion than on the loss of the Heimat. Moreover, the monuments explicitly and 
implicitly bestow those they memorialize with the title “victim.” Such monuments are the 
focus of the following three chapters.  
                                                           
expulsion, flight, internment and forced deportation) and (right side) IHRE HEIMAT WAR DANZIG, 
OSTPREUSSEN, POMMERN, SCHLESIEN, WESTPREUSSEN, IN DER TSCHECHOSLOWAKEI 
UND IN DEN DEUTSCHEN SIEDLUNGSGEBIETEN IN ESTLAND, LITAUEN, JUGOSLAWIEN, 
POLEN, RUMÄNIEN, RUSSLAND, UND UNGARN. (Their homeland was Danzig, East Prussia, 
Pomerania, Silesia, West Prussia, in Czechoslovakia, and in the German settlement areas in Estonia, 
Lithuania, Yugoslavia, Poland, Romania, Russia and Hungary). 
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          Expellee organizations erected most of these monuments in the 1970s, 1980s, 
1990s, and 2000s. While the drastic thematic switch these more recent monuments 
indicate certainly has much to do with Ostpolitik and the West German government’s 
renunciation of long-held territorial claims in the early 1970s, I believe it has even more 
to do with the rise of Holocaust-centered narratives I described in Chapter Two. The 
sweeping political and social changes of the 1960s and 1970s altered discussions of guilt 
and victimization in West Germany and effectively marginalized the experiences of the 
expellees—and all other German victims—in official accounts of the past. Thus the 
expellee organizations emplaced the monuments discussed here to counter national 
narratives focusing on the crimes of the Nazis and provide a putatively more complete 
history of WWII and its aftermath that sets the record straight. The historical counter-
narrative these monuments articulate centers on German suffering and seeks 
acknowledgement of the expellees’ plight and societal recognition of their victimization. 
Therefore, the monuments here address normative questions brought up in the speech in 
Karlsruhe with which I opened cluster B, and are part of the debates over who the victims 
of WWII actually were and whether remembrance of the war should dwell on Germany’s 
victims or on German victims. 
           This cluster is organized like the previous one but because the themes discussed 
are generally more complicated and less literal, I begin each chapter with longer 
introductions which situate my work and provide more thorough background 
information. Cluster B is comprised of three individual chapters, all of which examine 
monuments that claim the collective innocence of the expellees: Chapter Seven—
“Christian Symbolism & Collective Innocence” investigates monuments that link 
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expellee suffering to Christ’s suffering. These monuments—which appeared primarily in 
the 1950s—are the earliest examples of this type. Chapter Eight—“Mutterliebe: The 
Allegory of the Female Form” looks at the usage of women, especially mothers with 
small children, as the signal figures of the expulsion. These monuments, I contend, 
extend the presumed innocence of defenseless women and children to male expellees. 
The monuments of the first two chapters elevate the expellees’ experiences above those 
of all others. In Chapter Nine—“Subsuming Victims,” I look at monuments that stress 
expellee suffering in a different way. Particularly in the new Länder, monuments 
highlight the suffering of the Germans from the East not by portraying it as unique but by 
stressing its similarity to the suffering of others—specifically, to that of other (non-
German) victims of the war and violence, who, few would argue, were guiltlessly 
persecuted and slain. By saying that expellees suffered in kind, these monuments purport 
that the expellees were equally inculpable for their fate.  
           All of these monuments employ the aesthetics of innocence to dissolve causal 
links between WWII and the expulsion and thus preclude the possibility that individuals 
from the German East might have been complicit in Nazi atrocities or that the Germans 
in general were in any way liable for what befell the expellees. It is to a more specific 















          Meinhold Lurz, author of a six-volume study of war memorials (which includes a 
very brief analysis of expellee monuments) found that around ninety percent of the 
35,000-40,000 war memorials of various sorts erected in (West) Germany after the 
Second World War exhibit some type of Christian motif.1 As examples of this 
symbolism, Lurz lists (among other things) the cross, crowns of thorns, the Man of 
Sorrows (Schmerzensmann), pietà, and the resurrection of Christ—all designed and 
erected, though not always by religious communities, to commemorate various aspects 
and victims groups associated with the war. He attributes this not to a sincere return to 
Christian belief and general devoutness on the part of the West Germans, but to the “lack 
of a new state ideology in the still young republic” with which to make sense of the death 
and destruction—military and civilian—of the recent past. West Germans had to find 
new ways to understand and justify the reasons for dying in a lost war. No longer would 
death on the battlefield serve to glorify the nation. “The new Christianity of the 1950s,” 
according to Lurz, “served as an alternative to nationalism.”2
                                                           
1 See Lurz, Kriegerdenkmäler in Deutschland. Vol. VI Bundesrepublik, p. 217. This figure is also cited in 
Sabine Behrenbeck, “Heldenkult oder Friedensmahnung? Kriegerdenkmale nach beiden Weltkriegen,” in 
Gottfried Niedhart and Dieter Riesenberger (eds.) Lernen aus dem Krieg? Deutsche Nachkriegszeiten 1918 
und 1945. (Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck), pp. 344-361. 
 After the nation and the 
Vaterland had been discredited by the xenophobic hyper-nationalism of National 
2 See Lurz, Kriegerdenkmäler in Deutschland. Vol. VI Bundesrepublik, p. 141. 
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Socialism, West Germans used Christianity as the lens through which they could view 
their past.   
          As I showed in cluster A, the borderline nationalist and Germanic motifs seen on 
local expellee monuments demonstrate that such attitudes were not completely absent in 
the postwar era, as Lurz purports.3 It does, however, seem apparent that the “re-
Christianization” of West German society, “became the most important interconfessional 
response to war, fascism, and defeat,” as Frank Biess states in his study of the cultural 
and political implications of the POW phenomenon in post-WWII Germany.4 Biess 
writes that “[re-Christianization] propagated a return to Christian principles as the most 
promising concept for overcoming National Socialism as well as for safeguarding 
postwar society against the Communist East.” Correspondingly, representations of the 
recent past displaying Christian symbolism proliferated, including the thousands of war 
memorials identified by Lurz. In fact, as Biess puts it, “Christian motifs and tropes 
provided essential components for West German commemorations of the Second World 
War, even in seemingly secular settings.”5 Indeed, high percentages of local expellee 
monuments (though lower than Lurz’s figure of approximately 90% of all war 
memorials) also display religious forms and iconography.6
                                                           
3 For example, the scores of monuments with the coats-of-arms of the eastern territories, the dozens with 
Germany in its 1937 borders, and the many monuments in the form of erratic boulders. 
 The cross is in fact the most 
common form chosen to commemorate the expulsion and the loss of Heimat. So 
prevalent did re-Christianization as a strategy of memorialization become, that the 
4 See Frank Biess, Homecomings: Returning POWs and the Legacies of Defeat in Postwar Germany. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 98. 
5 Ibid., p. 102. 
6 For example, over half of the monuments in Hessen (121 out of 236) consist solely of or incorporate a 
simple cross.   
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wartime experiences of even non-Christian groups were commemorated with these 
familiar symbols.7
           The central question here is, of course, why? What did the Christian tradition have 
to offer West Germans—and the expellees in particular—after WWII for understanding 
their recent past? What historical interpretations did the employment of Christian 
symbolism facilitate? As a response, I turn back to Lurz,
 
8 who argues that the return to 
religiosity provided relatives and friends of the dead of WWII above all with solace. 
Believers in Christ could be redeemed; and though those commemorated—i.e. the war 
dead—were gone forever, they were in a better place and could enjoy everlasting life. 
Moreover, further comfort was provided by the Christian belief that, upon their own 
deaths, the surviving family members would reunite with their deceased loved ones. 
Therefore, Lurz writes, the many crosses and other references to Christ’s resurrection 
offered consolation by symbolizing the salvation of mankind.9
          While it appears at first glance that the monuments exhibit these religious symbols 
merely to provide comfort, other elements make it seem as if more is at play. In fact, Lurz 
is critical of the war memorials that express such sentiments. At the heart of his analysis 
is the assertion that West German society did not draw the proper lessons from the war 
experience, and that post-WWII monuments in the Federal Republic were not sufficiently 
  
                                                           
7 This enlightening point was made by Harold Marcuse, Frank Schimmelfennig, and Jochen Spielmann, 
who note the existence of a Verfolgtendenkmal (Monument to the Persecuted) in Kassel dedicated to DEN 
VERNICHTETEN 1933-1945 (The Annihilated 1933-1945) which as its centerpiece features a large crown 
of thorns. The choice of this motif seems problematic because while many of those persecuted by the Nazis 
were indeed Christians, millions of others were not. See Harold Marcuse, Frank Schimmelfennig, and 
Jochen Spielmann. Steine des Anstoßes. Nationalsozialismus und Zweiter Weltkrieg in Denkmalen 1945-
1985. (Hamburg: Hein & Co, 1985), p. 23. 
8 Though his study encompasses war memorials dedicated to civilians, it bears repeating that the real focus 
of Lurz’s work is on war memorials dedicated to fallen German soldiers. Nevertheless, his analysis applies 
to other groups as well.  
9 Lurz, Kriegerdenkmäler in Deutschland. Vol. VI Bundesrepublik, p. 216 & p. 219. 
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anti-war. The war memorials’ heavy focus on Christian redemption distracts the relatives, 
comrades and members of veterans’ organizations, as well other contemporaries—Lurz 
argues—from the real circumstances surrounding the deaths of the fallen. Cause and 
effect are omitted, or overlooked. The fact that the dead soldiers had served in a war of 
aggression that had spread death and destruction throughout Europe and the world, 
moreover, was not included in the monuments.10 Furthermore, the suffering of the fallen 
and the anguish of their relatives and surviving comrades, which according to Lurz 
appeared frequently on the war memorials,11 is coupled with that of Jesus Christ on the 
cross. Put differently, the sacrifices of dead German soldiers were like those of Christ. 
The fate of the fallen was identified with that of Jesus Christ.12
          The authors of a thematically similar but less exhaustive study are equally skeptical 
about the use of Christian forms and iconography on post-WWII monuments in West 
Germany. They find that virtually all such symbols “refer almost exclusively to the 
suffering, death, and resurrection of Christ.” This in itself is not as problematic as 
drawing parallels with the suffering and death of Christ and his sinless nature. They state, 
“Concomitantly, the actual circumstances of death can be transported away from the 
political realm through the latently implied identification of the dead with Christ to the 
mystical-sacral realm. The hindrance to political reflection caused thereby can conceal 
the ideological intentions of the monument’s initiators.”
  
13
                                                           
10 Ibid., p. 23. 
 In other words, without 
examining the origins of their suffering, the monuments’ sponsors used Christian 
symbolism to connect the wartime experiences of various victim groups to the death of 
11 Ibid., p. 216. 
12 Ibid., p. 142. 
13 Marcuse, Schimmelfennig and Spielmann, Steine des Anstoßes, p. 23. 
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Jesus Christ on the cross. Their affliction and sacrifices are similar to his. As I show in 
what follows, the initiators of local expellee monuments employed Christian symbols and 
iconography to propose precisely this analogy. 
          I am not the first to note the occurrence of Christian symbolism in the monuments 
of the expellees.14 In 2008, Stephan Scholz published an article in a Swiss journal in 
which he sketched out the changes in how expellee organizations have used Christian 
symbolism on monuments to narrate their experiences of flight and expulsion through the 
decades.15
                                                           
14 Tobias Weger briefly described the popular use of religious, particularly Catholic, motifs in a variety of 
cultural objects—including monuments—in his article: “Die katholische Rhetorik bei den vertriebenen 
Sudetendeutschen in der Nachkriegszeit,” Bohemia. 45, 2, 2004, pp. 454-468. 
 While Scholz’s contribution is indeed helpful, it both over- and 
underemphasizes certain points about expellee monuments in general and those 
displaying Christian motifs in particular. For example, his stress on the use of monuments 
with Christian motifs to make oblique territorial claims underplays the scores of 
monuments that make quite literal and forceful claims. Some of his readings of 
monuments are also overly Catholic. In addition, in the cross Scholz sees sacrifice 
(Opfer) as the central meaning whereas I see in this familiar motif seen in all cemeteries 
of Christendom a polyvalent symbol, the meaning of which encompasses mourning, but 
also hope, Christian love, forgiveness, salvation, and so on. The cross alone is not always 
automatically the political symbol as Scholz makes it seem. Nevertheless, my 
disagreements with Scholz are in most cases quite minor. Indeed, though his article has 
broader aims, it makes a valuable larger point similar to the one Lurz made about the 
repeated invocation of the Christian tradition on expellee monuments—he claims it was 
15 Stephan Scholz, “‘Opferdunst vernebelt die Verhältnisse.’” 
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used to cast the expulsion experience and the suffering it engendered as one akin to that 
of Jesus Christ’s crucifixion.  
           Even more important is Scholz’s argument about the implications of these claims 
in terms of shaping historical narratives and understanding the past. The monuments 
displaying Christian symbolism have much to say about how the expellees—and all 
Germans—viewed their own suffering vis-à-vis the suffering of other victims. He writes, 
“In light of the latent competition of victims of World War II, the goal of the victimhood 
rhetoric and symbolism is obviously to grant a prominent place for the German expellees 
and for the Germans as a whole in the hierarchy of victims.”16 The monuments do more 
than show the expellees as victims, however. As Scholz goes on, through their suffering, 
parallel to that of Christ, the victimhood of the expellees serves as expiation for the sins 
of the Nazis. He writes, “Through the victimization of the expellees […] the atonement of 
German guilt and a restoration of German innocence have taken place.”17
 
 The fate 
suffered by the expellees was punishment for the misdeeds of others. Just as sinless Jesus 
suffered and died to save the world and release all believers from their sins, the supposed 
innocent suffering of the expellees did the same for their countrymen. In other words, the 
fact the expellees suffered too absolved Germans of their guilt. It this critical point of 
Scholz’s article that I would like to refine and examine in greater detail.  
THE MONUMENTS 
           Of greatest interest to me are the monuments with religious motifs that add to the 
discourse on German victimization in and after the Second World War. Therefore, not all 
                                                           
16 Ibid., p. 306. 
17 Ibid., p. 310. 
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monuments displaying Christian symbolism will be discussed here. A simple cross 
dedicated “To our dead” clearly displays a religious motif, as do the crosses inscribed 
with the phrase HERR GELEITE UNS HEIM ([Lord, guide us home] e.g. in 
Bremerhaven and Söllingen, Baden-Württemberg, among other places). None of these, 
however, directly references the suffering of Christ or other biblical occurrences to 
contextualize and represent the expulsion.18 Other expressions of piety—either on the 
part of the monuments’ initiators, or of those commemorated—are also not included. 
Instead, the monuments under examination combine commemorations of the expulsion 
with religious symbols and biblical references. These monuments employ the cross and 
other unmistakable Christian elements, such as crowns of thorns, to ascribe a religious 
meaning to the expulsion. Put differently, I am looking at expellee monuments, as Lurz 
puts it, where, “From the passion of Christ becomes the passion of the German people in 
WWII.”19 In a nutshell, with these monuments, representatives of expellee organizations 
who initiated them were trying to make clear that the suffering inflicted on the expellees 
was the worst kind of all.20
                                                           
18 I also do not include references to the lost churches of the Heimat nor examples of the widespread 
practice in the Federal Republic of re-assembling and re-hanging bells from the churches and cathedrals in 
the eastern provinces. For a brief exploration of this topic in a very specific context, see Marion Josephin 
Wetzel, Die Integration von Flüchtlingen in evangelischen Kirchengemeinden. Das Beispiel Schleswig-
Holstein nach 1945. Kieler Studien zur Volkskunde und Kulturgeschichte, Band 7. (Münster: Waxmann 
Verlag, 2009), pp. 216ff.  
 Such assertions would, of course, have profound implications 
for discussions of German guilt, innocence, atonement, and absolution. 
19 Lurz, Kriegerdenkmäler in Deutschland. Vol. VI Bundesrepublik, p. 172. 
20 These views were, of course, already captured in two key passages from the Charter of the German 
Expellees from 1950. The first encapsulates expellee suffering vis-à-vis other Germans. Recall the 
document’s demand for the “Just and reasonable distribution of the burdens of the last war among the 
entire German people and an honest application of this principle.” The implication here, of course, is that 
the expellees had fared worse as a result of the war than their compatriots. In the minds of many expellees, 
because of their losses, they had borne the ultimate burden and made the ultimate sacrifice. Transcending 
the national context, the second passage dealing with the singularity of the expellees’ suffering also 
pertains to questions of guilt and responsibility. It declares, “The nations of the world should become 
sensitive of their co-responsibility for the fate of the expellees who have suffered most from the hardships 
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          There are specific examples of this narrative analogization. In addition to the large 
numbers of expellee monuments which take the form of crosses offering consolation to 
relatives or explicitly and implicitly raising territorial claims, a smaller number of 
monuments link the expulsion of Germans from the eastern territories to biblical 
happenings, especially the suffering of Jesus Christ. Unlike in other cases, however, in 
which just a cross is featured there seems to be no regional patterns in the locations of 
these monuments.21
                                                           
of our times.” The expellees’ Christ-like experience has been elevated vis-à-vis all other victim groups. 
They suffered most of all. Correspondingly, the monuments in this category are devoid of references to 
other (non-Aryan German) victims. The only victimization of consequence was that of the expellees. Their 
suffering of biblical proportions was all that mattered. 
 That is, they are located throughout West Germany. (For obvious 
reasons, monuments exhibiting religious forms and iconography of any type are rare in 
the former GDR). The temporal distribution of the monuments of this type in West 
Germany indicates the seeds of this narrative were planted early on and were part of the 
re-Christianizing, redemptive memories of the war Biess describes. Thus, while I concur 
with Scholz in his assessment that the emphasis on expellee victimhood has grown over 
time (as opposed to the political efficacy of territorial claims, which has dissipated) I 
would also argue that that elements of this narrative were present from the beginning—
despite the ongoing primacy of the reacquisition of the Heimat as chief goal of the 
expellee organizations—and continued intermittently throughout the postwar era.  
21 There are, however, regional patterns in the forms of the crosses. For example, in areas with large 
numbers of Catholics, particularly in southern Germany, crucifixes are prevalent, whereas in areas with 




                                                   Figure 23 Marbach. Photo: J.L. 
 
           My first example occupies a central place in the main cemetery in Friedrich 
Schiller’s birthplace, Marbach, Baden-Württemberg (Figures 23 & 24). The monument, 
initiated by a group of local expellees and erected in 1952,22
                                                           
22 The monument was erected the same year the federal state Baden-Württemberg came into existence upon 
the merger of the states Württemberg-Baden, Baden, and Württemberg-Hohenzollern.  
 consists of a tall wooden 
cross with a two-fold commemorative thrust that encompasses both the territorial 
dimension discussed in previous chapters as well as the physical hardships of flight and 
expulsion and the implied innocence of those who shared this experience. First, the 
monument is typical of the pre-Ostpolitik era in that it directly references the border 
issue. Displayed prominently near the base is a hand-carved shield bearing the coats-of-
arms of nine eastern provinces. Clearly, few of the expellee organizations’ 
commemorative efforts of the 1950s could be divorced from the concrete politics of 
agitating for a border adjustment.  
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           Nevertheless, the cross employs additional Christian symbolism to draw parallels 
between Christ’s suffering and that of the expellees. The second commemorative thrust 
therefore foreshadows the shift in emphasis away from territory to assertions of collective 
innocence. The cross exhibits two other elements more commonly associated with the 
symbolic politics of the post-Ostpolitik era, which shed light on the monument’s 
hybridity. First, to make clear the monument’s point of reference, the cross beam bears 
the inscription: “1945.” It appears that the monument’s initiators were confident that the 
historical understanding they sought to convey with the cross would not be 
misunderstood. There are no other explanatory inscriptions. Though the various phases of 
flight and expulsion actually happened over several years, starting in 1944, and lasted 
until the end of the decade, this year is singled out as the period of greatest suffering.23
           The monument’s second and more important element indicates how the initiators 
wanted to portray the expellees. The intersection of the two beams is ringed by a large 
metal crown of thorns—one of the most important Christian symbols—which, for Lurz, 
“unifies all the suffering due to the war and its consequences.”
 
This reference to a date rather than to the dead left behind (e.g. UNSEREN TOTEN DER 
HEIMAT), or to the Heimat, limits the field of possible referents to the originary acts of 
expulsion themselves.   
24
                                                           
23 The significance of this year for commemorating the expulsion is obvious: Setting the large-scale flight 
of Germans in motion, the Red Army’s winter offensive launched in January; as the year progressed and 
the eastern front further collapsed, more and more Germans were evacuated by Nazi authorities; May 
brought the formal cessation of hostilities as well as the concomitant ‘wilde Vertreibungen’ of Germans by 
local revenge-seeking partisans, and August saw the Potsdam Agreement and the official settlement of 
Germany’s postwar borders and the subsequent forced population transfer. 
 More effectively than 
the cross alone, the crown of thorns links the victimization of the expellees to that of 
24 Lurz, Kriegerdenkmäler in Deutschland. Vol. VI Bundesrepublik, p. 218. Lurz writes that the crown of 
thorns was one of the more common embellishments on the war memorials of the Federal Republic. He 
writes it was used to connote the wartime suffering of other German civilian groups such as at the 
monument for victims of the Allied firebombing of Hamburg at Ohlsdorfer Cemetery. 
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Christ.25 Whereas the cross alone stands for the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ and 
for Christianity as a whole, the crown of thorns stands for Christ’s physical torment and 
eventual torturous death. Scholz writes that the crown of thorns has been used on 
expellee monuments as an embellishment of the cross to more compellingly convey the 
“Passion” of the expellees.26
 
  
                      Figure 24 Marbach (close-up). Photo: J.L. 
 
          As portrayed here, however, the expellees’ experiences were Christ-like: like him, 
they had been humiliated, tortured, and killed. While I do not call into question that many 
expellees truly suffered during the expulsion, I do find problematic the fact that 
monuments of this type make it look like all expellees suffered the same fate, or that their 
suffering occurred for the same (or similar) reasons, and under the same (or similar) 
circumstances, as Christ’s did. Of course, those who erected this monument, and the 
millions of others who came to reside in what became the Federal Republic, were the 
survivors of the westward treks and the forced migration. They had not suffered the worst 
                                                           
25 In three of the four Gospels of the New Testament, Matthew (27:29), Mark (15:17) and John (19:2) write 
of the crown of thorns placed on Jesus Christ’s head by Roman soldiers to mock him as “King of the Jews” 
before his crucifixion.  
26 Scholz, “‘Opferdunst vernebelt die Verhältnisse,’” p. 304. 
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fate when compared to the Germans’ many victims. Even more problematic, however, is 
the additional meaning with which such monuments are encoded. Taken a step further, by 
linking the expulsion to Christ’s suffering, the monument tells an exculpatory narrative of 
the past. According to teachings in the New Testament, Christ was persecuted unjustly 
and suffered innocently. He was tortured and died undeservedly, so when the expellees 
connect their experiences to this fate, the expellees are portrayed in a similar light. The 
linkage represented by the cross, the shield of Wappen, the inscription “1945,” and the 
crown of thorns at the monument in Marbach amounts, therefore, to an assertion of 
collective innocence. The biblical metaphor was thus employed to absolve the expellees 
of the guilt of the war and Nazi crimes.27
          Another example from the 1950s makes a more direct visual link between flight 
and expulsion and the crucifixion of Christ to assert the collective innocence of the 
expellees. As a symbolic expression of the “insoluble bonds between Pomerania and 
Schleswig-Holstein,” the Pommernkapelle (Pomerania Chapel) was added to a wing of 
the St.-Nikolai-Kirche in Kiel, which due to extensive war damage had been under 
reconstruction throughout the decade (Figure 25). The Pomerania Chapel was created to 
stand vicariously for the many lost churches of Pomerania, which were “erected there as 
  
                                                           
27 A number of expellee monuments from the pre-Ostpolitik era display the crown of thorns. In fact, use of 
the motif was surprisingly widespread in the 1950s when monuments were erected in Gütersloh, NRW 
(1951), Immenhausen, Hessen (1955), Höhr-Grenzhausen, Rhineland-Palatinate (1956), Essingen, Baden-
Württemberg (1959), all displaying this telltale symbol of suffering and expiation. Crowns of thorns were 
seen on later monuments as well, for instance, in Villingen, Baden-Württemberg, where the artist Willi 
Dorn created a memorial site in 1967 comprised of a metal sculpture of a crown of thorns atop three granite 
blocks which surround a small fountain. Located in a green space in the city, the monument represents the 
three parts of parts of Germany—the Federal Republic, the GDR, and the eastern territories—all of which 
were held together by the sculpture of the crown. Carved into the base of the monument is the text 
UNVERGESSENE HEIMAT (Unforgotten Heimat) along with the names of several eastern provinces. 
According to the BdV’s online catalogue of monuments, the crown of thorns stands for the expellees’ 
Leidensweg (path of suffering, ordeal). The three constitutive parts of Germany were therefore held 
together by a symbol of expellee suffering. A crown of thorns also adorns the monument in Landshut, 
Bavaria, which was dedicated in 1986. 
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meaningful attestations of German architecture.” 28
           Like the monument in Marbach, however, the Pomerania Chapel goes beyond 
upholding a connection to the old Heimat. The second and more important window 
symbolically connects the suffering of the expulsion to Christ’s crucifixion, and once 
again asserts the collective innocence of the expellees. Consecrated by a clergyman at its 
unveiling, the window features a large depiction of Christ on the cross, surrounded by 
renderings of flight and expulsion: a man holding the hand of a small child while 
consoling a visibly distraught woman; an old man with a cane arduously shouldering his 
few remaining belongings in a bundle accompanied by a woman in black and a child; 
three figures struggling to move a heavy-laden cart; a long caravan of downtrodden 
mothers bearing their infants and other small children; horse-drawn carriages; and other 
assorted broken and battered people carrying meager possessions. Suffering from 
prolonged exposure to the elements, all the figures are warmly dressed in long cloaks, 
and wear hats and scarves. Interestingly, both genders are represented on the window, 
 The connection to the Heimat which 
the chapel’s initiators were attempting to convey is obvious. The chapel’s floor features a 
large mosaic map of the Pomeranian region with the seals of cities in the eastern 
territories. The Landsmannschaft of Pomeranians contributed the largest individual 
donation for the chapel and paid for the new addition’s centerpiece: two large stained-
glass windows dedicated in two separate ceremonies in 1957 and 1958, and designed by 
Lotte Usadel, a local artist born in Stettin, Pomerania’s capital city (today Szczecin, 
Poland). The first depicts the Jakobikirche in Stettin and its large organ, which, like the 
St.-Nikolai-Kirche in Kiel, had been destroyed by Allied bombs in WWII.  
                                                           
28 Hans Herbert Thode, “Der Bugenhagenteppich in der Kieler St. Nikolaikirche,” Mitteilungen der 
Gesellschaft für Kieler Stadtgeschichte. 3/4, July/October 1966, p. 234 & p. 235. 
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though the advanced age of some men is made apparent by the use of canes.29
 
 A younger 
man at the lower left uses a shovel to dig a grave for one of the victims of the perilous 
journey. In addition, just as Christ’s crucifiers are absent, the Polish partisans and Soviet 
authorities who forced the Germans out of their homes are not depicted. The symbolic 
link, it seems, required no explicit articulation. 
                                      Figure 23 Pommernkapelle, Kiel. Photo: BdV Archive 
 
           Such depictions of the expulsion have grown in familiarity throughout the postwar 
decades and have become central images in the visual vocabulary used to narrate the 
expulsion. The more harrowing incidents of the flight—replete with scenes in winter 
predominated by women, children, and old men using primitive modes of transportation 
(horse-drawn carts and carriages)—were chosen to represent the experience of the 
expulsion. Here, however, the window also juxtaposes these images with a depiction of 
                                                           
29 The meaning of the employment of gender for asserting the collective innocence of the expellees in 
depicting the expulsion is discussed in the next chapter. 
232 
 
Christ’s crucifixion to draw parallels between their plight and his. Once again, the 
expulsion has been linked—visually—to Christ’s suffering.30
            Not every local monument uses Christ’s suffering as its biblical referent to convey 
the victimization and guiltlessness of the expellees. For example, erected much later in 
the small Bavarian town Bubenreuth, a monument mounted on the wall of the 
Pfarrkirche Maria Heimsuchung (Parish Church of Mary’s Visitation), uses the Holy 
Family’s escape to Egypt (referenced with three small pyramids on the right side) to 
protect baby Jesus and his parents from King Herod’s order calling for the murder of the 
first-born sons of Bethlehem (Matthew 2:13-15) to represent the expulsion (Figure 26).
  
31
                                                           
30 Another example of this visual link is the painting which was hung in at the Glashütte Süßmuth in 
Immenhausen, Hessen in 1955, which features a depiction of the expulsion of the Germans from Penzig, 
Silesia in 1947 and their arrival in western Germany overlooked by a rendering of Christ’s death on the 
cross. 
 
The event is commonly referred to as the “Slaughter of the Innocents.” The South 
Tyrolean sculptor Paul Gartner created the large bronze disk, which was consecrated at 
an ecumenical ceremony on Volkstrauertag in 2003. Anonymous local survivors of the 
expulsion paid for it. The connection to biblical occurrences was deliberate. According to 
an article by Heinz Reiss in the Erlanger Nachrichten from November 18, 2003, the 
monument’s circular form represents “die Unendlichkeit” (infinity). The tree and the 
dwellings on the left side stand for the homes the expellees were forced to relinquish. 
Joseph’s outstretched arm points toward the expellees’ uncertain future. 
31 The community considers the monument one of its most important landmarks. It is listed as one of 
Bubenreuth’s Sehenswürdigkeiten (places of interest) on the town’s official website: 




                                          Figure 26 Bubenreuth. Photo: BdV Archive 
 
           What is arresting about this monument is not only that it once again exhibits 
Christian imagery to represent the expulsion, but also that it does so much later than those 
described above. However, at the same time as it illustrates a continuity of Biblical 
narrative strategies, the monument reveals a dramatic long-term shift in the societal 
acceptance of historical narratives. First, unlike the earlier monuments employing 
Christian symbolism, this monument dispenses with overt references to lost territory. It 
features no coats-of-arms or other claims to the old Heimat. The focus of the monument 
is the commemoration of the expellees’ suffering, not agitation for the reacquisition of 
territory. 
          Second and more importantly, the shift is also the result of a larger movement 
away from German-centered narratives and toward the centrality of the Holocaust in 
narrating Germany’s recent past. Though the monuments’ initiators chose a biblical 
analogy to convey a message similar to those of its related predecessors, the intrinsic 
assertion of the expellees’ collective innocence in this monument is more restrained than 
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in similar monuments of the 1950s. Though the monument memorializes a hazardous, 
life-threatening flight to an unknown destination—Joseph, Mary, and Baby Jesus were 
fleeing for their lives—the expellees’ fate is not shown as the worst imaginable. Put 
differently, in light of the revelations in the 1960s about Nazi crimes, the suggestion that 
the expellees had suffered worst of all WWII victims—conveyed by linking the expulsion 
to Christ’s death on the cross—was no longer convincing. Though the monument’s focus 
was still solely on the expellees’ victimization, such assertions had become too egregious 
to be acceptable. As a result, less contentious methods had to be sought to express the 
injustice of the expulsion and the collective innocence of the expellees. 
 
CONCLUSION 
            As Scholz has observed, the use of Christian symbolism on local expellee 
monuments has served many purposes. Building on Scholz’s observations, I have 
detailed an important subset of monuments that uses biblical metaphors to assert the 
expellees’ collective innocence. This category of monuments, though small in number, 
contributes greatly to our ability to understand the effects of larger societal developments 
on postwar historical understandings. In sum, they reveal how German victimization and 
innocence was expressed prior to the rise of Holocaust-centered narratives. These 
monuments were part of the articulation of an early narrative of German victimization. 
This demonstrates that alongside the expellee organizations’ political efforts to agitate for 
a change in the postwar territorial status quo, the discourse on German victimization had 
become entrenched well prior to the key political and societal developments of the late 
1960s and 1970s.  
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          Scholz speculates that the use of Christian symbolism to express the expellees’ 
collective innocence dissipated over time due to the secularization of West German 
society.32
                                                           
32 Scholz, ‘“Opferdunst vernebelt die Verhältnisse,’” p. 307. 
 Experiencing their heyday in the 1950s, the numbers of monuments of this type 
did indeed drop significantly in the following decades. While Scholz’s argument may in 
part be the case, his explanation is not entirely persuasive. To be sure, religious 
iconography still appeared on local expellee monuments in subsequent decades. 
However, as a means of proposing the collective innocence of the expellees—
particularly, of suggesting they suffered on par with Christ—the motif lost virtually all 
currency. Rather than resulting from a societal move away from public religiosity, 
however, I would argue that the decreased employment of this commemorative strategy 
had more to do with the increase in public awareness of the crimes the Nazis committed, 
in particular, the Holocaust. With this knowledge, the assertion that Germans had 
suffered Christ-like and most of all as a result of WWII was no longer plausible and in 
fact became socially and politically unpalatable. For this reason, only a few individual 
cases liken the expulsion to the suffering of Christ following Ostpolitik and the rise of 
Holocaust-centered narratives. The expellee organizations had to find other means to 
















           Because of the ignominious shadow cast by National Socialism, representing 
German experiences of WWII has been an inordinately complex and problematic 
undertaking. Examining one strategy for addressing this thorny issue, Elizabeth 
Heinemann has described how the female war experience helped fill the representational 
vacuum that emerged after 1945.2 As a result of women’s demographic predominance 
and the atypically visible role played by women in the immediate aftermath of the war 
(i.e. the so-called Frauenüberschuss)3
                                                           
1 This chapter’s title consists of two parts. The first comes from the title of a sculpture (Mutterliebe—
“motherly love”) located outside the half-timbered Haus der Landsmannschaften—a museum dedicated to 
preserving the culture of Germans from the eastern territories—in Pforzheim, Baden-Württemberg. 
Dedicated in 1994, the sculpture consists of a woman lovingly and protectively cradling three infants. The 
base bears the inscription DEN MILLIONEN OPFERN VON FLUCHT UND VERTREIBUNG NACH 
DEM II. WELTKRIEG. BESONDERS DEN MÜTTERN UND DEN KINDERN ZUM GEDENKEN (To 
the millions of victims of flight and expulsion after WWII, especially in commemoration of the mothers 
and children). The monument’s base features two other inscriptions which refer, respectively, to the 
monument’s initiator and designer (Herwig Schubert) and to the artist who carried out the sculpture 
(Gerhard Bruhn-Dzielcielski), both of whom were born in the eastern provinces. The origin of the second 
part is discussed below. 
, coupled with male dishonor and disgrace over 
having served in the military of the criminal Nazi regime, she argues, the “stereotypical 
female experience” was universalized as the basis for a new national identity for all 
Germans, regardless of gender. Specifically, she identifies the memories of three 
2 Elizabeth Heinemann, “The Hour of the Women: Memories of Germany’s ‘Crisis Years’ and German 
National Identity,” American Historical Review. 101, (April 1996), pp. 354-395. Heinemann’s focus is on 
the years 1942-1948 but it seems her analysis is apt for subsequent years as well. 
3 Heinemann writes that in October 1946 women outnumbered men in the occupied zones of the former 
German Reich by 7 million. (“The Hour of the Women,” p. 374). 
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“moments” which served key roles in forging the new identity: female victimization 
brought about by Allied bombings, fleeing the advancing Red Army, and rape; the 
massive rebuilding efforts by the Trümmerfrauen (rubble women); and sexual upheaval 
during the Allied occupation. Germans appropriated these moments to help themselves 
understand and come to grips with the recent past. What started as personal experiences 
of some women became, in many cases, the popular memories of the war for both 
genders. In time, some of those popular memories became the official memories of the 
war.4
           Why were female memories chosen? Heinemann declares that the emphasis on 
women’s wartime experiences in general was especially useful because they offered 
“images that could be generalized and that provided vital alternatives to representations 
of militaristic and genocidal Germans. They also prompted a discourse about decline in 
the realm of sexual morality and the loss of national sovereignty that helped to deflect 
attention away from troubling moral questions about the Nazi past.”
 
5 This kind of 
approach had a major impact on the way Germans viewed their recent past. By 
embracing these female memories, men could shed their own, more troublesome, 
memories and distance themselves from the past. What this meant in practice was, as 
Heinemann explains, “The disproportionately female civilian experience and the almost 
exclusively female rape experience…seem to have been especially well-suited for 
allowing Germans to consider their nation as a whole an innocent victim of war.”6
                                                           
4 Ibid., p. 358. 
 Few 
would contest that German women had suffered on the home front, so by adopting female 
5 Ibid., p. 388. 
6 Ibid., p. 367. 
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experiences as their own, German men, could view themselves and their Vaterland as 
victims too.  
           Heinemann discusses large-scale appropriations of female experiences for the 
entire nation, i.e., about one of many strategies that shaped how Germans could view the 
past and from which all Germans could benefit. But the same process transpired on a 
smaller scale as well. For example, the female experience of forced migration—in 
particular, women’s perilous flights westward in the face of the invading Soviets—has 
become one of the signature experiences of the expulsion and depictions of these flights 
have become a central motif in representing it. Moreover, these female experiences have 
been chosen as representational of the expulsion experience for all expellees, women and 
men. 
          Before commencing my analysis of these monuments, however, it is worth 
mentioning that the use of female forms as symbols of grief and mourning has long held a 
place in the history of the visual arts, particularly in commemorative art. David Robinson, 
for example, presents a collection of photographs with idealized women as “bearers of 
sorrow,” grieving for men.7 In addition, and more significant for this study, female forms 
have also long been used allegorically. In fact, the latter half of this section’s title is taken 
from the subtitle of a monograph by Marina Warner.8
                                                           
7 See David Robinson, Saving Graces: Images of Women in European Cemeteries. (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1995). Robinson notices four general types of funerary sculpture featuring female forms: 1. 
Women so overwhelmed in sorrow that they drape themselves over the graves or at the feet of the 
deceased. 2. Upward-reaching women attempting in vain to reach a loved one who has ascended into 
Heaven. 3. Inconsolable and immovable women holding themselves. 4. Women resigned to their fate and 
accepting of death. 
 In it, Warner shows how generic 
female figures have often been employed allegorically in public art to embody high-
minded ideals such as liberty, justice, or virtue. In a different study on a similar topic, 
8 Marina Warner, Monuments & Maidens: The Allegory of the Female Form. (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1985). 
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Silke Wenk writes that “Signs of femininity have served again and again historically to 
bring into view and to “personify” that which cannot be represented or portrayed 
(Nichtdarstellbares).”9 Combining the two, mourning and allegory, monuments to the 
First World War in Germany (and elsewhere) featuring women provide an illustrative 
case in point. Lurz notes the widespread use of the female form in war memorials after 
WWI, especially to distinguish between the brutality of the warfront and the tranquility of 
the Heimat.10
           With few exceptions, however, the women featured on local expellee monuments 
do not fit the historic mould of mourning mothers and grieving wives. I would argue, 
however, that they do in fact perform allegorical functions. Small numbers of monuments 
portray lone women and their children as the personifications of German forced 
migration. The women and children embody the personal trauma associated with leaving 
the Heimat. So what is the problem with that? After all, women had in all likelihood 
constituted the majority of the adult civilian population at the time of the expulsion.
  
11
                                                           
9 Silke Wenk, Versteinerte Weiblichkeit: Allegorien in der Skulptur der Moderne. (Cologne: Böhlau 
Verlag, 1996). Wenk sets out to track how ultimate meanings of the allegories featuring female forms have 
changed over time. She is also the author of a shorter study which examines the allegories of female form 
in the monuments of Berlin. See Wenk, “Warum ist die (Kriegs-) Kunst weiblich? Frauenbilder in der 
Plastik auf öffentlichen Plätzen in Berlin,” Kunst + Unterricht, Heft 101, April 1986, pp. 7-14. 
 
Left to fend for themselves, it was the women of the German East who in largest number 
had fled westward as the Red Army advanced toward Berlin. In addition, it was also the 
women of the eastern provinces who had fallen victim in greatest number to the 
10 Lurz, Kriegerdenkmäler in Deutschland. Vol. VI Bundesrepublik p. 177. Gerhard Armanski has also 
written about the use of female forms, particularly the usurpation of the traditional Christian pietà, in 
German war memorials. See Armanski, “…und wenn wir sterben müssen:” Die politische Ästethik von 
Kriegerdenkmälern. (Hamburg: VSA-Verlag, 1988). 
11 This seems a safe assumption though I am unaware of a reliable demographic breakdown on the victims 
of expulsion based on gender or age. Due to the mass mobilization for the Nazi war effort, virtually all 
males—except for the very young, the elderly and infirm—had been called away from home. 
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“unrestrained explosion of sexual violence” unleashed by revenge-seeking Soviet soldiers 
so powerfully described by Norman M. Naimark’s study.12




Thanks to the Federal Expellee Law of 1953, everyone who came “from the East” could 
label him/herself as an expellee, regardless of how s/he left his homeland: whether the 
person was forced by Nazi authorities or fled by May 1945, whether expelled or forced to 
resettle between 1945-1947, or whether the person left the Heimat voluntarily between 
1950-1990 and lives as a so-called ‘Spätaussiedler’ in West Germany. The collective 
appellation “expellee” in no way designates people connected by the same or similar 
experiences.
 Yet gender played no role when it came to defining expellees in a 
legalistic sense. Not all expellees were women, nor had all expellees fled the eastern 
territories, nor did all make the dangerous trek across the frozen waters of the Baltic Sea 
or along the snow-covered roads of East Prussia. Regardless of their personal 
circumstances, and regardless of their gender or age, all Germans from the former eastern 
territories were recognized by federal law as expellees. As Hans Henning Hahn and Eva 
Hahn point out, 
14
 
 (my emphasis) 
This meant, of course, that despite the fact that women probably had borne the brunt of 
the direct violence and suffering brought about by expulsion, they were not the only ones 
to claim the expellee status and the presumption of victimhood that it conferred. Millions 
of men—who spent the end of the war in the field or in prisoner of war camps—claimed 
it, as well. What is more, the women’s dominance of the expulsion experience did not 
                                                           
12 Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-
1949. (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 79-80. For more on the large-
scale rape of German women and girls at the end of the Second World War, see Helke Sander and Barbara 
Johr (eds.) BeFreier und Befreite. See also the special issue of October 72, Berlin 1945: War and Rape 
“Liberators Take Liberties;” Spring 1995, especially Atina Grossmann’s contribution, “A Question of 
Silence.” 
13 Elizabeth Heinemann, “Gender, Sexuality, and Coming to Terms with the Nazi Past,” Central European 
History. 38, 1 (2005), pp. 41-74. 
14 Hans Henning Hahn and Eva Hahn, “Mythos ‘Vertreibung,’” p. 171. 
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extend to postwar expellee politics. Men dominated the scene in the major expellee 
organizations. In fact, not a single woman was amongst the thirty signers of the Charter 
of the German Expellees.15 This notwithstanding, women and children have been deemed 
suitable as symbolic representatives of the expulsion, including in monuments. However, 
the monuments have not been designed with only the commemoration of a specific 





          The defining characteristic of the monuments in this chapter is the employment of 
a female form to represent the expulsion. Expellee organizations have erected roughly 
twenty statues and sculptures of women, or where women are the most prominent figures 
(above all as mothers, e.g. carrying and leading small children).17
                                                           
15 The group of men who signed the Charter was made up of representatives and chairmen of the leading 
expellee organizations of the time including individual Landsmannschaften. Hahn and Hahn state 
unequivocally, “the myth of the expelled, suffering woman was construed predominantly by men at a time 
when one needed to use a microscope to find women amongst the leaders of the expellee organizations and 
their authors.” See Ibid., p. 184. 
 There is no clear 
geographical pattern: the monuments stand in Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, North 
Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Baden-Württemberg, Thuringia (Erfurt), in 
Germany, and in Austria (Unterretzbach bei Reitz, Lower Austria), and Lithuania 
(Klaipeda, the formerly predominantly German city, Memel). Though Scholz notes an 
16 Wenk made a similar observation about the monuments in Berlin displaying the female form. Virtually 
none of the monuments that employ renderings of women, she claims, are actually dedicated to them.  
17 Scholz noticed the same development in an article that focuses primarily on religious motifs in expellee 
monuments entitled, “‘Opferdunst vernebelt die Verhältnisse.’”  
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increase in the numbers since the 1980s,18
          Addressing the question of how these monuments operated requires closer analysis 
of some individual examples. To identify changes over time, if there have been any, I 
have chosen to look at some of the earliest examples—from Troisdorf and Bielefeld, both 
in North-Rhine Westphalia—and compare these with some more recent monuments from 
the last two decades. 
 which is certainly noticeable, a handful of 
monuments displaying the female form have been in existence starting in the early 1950s. 
It seems that just as there were veiled and unveiled territorial claims in some monuments 
erected post-Ostpolitik, there were efforts to address symbolic politics in this manner 
before Ostpolitik and the rise of Holocaust-centered narratives. This reflects the early 
efforts—identified by Heinemann et al.—by West Germans to appropriate the female 
experience in order to create a new national identity. While a more recent phenomenon in 
general, female figures with children have been used for some time. 
 
Early Examples 
           In Troisdorf, a city located between Cologne and Bonn, expellee organizations 
dedicated a sculpture of a woman and child in 1953 (Figure 27). The monument stands at 
the main entrance to the city’s Waldfriedhof (forest cemetery) and rests on a plinth made 
of bricks. BdV literature tells us that the sculpture, called Flüchtlingsfrau mit Kind 
(female refugee and child), was created by Edmund Wessling, an artist from a nearby 
town. The piece features the figures’ heads as well as the arm of the female figure—
presumably the child’s mother—wrapped around the adolescent. Whether the arm is there 
                                                           
18 Ibid., p. 307. Again, Scholz’s emphasis is on the religious elements of expellee monuments. Indeed, he 
attributes the higher numbers not to the rise of Holocaust-centered narratives but to the loss of meaning of 
the cross as a symbol of sacrifice and victimization in a secularized West German society.  
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to protect or comfort is unclear. Wearing a hood or a head wrap, the woman appears 
exhausted and forlorn. She is grimacing and is visibly distressed. No man is present. 
Where is the father of the child? Did he fall in war? Is he in a prisoner of war camp? 
These questions remain unanswered. The monument does not commemorate anyone in 
particular. The woman and child are anonymous. The figures stand for other things. 
 
                                         Figure 27 Troisdorf. Photo: BdV Archive 
 
          Though the cause of her anguish is uncertain, the monument’s inscription gives us 
clues. It reads: GEDENKET DES JAHRES 1945 (Commemorate the year 1945). The 
date is probably in reference to the expulsion but could just as easily be interpreted as 
commemorating the defeat of Nazi Germany. However, other elements shed more light 
on the monument’s specific topic. Surrounding the monument is a knee-high semicircular 
wall which features three coats-of-arms of eastern provinces as well as three plaques 
inscribed with the phrase DEN TOTEN DER FERNEN HEIMAT (To the dead of the 
distant homeland). The monument was designed to commemorate the expulsion and 
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agitate for a border revision. As reported in the press, the speeches by expellee 
functionaries and local religious and political leaders at the unveiling ceremony focused 
on the solution of the “Vertriebenenfrage” (expellee question), which could be solved by 
reestablishing German territory in the borders of 1937, by improving relations between 
the local population and the expellees in the area, and by improved organization on the 
part of the expellees. But the depicted anguish of women and children (or of anyone else) 
was not the object of commemoration per se. More than that, the monument symbolized 
the loss of German territory and the efforts necessary to get it back, as was typical at that 
time.   
           The sculpture in Bielefeld functioned similarly (Figures 28 & 29). Even more 
conspicuous than the figures in Troisdorf, the monument still stands at the end of a one-
kilometer-long street with homes constructed in the late 1940s and early 1950s to meet 
housing needs for the influx of expellees in the city. The building cooperative responsible 
for the new residential area (Baugenossenschaft “Freie Scholle”) commissioned a well-
known local artist, Karlheinz Rhode-Jüchtern, to create the monument, which was 
dedicated in 1953. The monument itself has two parts. The first is a stone sculpture of a 
female figure with a young child and a somewhat older male figure.19
                                                           
19 It is difficult to ascertain whether the older male is the female figure’s son or husband. Contemporary 
descriptions refer to the figure as both the son and the husband. At any rate, the woman is without question 
the dominant figure. 
 The mother looks 
unfazed, almost proud, as she looks into the distance with one hand holding the hand of 
the child and the other resting on the third figure’s shoulder. Unlike the figure of the 
mother in Troisdorf, however, she does not look mournful, distraught, or defeated. She is 
determinedly leading the others into the future. All three are in a small boat. The mother 
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                                              Figure 28 Bielefeld. Photo: J.L.  
 
          Behind the sculpture, the monument’s second part hangs on a wall of the last 
apartment building on the street. In large letters, one sees the text: VOR UNS NEUER 
STRAND IN UNS HEIMATLAND (Before us, new shores, in us, our homeland) as well 
as the vibrantly colored coats-of-arms of Bielefeld and several eastern provinces, 
including Upper Silesia, Danzig, and the Sudetenland (None of which was a part of the 
German Reich in 1937). While the monument certainly acknowledges the past in the old 
Heimat, it seems to be more a celebration of the “new shores,” new opportunities, and the 
                                                           
20 Not the expressions on the faces but the characteristics of the faces spawned a brief but heated 
controversy after the monument was unveiled. It seems that a member of the local branch of the expellee 
party BHE did not think Rhode-Jüchtern’s figures looked German enough. He criticized the figures’ 
“östliche Physiognomien” (eastern physiognomies), which for him amounted to “defamation of the 
expellees.” Bernd J. Wagner, of the Bielefeld city archive kindly informed me about the debate. For a brief 
account of the hullabaloo, see Wagner’s “50 Jahre Berufsverband Bildender Künstelerinnen und Künstler 
in Ostwestfalen-Lippe,” in Peter Flachmann, (ed.) Kunst ist kein Luxus, sie gehört zum Leben. Bielefeld: 
Westfalen-Verlag, 2005, p. 23. 
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new future in West Germany. The reference to territory, therefore, has more to do with 
integration into West German society than with border revision. After all, it is unlikely 
that the building cooperative which commissioned the sculpture would be in favor of the 
expellees returning en masse to the old Heimat.  
 
                                               Figure 29 Bielefeld (close-up). Photo: J.L. 
 
          More importantly, however, as in Troisdorf, the monument is not dedicated to the 
suffering of women and/or children (or anyone else, for that matter). In neither case are 
the actual victims named nor is there a direct reference to the expulsion. However, the 
polyvalent trope of the mother had already been established and needed no further 
explanation. Moreover, in both cases, the female form was employed to pursue concrete 
politics. As we have seen, the economic, social, and political integration of the expellees 
was a central objective of their organized efforts throughout the first decade after the war. 
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Though the monuments have different emphases, the familiar trope of female and 
children survivors, along with the coats-of-arms, tell the story.  
 
More Recent Examples 
           I open with these brief looks at older examples not to recapitulate the themes 
discussed in the previous cluster, but rather to contrast the usage of the female form that 
was to come. Before the rise of Holocaust-centered narratives, the suffering of the 
expellees, as personified on local monuments by mothers and children, was used as a 
means to an end. That is, the expellee experience was used to further the concrete 
political objectives of the expellee organizations: border revision and right to homeland, 
compensation, and integration. After Ostpolitik and the rise of Holocaust-centered 
narratives, however, the expellee experience became an end in itself. The era of concrete 
politics had come to an end, and the symbolic politics of victimization and exculpatory 
assertions of collective innocence became more prevalent. Reflecting these changes, the 
expellee organizations used the female form differently, as more recent examples 
demonstrate. 
       Privately initiated and donated, a bronze statue of a female figure and three young 
children was erected in Oberursel, Hessen, in 1981 (Figure 30).21
                                                           
21 The sponsors of the monument, Anton and Gisela Ritschny, were both expellees born in Troppau in 
Moravian Silesia (today, Opava in the Czech Republic). Anton Ritschny was the founder of the Hessen-
Glasswerke. 
 The sponsors 
commissioned a sculpture by the noted local artist Georg Hieronymi. Originally slated to 
stand at the corner of Troppauerstrasse and Schlesierstrasse, two of the city’s main 
arteries, the monument was placed instead outside the entrance to the city’s main 
cemetery. Featured on the sculpture are the figures of a visibly downtrodden, hunched 
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over woman with her children (two older children and an infant) trudging during winter 
and carrying their meager possessions in small bundles. The sculpture is most likely 
based on well-known visual depictions of one of the most harrowing experiences of the 
expulsion, the westward treks of Germans fleeing the Red Army’s winter offensive of 
January 1945. As usual, the father is not present. His whereabouts, like the group’s final 
destination, can only be speculated upon. Why they were forced to flee, however, is 
inscribed at the sculpture’s base: 1945/1946 FLUCHT UND VERTREIBUNG AUS DER 
HEIMAT IM OSTEN (1945/1946 Flight and expulsion from the Heimat in the East). 
They were the blameless German victims of expulsion at the end of WWII. 
 
                                           Figure 30 Oberursel. Photo: BdV Archive 
 
           According to an article in a local newspaper, the monument’s sponsors 
commissioned the sculpture both to mark their upcoming fiftieth anniversary and to 
express their gratitude to their 43,000 fellow Oberursel residents, who had received the 
expellees as they streamed into the area after the war. The sculptor, Hieronymi, was 
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quoted as saying, “[The sculpture] should also make clear that the women and mothers 
almost always had to bear the burden of the flight or expulsion without help from men 
because males were at war.” While the inscription clarifies exactly to which historical 
events the monument refers, it was also meant to refer to all the women and children of 
the world facing a similar fate.22 Though the piece had been privately initiated, the local 
chapter of the BdV organized the unveiling ceremony.23
         Compared to the earlier, previously mentioned examples, the monument is 
relatively apolitical. It features no coats-of-arms from the eastern provinces. Aside from 
the word “Heimat” in the inscription, no other reference is made to territory or the other 
tangible political goals so energetically pursued by the expellee organizations in the 
decades after the war. Instead, the monument in Oberursel employs the female form to 
portray expellees as hapless victims of events out of their control. Abandoned by men 
who had to fight, women and children were left to their own devices. By commemorating 
the expulsion at large, however, not just that of female and adolescent Germans, the 
victimization extends to all expellees. The sculpture paints all expellees—regardless of 
gender—as victims. As the inscription makes clear, moreover, this particular suffering 
did not commence until 1945. It was apparently not connected to the war. In other words, 
flight and expulsion are portrayed as events with no antecedents and effectuated by 
nothing in particular.  
  
          The historic specifics of this sculpture’s privately financed origin are important as 
well because they might help explain why fewer monuments of this type have been 
erected. In general, privately initiated local expellee monuments are rare. As mentioned, 
                                                           
22 “Denkmal stellt das Leid der Mütter auf der Flucht dar,” Taunus-Zeitung. August 29, 1980. 
23 “Denkmal wird enthüllt,” Taunus-Zeitung. October 17, 1981. 
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affluent local residents with expellee backgrounds commissioned the monument. In this 
and other cases, monument sponsors hired recognized local artists rather than gravestone 
engravers to execute the sculptures. It can be safely assumed that the costs of such 
undertakings were high when compared to the prices of more modest and simple 
monuments. Because most other monuments were proposed by perennially cash-strapped 
local branches of expellee organizations, the high cost and time consuming efforts to 
produce these types of works would probably present a hindrance difficult to overcome. 
           The same is true of the monument in Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt (Figure 31). In the 
mid-1980s, a call to regional artists was made by the local branch of the BdV for 
submissions in a competition to complete a new monument. The winning design was 
submitted by Ingrid Seddig, an expellee from Pomerania.24
                                                           
24 Seddig was born in 1926 in Kreis Stolp in Pomerania, where she lived until 1947. Seddig died in 2008. 
 It features six figures on a 
stone pedestal: four adult women on foot with no possessions during a westward trek—
recognizable as females by their long, windblown hair and their attire—two of whom are 
carrying infants on their backs. Striding determinedly against a strong wind, the group 
plods forward gathered tightly together. With the exception of one of the small children, 
all face the same direction. Each face is marked by peculiarly arched eyebrows, but the 





                                         Figure 31 Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt. Photo: J.L. 
 
          The monument is significant for two reasons. First, once again, in a move typical 
of the more recent examples from this chapter, women and children were chosen to 
represent all expellees. Seddig’s bronze sculpture is called the Denkmal für die Opfer der 
Vertreibung (Monument for the Victims of the Expulsion). The gender of those victims 
remains unspecified although the gender of the adult expellees on the monument is clear. 
Moreover, the sculpture’s base is ringed by metal plates with the full text of the Charter 
of the German Expellees (more about this in a moment) as well as a text, which, in part, 
reads: 14 MILLIONEN DEUTSCHE WURDEN INFOLGE DES ZWEITEN 
WELTKRIEGES AUS IHRER HEIMAT IM OSTEN VERTRIEBEN. 2 MILLIONEN 
FANDEN DABEI DEN TOD. VERGESST DIESES SCHICKSAL NICHT. (Fourteen 
million Germans were expelled from their homelands in the East as a result of WWII. 
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Two million met thereby their deaths. Do not forget this fate.)25
          Almost a decade later, another monument with the maternal form was unveiled in 
the small Westphalian city, Ahlen (Figure 32). Sculpted by local artist Alfons Reiberg, a 
bronze statue of a lone woman with children stands atop a platform in a small square with 
a parking lot amidst an expellee housing development built at the edge of town in 1956.
 The text makes it even 
more apparent that the female experience of flight and expulsion was to stand as typical 
for all expellees. Perhaps even more significant than the monument’s form is, secondly, 
its location. The monument’s setting indicates that the usage of the female form is not a 
phenomenon limited to small, unimportant towns on the periphery. Unofficially, the 
sculpture is the central expellee monument in Stuttgart—the capital and largest city of 
Baden-Württemberg—and stands in the city’s most populous district. Moreover, the 
sculpture is situated just a stone’s throw away from a stop on the city’s public 
transportation line, in a small park near the historic Kursaal Bad Cannstatt, where the 
“founding fathers” of the expellee organizations met in 1950 to formulate the Charter of 
the German Expellees, which was proclaimed publicly in Stuttgart’s city center the next 
day. 
26
                                                           
25 The rest of the text reads: DAHER ERRICHTETE DIESE GEDENKSTÄTTE DER BUND DER 
VERTRIEBENEN – VEREINIGTE LANDSMANNSCHAFTEN IN STUTTGART MIT HILFE DES 
LANDES BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG UND DER LANDESHAUPTSTADT STUTTGART.  (Therefore, 
the BdV-Stuttgart erected this monument with the support of the state Baden-Württemberg and the city of 
Stuttgart). The costs of the monument were divided equally amongst the three parties.  While the 
involvement of the state and city government in funding the erection of the monument might serve as 
evidence of widespread approval of the monument, a short piece and photograph in an expellee publication 
shows that not everyone concurred. The photograph shows the monument sprayed with graffiti: “Die 
deutschen Täter sind keine Opfer!” (The German perpetrators aren’t victims!). See “Vertriebenen-Denkmal 
in S-Bad Cannstatt geschändet,” BdV-Nachrichten. Mitteilungsblatt des Bundes der Vertriebenen. 
Landesverband Baden-Württemberg. Issue 4, December 2000, p. 9. 
 
The monument is unique because, in addition to the sculpture, this Mahnmal gegen 
Vertreibung und Willkür (Monument against Expulsion and Despotism) features brass 
26 Local citizens made the donations that paid for the sculpture. The local branch of the BdV initiated it.  
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plates with the coats of arms of eight eastern provinces (Danzig, Silesia, Sudetenland, 
Brandenburg, East Prussia, West Prussia, Upper Silesia, and Pomerania) affixed to the 
plinth. Rarely does one see references to territory on the later monuments of this type. In 
addition, a metal plate fastened to an inlayed concrete block with the text VON DER 
HEIMAT GEHEN IST DIE SCHWERSTE LAST DIE GÖTTER UND MENSCHEN 
BEUGT. AGNES MIEGEL 1960 (literal translation: Leaving the Heimat is the most 
difficult burden that bends gods and people. Agnes Miegel 1960) was emplaced 
approximately two meters in front of the statue.27
          The figure of the mother appears resolute. Though gaunt, she stands tall, and is not 
hunched over, but remains stationary. Unlike the other examples in this category, she is 
not still fleeing. Rather than on a frightful westward trek, she looks like she has arrived in 
the  
new Heimat. Nevertheless, her expression is sober as she looks into the distance. Her 
sleeve is rolled up. With one hand she carries her meager remaining possessions in a 
small bundle. The other hand holds her infant close to her chest in a bag slung across her 
torso. As usual, no man is present. Instead, she is accompanied by the infant and another 
child. The older child walks on her own. She peers to the side with her arm comfortingly 
placed around her mother. Befitting a young child, her expression is less serious than that 
of her mother. She carries her last remaining possession from the old Heimat, a doll. 
 
          The monument was dedicated on April 19, 1995—just weeks before the fiftieth 
anniversary of the end of WWII. As I will show, the timing of the unveiling ceremony 
makes the sculpture, and what it stands for, noteworthy, as does the participation that day 
                                                           
27 Agnes Miegel (1879-1964) was an author and journalist born in Königsberg, East Prussia. Prominent in 
expellee circles, Miegel has been a controversial figure in the postwar era due to her ties to National 
Socialism during the years of the Third Reich.   
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of Heinrich Windelen. Mentioned in Chapter Two, Windelen was the last head of the 
federal government’s Expellee Ministry and the chief of its successor, the Ministry for 
German-German Relations, after the formation of the CDU-led government in 1982. 
Born in Silesia in 1921, the former cabinet member was also an expellee who resided 
near Ahlen at the time of the monument’s erection.  
 
                                                          Figure 32 Ahlen. Photo: J.L. 
 
       In a remarkable address, Windelen clarified the monument’s real intention.28
                                                           
28 The speech was reprinted verbatim in Heinrich Windelen, “‘Möge diese Mahnung von allen verstanden 
werden,’” in Münsterland, Jahrbuch des Kreises Warendorf. 2, (Warendorf: Kreisheimatverein Beckum-
Warendorf, 1996), pp. 7-11. 
 It was a 
response to the past two and a half decades’ tendency toward marginalization of the 
expellees. The monument would serve the purpose of setting the record straight. It would 
correct postwar interpretations centering not enough on German experiences, i.e. on those 
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narratives focusing on the Holocaust. Windelen mentioned the debates raging at that 
time, which concerned how Germans should commemorate the fifty-year anniversary of 
the end of the war. He then pointed out that the topic remained most controversial for 
those not yet born in 1945. He then stated that May 8th must remain open to many 
interpretations. Although the speaker very briefly acknowledged the suffering of non-
Germans (without mentioning them by name), the focus was clearly on non-Jewish 
German suffering.  
          For many Germans, particularly the expellees, Windelen contended, the end of the 
war meant the beginning of suffering. And thus for the sake of historical truth, Germans 
must also commemorate those who fell victim during the expulsion. Windelen declared, 
“That there were also crimes committed against millions of innocent Germans also 
belongs to this truth. This we do not say to offset or balance out. But when one side 
denies all guilt, then it is difficult to dignify equitably the suffering of others beyond your 
own.”29
                                                           
29 In the original German, this passage reads, “Doch zu dieser Wahrheit gehört, dass es eben auch 
Verbrechen an Millionen unschuldigen Deutschen gegeben hat. Das sagen wir nicht, um aufzurechnen. 
Wenn aber eine Seite jede Schuld leugnet, dann fällt es schwer, über dem eigenen Leid auch das Leid der 
anderen gerecht zu würdigen“ (Ibid., p. 8). 
 Though the expellees were not any more responsible for Auschwitz and Hitler’s 
other misdeeds than other Germans had been, they were the ones who had to make the 
largest sin offering (Sühneopfer) vicariously for all Germans. The monument is 
important, according to the former cabinet minister, because it helps keep alive 
remembrance of the horrors of expulsion lest they be repeated. Addressing the public 
opinion makers for whom commemoration of WWII remained so controversial, 
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Windelen said, “Whoever seeks to suppress this memory makes him-/herself 
complicit.”30
           Windelen closed his remarks by commending those involved with the completion 
of the monument, and with the hope that the monument would exhort everyone to peace, 
freedom, and reconciliation. But throughout the speech, he clearly said more. In fact, his 
comments do much to recapitulate the efforts of the expellee organizations typical of the 
symbolic politics of victimization seen since the 1970s. Windelen argued that the 
commemoration of German suffering had been pushed aside by too much 
commemoration of other victims. As a result, Germans had forgotten the fate of the 
expellees. The monument featuring indisputably innocent women and children in Ahlen 
was created to remedy this. Though Windelen’s speech was ephemeral, the monument 





          As these monuments show, mothers with children have become iconic figures for 
the entire experience of flight and expulsion.31
                                                           
30 In the original German, this passage reads, “Wer diese Erinnerung verdrängen will, macht sich 
mitschuldig.” (Ibid., p. 10). 
 Dedicated to all expellees, the monuments 
universalize the victimization of some (mothers with children) for all. My goal here has 
been to examine why female figures became a preferred form and to explore the broader 
31 This is seen in other representations as well, e.g. in movies, where women have been featured as the lead 
protagonists in filmic portrayals of flight and expulsion. An early example is the film Nacht fiel über 
Gotenhafen (Dir. Frank Wisbar, 1959), starring Sonja Ziemann. A more recent example is the TV-
docudrama Die Flucht (Dir. Kai Wessel, 2007), with Maria Fürtwangler in the lead role. In his examination 
of newspaper articles commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the end of WWII, Klaus Naumann found 
that photos of women and children fleeing the eastern territories comprised one of the three principal motifs 
in reporting on experiences of flight and expulsion. See Naumann, Der Krieg als Text, p. 72ff. 
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implications for the historical understandings this chapter’s monuments bring to bear. 
The answer to why Germans have chosen women (and children) to depict these 
experiences is probably obvious, and has already been addressed in part by Heinemann 
and many others, including Confino and Atina Grossmann.32
           This chapter’s monuments are thus among the postwar renderings that depict 
women—who apparently had no connection to the Nazi state apparatus or its genocidal 
war machine despite the fact that many females had been members of the 
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP—National Socialist Workers’ 
Party), served as military auxiliaries and concentration camp guards, and had in general 
approved of the Nazi regime
 In general, the victimization 
of German women allowed German men to see their nation and themselves as victims. 
While this is certainly a disconcerting distortion of historical truth, there is more. 
Defenseless women and children—embodying the sacrifices and resilience of the home 
front, far from the battlefront—are presumed a priori to be “innocent.”  
33
                                                           
32 For example, Confino writes, “When war reached women and the Heimat, as happened in the years of 
total war and defeat, the result was violation, rape, and changing of what was viewed as the natural order. 
The violation of German women stood for the violation of Heimat and nation.” Confino, Germany as a 
Culture of Remembrance, p. 86. 
—as the guiltless victims of brutally violent, retributive 
33 Such discussions hearken back to the so-called Historikerinnenstreit—centering predominantly on the 
writings of Claudia Koonz and Gisela Bock—which debated women’s involvement with and approval of 
National Socialism. For a nuanced response to this academic dustup, see Adalheid von Saldern, “Victims or 
Perpetrators? Controversies about the Role of Women in the Nazi State,” in David F. Crew (ed.) Nazism 
and German Society, 1933-1945. (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 141-165. How does one, however, 
evaluate the level of women’s involvement in and acceptance of National Socialism? Just how innocent 
were they? This is difficult to measure. As Moeller has stated, “It is difficult to chart the boundaries 
between acquiescence, accommodation, acceptance, and support; there is no accurate gauge of women’s 
attitudes toward Nazi ideology and policies that elevated the status of those women, judged fit according to 
the regime’s racialist criteria, for whom children and housework constituted the most important 
employment.” See Robert G. Moeller, Protecting Motherhood: Women and the Family in the Politics of 
Postwar West Germany. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 15. Without question, women 
helped carry out National Socialist policies, particularly in the eastern territories. Elizabeth Harvey has 
written an impressive study about women as the “missionaries of Germanness” in the lands of Central and 
Eastern Europe occupied by the Nazis. As Harvey points out, some of these women’s accounts of the end 
of the war were included in Dokumentation der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa. See Harvey, Women and 
the Nazi East: Agents and Witnesses of Germanization. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003). There 
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acts. Having no connection to National Socialism, the war, or the Holocaust, women 
(especially mothers) and children are therefore morally “pure” and untainted by the past. 
Particularly in the case of the expulsion, Hahn and Hahn as well as Scholz have written 
that the presumption of female innocence has validated and bolstered expellees’ 
assertions of their own collective victimhood. While correct, this overlooks another key 
aspect: namely, the presumption’s exculpatory potential. Men appropriate women’s and 
children’s experiences, and what Warner calls the “plural significations of women’s 
bodies” facilitates the creation of an exculpatory narrative for all expellees.34
           The historical understanding behind the contention follows a straightforward, if 
ethically tenuous logic: Since most adult males were either on the front, POWs or dead, 
the majority of those Germans forced to leave their homes near the end of and after 
WWII were women and children. Hence, most expellees were women and children. 
Women and children, since they were not involved with the war, were “innocent.” The 
men from the eastern provinces—legally defined as expellees too after the war —could 
therefore declare themselves guiltless as well. As a result, all expellees were considered 
the same—the innocent victims of events beyond their control. Reasoning of this kind has 
always been indispensable in the self-perceptions of the expellee organizations and 
equally crucial in their political pursuits, both concrete and symbolic. Contrary assertions 
would undermine the righteousness of expellees’ claims, which have always been 
 In other 
words, I contend that the employment of women and children on local monuments 
amounts to an assertion of collective innocence for all expellees.  
                                                           
is also new research which indicates that many more German women than once believed were complicitous 
in committing Nazi atrocities. See Isabel Kershner, “Women’s Role in Holocaust May Exceed Old 
Notions,” New York Times. July 17, 2010. 
34 Warner, Monuments & Maidens, p. xix. 
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premised on their presumed lack of involvement with National Socialism and the 
singularity of expellee suffering.  
           Conceding the latter point, the monuments I examine in the next chapter attest the 
strength and pervasiveness of Holocaust-centered narratives. Instead of purporting the 
uniqueness of expellee victimization to assert their own collective innocence, the 
monuments state that the expellees suffered like others and thus subsume all victims of 















          Two main inscriptions offer clarification and context at the Neue Wache, the 
Federal Republic’s Zentrale Gedenkstätte für die Opfer von Krieg und Gewaltherrschaft 
(Central Commemorative Site for the Victims of War and Dictatorship) on Berlin’s Unter 
den Linden. Located at the foot of the monument’s centerpiece, an enlarged version of 
Käthe Kollwitz’s pietà, the first states succinctly: DEN OPFERN VON KRIEG UND 
GEWALTHERRSCHAFT (To the victims of war and dictatorship). The second and more 
detailed text is inscribed on a tablet hanging on the wall near the monument’s entrance 
and presents an ambiguous who’s who of victims, both German and non-German.1
We commemorate the peoples who suffered because of the war. We commemorate the 
citizens who were persecuted and lost their lives. We commemorate the fallen of the 
world wars. We commemorate the innocents who lost their lives in the Heimat during the 





We commemorate the millions of murdered Jews. We commemorate the murdered Sinti 
and Roma. We commemorate all those who were killed because of their ancestry, their 
homosexuality, or because of illness and debility. We commemorate all those murdered 
who were denied the right to life.  
 
We commemorate the people who had to die because of their religious or political 
convictions. We commemorate all those who were victims of dictatorship and innocently 
lost their lives. 
 
                                                           
1 The third text gives an historical account of the Neue Wache. 
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We commemorate the women and men who sacrificed their lives in resistance to 
dictatorship. We honor all those who accepted death rather than compromise their 
conscience. 
 
We commemorate all the women and men who were persecuted and murdered because 
they resisted totalitarian dictatorship after 1945.     
 
As briefly addressed in Chapter Two, Helmut Kohl’s forays into memory politics as well 
as his top-down efforts to “normalize” Germany’s past and thereby forge a more positive 
national identity—including through the renovation and re-conceptualization of the Neue 
Wache—were contentious for several reasons.2 I do not mention this central monument 
and its long inscriptions to open this chapter, however, in order to revisit these larger 
controversies. Instead, I do so because these texts capture the essence of, and exemplify 
on a grander scale, the sentiments expressed by my final category of local expellee 
monuments. That is, the texts at the Neue Wache make for an interesting analogue 
because they subsume those who suffered during and after World War II into a universal 
collective of victims. Rather than commemorating victims of a war in which some were 
active agents and some passive recipients, these monuments collapse categories like 
“German” and “Jew” or “Pole,” or “civilian” and “soldier,” or “perpetrator” and 
“victim,” to remember all who suffered without addressing how or why. As Sabine 
Behrenbeck observes, this type of historical interpretation treats all the nameless, faceless 
war dead as the victims of “an accident, like a tragic fate, or a natural disaster.”3
                                                           
2 The controversy is nicely summed up in Peter Reichel’s Politik mit der Erinnerung. Gedächtnisorte im 
Streit um die nationalsozialistische Vergangenheit. (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1995), pp. 231-246. See 
also Ladd, The Ghosts of Berlin and Niven, Facing the Nazi Past. 
 
Narratives positing the universality of victimhood in the post-WWII German context 
have profound implications for discussions of guilt and responsibility.  
3 Sabine Behrenbeck. “Heldenkult oder Friedensmahnung? p. 361. 
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           In a related fashion, Constantin Goschler hypothesizes the existence of two 
competing, ideal-typical models of victimhood discourse in the decades following the 
founding of the Federal Republic.4 He labels the first—which distinguishes between Nazi 
Germany’s victims and German victims, including the expellees—the “particularistic 
model.” Most prevalent from the 1970s until the late 1990s, this model differentiates 
between victims groups and creates hierarchies them. It was during the time of the 
particularistic model that the centrality of the Final Solution for depicting the recent past 
in (West) Germany came to the fore. Goschler calls the second and, for my purposes, 
more significant model of victimhood discourse “integrationist.” About it, Goschler 
writes, “the integrationist model of victimhood constructs […] an overarching category of 
victims based above all on the existential, fundamental experience of being a victim and 
thus annuls (nivelliert) the contextual differences of the various victim groups.” His 
description of the latter model continues: “This model found and finds itself especially in 
connection with attempts to assert the parity of German victims of the war vis-à-vis the 
German and non-German victims of National Socialist dictatorship and, in extreme cases, 
amounts to a form of offsetting (Aufrechnung) of victims.”5 While the two models have 
always been in existence, Goschler claims that each has dominated at different times.6
                                                           
4 Constantin Goschler, “‘Versöhnung’ und ‘Viktimisierung.’ Die Vertriebenen und der deutsche 
Opferdiskurs,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft. 10, 2005, pp. 873-884. 
 Of 
the two, the monuments in this chapter correspond to Goschler’s integrationist model. 
5 Goschler, “‘Versöhnung’ und ‘Viktimisierung,’” p. 874. 
6 While compelling and useful for describing the monuments in this category, Goschler’s argument is not 
without its conceptual holes. He theorizes that the integrationist model of victimhood discourse thrived 
most especially in the 1950s and 1960s as well today. I would certainly concur that postwar narratives 
today incorporate both the victimization of both German victims and Nazi Germany’s victims and is as 
such “integrationist.” I would argue, however, that the loudest voices in the first two decades after the war 
were not integrationist and were indeed particularistic—with German victims at the pinnacle. It seems the 
change from the 1950s/1960s to the 1970s/1980s was not a shift from the integrationist model to the 
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           On the one hand, subsuming various victims groups into all-embracing historical 
narratives has the potential to offer more inclusive and more accurate accounts of the past 
that allow for a full range of individual and group experiences. Victims groups are no 
longer hierarchized and are memorialized alongside one another. In contrast to the 
German-centered historical interpretations circulating in the first decades after the war, 
those that integrate the memories and histories of all the victims of the war would be 
considered an improvement because everyone’s story could be told. In fact, nuanced 
subsumption in current discussions of the Nazi past demonstrate the poignancy and 
pervasiveness of historical narratives based on knowledge and recognition of National 
Socialist crimes, especially the Holocaust. On the other hand, subsuming all victims as a 
commemorative strategy is not without its faults, as Goschler’s description of the 
integrationist model points out. A key aspect of the integrationist model is that despite the 
inclusion of other victims, German suffering remains at the forefront. What becomes 
even more problematic, however, is when the victimization of Germans, particularly of 
the expellees, is equated with that of other victims.  
 
THE MONUMENTS 
           The preceding two chapters show how local monuments have elevated the 
expulsion experience to highlight the putatively guiltless suffering of the expellees. As 
we saw in Chapter Seven, religious symbolism on expellee monuments in the 1950s and 
1960s equated expellees’ victimization with Christ’s innocent suffering. In more recent 
times, monuments have employed gender to allegorize the innocent suffering of all 
                                                           
particularistic but instead a shift in particularity away from the preeminence of German suffering to the 
preeminence of Jewish suffering. Local expellee monuments function as a solid case in point. 
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expellees. Whereas the motifs employed in the prior categories were selected to elevate 
the expulsion experience by conveying the singularity of expellee suffering, the 
monuments here heighten it by doing the opposite. Their assertions are tempered. That is, 
by negating previous assertions of expellee exceptionalism, they equate the suffering of 
the expellees with the suffering of Nazi Germany’s victims. Subsuming German 
victims—more specifically, the expellees—into this undifferentiated collective of 
wartime victims is tantamount therefore to proclaiming that the expellees suffered in kind 
with victims of Germans’ military and political measures. These local monuments are 
therefore an expression of the perceived common bonds of suffering shared by the 
expellees and other victims of the war and violence. They acknowledge the suffering of 
others, but see that of the expellees as commensurate.  
           Moreover, like the monuments in Chapters Seven and Eight, those examined here 
make cautious and implicit—but unmistakable—exculpatory claims. First of all, through 
the inscriptions, the monuments classify the expellees simply as victims and testify to the 
expellee organizations’ strong desire to be recognized accordingly. Though variations of 
the texts exist, they usually contain the phrase “…to the victims of the expulsion” 
(…DEN OPFERN DER VERTREIBUNG). In formulating the inscriptions of their 
monuments, the expellee organizations declare themselves victims. As we have seen, 
claiming victimhood is virtually the same as claiming innocence.7
                                                           
7 Goschler writes, “The label of victim is decisive. Associated with this designation is a principal 
presumption of innocence regardless of whether or not Sudeten Germans were involved in the destruction 
of Czechoslovakia, or other Germans were involved in the National Socialist regime. To all appearances, 
the contemporary victimhood discourse allows them the wished for acceptance amongst the group of 
“desired” victims as it has developed in the western world in the last two decades.” (Goschler, 
“‘Versöhnung’ und ‘Viktimisierung,’” p. 883). 
 Secondly, few 
question the guiltlessness of the victims of Nazi persecution. By lumping themselves in 
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with the other innocent victims of war and violence, however, the expellees convey their 
desire to be viewed similarly. As reflected on the monuments, therefore, expellees 
identify themselves with other innocent victims.  
           Though a few examples of such inclusively-themed monuments hailing from pre-
unification decades exist (two of which will be discussed in greater detail below), the 
subsumption of victims on local expellee monuments is a recent phenomenon. The 
majority of the more than forty examples of this type that I have identified were in fact 
erected after 1990.8
           In terms of location, virtually all of these monuments stand in cemeteries. This 
alone does not make the monuments unique. As we have seen, many other kinds of 
 Only rarely do the monuments contain textual (as part of an 
inscription) or symbolic references to the former eastern territories. With them, the 
monuments’ initiators have sought acknowledgement of expellee victimization. Thus, 
they have been part of the expellee organizations’ pursuit of symbolic politics. As such, it 
seems that the increase in the numbers of these monuments has to do with the emergence 
and solidification of the Holocaust as the constitutive part of most mainstream postwar 
historical narratives. The defining characteristic for this category is therefore a reference 
to the victims of the expulsion in addition to (oftentimes vague) references to other 
victims. The monuments represent the past in a way that asserts all were equal victims of 
the war. 
                                                           
8 This fact raises the question as to Helmut Kohl’s impact on what Henning Süssner called the 
“renationalization of public discourse.” (Süssner, “Still Yearning for the Lost Heimat? Ethnic German 
Expellees and the Politics of Belonging,” German Politics and Society. Issue 72, Vol. 22, 2 (Summer 
2004), p. 15.) Put differently, did Kohl’s very public efforts to normalize the German past and the 
challenges to the centrality of the Holocaust in postwar narratives at the federal level in the 1980s and early 
1990s—culminating in the subsumptive inscriptions at the Neue Wache—trickle down to the local level? 
Many expellee monuments suggest the flow was heading in the opposite direction. That is, it could be 
argued that Kohl’s actions and the national debates over the past were echoes of widely held sentiments 
already expressed at the grassroots.  
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expellee monuments are located in or near graveyards. In this context, however, the 
location of the monuments augments their other subsumptive properties. Lurz and Ulrike 
Haß have both commented on this additional aspect of post-WWII monuments, though in 
different contexts. On war memorials Lurz writes, “The central problem with the erection 
of a monument in a cemetery consists in annulling (Nivellierung) the difference that 
exists between a death due to war and a normal civilian death. Death due to war is not the 
same as the necessary death of an average person and instead came prematurely, 
needlessly and occurred at the hand of another.”9
           Writing about memorials to Nazi victims in cemeteries, particularly during the 
1960s and 1970s, Haß addresses more directly the ramifications of universalizing 
victimhood for guilt and absolution. “The selection of the cemetery as the place of 
commemoration makes it possible to blur differences between the dead who merely 
perished and the dead who were murdered, between those of the persecuted who survived 




                                                           
9 Lurz, Kriegerdenkmäler in Deutschland. Vol. VI Bundesrepublik, p. 294. Lurz sees in the Federal 
Republic’s monuments evidence that the anti-war lessons that West Germans should have learned after 
WWII did not take hold. Emplacing monuments dedicated to fallen soldiers in cemeteries does not 
underscore the uselessness of war and ergo does not emphasize the lessons of anti-militarism that he 
espouses. 
 The circumstances surrounding the deaths commemorated by the 
monuments described by Lurz and Haß—and by expellee monuments—were 
extraordinary. However, when they stand in cemeteries, these monuments make the 
deaths remembered seem quotidian. As both authors make clear, treating all the dead of 
WWII the same by memorializing them with monuments emplaced in cemeteries bestows 
a certain normality to the deaths and, more importantly, obfuscates causation. 
10 Ulrike Haß. “Mahnmaltexte 1945 bis 1988. Annäherung an eine schwierige Textsorte,” in Wolfgang 




Subsuming Victims in West Germany 
           One of the best examples of the monuments of this type is not located in a 
cemetery. The monument—comprising a Gedenkhalle (memorial hall) and a large statue, 
both of which subsume victims—is situated next to the Castle Oberhausen in the North 
Rhine-Westphalian city of the same name (Figures 33 & 34).11
          Erected near the front of the memorial hall, the large (~4m) statue Die Trauernde 
(“The [Female] Mourner”) was created with the intention of offering as many groups as 
possible a place to commemorate their dead.
 Both elements of the 
monument were dedicated on September 2, 1962 at a ceremony presided over by the 
city’s mayor, Luise Albertz (SPD), and attended by numerous former inmates of Nazi 
concentration camps. This commemorative site is especially significant. Considered the 
first memorial to the victims of National Socialism in West Germany financed solely by a 
municipal government, the monument’s intended commemorative reach extended not 
only to victims of National Socialism but to the expellees as well.  
12 For decades, Die Trauernde has served as 
the location for Oberhausen’s official commemorative ceremonies, for example on 
Volkstrauertag. The artist Willy Meller13
                                                           
11 Oberhausen’s city council unanimously made the decision to construct the monument in 1960.  
 created the sculpture featuring a sleek statue in 
the form of a lone, visibly bereaving woman enshrouded in a cloaked hood with her arms 
crossed and her head bowed. More important than the form, however, is the dedication. 
The figure looks in the direction of an inlayed plate at the foot of the statue, which bears 
12 Much of the following discussion is based on a brief article by Günter Born called “Die Gedenkhalle 
Schloß Oberhausen,” published in the online journal Lotta—Antifaschistische Zeitung aus NRW.  
<http://projekte.free.de/lotta/pdf/29/schloss_oberhausen.pdf> Accessed August 10, 2010. 
13 The fact that Meller was not only a member of the NSDAP but also a highly decorated artist during the 
Third Reich (he obtained a professorship from Hitler) was the cause of recent controversy. On 
Volkstrauertag in 2008, a member of the city’s Green Party faction sent an open letter to Oberhausen’s 
mayor protesting the use of the statue as the insignia on the city’s invitations for the ceremonies taking 
place at the statue and proposing the use of the memorial hall as a replacement site for future ceremonies. 
The Greens had suggested the addition of a plaque detailing Meller’s inglorious personal history. 
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the ambiguous inscription ZUM GEDENKEN AN DIE OPFER DER KRIEGE, DER 
UNFREIHEIT, DER VERTREIBUNG (In commemoration of the victims of the wars, 
lack of freedom, the expulsion). According to Günter Born, the text applied to the dead of 
both world wars, including those who had been persecuted by the Nazis, the victims of 
Unfreiheit (which he leaves undefined), and the victims of expulsion. The lack of 
specificity in these monuments’ inscriptions is a common feature. Who is actually 
invoked when the victims of the war (or wars) are commemorated? 
 
                                      Figure 33 Die Trauernde in Oberhausen. Photo: J.L. 
 
          The original configuration of the Gedenkhalle also subsumed victims.14
                                                           
14 It is important to note that expellee organizations initiated neither the statue nor the memorial hall. The 
BdV includes just the statue Die Trauernde on its list of expellee monuments. The city overhauled the 
exhibitions in the memorial hall in 1988. 
 Although, 
as Born points out, it originally contained a permanent exhibition with informational texts 
and displays focusing on National Socialism and its victims, the exhibit also included a 
large photomontage which, in addition to an image of a liberated concentration camp, 
also displayed photos of Dresden after the firebombing and of Germans fleeing the 
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eastern provinces. It is clear that the city council conceived of this site as the city’s main 
memorial complex for all victim groups. In terms of inclusiveness, the elements of the 
monument in Oberhausen were doubtlessly progressive for their time. But while the 
emphasis remained on victims of the Germans, German victims were not ignored. In fact, 
the hall housed the exhibition space commemorating Oberhausen’s adoption of the Upper 
Silesian city, Königshütte (today, Chorzów, Poland) in a Patenschaft established in 
1955.15
 
 Despite the differing circumstances of their deaths, however, the exhibit treated 
all victims equally. It made room for all victims, German and others. 
                        Figure 34 Die Trauernde (inscription). Photo: J.L. 
 
           The two elements of the monument in Oberhausen show how inclusion in an all-
embracing memory complex subsumes victims. The expellee monument erected in 
Heilbronn in 1985 does the same thing (Figure 35). Here, the monument itself is not 
subsumptive—the main inscription makes clear that the piece is dedicated to the German 
victims of the expulsion and to other victims of forced migration throughout the world—
but the large stone’s location in the heart of the city at the Hafenmarktturm links the 
                                                           
15 Perlick, “Die west-ostdeutschte Patenschaftsbewegung in Nordrhein-Westfalen,” pp. 116-117. 
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suffering of the expellees with that of others who were killed as a result of the war.16
 
 
Though the city’s main cemetery had been home to a different expellee monument since 
the 1960s, the local chapter of the BdV commissioned a new monument, designed by 
Rainer Bergmann, to complete the city’s main commemorative site for the victims of the 
world wars. The BdV unveiled the monument in May 1985, as part of a ceremony 
marking the fortieth anniversary of the end of WWII.  
                                     Figure 35 Heilbronn. Photo: J.L. 
 
           The Hafenmarktturm features memorials dedicated to the fallen and missing 
soldiers from various divisions and regiments of the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht, as well 
as a monument commemorating Heilbronn’s reconstruction after the city’s devastating 
                                                           
16 The main inscription reads: DEN 14,000,000 DEUTSCHEN HEIMATVERTRIEBENEN UND DEN 
FLÜCHTLINGEN UND VERTRIEBENEN IN ALLER WELT (To the 14 Million German Expellees and 
the Refugees and Expellees of the world). Interestingly, while referencing the former German East, the 
monument does so by listing the names of the people who lived there rather than to the territory itself. For 
example, it lists the Sudetendeutsche (Sudeten Germans) rather than the Sudetenland.   
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bombardment in December 1944 (dubbed the Denkmal für den Wiederaufbau).17
          Erected ten years later, another example of subsuming victims in West Germany is 
the expellee monument in Minden-Todtenhausen, North Rhine-Westphalia (Figure 36). 
Like most monuments of this type, the stone, initiated by the BdV, stands in a cemetery 
near other war memorials and gravestones.  A plate affixed to the top of the stone bears 
the inscription: 1945-1995 – 50 JAHRE FRIEDEN. NIE WIEDER KRIEG, FLUCHT, 
VERTREIBUNG UND VERSCHLEPPUNG. NIE WIEDER OPFER VON GEWALT. 
(1945-1995 – 50 years of peace. Never again war, flight, expulsion, and deportation. 
Never again victims of violence) as well as an engraved adaptation of a well-known 
image of a westward trek once featured on a postage stamp.
 The site 
is decidedly German-centered. In fact, non-German victims and other victims of the 
Nazis are not mentioned. The inclusion of the expellee monument at this site makes it 
look like all Germans were victims of WWII.  
18
                                                           
17 The monument’s inscription lists “the thousands of dead Heilbronners demanded by the First and Second 
World Wars.” The monument itself is dedicated to the “women and men who survived the terrors of the 
war and National Socialism who in spite of the hopelessness of the postwar situation had the courage and 
the power to clear the rubble and helped rebuild the city.” 
 As we have seen, a 
monument’s location in a cemetery enhances its subsumptive properties. While the 
monument strikes a decidedly anti-war tone and (at least indirectly) references other 
victims (“Never again victims of violence”), the main thrust of the inscription applies 
only to the Germans from the eastern territories who fled, were expelled, or were 
deported to the Soviet Union as slave laborers after the war. Though other victims are 
mentioned, the text and the image of the trek foreground German suffering and make 
clear to whom the monument is actually dedicated. 
18 The Deutsche Bundespost (German Postal Service) produced and circulated the stamp in the Federal 




                                   Figure 36 Minden-Todtenhausen. Photo: J.L. 
 
Subsuming Victims in the Former GDR 
          The monuments in Oberhausen, Heilbronn, and Minden are but a few examples of 
this type in West Germany. There is a clear geographic dimension to these monuments. 
Immediately apparent when looking at the distribution of these monuments is that their 
numbers are skewed higher toward the new Länder. In fact, roughly three-quarters of 
them have been erected in the former GDR.19
                                                           
19 While a good portion of the new monuments in the former GDR bear the inclusive motifs and 
inscriptions which subsume the victims of the war, many bear the familiar one-sided, German-centered 
tropes common in West Germany.   
 As discussed in Chapter Two, no expellee 
monuments were erected there during the reign of the SED. As if to make up for lost 
time, dozens of new monuments were unveiled in eastern Germany after 1990. In fact, 
these comprise a significant percentage of all post-unification expellee monuments. 
Interestingly, most of these monuments were erected on Volkstrauertag and not on Tag 
der Heimat, the expellee organizations’ traditional day of commemoration. It is probable 
that these monuments’ location in the former GDR plays a part in their formal attributes 
as well. On the whole, they are less ornate than earlier monuments in the West. Most are 
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plain, comparatively less expensive commemorative stones bearing simple inscriptions. 
This is likely a reflection of post-unification economic and political realities in the new 
Länder; less established expellee organizations with fewer members, fewer financial 
resources, and fewer sympathizers within the community as well as within local and 
regional governments. I surmise that the more modest monuments in the new Länder are 
thus the result of limited resources.20
          Despite these structural disadvantages, the newly established expellee 
organizations in the former GDR still felt the need decades after the fact to commemorate 
publicly the collective fate of the expellees. Immediately striking is the fact that the 
monuments, in particular, the inscriptions, exhibit so little variation.
 
21 For this reason, 
just two examples will be described. The monument in Jena, Thuringia, for example, was 
erected at no cost to the BdV in 1998 (Figure 37).22
                                                           
20 It is likely that the initiators of these monuments in the former GDR faced other limitations as well; for 
example, in their choices of motifs and inscriptions which had to be rendered more inclusive to make them 
less likely to arouse suspicions of revanchism and revisionism and thereby render them less contentious and 
more likely to be politically implementable in the changed post-1990 political environment. 
 The austere, though quite large, 
commemorative stone stands in a cemetery and bears the inscription: DEN OPFERN 
VON KRIEG, FLUCHT UND VERTREIBUNG ZUM GEDENKEN (In commemoration 
of the victims of war, flight, and expulsion). Local government officials, including the 
city’s lord mayor, took part in the dedication ceremony. Similarly, in the city of Torgau, 
Saxony—perhaps best-known as the city on the Elbe where US Army troops met the 
21 To wit, along with the monument in Jena, discussed here, eleven other monuments in Thuringia subsume 
the victims of the war. Some examples of their inscriptions include, in Bleicherode: GEDENKT DER 
OPFER VON GEWALT, FLUCHT UND VERTREIBUNG (Commemorate the victims of violence, flight 
and expulsion); in Flemmingen: along with a Bible verse, ZUM GEDENKEN DER OPFER VON KRIEG, 
GEWALT UND VERTREIBUNG (In commemoration of the victims of war, violence, and expulsion); in 
Rositz, DEN OPFERN DES ZWEITEN WELTKRIEGS, DER GEWALTHERRSCHAFT UND DER 
VERTREIBUNG (To the victims of the Second World War, dictatorship, and the expulsion). Though 
different formulations exist there is little variation in the sentiments expressed. 
22 The commemorative stone as well as a plant basin (Pflanzschale) were donated by the masonry firm 
which carried out the engraving. The Jena city government provided the location in the cemetery for free. 
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Soviet Red Army in April 1945—a white marble stele bearing the coats-of-arms of 
eastern provinces and the inscription IN EHRENDEM GEDENKEN ALLER OPFER 
VON KRIEG, FLUCHT UND VERTREIBUNG. ERINNERUNG, MAHNUNG, 
VERSÖHNUNG, FRIEDEN. GESTIFTET VOM BUND DER VERTRIEBENEN (In 
honoring commemoration of all victims of war, flight and expulsion. Memory, 
admonition, reconciliation, peace. Donated by the BdV) was unveiled next to the river at 
a ceremony presided over by Angelika Pfeiffer, at the time a member of the Bundestag 
(CDU), on Volkstrauertag 1995. (Figure 38) 
                        
Figure 37 Jena. Photo: BdV Archive            Figure 38 Torgau. Photo: BdV Archive 
 
CONCLUSION            
          On the monuments in both Jena and Torgau, and on so many other newly 
constructed expellee monuments elsewhere in the former GDR, it seems society had 
deemed it no longer acceptable to focus exclusively on German suffering. Instead, catch-
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all inscriptions memorialize all victims of the war. Thus, the monuments remember 
victims of the expulsion alongside all other victims (of the war, of violence, of 
dictatorship, of terror, etc.).23 Interestingly, however, there is no clear indication of who 
the other victims are.24
          Writing about a variety of postwar monuments in the Federal Republic, Frank 
Schimmelfennig decries the lack of clarity in explaining the historical events the 
monuments were to memorialize. He reserves his harshest criticism, however, for the 
ambiguous inscriptions seen also on these expellee monuments (and other types 
dedicated, for instance, to “the victims of violence”). He labels these inscriptions the 
“apex of indeterminacy” and points out the “alibi-function” such inscriptions activate.
 Moreover, though the monuments make vague references to other 
victims, the victimization of the Germans forced from their homelands in the eastern 
provinces remains at the forefront. Within the newly created, all-encompassing rubric 
“victim,” the expellees stand apart. Indeed, the only victims specifically distinguished are 
expellees. In fact, the only differentiation between victims occurs when the monuments 
list the victims of flight and expulsion as a group apart—a collective of people who 
apparently do not consider themselves victims of the war. According to the monuments, 
the expulsion was not connected to it. It was separate, and a result of other historical 
events. Because they experienced a similar fate, all are memorialized equally—except the 
expellees, whose suffering garners special attention. 
25
                                                           
23 In the specific context of the former GDR, of course, the victims of dictatorship or of terror might refer to 
the victims of the Soviet occupation authorities or of the GDR’s own communist regime. 
 
According to Brian Ladd, of all the many objections raised against Helmut Kohl’s 
24 It is, of course, also possible that my analysis is too generous to the initiators of these monuments. It 
could be that the “victims of the war and violence” to whom the monuments are dedicated are not the 
victims of the Nazis at all and instead encompass only German military and civilian casualties.  
25 Schimmelfennig, “Die Denkmalinschrift,” in Marcuse, Schimmelfennig, and Spielmann (eds.) Steine des 
Anstoßes, p. 24. 
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redesigned Neue Wache in the early 1990s, the voices against the “implied equality of 
victims” reverberated most loudly.26 I would argue, this was for good reason. If everyone 
was a guiltless victim, then no one (or only a few, i.e. Hitler and the upper echelon of the 
National Socialist regime) was a perpetrator. Subsuming victims thus transforms the 
expellees—and all Germans—into passive recipients of actions and events out of their 
control. Agency is removed and the suffering of different groups is equated.27 Since they 
(the expellees) suffered like others did, they could also be innocent like others.28
  
            
                                                           
26 Ladd, The Ghosts of Berlin, p. 220. 
27 This line of thinking and the disconnection of the causal link between the Second World War and the 
expulsion are explored in Hans Henning Hahn and Eva Hahn, “Mythos ‘Vertreibung,’” pp. 167-188. 
28 Such historical interpretations are in keeping with long-held assertions of collective innocence, which 
Aleida Assmann avers, have functioned as a mechanism of exculpation (Entlastungsmechanismus) to elude 
(real or imagined) claims of collective guilt. Assmann argues that the “victim syndrome” was one of three 
such mechanisms coursing about in the first decades of the Federal Republic. The other two were silence 
(Schweigen) and anti-communism, both of which helped postwar Germans deflect attributions of guilt and 
avoid painful memories of the recent war. While Assmann claims all three have lost efficacy over time, 
these monuments seem to disprove that. See Aleida Assmann and Ute Frevert, Geschichtsvergessenheit – 
Geschichtversessenheit: Vom Umgang mit deutschen Vergangenheiten nach 1945. (Stuttgart: DVA, 1999), 
p. 140ff.  
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CONCLUSION—AESTHETICS OF COLLECTIVE INNOCENCE 
          Though less forceful than in the blunt remarks at the dedication ceremony in 
Karlsruhe which open cluster B, the monuments here make profound statements about 
how the expellee organizations have perceived the expulsion experience and illuminate 
their views concerning guilt, responsibility, and causality. The monuments disconnect the 
expulsion from WWII and show the expellees as the collectively innocent victims of 
circumstances beyond their control. For many expellees, this stance confirmed the 
absolute injustice of their fate and has been a key component of their postwar self-
understandings. Indeed, from the beginning, the belief in the collective innocence of the 
expellees has been a constant for the expellee organizations and has been crucial in 
formulating their political demands. But rather than as part of a proactive effort in the 
pursuit of concrete politics (though those topics have never been far from the surface), 
the expellee organizations constructed these monuments in the pursuit of symbolic 
politics: the desire for societal recognition as victims on par with other victim groups, in 
particular, those persecuted by the Nazis.  
           I believe the expellee organizations have erected these monuments as a response to 
recent social developments with regard to how Germans have come to understand the 
Nazi era. Above all, the designs and motifs of B’s monuments reflect the rise in 
importance of the Holocaust for narrating Germany’s past. Indeed, most of the 
monuments here are from recent decades. The earliest examples (Chapter Seven) 
represent expellee suffering as being akin to Christ’s innocent suffering and portray the 
expulsion as the German people’s expiation for the sins of others. In this regard, the 
monuments correspond to the belief that Hitler and the National Socialist leadership 
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alone had been responsible for the war and for all the death and destruction—military and 
civilian—it brought about. Not only was their suffering Christ-like, in other cases, 
monuments have instrumentalized gender to re-link all expellees to the peaceful, halcyon 
days in hearth and home and further distance the expellees from the National Socialist 
regime and its murderous war efforts (Chapter Eight). That blameless women and 
children suffered demonstrates the wanton brutality and senselessness of the expulsion. 
Most recently, monuments subsume the victims of the expulsion amongst all war 
victims—a move which obfuscates the differing causes of death and says that all were 
equal victims (Chapter Nine). Though the monuments make gestures to other victims, 
they once again thrust German wartime suffering to the fore and mute attributions of guilt 
and responsibility 
           Though there can be little doubt that many expellees suffered at the end of WWII, 
the monuments in all three chapters go beyond simple commemoration to make universal 
attributions of innocence. Moreover, these monuments unveil historical interpretations 
that dissolve causal links and preclude the possibility that certain expellees might have 
been complicit in Nazi atrocities or were in any way liable for what befell them. No real 
discussion of guilt graces the monuments; nor do the monuments provide worthy 
provocation for further discussion; nor do they mention responsibility, a fact which—in 
light of the changes in official narratives at the national level—is surprising. Despite the 
sluggish progress made in incorporating non-German casualties in official postwar 
narratives in Germany, it appears that the initiators of these monuments have sought to go 
beyond simply commemorating the expellees’ losses and have desired instead to contest 
non-German-centered narratives. Thus, cluster B’s monuments have been local-level 
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participants in larger discussion over the guilt and innocence, not only of the expellees 
but also of the German people as a whole.  
          As inaccurate and misleading as it is to conclude that all Germans after WWII were 
collectively guilty for Nazi crimes, it is likewise erroneous to propound that such a large 
segment of the German populace—the expellees made up roughly 16% of West 
Germany’s population—was collectively innocent. To be sure, I do not claim that all 
expellees, regardless of gender or age, “deserved,” or should have expected, any adverse 
fate—regardless of their involvement with National Socialism. Nor do I pass judgment 
on the millions of individual Germans expelled from their homes. In my opinion, such 
conclusions are irrelevant; the purported “guilt” or “innocence” of expellees has no real 
bearing on an analysis concerned with their representations of these things. The forms 
and methods the expellee organizations have chosen to represent the expulsion 
experience are more interesting and pertinent for my analysis. Nonetheless, when the 
“untainted” are selected to represent an entire community—millions of people—that had 
at least some members involved in National Socialism, troubles arise. In a war in which 
all but a very few were innocent, no one was guilty. When all were victims, no one was a 
perpetrator. 
          Cluster B ends my direct interpretive work on expellee monuments. In Part Three, I 
look at the commemorative ceremonies which occur there and provide further insight into 













LOCAL EXPELLEE MONUMENTS AS LOCI OF REMEMBRANCE:  




A Volk that honors its dead honors itself and 
overcomes the prejudices of callousness and 
barbarity hurled against us by the whole 
world.  
 
--Paul Löbe, President of the 
Reichstag, at the inaugural 




           Throughout this dissertation I have referred occasionally to the commemorative 
ceremonies of the expellee organizations to contextualize the narratives articulated by 
their monuments. For example, in Chapter Six I brought into relief the monument in 
Kamen, NRW. Consisting of a simple cross with the inscription “To the dead of the East 
German Heimat,” the monument assumes an amplified meaning when the 
commemorative ceremonies surrounding its erection—which were part of demonstrations 
protesting the postwar territorial status quo—are put into view. Nevertheless, the focus in 
Part II remained on the monuments themselves. In this chapter, I reverse my aim. Adding 
                                                           
1 Cited in Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge, e.V. (ed.) 40 Jahre Volksbund Deutsche 
Kriegsgräberfürsorge. (Neuwied: Raiffeisendruckerei, 1959), p. 28. 
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another layer to their mnemonic capabilities, these monuments have played host for 
decades to regular commemorative ceremonies: first at their dedications and 
consecrations, and annually on Volkstrauertag and other days of mourning, as well as on 
the most important expellee day of commemoration, Tag der Heimat. In this chapter, I 
examine the public rituals and remembrance practices of the expellees that take place at 
their local monuments.  
           Gershoni and Jankowski consider commemorative ceremonies “one of the primary 
means of representation of collective memories.”2 Indeed, it seems a thorough study of 
monuments and the historical narratives they generate and reflect would be incomplete 
without a discussion of the commemorative ceremonies that happen there. The 
ceremonies give an indication of a monument’s “life” in the years after its initial 
emplacement.3
                                                           
2 Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, Commemorating the Nation: Collective Memory, Public 
Commemoration, and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Egypt. (Chicago: Middle East 
Documentation Center, 2004), p. 4. 
 At these times, the often veiled messages of monuments are revealed in 
both word and deed. The ceremonies are an important part of an all-encompassing 
investigation because they echo and reinforce the historical interpretations the 
monuments’ inscriptions and forms already express. In other words, the ceremonies 
enliven and embellish the narratives the monuments tersely articulate. Not all of the 
1,400+ local monuments play host to organized commemorative ceremonies. In the 
numerous cases in which they do, however, they provide the central location for the 
“performance” of memories of the expulsion. The ceremonies with the monuments as 
backdrops are where memories and historical narratives are brought to life. Most 
importantly, the commemorative ceremonies put those narratives on display in public.  




           Thus, the object of my analysis here is not the expellee monuments per se but 
rather the festivities that occur there, which, I contend, like the monuments, shed light on 
the oftentimes one-sided and de-contextualized historical interpretations the expellee 
organizations propound. That is, instead of using the ceremonies to clarify the 
monuments’ sometimes vague or ambiguous meanings, I seek here to analyze the key 
role played by the monuments as loci of public remembrance. I do this, first, by 
highlighting the three main ways monuments facilitate and promote commemorative 
ceremonies, and second, by exploring how the ceremonies performed there further unveil 
historical narratives. I then offer a review of the expellees’ primary days of 
commemoration and the main rituals that happen during them. 
 
FACILITATING COMMEMORATIVE CEREMONIES 
          Monuments play a central role in facilitating commemorative ceremonies. At the 
most basic level, monuments’ inscriptions and forms offer a one-sided take on the events 
of the past and give direction as to what or who is to be commemorated. As Part II has 
shown, the historical narrative made local expellee monuments reveal is one centered on 
German wartime suffering, particularly that of the expellees. This simple aspect 
constitutes the first way in which monuments facilitate commemorative ceremonies: they 
instruct. The second and third ways are equally straightforward, and are related to what I 
referred to in Chapter One as the practical functions of monuments.  
          Of these latter two ways, the first is that all monuments fashion a physical space for 
people to congregate in public. While this is true of all monuments, it is especially 
significant for those commemorating the expulsion: an object of commemoration which, 
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due to the diffuse nature of the events associated with the forced migration of Germans 
after WWII, has no centralized or representative site.4 The monuments have therefore 
extricated the expulsion from the far reaches of the former German Reich and other areas 
of German settlement—from those locations where most of the events the expulsion 
comprised actually occurred—and transplanted it to the Federal Republic. Thus, the 
monuments “localize” the expulsion by anchoring it in communities far from where the 
commemorated events occurred. Much the same, local monuments have offered members 
of the Landsmannschaften and their sympathizers an authentischer Ort (authentic site)—
otherwise lacking—to mourn their dead and celebrate the Heimat.5
           As also noted in Chapter One, the physical space created by monuments enables 
the formation of collectives. In particular, it was Koselleck who demonstrated the ways in 
which monuments classify and identify both those commemorated as well as those doing 
the commemorating.
 To be sure, the 
authentic sites are not “authentic” in the sense that the events commemorated actually 
occurred there, as might be the case with a commemorative plaque on a battlefield or 
some other kind of historical marker. For the expellees, however, the monuments become 
the next best thing.  
6
                                                           
4 A growing number of expellees monuments have been erected by the expellee organizations—with the 
approval of local authorities—in the “old Heimat,” for example in Poland, the Czech Republic, Serbia, 
Romania, and Hungary. The expellee organizations have erected the lion’s share of monuments located 
outside of the Federal Republic in these countries.  
 In this case, the monuments designate all expellees—those who 
perished as a result of the expulsion and those who survived it—as the aggrieved. 
Moreover, not only do the monuments foster communities of East Prussians, Sudeten 
5 In all but a few cases, for example, the monuments commemorating the fate of the expellees who passed 
through the transit camps at Friedland (Lower Saxony) and Moschendorf (in Hof a.d. Saale, Bavaria), or at 
expellee cemeteries, such as in Freiberg, Saxony, local expellee monuments are located far from the places 
and events they were designed to memorialize. 
6 Koselleck. “Kriegerdenkmale als Identitätsstiftungen der Überlebenden.” 
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Germans, Pomeranians, Danube Swabians, etc., they also help create communities of 
victims. The surviving expellees, who gather at the monuments to mourn, celebrate, and 
protest, identify with the victims of the expulsion (designated thusly by the monuments) 
and ostensibly declare themselves victims as well. The offer of a potential identity the 
monuments make and that Koselleck described, it seems, is made most conspicuously 
during the commemorative ceremonies. In fact, the creation of a site via the emplacement 
of a monument is vital for developing what is arguably the most significant social impact 
of commemorative ceremonies: namely, the coalescence of these collectives.  
          As Koselleck noticed, the physical space for remembrance that monuments provide 
affords visitors the opportunity to identify with the dead, and thereby promotes the 
formation of these groups; the united memorialization that happens there during 
commemorative ceremonies actually cements this identification and group building. 
According to Insa Eschebach, one of the goals of public commemoration is the 
“constitution of a ‘we,’ a society, which is produced on the one hand through speeches 
and on the other hand, for example, through collective songs or moments of silence.”7 In 
other words, the monuments provide the sites for likeminded people to congregate; the 
ceremonies Eschebach has written about solidify their bond. It is these groups who return 
to the monuments year after year to remember their dead, reminisce about the old 
homeland, and celebrate their interpretation of history.8
 
 
                                                           
7 Insa Eschebach. Öffentliches Gedenken. Deutsche Erinnerungskulturen seit der Weimarer Republik. 
(Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2005), p. 9. 
8 Writing about “primitive” societies (in particular, about ancient Egypt), Jan Assmann has also written on 
this topic. He claims, “Every group that wants to consolidate itself as such endeavors to create and secure 
sites that not only offer stages of their forms of interaction, but also serve as symbols of their identity and 
provide a common ground for their recollection.” See Jan Assmann, Das kulturelle Gedächtnis. Schrift, 
Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen. (Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1992), p. 39. 
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COMMEMORATIVE CEREMONIES: WHAT THEY ARE AND WHAT THEY 
DO 
 
           In order for the study of these monuments and their ceremonies to be effective, it 
is important to understand what commemorative ceremonies and rituals are, and why 
they are so meaningful for the transmission of historical narratives. First, a clarification 
of terms: I use the concept “commemorative ceremonies” here as an umbrella term. The 
commemorative ceremonies of the expellees need not (and often do not) occur at 
monuments. The festivities I discuss in this chapter, however, do and have indeed taken 
place at these sites. The ceremonies are regular (usually annual), highly organized and 
structured events that occur in public. My focus, therefore, is not on private, individual 
remembrance but rather on groups’ ritualized commemoration in the public sphere. I 
examine the both the concepts “commemorative ceremonies” and “rituals” here and use 
them interchangeably when appropriate. However, I do not consider them synonymous. 
For the purposes of this study, rituals are the constitutive parts of ceremonies. In other 
words, the former comprise the latter. Obviously, there are many types of both: 
secular/non-secular, public/private, political, commemorative, etc. In addition, although 
the commemorative ceremonies of the expellees often contain religious elements and 
include the participation of spiritual leaders, neither of these terms should be understood 
as denoting something religious. I do not distinguish between the two terms to imbue 
either with any sort of religious significance and thereby remove the other from the 
ecclesiastical realm. I understand the term “rite” as being synonymous with “ritual;” thus 
I employ the two interchangeably. 
          That clarified, the meaning of ritual as I define it is rather simple. In particular, my 
thinking has been shaped by the helpful explanations of the concept that Robert Bocock 
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and Paul Connerton have provided. Bocock states that “ritual is to be used here to mean 
bodily action in relation to symbols. The action is social, that is it involves groups of 
people who share some sets of expectations in common […]” He elucidates his definition 
further with the assertion: “Ritual is the symbolic use of bodily movement and gesture in 
a social situation to express and articulate meaning.”9 Connerton offers a similar 
explanation. His description starts with Lukes’ definition of ritual as the “rule-governed 
activity of a symbolic character which draws the attention of its participants to objects of 
thought and feeling which they hold to be of special significance,” but goes on to say, 
“[Rites] are formalized acts, and tend to be stylized, stereotyped, and repetitive. […] 
They are not performed under inner momentary compulsion but are deliberately observed 
to denote feelings.”10 Rituals, in sum, are the highly structured, programmatic, and 
symbolic activities of groups which have meanings that transcend the actual activities 
themselves. Bocock labels what I call commemorative ceremonies “ritual occasions”: 
“These are social situations defined by the people themselves as separate, ‘special’ set-
apart occasions, set apart from the world of work and from recreational activities.”11
           To begin my exploration of what commemorative ceremonies do, I start with 
concepts developed by Emile Durkheim. Focusing primarily on organized festivities of a 
religious nature, Durkheim saw the rites that make up ceremonies as the basis of society, 
and described the “change of consciousness” that is engendered by bringing together 
 To 
reiterate, the commemorative ceremonies of the expellees are the various such occasions 
and are made up of rituals. 
                                                           
9 Robert Bocock, Ritual in Industrial Society: A Sociological Analysis of Ritualism in Modern England. 
(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1974), p. 36 & p. 37. 
10 Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 44. The 
theories espoused in this important book will be discussed in greater detail below. 
11 Bocock, Ritual in Industrial Society, p. 39. 
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people for these purposes.12 Groups coalesce around certain beliefs and gather to “revive 
the most essential elements of the collective consciousness” by “support[ing] the vitality 
of these beliefs” and “prevent[ing] them from fading from memory. In rituals, therefore, 
convictions already held are strengthened.13 The beliefs expressed in ritual form at 
ceremonies are integral for the internal cohesion and reaffirmation of social groups and 
communities. “No society can exist that does not feel the need at regular intervals to 
sustain and reaffirm the collective feelings and ideas that constitute its unity and 
personality.”14 Clearly, the social element Durkheim observed is central and large 
numbers of scholars mention it, including the authors of virtually all of the literature I 
have cited in this chapter. Without a doubt, commemorative ceremonies are an important 
means of consolidating membership in a collective by transmitting shared convictions.15
           While the formation of groups through rituals and ceremonies is crucial, at the 
center remain the beliefs around which the groups’ members coalesce. While Durkheim 
explored what the shared beliefs espoused during rituals mean for groups, I am more 
concerned with what groups mean for the beliefs. Commemorative ceremonies bring a 
group’s beliefs to life and are one means of putting them on display. These beliefs—
referred to in other studies as “myths,”
  
16 “collective memories,”17
                                                           
12 Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Tr. Carol Cosman. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001). 
 or others terms—
constitute the historical narratives that participants at the ceremonies enliven and 
13 Ibid., p. 279. 
14 Ibid., p. 285 & p. 322. 
15 Those who do not share in the beliefs are unlikely to participate. As Connerton notes, “And conversely, 
people resist being forced to pay lip-service to an alien set of rites, incompatible with their own vision of 
the ‘truth,’ because to enact a rite is always, in some sense, to assent to its meaning” (Connerton, How 
Society Remembers, p. 44). 
16 For example, in Rüdiger Voigt, “Mythen, Rituale und Symbole in der Politik,” in Voigt (ed.) Symbole 
der Politik, Politik der Symbole. (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1989), pp. 9-37. 
17 For example, in Yael Zerubavel, Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli 
National Tradition. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). 
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perform.  In my opinion, this is the most important aspect of all; the staging of 
commemorative ceremonies at monuments gives even more credence to the beliefs 
articulated there, both by the monuments and by participants at the ceremonies—
especially when the events are large, held in public, and are attended or officiated over by 
important leaders.  
           Commemorative ceremonies have a profound effect therefore on the 
authoritativeness of historical narratives. Writing about the meaning of rituals for 
political myths, Rüdiger Voigt, for example, has written that ceremonies “concretize” 
those beliefs. “Political festivals (Feste)—such as historical commemorations, national 
holidays, […]—are where myths are newly attested and where acceptance of their 
political content is produced.”18 Concerned primarily with how collectives perceive the 
past and how those perceptions are vocalized, Zerubavel states that commemorative 
ceremonies are one means through which such beliefs are authenticated and validated. 
“Collective memory is substantiated through multiple forms of commemoration: the 
celebration of a communal festival, the reading of a tale, the participation in a memorial 
service, or the observance of a holiday. Through these commemorative rituals, groups 
create, articulate, and negotiate their shared memories of particular events.”19
                                                           
18 Voigt, “Mythen, Rituale und Symbole in der Politik,” p. 11. 
 The fact 
that beliefs—be they political myths or collectively produced memories of the past (both 
of which apply to the commemoration of the expulsion, of course)—are celebrated and 
commemorated at public ceremonies adds to their weight, thereby rendering them more 
19 Zerubavel, Recovered Roots, p. 5. Zerubavel makes an equally germane point about the historical 
selectivity of commemorative ceremonies. She declares, “Each act of commemoration reproduces a 
commemorative narrative, a story about a particular past that accounts for this ritualized remembrance and 
provides a moral message for the group members. In creating this narrative, collective memory clearly 
draws upon historical sources. Yet it does so selectively and creatively (p. 6). 
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credible. Commemorative ceremonies, therefore, reiterate and reinforce already held 
beliefs.  
           What is it about the performance of memories at commemorative ceremonies that 
makes them so fundamental for the consolidation and transmission of these beliefs? Jan 
Assmann, for example, notes that “all rituals have the double aspect of repetition 
(Wiederholung) and making present (Vergegenwärtigung).”20 Paul Connerton also picks 
up on this point in his study How Societies Remember, an analysis of how memory is 
conveyed and sustained. He claims, “All rites are repetitive, and repetition automatically 
implies continuity with the past.”21
This narrative was more than a story told – it was a cult enacted. It was a rite fixed and 
performed. […] We would underestimate the commemorative hold of the rite, we would 
minimize its mnemonic power, if we were to say that it reminded the participants of 
mythic events; we should say rather that the sacred event […] was re-presented; the 
participants in the rite gave it ceremonially embodied form. [...] Above all, it was through 
acts performed at a sacred site that the illusion of mundane time was suspended. 
[Emphasis in original]
 Above all, Connerton sees “social memory” at work 
in commemorative ceremonies and other “bodily practices.” Two long passages sum up 
his views about the importance of commemorative ceremonies for conveying historical 






What, then, is being remembered in commemorative ceremonies? Part of the answer is 
that a community is reminded of its identity as represented by and told in a master 
narrative. [A ritual’s] master narrative is more than a story told and reflected on; it is a 
cult enacted. An image of the past, even in the form of a master narrative, is conveyed 
and sustained by ritual performances. And this means that what is remembered in 
commemorative ceremonies is something in addition to a collectively organized variant 
of personal and cognitive memory.23
                                                           
20 Jan Assmann, Das kulturelle Gedächtnis, p. 17. As such, commemorative ceremonies and the rituals that 
make them up are a part of cultural memory, as opposed to communicative memory—a key distinction at 
the root of Assmann’s theory of cultural memory. 
 
21 Connerton, How Societies Remember, p. 45. 
22 Ibid., p. 43. 




To be sure, as Connerton concedes, commemorative ceremonies are not the sole 
constituents of collective memory. He does state, however, that beliefs adhered to and 
conveyed at special ceremonies seep into everyday life as well: “But whatever is 
demonstrated in rites permeates also non-ritual behavior and mentality.”24 According to 
Connerton, in order to preserve over time the beliefs its members hold most dear, a group 
will translate its memories into rites and perform them at commemorative ceremonies.25
          Lastly, commemorative ceremonies—particularly at the local level—are one of the 
primary avenues for non-elites to gain access to the processes in which meaning is made 
of history. As Zerubavel points out, “While scholars and intellectuals engage in a formal 
historical discourse, for most members of society, knowledge of the past is first and 




 This is an especially pertinent 
point when the historical interpretations at the grassroots are at odds with those held by 
elites. The commemorative ceremonies thus allow average people access to the past and 
permit them to interpret and frame it in ways government commissions and history books 
do not.  
THE EXPELLEES’ DAYS OF COMMEMORATION: TAG DER HEIMAT & 
VOLKSTRAUERTAG 
 
           In his analysis of ritual means of public mourning in Germany after 1945, Frank 
Maciejewski reaches the conclusion that when it came to commemorating their own 
victims of the war and its aftermath, Germans could only engage in mourning without 
rituals; when it came to commemorating others—including the victims of the 
                                                           
24 Ibid., p. 44. 
25 Ibid., p. 102. 
26 Zerubavel, Recovered Roots, p. 6. 
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Holocaust—the Germans were forced to conduct rituals without mourning.27
          Events at local expellee monuments have happened on a number of set days, 
including their days of dedication, traditional German days of mourning such as 
Allerseelentag (All Soul’s Day, November 2nd, i.e. the day after All Saints Day) in 
Catholic regions and Totensonntag
 Of course, 
this stance—more a statement about the commemoration of Germany’s victims than 
about German victims themselves—overlooks the numerous rituals of mourning and 
commemoration (and political demonstrations) the expellee organizations have conducted 
throughout (West) Germany since WWII. Starting in the late 1940s and continuing until 
today, the expellees have held regular, highly structured, well-publicized, and highly 
visible commemorative ceremonies at all levels: national, regional, and local. While 
participation levels have diminished since the early days, the ceremonies persist. The 
monuments the expellees have erected, however, have served as special loci of 
remembrance for these events. This is why my focus here remains on the ceremonies at 
these important commemorative sites, despite the fact that expellee gatherings take many 
forms and occur at many places. 
28
                                                           
27 Franz Maciejewski,“Trauer ohne Riten – Riten ohne Trauer. Deutsche Volkstrauer nach 1945,” in Jan 
Assmann, Franz Maciejewski and Axel Michaels (eds.) Der Abschied von den Toten: Trauerrituale im 
Kulturvergleich. (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2005), pp. 245-266. In this text—in essence, an examination 
of the shape of Holocaust mourning rituals (or the lack thereof) and how they came about in postwar 
Germany—Maciejewski argues that Germans commemorated their own dead and the dead of the Holocaust 
in the only means open to them. He writes, “The empirical results of ritual performances of Holocaust 
commemoration allows no doubt: a ritual of mourning in the emphatic sense does not take place on the 
German side; what one sees instead is the repeated staging of rituals of guilt” (p. 262). 
 in predominantly Protestant areas, or on days of 
national and political celebration and reflection (for example, prior to reunification in 
1990, on the Day of German Unity, i.e. June 17th). Nevertheless, the two main days of 
commemoration for the expellees have been Tag der Heimat and Volkstrauertag—both of 
28 Totensonntag is also celebrated in November, on the last Sunday before the first Advent Sunday.  
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which have garnered scant scholarly attention, at least in this context.29
 
 These two 
dates—the very concepts of which parallel the historical narratives put forth by the 
monuments—also have in common the fact that they memorialize people and events 
intimately related to WWII. In what follows, I discuss the origins and evolution of these 
chief days of expellee commemoration, and describe the key elements of the ceremonies 
that occur on them. I then present a discussion of what these ceremonies mean for the 
historical narratives the monuments represent. 
Tag der Heimat 
          As Michael Schwartz has pointed out, public memorialization of the expulsion was 
hampered immediately after the war by the fact that there was no clear date—like June 
17th, the Day of German Unity, for instance—on which to celebrate its yearly 
anniversary.30 As a result, the pageantry for a new day of commemoration had to be 
“invented.”31
                                                           
29 As a result, the bulk of my material, particularly on Tag der Heimat, comes from the BdV’s own sources. 
 The date selected was not May 8th or any other day associated with the end 
30 Michael Schwartz, “Vertriebene im doppelten Deutschland. Integrations- und Erinnerungspolitik in der 
DDR und in der Bundesrepublik,” Vierteljahrsheft für Zeitgeschichte. 1/2008, p. 141ff. Zerubavel has 
written that fixing specific dates as memorial days to guarantee the commemoration of key events is crucial 
for a collective’s cohesiveness. For this reason, the designation of certain days is crucial. See Zerubavel, 
Recollected Roots, p. 139f. 
31 I use the term “invented” here deliberately in obvious reference to Eric Hobsbawm’s concept of 
“invented tradition,” which he defines as “a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly 
accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of 
behavior by repetition, which automatically, implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they 
normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past.” (p.1) The idealization of the prewar 
Heimat and the mourning of its loss (believed in the first few years after the war to be merely temporary, of 
course) as well the commemoration of the dead which have taken place on the expellees’ invented holiday, 
Tag der Heimat, seem to mirror the “process of formalization and ritualization” which Hobsbawm claims is 
the essence of inventing traditions. (p.4) He states “For all invented traditions, so far as possible, use 
history as a legitimator of action and cement of group cohesion” (p. 12)—which certainly applies to the 
expellees, whose commemorative ceremonies helped make a motley crew of millions of Germans with 
different origins, dialects, religious convictions, etc., conscious of their fate as victims of WWII and the 
postwar settlement and amenable to the concrete and symbolic political and cultural objectives of the 
expellee organizations. See Eric Hobsbawm, “Introduction,” in E. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.) 
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of the war. Instead, a date was chosen which connected the new day of commemoration 
with the signing of the Charter of the German Expellees on August 5, 1950, and its public 
proclamation in front of an estimated 150,000 demonstrators in Stuttgart the next day. As 
noted at various points in this dissertation, the date chosen for this act was not a 
coincidence. The Charter was signed and proclaimed on those respective days as a 
deliberate protest against the Potsdam Agreement, which five years before had formally 
sanctioned the postwar borders and set in motion the forced migration of the Germans.  
           The commemoration of the expulsion thus was not connected to the war but to this 
post-WWII event. The choice of this date shows that from the start, the expellee 
organizations had disconnected the causal link between the Nazi war of aggression and 
the forced migration of the Germans. “Instead of identifying themselves with the loss 
suffered by a ‘Tätervolk’ (perpetrators),” Schwartz writes, with the selection of this date 
“the expellee organizations portrayed themselves with the Charter as the conciliatory 
victims of a reprehensible postwar event.”32 August 5, 1950 is considered the first Tag 
der Heimat, though expellees had held a similar day of commemoration and protest—Tag 
der Deutschen—at the same time the year before.33
                                                           
The Invention of Tradition. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 1-14, as well as, in the 
same volume, Hobsbawm, “Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914,” pp. 263-307. 
 Initially, the national offices of the 
expellee organizations selected the first Sunday in August as the fixed date for the new 
“holiday.” After 1954, however, in an attempt to maximize the mobilization of their 
members and thus boost the media attention received by the ceremonies, the 
organizations moved the date to the second Sunday in September. With the selection of 
32 Schwartz, “Vertriebene im doppelten Deutschland,” pp. 143-144. 
33 The expellee organizations dedicated their monument in Kamen, referenced at the beginning of this 
chapter, on this precursor to the inaugural Tag der Heimat. 
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the new date, event organizers sought to avoid scheduling conflicts with the schools’ 
summer break and increase participation.34
           Credit for the conceptualization of Tag der Heimat is generally given to Paul 




                                                           
34 Tag der Heimat on the national level occurs the first Sunday of September while local-level ceremonies 
take place on the second Sunday. The arrangement was made presumably to enable affiliates to send 
members to the national gathering and partake in their own local and regional celebrations as well. Gilad 
Margalit has another explanation for the date change. He claims the German government coerced the 
expellee organizations to push back the date to the second Sunday in September because Tag der Heimat in 
August fell during Konrad Adenauer’s noted visit to Moscow in 1955. See Margalit, Guilt, Suffering, and 
Memory, p. 198. 
 In a memorandum proposing the introduction of the commemoration, Wagner 
outlined three principal objectives for the Tag der Heimat, all of which, when put into 
action, aimed at reaching the widest audience possible. First, Wagner wrote that “the 
expellees should gather annually to avow themselves in public to their currently lost 
Heimat. They should familiarize their children and all Germans with the Heimat, 
especially with the Right to Heimat, which is inalienable and indispensible.” Second, he 
stated that “the expellees should take pride in their Heimat and publicly display its 
cultural legacy and pass it on to their children.” Third, he encouraged his fellow expellees 
to make all Germans aware of the value of the Heimat and, at the same time, demand the 
Right to Heimat before the entire world. These efforts would result in “promoting the 
commonalities between local Germans and the expellees and end the divide between 
35 Wagner was born in Silesia in 1900 and later moved to East Prussia. He was a cofounder of the 
Landsmannschaft East Prussia and earned a Bundesverdienstkreuz for his efforts in initiating this holiday. I 
gleaned this and most of the following information about Wagner and his original concept of Tag der 
Heimat from a pamphlet published by the BdV and written by Gustl Huber. See Huber, Tag der Heimat – 
Tag der Deutschen. Kulturelle Arbeitshefte 17. 3rd Edition. (Bonn: Bund der Vertriebenen – Vereinigte 
Landsmannschaften und Landesverbände,  1998). The text provides some historical background on the 
expellees, philosophical remarks on the meaning of Heimat, and the legal background information on the 
right to Heimat. This is followed by a description of the Tag der Heimat’s origin, a discussion of the day’s 
meaning, as well as guidelines for local branches of the BdV on organizing Tag der Heimat ceremonies.  
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them so that they might grow closer together.”36
          According to BdV documents from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s (cited in 
Huber’s pamphlet), organizers had strictly followed two main viewpoints concerning the 
subsequent development of this commemorative day: first, the Tag der Heimat was to 
have a decidedly political character. Organizers crafted events that “embod[ied] the entire 
culture of all Heimat regions.” Moreover, Tag der Heimat was to be a “day of admonition 
(Mahnung), a day of obligation, and a day of avowal to the Heimat snatched away from 
the expellees and to the difficult lot of the Germans suffering under the Communist 
yoke.” In addition to the already political content of the celebrations and 
commemoration, the events themselves were also highly politicized. The expellee 
organizations traditionally held Tag der Heimat’s opening ceremonies in Berlin to 
underscore its role as the capital of all Germans. According to Stickler, a number of 
notable public officials took part in the events in Berlin—including Willy Brandt (serving 
at the time as Berlin’s Lord Mayor), Herbert Wehner (the SPD’s deputy chairman) Kurt 
Georg Kiesinger (then Minister President of Baden-Württemberg). Interestingly, as 
Stickler points out, neither Konrad Adenauer, nor either of his two foreign ministers ever 
 As Wagner conceived it, at the heart of 
Tag der Heimat was not a somber and mournful commemoration of expellee suffering 
and victimization but rather a celebration of the Heimat, which would serve to bridge the 
gap between the various expellee groups themselves as well as between the expellees and 
the Einheimischen and ensure that their cultural legacy would be passed on to their 
children, now spending their formative years on “foreign soil” in the West. The holiday’s 
goals were thus political, cultural, and intergenerational. 
                                                           
36 Huber, Tag der Heimat – Tag der Deutschen, p. 8. 
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attended.37 In fact, not until Gerhard Schröder participated in 2000 did a federal 
chancellor ever take part in the national Tag der Heimat ceremony.38
          The second viewpoint demonstrates once again that Tag der Heimat organizers 
intended the day’s content to appeal to as wide an audience as possible. The day was to 
be nonpartisan and interdenominational. As we have seen, all the major political parties 
embraced the expellees’ cause at first, so the participation of leading figures from the 
SPD in the early and mid-1960s should come as no surprise. In light of the vociferous 
opposition voiced by the expellee organizations to the new Ostpolitik, it became 
inconceivable that Willy Brandt would have participated in any of the expellee 
organizations’ functions in the late 1960s and early 1970s—just years after appearing at 
them in the early and mid-1960s. Nor would the expellee organizations have invited him. 
Therefore, the early pledge of nonpartisanship is particularly noteworthy. Concomitantly, 
the BdV’s political objectives superseded any religious affiliations—hence, the great 
effort not to alienate expellees with either Catholic or Protestant backgrounds. This 
holiday was created to appeal to all Germans from the eastern territories, and, if possible, 
to local West Germans as well. Again, Huber cites the BdV’s documentation: “all 
 
                                                           
37 The lack of participation of members of the CDU-led government is most likely attributed to the fact 
that, as we have already seen, the BdV’s rigid political stance regarding the border issue was often at odds 
with the foreign policy objectives of the Adenauer government. The potential discord these disagreements 
would cause for West Germany’s relations with its western partners proved to be too risky for the federal 
government. In addition, Edgar Wolfrum points out that there is evidence that the West German federal 
government did not want strong state involvement in any political commemorative ceremonies—in 
particular, in the remembrance events celebrating June 17, 1953—of the new republic because of the 
overwhelming role played by the Nazi state in such events during the Third Reich. For this reason, such 
events were organized in a decentralized fashion with little government direction. For more, see Wolfrum, 
Geschichtspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, p. 134. This is not to say, however, that state 
governments did not support Tag der Heimat festivities. For instance, Retterath describes the role played by 
the state government of Baden-Württemberg in aiding the coordination of events there. See Retterath, 
“Geschichtsbilderkampf...” p. 88. 
38 Stickler, “Ostdeutsch heißt Gesamtdeutsch,” p. 161. 
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Germans conscious of the homeland (alle heimatbewußten Deutschen) unite on [Tag der 
Heimat,] as an avowal of Heimat on this side and on the other side of the iron curtain.”39
           As to the “decidedly political character” of Tag der Heimat—that is, to the actual 
content of the days’ festivities—the BdV’s directives, as Huber summarized, state clearly 
that the events associated with Tag der Heimat were “to remind the world public that the 
Potsdam Agreement was not the final settlement of the border issue.” Reflecting the 
concrete politics expressed by their monuments, the expellee organizations desired to 
make the point that the areas of German settlement to the east of the Oder/Neisse were 
still German territory. According to Huber, the BdV’s documents state that this fact [was] 
“to be acknowledged and the rights derived from this standpoint [were] to be 
represented.” The expellees sought to join all relevant non-expellee institutions in 
espousing “the right to homeland and its realization through peaceful transition and the 
dictates of the Basic Law regarding the unification of Germany. The ceremonies were 
also to vocalize the fact that “the expulsion of individuals or of entire groups is a 




           By the end of the 1950s, writes Stickler, Tag der Heimat had become a chief 
component of the expellee organizations’ public relations efforts. In addition to the 
festivities in Berlin, local branches of the expellee organizations celebrated their 
 All of this had to do with concrete politics. No mention was made at this 
time of the suffering or victimization of the expellees unless it pertained to territorial 
reacquisition or tangible political rights. This, of course, would change in the years to 
come. 
                                                           
39 Huber, Tag der Heimat – Tag der Deutschen, p. 9. 
40 Ibid., p. 9. 
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ceremonies throughout West Germany in order to mobilize the expellees in all their home 
communities, often with the participation of prominent BdV functionaries. In addition, 
this “regionalization” of Tag der Heimat served to promote the involvement of local 
populations, in order to inform them of the BdV’s goals and garner their support.41 All in 
all, Kossert contends, this mass mobilization of the expellees, not all of whom were 
politically active, served a two-pronged purpose. First, the events were to solidify the 
expellees’ identities as Germans from the East “to reinforce their inner cohesion as a 
group” and “to counteract the assimilation of ‘the community of fate’ 
(Schicksalsgemeinschaft) into West German society.” Second, the events were to be a 
show of strength vis-à-vis both the federal government and all political parties by 
demonstrating the grassroots support for the BdV’s concrete political aims.42
           Over the decades, Tag der Heimat has become the principal day for 
commemorating the expulsion. Today, it is nothing new (though still controversial, 
particularly in Poland, because of the ongoing debate over the Center Against 
Expulsions) when the Federal Republic’s chancellor or its president speaks at the BdV’s 
national commemoration in Berlin. Though not all Tag der Heimat events happen at local 
monuments, the expellees’ commemorative ceremonies—including in the capital, where 
speeches are made and wreaths are laid at the monument on Theodor-Heuss-Platz—
usually consist of events there. As we have seen, the expellee organizations have 
unveiled many other their monuments on Tag der Heimat. Nevertheless, the BdV’s 
ability to mobilize its members and sympathizers for local ceremonies at the monuments 
  
                                                           
41 Stickler, “Ostdeutsch heißt Gesamtdeutsch,” pp. 160-161. 





 Instead of the thousands who came out to protest in the 1950s 
and early 1960s, communal events today draw only hundreds, or occasionally even 
dozens. Yet the ceremonies persist and appeals have been made to the federal 
government to make it an official national holiday.  
Volkstrauertag 
           The history of Volkstrauertag—the “People’s Day of Mourning” (also translated 
as “Remembrance Day”)—extends back more than two decades before the end of WWII 
and the expulsion.44
                                                           
43 Among other things, the reasons given for the decreasing rate of participation are usually the old age of 
the members of the expellee organizations and the Erlebnisgeneration (the “experience generation,” i.e. 
those who experienced the expulsion firsthand), the lack of interest of the second generation after its 
complete integration into society, and diminished financial support. 
 Obviously, its origins do not lie with the expellee organizations, and 
we should not view it exclusively as a day of remembrance and mourning for the 
expellees. In fact, the commemoration of the expulsion has comprised only a small part 
of the festivities. Nevertheless, like Tag der Heimat, the People’s Day of Mourning has 
become one of the central days of public commemoration of the expulsion in the Federal 
Republic, which regularly include ceremonies at local expellee monuments. While a full 
history of Volkstrauertag would exceed the scope of this chapter, a brief overview of the 
holiday’s genesis and its initial conceptualization are indispensable for understanding 
how the day has come to be used and understood after 1945, and how its appropriation by 
the expellees has become one more vehicle for the ritualized articulation of one-sided 
historical narratives. 
44 Probably the most comprehensive investigation of Volkstrauertag’s origin and its evolution during the 
Weimar period and into the Nazi era (when it was known as Heldengedenktag) can be found in Fritz 
Schellack, Nationalfeiertage in Deutschland von 1871 bis 1945. (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1989).  
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           As originally conceived, Volkstrauertag was set aside as a day for mourning the 
millions of fallen German soldiers of the First World War. After the National Assembly 
of the Weimar Republic was unable to pass the legislation necessary to institute a 
national day of mourning, a private organization founded in 1919 to oversee the care of 
German war graves, the Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge (VDK—People’s 
League for the Care of War Graves), proposed a secular day of mourning that would 
unite people of different political persuasions and religious faiths in common 
commemoration. Though the VDK made its proposal in consultation with the Christian 
churches, in the interest of neutrality, the date for the new day of mourning it selected 
was in no way associated with the Catholic (Allerseelentag) or Protestant (Totensonntag) 
days of mourning.45 Instead, the VDK selected a day in the spring (both the 6th Sunday 
and 5th Sunday before Easter were used), which “symbolize[d] the resurrection of the 
German nation after its defeat by suggesting that the ‘heroes’ had sacrificed their lives for 
a better future.”46
                                                           
45 Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge, e.V. (ed.) 40 Jahre Volksbund Deutsche 
Kriegsgräberfürsorge, p. 26ff. 
 Though somber and mournful, Volkstrauertag was imbued from the 
start with a rousing national-political dimension. Though the parliament held an official, 
national-level ceremony in the Reichstag in 1922, it was not until 1925 that Germans 
celebrated Volkstrauertag throughout the country. The national-political dimension 
allowed its easy transition into and continuance during the Third Reich, where the Nazi 
leadership embraced the holiday, albeit after a law changed the name to Heldengedenktag 
46 Alexandra Kaiser, “Performing the New German Past: The People’s Day of Mourning and 27 January as 
Postunification Commemorations,” German Politics and Society. Issue 89, Vol. 26, No. 4 Winter 2008, p. 
30. Kaiser’s essays on Volkstrauertag are important contributions to our understanding of this key holiday 
and are cited extensively throughout what follows.  
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(Commemoration of Heroes Day) in 1934 and made it a national holiday.47 The name 
change gives an indication of the shift in memorialization that accompanied it; no longer 
was the public to “mourn” the fallen per se—instead, the public was to glorify the dead as 
the heroic sacrifices of those who paved the way for National Socialism.48
           Germany’s unconditional surrender to end WWII, and the revelation of the 
countless atrocities committed in its name, made the postwar public commemoration of 
its dead—military and civilian—even more complicated than after its ignominious defeat 
in WWI. Nevertheless, under the auspices of its Weimar-era initiator, the VDK, the West 
German government officially celebrated Volkstrauertag at the newly established 
Bundestag in Bonn on the holiday’s traditional day in the first spring after the founding 
of the Federal Republic.
 The German 
public celebrated Heldengedenktag even after Germany began the Second World War: 
Hitler himself laid wreaths at the Neue Wache to honor both the dead of WWI and the 
more recently fallen soldiers of the Wehrmacht. 
49
                                                           
47 See, for instance, Alexandra Kaiser, “‘Sie wollen gar nicht, dass wir mit lauten Worten sie ‘Helden’ 
nennen.’ Der Volkstrauertag und der Mythos vom Sinn des Sterbens im Krieg,” in Hein-Kircher and Hahn 
(eds.) Politische Mythen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert in Mittel- und Osteuropa, p. 68. 
 Two years later, a decree by the Federal Minister of the 
Interior moved the day to the second Sunday before the first Sunday of Advent in 
48 Also indicative of this shift was the directive of the Ministry of Propaganda, which oversaw 
Heldengedenkentag, which required that flags no longer were flown at half-staff as had hitherto been the 
case. 
49 In spite of the changed historical context, the commemoration of the fallen remained essentially the 
same. Kaiser writes, “In articles and memoranda originating with the VDK, the sacrificial interpretation [of 
Volkstrauertag] clearly predominates: the Wehrmacht dead had done their ‘duty’ in ‘good faith’ to defend 
the beloved ‘Heimat’ (native land, and thus could be cast as heroes whose sacrifice should be revered.” See 
Kaiser, “Performing the New German Past,” p. 31. In her earlier text on this subject, she claims “The 
concept of “Opfer” [which in German means both “sacrifice” and “victim”] is the key concept that lies at 
the heart of the commemoration of Volkstrauertag from the Weimar Republic to today; its flexibility and 
adaptability enabled the reestablishment of Volkstrauertag after 1945.” See Kaiser, “‘Sie wollen gar nicht, 
dass wir mit lauten Worten sie ‘Helden’ nennen,’” p. 70. 
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November, the date on which it has been held ever since.50
           While the commemorative focus remained on fallen soldiers, it was not long 
before Volkstrauertag organizers extended the focus to Germany’s civilian dead, 
including those killed during the expulsion and aerial bombardment. Kaiser writes that in 
the VDK’s opinion, Volkstrauertag was intended to memorialize only the German war 
dead. For the West German government, however, this became an untenable position due 
to growing knowledge of Nazi crimes, including those committed by the Wehrmacht. As 
a result, the Adenauer administration exerted pressure on the VDK to make 
Volkstrauertag more inclusive—an effort the VDK was able to withstand until the early 
1960s, when organizers extended the holiday’s commemorative umbrella to all “victims 
of war and violence”—i.e. German victims and Germany’s victims.
 The history of Volkstrauertag 
is a West (and reunited) German story. The SED did not establish an equivalent day of 
commemoration in the GDR.  
51 The ceremonies’ 
refrain became that all—civilians and soldiers, Germans and non-Germans—had suffered 
during the war and were thus all equally worthy of public remembrance.52
                                                           
50 Lurz states that the date was changed because of regional elections scheduled on the Sunday Reminiscere 
in 1952. See Lurz, Kriegerdenkmäler in Deutschland. Vol. VI Bundesrepublik, p. 510.  According to 
Thomas Peter Petersen, postwar Volkstrauertag organizers had sought a date that was neither politically nor 
religiously “bound” (gebunden). See Petersen, Volkstrauertag. Seine Geschichte und Entwicklung. Eine 
wissenschaftliche Betrachtung. (Bad Kleinen: Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge, 1998), p. 33. 
Henceforth, according to a bizarre formulation of the federal minister, Volkstrauertag was to be observed 
“in memory of all those who lost their life for the good of mankind” (die Güter der Menschheit). 
 This 
notwithstanding, Kaiser declares, “[T]he Volkstrauertag’s position between the 
commemoration of the fallen and other German losses and commemoration of “all 
victims,” was always ambivalent.” She underscores this point by describing the 
51 See Kaiser, “‘Sie wollen gar nicht, dass wir mit lauten Worten sie ‘Helden’ nennen,’” p. 31-32. On this 
point, she continues: “The rebranding of the Volkstrauertag can thus be regarded not only from a moral 
perspective, but first and foremost as a stratagem: only by eliding the difference between those who fought 
for the Third Reich and those who were persecuted by it was it possible to ‘honor’ the former group any 
longer in public” (p. 32). 
52 See for instance, Assmann and Frevert. Geschichtsvergessenheit – Geschichtsversessenheit, pp. 209-210.  
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overwhelmingly military character of the national-level observances of Volkstrauertag, 
which after 1955 included the participation of representatives of the newly established 
Bundeswehr. The lack of explicit references, visual or verbal, to the victims of the Nazis, 
Kaiser notes, was even more telling.53
          The new, sweeping conception of Volkstrauertag subsumed all war dead into one 
large category of victims. As we have seen, such commemorative efforts have had far-
reaching implications for discussions of wartime guilt and responsibility. As Rosenfeld 
put it, “Commemorating not only the military dead of WWI but also those of WWII, 
along with the civilian victims of the aerial bombing and those of other nations, the 
Volkstrauertag effaced the distinction between victims and perpetrators into one 
generalized, suffering mass of humanity.”
 
54 This annulment of differences was achieved, 
“by concentrating on the individual suffering and death which was presented as ‘fate’ by 
way of the consistent disregard of the historical context.”55 The interpretation of history 
that Volkstrauertag had come to represent thus served in many ways to relativize German 
war guilt (See also Chapter Nine). “The dogma ‘death eliminated all differences’ (“Der 
Tod hat alle Unterschiede ausgelöscht”) that was propagated constantly and believed by 
many,” according to Kaiser, “contains a potential for reductionism for individual and 
collective guilt that makes possible an historically haphazard and careless overcoming of 
the past.”56
                                                           
53 See Kaiser, “‘Sie wollen gar nicht, dass wir mit lauten Worten sie ‘Helden’ nennen,’” p. 33. In her 
analysis of Volkstrauertag, Ute Frevert is somewhat less critical than Kaiser, noting the “decidedly 
inclusive” nature of the official ceremonies. See Assmann and Frevert, Geschichtsvergessenheit – 
Geschichtsversessenheit, p. 209. 
 Thus, those who conceive of Volkstrauertag in this way deem all of the war 
dead, including German soldiers, innocent by virtue of their victimization. In other 
54 Gavriel D. Rosenfeld, Munich and Memory, p. 139.  
55 Kaiser, “‘Sie wollen gar nicht, dass wir mit lauten Worten sie ‘Helden’ nennen,’” p. 71. 
56 Ibid., p. 72. 
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words, those who commemorate all victims equally might be seeking to exonerate and 
absolve German perpetrators. 
          While the national ceremonies of Volkstrauertag have always received the most 
media (and indeed, scholarly) attention, and have always been broadcast live on the radio 
and television, the local events have enjoyed a wide resonance. In fact, annual 
commemorative ceremonies held in observance of Volkstrauertag occur in over 20,000 
villages, towns, and cities in the Federal Republic.57 As Ute Frevert and Alexandra 
Kaiser observe respectively, it is also at the local level, even more than in the official 
ceremonies held in Bonn—and after reunification, in Berlin—where the holiday’s true, 
one-sided character has been revealed. For example, Frevert remarks that “The farther 
away one distanced oneself from the center and its official diction, the more the 
commemoration was limited to fallen soldiers.”58 Moreover, local observances of this all-
encompassing day of commemoration have been even more bereft of references to those 
persecuted by the Nazis. Echoing Frevert, Kaiser states, “In most communities, people 
gather at local war memorials or soldiers’ graves, places naturally devoid of reference to 
those killed by the Wehrmacht or the Nazis. The expanded conception of a 
‘commemoration day for all victims of war and violence’ never filtered down to the local 
level, where families’ memories of their ‘own’ dead have always dominated and still 
do…”59
           Of course, I am most interested in Volkstrauertag as it pertains to the 
commemoration of the dead of the expulsion, particularly when the ceremonies take 
place at local monuments. Kaiser’s main argument is that Volkstrauertag’s putative 
  
                                                           
57 Ibid., p. 66. 
58 Frevert, Geschichtsvergessenheit – Geschichtsversessenheit, p. 210. 
59 Kaiser, “Performing the New German Past,” p. 34. 
305 
 
inclusiveness “served to mask its purpose,” which was the commemoration of German 
losses, in particular, its fallen soldiers.60 The only way to do so without upsetting the 
international (and in some circles, the domestic) community was by making token 
gestures of remembrance and reconciliation to those persecuted by the Nazis, all the time 
truly only wishing to honor “unsere Toten” (our dead).61 This matches my argument 
about the subsumption of victims on many local expellee monuments, particularly those 
erected in the former GDR, most of which make vague nods to other war dead but only 
specify the victims of flight and expulsion (See Chapter Nine). By connecting all the 
victims of war (both Germany’s victims and German victims), both subsumptive 
monuments and commemorations of Volkstrauertag in this matter paint all who suffered 
with the same brush collective innocence. Not coincidently, in my opinion, the 
dedications of many of these same monuments happened on Volkstrauertag.62
          A number of expellee monuments throughout the entire Federal Republic play host 
to these annual ceremonies which, along with rituals held elsewhere in conjunction with 
Tag der Heimat, constitute the expellee organizations’ principal acts of public 
commemoration. These ceremonies have allowed the expellees to memorialize their 
losses alongside others, all while focusing exclusively on themselves. For the expellees, 
and for so many other Germans, Volkstrauertag—though conceived as an all-embracing 
  
                                                           
60 Ibid., p. 41. Serving as further evidence, she makes the very persuasive point that “The institution of a 
Remembrance Day for the Victims of National Socialism” (on January 27th) is a tacit admission that the 
VTT did not commemorate adequately victims of the Nazi regime, German or otherwise (p. 37). On this 
same point, see also Petersen, Volkstrauertag, p. 39. 
61 As such, in terms of remembrance of the war dead, Kaiser opines, WWII does not represent an 
ideological “rupture” (Bruch) as declared by others. As a proponent of this particular view, she cites 
Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning, p. 5f. 
62 A short and incomplete list of local expellee monuments dedicated on Volkstrauertag must include the 
monuments in: Altenburg, Bleicherode, Rositz, Schmölln, Steinbach-Hallenberg, Unterweißbach 
(Thuringia); Brandenburg (Brandenburg); Schwerin (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern); Minden (North Rhine-
Westphalia—discussed in Chapter Nine); Freital, Radeberg, Torgau (Saxony); Strassfurt (Saxony-Anhalt).  
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day of commemoration—remains an opportunity for German-centered commemoration. 
The following section, a more in-depth exploration of the ceremonies conducted on Tag 
der Heimat and Volkstrauertag, will explain how. 
 
COMMEMORATIVE CEREMONIES OF THE EXPELLEES 
           If the respective histories and conceptions of Tag der Heimat and Volkstrauertag 
by themselves were not persuasive enough to demonstrate the exculpatory German-
centeredness of these chief days of expellee commemoration, close analysis of the main 
elements the ceremonies comprise certainly will be. Though the initiators of the 
respective days of remembrance had different objectives when the holidays were 
originally conceived (Tag der Heimat was a day of political protest and commemoration 
of civilian dead, whereas Volkstrauertag was a day for mourning fallen soldiers), their 
fundamental raisons d’être have come to converge, especially now after Ostpolitik and 
reunification ended the possibility of a border revision. Moreover, the ceremonies 
performed during the expellees’ primary days of commemoration share some basic 
structural features and exhibit similar key elements. Above all, however, the 
commonalities are thematic: German wartime suffering—especially that experienced by 
the presumed collectively innocent expellees—is at the forefront during the ceremonies. 
Furthermore, while the festivities do not ignore the victimization of those persecuted by 
the Nazis, their emphasis on expellee experiences does overshadow it. Therefore, the 
ceremonies buttress and bring to life the one-sided historical narratives the expellee 
organizations advocate and the monuments put on display.   
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           Like their monuments then, the expellees’ commemorative ceremonies, while 
commemorative in tone, are actually political in intent. In the cases of both Tag der 
Heimat and Volkstrauertag, events have occurred for decades throughout (West) 
Germany on the national, regional, and local levels. Though some examples come from 
national events, the focus here remains on the festivities at the local level which happen 
at expellee monuments. In what follows, I provide a description of the most important 
and representative foundational features and traditional elements, particularly of those 
shared by both days of commemoration. In other cases, I stress outstanding features of 
either. Ultimately, the goal is to characterize the way the expellees’ commemorative 
ceremonies have framed their historical understandings. For this reason, continuities or 
any changes over time in how this framing has been conducted are of great interest and 
will be given extra emphasis.  
          What becomes immediately apparent upon examination of the events on Tag der 
Heimat and Volkstrauertag are ceremonies’ almost liturgical arrangements.63
                                                           
63 Kaiser, “‘Sie wollen gar nicht, dass wir mit lauten Worten sie ‘Helden’ nennen,’” p. 79. For more on the 
infusion of civic and political rituals with religious elements, see Bocock, Ritual in Industrial Society, p. 
69ff. 
 The events 
are highly organized and follow familiar patterns; in both cases, the national offices of 
the BdV and the VDK have issued guidelines (annually, in the case of the VDK, for 
Volkstrauertag) with advice for conducting local ceremonies. For example, those 
responsible for overseeing Volkstrauertag supply documents with “recommendations and 
thoughts” which have included suggestions for speeches, prayers, poems, and musical 
pieces, as well as other practical tips (e.g. on how best to publicize the event) in order to 
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set the stage properly and maximize its societal resonance.64 The BdV produced a 
revised, third edition of its recommendations for putting on Tag der Heimat celebrations 
in 1998.65 Reading the instruction booklets, it is clear in both cases that the national 
overseers have wanted the yearly local events to be observed in a certain fashion and to 
strike with a particular tone. Writing about Volkstrauertag, Kaiser states that, “Tinkering 
with Volkstrauertag is work on the power of interpretation; the schematization, the 
transformation of commemoration into set ritual forms serves to control not only the 
formal aspects but also the content and safeguards the continuation of the ‘Volkstrauertag 
idea’ into the future.”66 Her observation applies equally to the BdV’s oversight of Tag 
der Heimat, where some semblance of ceremonial conformity is also considered 
paramount. In addition to setting the tone, in both cases, the directives give the 
ceremonies a quasi-religious feel and contribute to the earnestness with which they are 
carried out.67
                                                           
64 Kaiser notes this as well.  See Kaiser, “‘Sie wollen gar nicht, dass wir mit lauten Worten sie ‘Helden’ 
nennen,’” p. 79. The instruction booklet for 2009 Volkstrauertag 2009 am 15. November. Anregungen und 
Gedanken zur Gestaltung von Gedenkstunden und Gottesdiensten is available on the Internet. 
<http://www.volksbund.de/downloads/handreichung_volkstrauertag_2009.pdf> Accessed June 24, 2010. 
 Contributing to this solemn, sacral atmosphere, local religious leaders often 
also participate. 
65 Huber, Tag der Heimat – Tag der Deutschen. One of the most interesting parts of this sixteen-page 
pamphlet is the instructions for organizing and conducting Tag der Heimat events. Topics in this section 
include costs, (ceremonies were/are to be financed locally), preparations for the media (including, for 
example, when to inform the press in order to spark the public’s interest), and preparing a worthy musical 
element to the program (Above all, works by composers from East, Sudeten, and Southeast European 
Germans were preferred, or at least works by one with a connection to the region). Huber, p. 11 
66 Kaiser, “‘Sie wollen gar nicht, dass wir mit lauten Worten sie ‘Helden’ nennen,’” p. 79. 
67 The BdV’s guidelines include a program example which structures the festivities like a religious service. 
The suggested program opens with a music piece (opening hymn), which is followed by: a formal greeting 
of dignitaries and participants (invocation), another music piece (hymn), a recitation of the Charter of the 
Expellees (creed), more music, a main address (sermon), concluding remarks (benediction) and a final 
music piece (closing hymn). According to Kaiser, the main address has formed the centerpiece of 
Volkstrauertag festivities since the Weimar period as well. See Kaiser, “‘Sie wollen gar nicht, dass wir mit 
lauten Worten sie ‘Helden’ nennen,’” pp. 75 & 79-80. 
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           Ultimately, however, the ceremonies are about politics, though the emphasis—
particularly during Tag der Heimat festivities—has shifted from a concrete politics of 
territorial revision to a broader symbolic politics of societal recognition as innocent 
victims. In this way, developments within the ceremonies themselves have pursued the 
same trajectory as identified among the different monuments’ physical designs. As we 
have seen, organizers have always intended commemorations on Tag der Heimat to be 
high-minded and uplifting. They crafted the ceremonies in such a way that the events are 
always as much about providing lessons for the future as commemorating of the past—
hence the consistent stress on the universality of their ideals: human rights, self-
determination, peace, etc. Giving further evidence of the national organizations’ efforts to 
shape the ceremonies and set the tone for the commemorations, starting in 1954, the 
BdV’s executive committee has given the annual celebrations official Leitworte (mottos), 
which have served as the thematic focal point around which events at all levels have 
revolved. According to the Tag der Heimat guidelines, each ceremony’s main speaker 
was to make the motto the centerpiece of his or her address.68
           While the mottos were somewhat ambiguous and open to interpretation (I would 
argue that they were deliberately kept so to broaden their appeal and circumvent potential 
opposition), they have provided insight into both the self-perception of the BdV and its 
objectives throughout the postwar decades as well as its understandings of the expulsion 
in light of international political developments and shifting emphases in national 
historical narratives. Strikingly, the change over time in the tenor of the mottos of Tag 
der Heimat corresponds with the change in tone seen on the monuments. They, too, 
document this shift and enable us to trace it. For example, early mottos accentuated the 
 
                                                           
68 Huber, Tag der Heimat – Tag der Deutschen, p. 11. 
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expellee organizations’ chief objective of territorial reacquisition and the procurement of 
more political rights: In Ost und West – deutsche Heimat! (In the East and West – 
German Homeland! 1954), Recht und Treue siegen! (Justice and Loyalty Triumph, 1957), 
Heimat verpflichtet! (Obligated to the Homeland! 1958) Heimat in Freiheit! (Heimat in 
Freedom! 1959), Selbstbestimmung auch für Deutsche! (Self-Determination for Germans 
Too! 1960). As the political tide turned against the interests of the expellee organizations, 
particularly on the question of West Germany’s recognition of the Oder/Neisse, the 
emphases changed: Verständigung und Frieden – kein neues Versailles! (Understanding 
and Peace – No New Versailles! 1967), Wer Gewalt anerkennt, verliert den Frieden! (He 
Who Recognizes Violence Loses the Peace! 1970),  Gefahr für Deutschland – Gefahr für 
Europa! (Danger for Germany – Danger for Europe! 1971), Das Ziel bleibt: Die freie 
Heimat im freien Europa! (The Goal Remains: Free Homeland in a Free Europe! 1973). 
As the slogans indicate, the thrust behind the Tag der Heimat commemorations in the 
quarter century after the holiday was established remained on concrete politics.  
          Much like the inscriptions on local expellee monuments, however, the BdV’s 
executive committee moved away from vociferous political protest after Ostpolitik and 
the emergence of Holocaust-centered historical narratives to more somber and 
contemplative slogans. Instead of calling for a revision of the territorial status quo, the 
Tag der Heimat ceremonies have focused more on symbolic politics: on the broader 
societal recognition and explicit acknowledgement of expellee suffering, righting 
historical wrongs, historical truth, and justice. For instance, Gegen die Mauer des 
Schweigens – Ganz Deutschland verpflichtet! (Against the Wall of Silence – Obligated to 
All of Germany! 1979), 10 Jahre Ostverträge – die deutsche Frage bleibt offen! (10 
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Years of the Eastern Treaties – The German Question Remains Open! 1982), 40 Jahre 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland – Das ganze Deutschland ist unser Vaterland! (40 Years of 
the Federal Republic of Germany – All of Germany is Our Fatherland! 1989), Für Recht 
und geschichtliche Wahrheit! (For Justice and Historical Truth! 1992), 50 Jahre Flucht, 
Deportation, Vertreibung – Unrecht bleibt Unrecht! (50 Years Flight, Deportation, 
Expulsion – Injustice Remains Injustice! 1995), Heimat ist Auftrag – Gerechtigkeit unser 
Ziel! (Homeland is Our Mandate – Justice Our Goal! 1996)  Erinnern – Bewahren – 
Zukunft gewinnen (Remembrance – Preservation – Winning the Future, 2002), Erinnern 
und Verstehen (Remember and Understand, 2008),  Wahrheit und Gerechtigkeit – Ein 
starkes Europa! (Truth and Justice – A strong Europe! 2009) Once again, the effort to 
shape a more expulsion-centered historical narrative is reflected in this year’s slogan: 
Durch Wahrheit zum Miteinander (Through Truth to Togetherness, 2010).69
          The attendance and participation of political figures at these ceremonies is clearly 
desirable. Though the events are officially organized by the VDK, the Federal 
Government has played an increasing role in carrying out Volkstrauertag ceremonies at 
the national level. Representatives of the government have long recited the official list of 
dead to be commemorated (Totenehrung—more about this illuminating facet of postwar 
commemoration below). Furthermore, since 1993 officials from the five branches of 
government have taken part in wreath-laying ceremonies at the Neue Wache in Berlin.
 
70
                                                           
69 A complete list (1954-2010) of all Tag der Heimat mottos can be found on the Bavarian BdV’s website: 
<http://www.bdv-bayern.de/72.html> Accessed: April 12, 2010. 
 
In the 2000s, the appearance alone of government officials at the national celebration of 
Tag der Heimat is no longer newsworthy—although their comments there often are. In 
both cases, events at the local level are more likely to feature representatives of city and 
70 Kaiser, “Performing the New German Past,” p. 32 & p. 34. 
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communal governments or national parliamentary backbenchers.71 For the most part, 
gone are the days when the unveiling of a new monument prompts the participation of 
major national political figures as in the dedication ceremony at Schloss Burg (attended 
by Federal President Theodor Heuss) or Bad Harzburg (attended by Ernst Reuter and 
federal government cabinet members) in the 1950s. At any rate, the BdV’s Tag der 
Heimat guidelines suggest contacting possible participants well in advance and urges 
local organizers to reach out to their state-level BdV office, should they need help finding 
a suitable speaker.72
           A second central and illuminating component of these ceremonies is the 
aforementioned recitation of a “Totenehrung.”
 Obviously, the participation of government representatives adds to 
the “decidedly political character” but it also lends some official sanction to the event 
and, more importantly, to the ideas and beliefs espoused there. 
73 The fact alone that a list of those to be 
commemorated is presented during these ceremonies is in itself not interesting. What 
makes it noteworthy, however, is that the Totenehrung has become an indispensable 
component of both Tag der Heimat and Volkstrauertag events on all levels.74
                                                           
71  For example, during the over two decades between 1983-2006 the Tag der Heimat ceremonies in Hagen, 
North Rhine-Westphalia included the participation of a former parliamentary state secretary, members of 
the Bundestag, members of the Landtag, the chairman of the Silesian Landsmannschaft, the state chairman 
of the BdV, et. al. 
 The ritual 
consists of the public reading of a list of people deemed worthy of recognition and 
remembrance. As we have seen, the official list of those commemorated on 
Volkstrauertag was expanded to include “all victims of war and violence” surprisingly 
72 Huber, Tag der Heimat – Tag der Deutschen, p. 11. 
73 Kaiser translates this as “honoring of the dead.” See Kaiser, “Performing the New German Past,” p. 32. 
74 Citing a VDK source, Kaiser writes that the Totenehrung is among the three key elements of 
Volkstrauertag that, according to the Volksbund, must always be included. The others are a wreath-laying 
ceremony and the playing of the “Lied vom Guten Kameraden”—which is discussed in detail below. See 
Kaiser, “‘Sie wollen gar nicht, dass wir mit lauten Worten sie ‘Helden’ nennen,’” p. 77. The importance of 
the recitation of the Totenehrung is indicated in the fact that virtually all VDK publications include a 
version of the list. A Totenehrung has also been an important feature of Tag der Heimat festivities at all 
levels in all decades. 
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early—the late 1950s and early 1960s. In particular, it was the mutability of the 
Totenehrung which allowed for this inclusion.75 With the new list, it was easy to make 
the largely empty gesture Kaiser describes toward non-German victims, without 
abandoning the commemorative day’s German-centered commemorative thrust. There 
can be little doubt that the augmentation of the Totenehrung at the national 
commemorations of Volkstrauertag can be seen as a bellwether for larger changes to 
come in (West) Germany’s memory culture. Over the years, organizers have updated the 
text frequently to reflect the changing commemorative landscape and address 
contemporary remembrance needs. More recent modifications include the honoring of 
fallen Bundeswehr soldiers and victims of terrorism and xenophobia.76
           What this means in practice, of course, is that during the reading of the 
Totenehrung, the war dead of WWII and its aftermath—including victims of the 
Holocaust, fallen German soldiers, and the victims of flight and expulsion—are 
memorialized alongside those killed in more recent fighting and strife, both within 
Germany and abroad, as well as those who perished during the First World War. Thus, 
 The official list 
clearly aims at comprehensiveness. Still, while references to non-German victims are 
rather vague, the references to German victims are more precise. 
                                                           
75 Ibid., p. 77. 
76 The current text recommended by the VDK specifically mentions the victims of flight and expulsion and 
reads in full: “Today we think about the victims of violence and war, on the children, women and men of 
all peoples. We commemorate the soldiers who died in the world wars, the people who died due to the war 
or thereafter in prison or as expellees and refugees. We commemorate those who were persecuted or killed 
because they belonged to another Volk or were defined as belonging to another race or were declared unfit 
to live because of illness or handicap. We commemorate those who perished because they resisted against 
dictatorship and those who found their deaths because of their religious conviction or because they stood by 
their faith. We mourn the victims of war and civil war of our time, the victims of terrorism and political 
persecution, the soldiers of the Bundeswehr and other forces who have lost their lives in overseas 
engagements. We commemorate today those who have been victimized here because of hatred and violence 
against foreigners and the weak. We mourn with the mothers and all those who suffer because of the 
deaths. But our life stands in the hope of reconciliation amongst peoples and groups of people and our 
responsibility lies in peace amongst peoples at home and in the world.” As cited in Volkstrauertag 2009 am 
15. November, p. 5.  
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much like the expellee monuments dedicated “To the Dead of the War, the Expulsion, 
and Dictatorship,” the Totenehrung subsumes all who died into one undifferentiated 
category of victims. Indeed the current version might be the most flagrant instance of 
victim subsumption. But it does even more than just subsume. By linking the dead of the 
Second World War with the modern victims of terrorism and right-wing extremism, the 
distinction between the victims and perpetrators of WWII are more than simply blurred. 
They are dissolved all together. As discussed at length above (and in Chapter Nine), the 
implications for attributions of culpability and guilt are profound when all war dead are 
treated equally. 
          Tag der Heimat ceremonies also regularly incorporate a Totenehrung. To honor the 
dead, attendees are generally asked to rise for a moment of silence prior to the reading. 
Whereas the Volkstrauertag traditions of the Totenehrung have changed overtime, the 
recitations at these ceremonies have remained relatively constant: the ritual necrologies 
focus on the experience of Germans, namely those who fled and were expelled from the 
eastern provinces. The circle of those deserving commemoration has only grown 
minimally to include victims of the Nazis but has remained expansive and flexible 
enough to capture the various plights of Germans from the East as well as that of other 
expellees. A brief comparison of the Totenehrung recited at a local Tag der Heimat 
ceremony in Leverkusen in 1952 to the text presented by BdV Chairwoman Erika 
Steinbach at the national Tag der Heimat commemoration in 2006 will demonstrate this.  
          The 1952 version makes clear early on that even though the dead were to be 
honored, the territorial question would also be touched upon. It opens flatly: “We 
commemorate the dead. We commemorate the mothers and fathers, violently separated 
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from us, who rest in the earth of our Heimat. They wait for our return!” Clearly, the 
expectation was that the border situation was provisional and that it was only a matter of 
time before the former (German) inhabitants would be repatriated to their former 
homelands to tend to the graves of their ancestors and relatives. The text also mentioned 
the soldiers of the Wehrmacht. “We commemorate those who fell for us and our mutual 
Fatherland.” According to this telling, Hitler’s armies had been engaged in a defensive 
battle to protect civilians rather than a war of conquest and annihilation. The next section 
was also de-contextualized historically. As was typical at that time, it focused on the 
wartime (and postwar) suffering of the Germans from the East, including the various 
stages of evacuation, flight, the “wild expulsions,” the post-Potsdam Agreement forced 
resettlement, and even the difficult integration into West German society.  
We German expellees commemorate all the brothers and sisters who fell victim to ethnic 
hatred and inhumanity. We commemorate those who we had to leave behind on the 
streets of flight and expulsion. We commemorate those deported and the tortured, those 
who froze to death and drowned, those who were innocently beaten to death and executed 
in violation of the law. We commemorate the 3.5 million people of our ethnic groups 
(unserer Volksgruppen) whose blood soaked the earth after the cessation of hostilities. 
We commemorate all those struck by fate who died in desperation and despair, here, far 
from home, in the years of hunger and misery.  
 
What is missing, of course, is a reference to what precipitated all this suffering. The 
grounds for these calamities must have been understood by everyone in attendance 
because they were not at all mentioned. In fact, the text expressed no causality. The 
Totenehrung also makes apparent that the expellees at this time did not understand 
themselves to be “normal” casualties of war. Disconnecting their suffering further from 
the armed hostilities that Germany had unleashed, the text stressed the (by all accounts 
wildly exaggerated) numbers of dead killed after the war ended. 
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           Interestingly, a vague nod to non-Germans victims followed. “We commemorate 
the people of all nations (Völker) who suffered and died in the inferno of inhumanity.” 
Who exactly these other people were is unclear. Again, no one in particular is made 
accountable for the “inferno of inhumanity” that brought about their demise. Apparently, 
it was fate akin to a natural disaster. The recitation concluded with an uplifting 
admonishment—what might be the most baffling passage of all. “They all [the dead] do 
not call us to revenge and retribution. And they certainly must not have suffered for 
nothing. Instead they want that those of us still living see a meaning and task (Sinn und 
Auftrag) in their deaths. Therefore do not commemorate them only as victims of the past, 
commemorate them as martyrs of what is to come!” The people commemorated in the 
1952 text had not died in vain but were instead to be considered sacrificial victims who 
perished for an unspecified greater good.  
          Despite the passage of over fifty years, Erika Steinbach’s 2006 Totenehrung 
echoed the 1952 text in many ways.77 Gone, however, was a reference to the 
Wehrmacht.78
                                                           
77 The text was reprinted in an online document called “Dokumentation zum Tag der Heimat 2006. 
Menschenrecht achten – Vertreibungen ächten. Festakt des Bundes der Vertriebenen in Berlin, 2. 
September 2006.” <http://www.bund-der-vertriebenen.de/files/tdhdokumentation061.pdf> Accessed 
August 12, 2010. 
 Though the possibility of a return to the former homeland was long gone, 
the theme of “Heimat” was the first one invoked. “We think of the Heimat, of the Heimat 
of our parents and grandparents. We will keep you in our hearts.” Then Steinbach began 
her enumeration of the dead to be memorialized: “We commemorate the grandparents 
and parents, the wives and fiancées, sisters, brothers and children who lost their lives 
because the streets were jammed and snowed over or because they were overrun by 
78 The role of the Wehrmacht and its fallen soldiers in “defending” the expellees is still lauded at Tag der 
Heimat ceremonies and at less prominent gatherings of the expellee organizations on the local level, for 
example, at the Kleines Ostpreussentreffen at Schloss Burg an der Wupper, which I attended in July 2007. 
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tanks. We commemorate those for whom the ice over the lagoon (reference to the 
Kurisches Haff and Frisches Haff—two lagoons on the Baltic Sea) and rivers did not hold 
or was blown up. We commemorate those who were overcome by the waves and who 
sank in the icy flood as they tried to escape the death-bringing front on ships.” The 
desperate scenes she described were references to the perilous flight westward near the 
end of the war, as well as to the destruction of the Wilhelm Gustloff by a Soviet 
submarine. As has often been the case, the BdV presents some of the most harrowing 
expulsion experiences as archetypal or representative.     
           Steinbach continued with other familiar tropes. “We commemorate the women, 
men, and children who were deported for forced labor and have since disappeared. They 
remained lying on some country road and were shot to death. They disappeared on the 
side of railway streets in the far reaches of Siberia and were covered by snow.” What 
followed immediately thereafter was perhaps the most intriguing section of the official 
2006 Totenehrung. It included what might be interpreted as a reference to victims of the 
Nazis.  “We commemorate everyone who died in death camps (in Todeslagern) or were 
killed in massacres.”79
                                                           
79 For a scholarly article on the internment of Germans after the war and how it was commemorated, see 
Rex Rexhauser, “Das Bild des Nachkriegslagers in Lamsdorf im kollektiven Gedächtnis der Deutschen,” 
Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung.50 (2001), pp. 48-72. 
 Some ethnic Germans from the eastern provinces had indeed been 
held in camps at the end of the war, and thereafter, but they were hardly “death camps.” 
Of course, Steinbach might have been referencing Jews or other victims of the Nazi 
concentration camp system but because of the context this is difficult to imagine. The 
next statement, however, was definitely a reference to non-Germans: “We commemorate 
in gratefulness the men and women of other peoples who offered help despite the 
personal danger.” However, the reference applies as much to the travails of the expellees 
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(after all, they were the ones who needed the assistance) as it does to their helpful, non-
German neighbors. At any rate, the text does not include another reference to victims of 
the Nazis.  
          Next, Steinbach honored two expellee dignitaries: first, the recently deceased Peter 
Glotz, SPD politician and co-chairman (with Steinbach) of the Center Against Expulsions 
Foundation, for his “efforts for a complete historical account” (Geschichtsbild), and 
second, the chairman of the Silesian Landsmannschaft, Herbert Hupka. Steinbach did not 
mention other non-Germans unless it served the needs of the expellee organizations. She 
followed the homage with a self-serving reference to victims of expulsion in other areas 
of the world. “We share (nehmen Anteil) in the fates of all peoples of other nations who 
have been and are being expelled. We feel for them.”80
          The recitation of a Totenehrung has been a key component of Tag der Heimat and 
Volkstrauertag ceremonies on all levels. The versions of the Totenehrung cited here are 
 By expressing solidarity with 
other victims of ethnic cleansing and displacement, the BdV’s chairwoman de-
contextualized the German expulsion experience and linked it to that of other, more 
recent instances of forced migration, the images of which still flickered in the minds of 
many. The circumstances surrounding more recent events were unquestionably different. 
Clearly, not all expulsions are the same. She concluded the Totenehrung with a similarly 
uplifting admonition: “The dead have found their peace. They implore us by the 
thousands, yes, by the millions to work for peace and tolerance. That is our task. We will 
never forget the dead. They have a place in our hearts!” 
                                                           
80 The victims of expulsion as a result of the Balkan Wars in the 1990s helped raise the profile of the 
expellee organizations. According to Gilad Margalit, images in the German media of downtrodden victims 
of ethnic cleansing and the displacement of various groups in Europe were a major catalyst in reopening the 
discussions about the German experience of expulsion during WWII and its aftermath. See Margalit, Guilt, 
Suffering, and Memory, p. 231. 
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typical. This abiding tradition has allowed for one-sided, exculpatory commemorations of 
the German dead of the Second World War. Another enduring—and similarly 
problematic—tradition that occurs during ceremonies on both key days of expellee 
commemoration is the ritual performance of the song “Ich hatt’ einen Kameraden” (“I 
Had a Comrade”),81 labeled by one journalist Germany’s “secret national anthem.”82
          The song has its origins in the wars of liberation during the Napoleonic occupation 
of German lands. Its text was written in 1809 by Ludwig Uhland and put to music in 
1825 by Friedrich Silcher. In time, it came to be seen as the German equivalent of the 
 The 
playing of the song testifies to the centrality of the German experience at these gatherings 
and to the self-referential, self-pitying nature of the commemorative ceremonies that take 
place on Tag der Heimat and Volkstrauertag. Though brief rhetorical gestures are made 
toward the suffering of others there, German war losses remain paramount. The song is 
usually played at the conclusion of the Totenehrung. It is also often at this time that 
wreaths are laid at the feet of monuments. 
                                                           
81 The song’s title is sometimes also given as “Der Gute Kamerad” (“The Good Comrade”) or the “Lied 
vom guten Kameraden” (“Song of the Good Comrade”). The lyrics are as follows: 
 
Ich hatt’ einen Kameraden,   I had a comrade, 
Einen besseren findst du nit. A better one you’ll never find. 
Die Trommel schlug zum Streite, The drum banged to battle, 
Er ging an meiner Seite  He walked by my side 
Im gleichen Schritt und Tritt. step for step. 
 
Eine Kugel kam geflogen  A bullet came flying 
Gilt’s mir oder gilt es dir?  Is it for me or for you? 
Ihn hat es weggerissen,  It ripped him away, 
Er liegt mir vor den Füßen, he lied at my feet, 
Als wär’s ein Stück von mir. As if it was a piece of me. 
 
Will mir die Hand noch reichen, Wanted to reach me his hand 
Derweil ich eben lad:  While I was reloading: 
“Kann dir die Hand nicht geben, “I can’t give you my hand, 
Bleib du im ewigen Leben,  Remain for eternity, 
Mein guter Kamerad!”  My good comrade!” 
82 Kurt Oesterle, “Die heimliche deutsche Nationalhymne,” taz Magazin. November 10, 2001. 
320 
 
American “Taps”—a funereal military song played at the burials of the fallen soldiers. 
Before long, its appeal broadened to the general public as well. Norbert Elias wrote that 
this song and others like it were part of the conditioning process which produced within 
the German people the compulsion “to follow leaders who proclaimed it to be the duty of 
Germans once more to take the field against the common foe.”83 The song was intoned 
during the Weimar Republic to commemorate Germany’s two million fallen soldiers, 
remained a key element of commemorations of Heldengedenktag during the Third 
Reich,84 and has continued to be heard despite its loaded militaristic legacy at the burials 
of Bundeswehr soldiers as well as at civilian commemorative ceremonies in (West) 
Germany throughout the post-WWII era, including, of course, those of the expellees.85
           The performance of “Ich hatt’ einen Kameraden” has become a fixture of postwar 
commemorative ceremonies of all kinds.
 
86 Tapping into this tradition has become a 
tradition itself. In the case of Volkstrauertag, Kaiser finds in the continued playing of this 
threnody—what she calls “the commemoration day’s most central symbol”—the most 
obvious instance of the holiday’s continuity over time despite the expanded circle of 
victims the day has come to embrace.87
                                                           
83 Norbert Elias, The Germans: Power Struggles and the Development of Habitus in the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries. Tr. Eric Dunning and Stephen Mennell. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996), p. 332. In this same study and about this song, Elias contended that, “Few other peoples had in their 
national mystique, in their poetry, and in their songs so many allusions to death and self-sacrifice as did the 
Germans” (p. 331). 
 That is not to say, however, that the song’s usage 
has not been without its critics. Kurt Oesterle elucidated an official inquiry into the 
84 According to Volker Ackermann, the playing of the song was not only the domain of common soldiers 
but was also played at funerals of fallen members of the SS as well. See Ackermann, Nationale Totenfeiern 
in Deutschland. Von Wilhelm I. bis Franz Josef Strauss. Eine Studie zur politischen Semiotik. (Stuttgart: 
Klett-Cotta, 1990). 
85 Kaiser, “‘Sie wollen gar nicht, dass wir mit lauten Worten sie ‘Helden’ nennen,’” pp. 76-77. 
86 A nine-part video of the Tag der Heimat ceremony in 2008 at the expellee monument in Leverkusen 
includes a one-sided Totenehrung as well as a performance of “Ich hatt’ einen Kameraden.” The video is 
available on Youtube: Tag der Heimat in Leverkusen 2008 (Teil 4) 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XCgHitjO_Qs&feature=related> Accessed August 15, 2010. 
87 Kaiser, “Performing the New German Past,” p. 31. 
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song’s origins and uses with the Folk Music Archive in Freiburg in the early 1990s. 
Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker’s office wished to investigate the song’s 
aptness for the memorial culture of the newly reunited Federal Republic.88 On the local 
level as well, contends Oesterle, the song (especially the third stanza) is regularly 
criticized by peace activists who protest against the song’s glorification of war and death 
in war. This is opposed, in turn, by veterans, who feel personally attacked when an 
alternative song is selected. Why? As to the former, as Kaiser put it, “The song embodies 
an uncritical glorification of soldierly comradeship, distorts death in war to a silent, 
valorous, heroic death (Heldentod) and gives it meaning without questioning the meaning 
of the war.”89 Kaiser believes the song “romanticiz[es] and glorif[ies] a soldier’s death in 
war while emphasizing its arbitrariness.”90 Clearly, the song was tarnished by its usage 
during observances of Heldengedenktag during the National Socialist era as well as by its 
espousal of military virtue—an untenable position for some in light of the atrocities 
brought about by German soldiers in WWII.91 Presumably for this reason, in most cases 
today the song is played instrumentally at commemorative ceremonies.92
                                                           
88 Oesterle cites the archivist’s response which stated that “Ich hatt’ einen Kameraden“—in addition to 
“Silent Night” and Mendelssohn’s “Wedding March“—belong to the irreplaceable  musical standard types 
in the everyday lives of average citizens. See Oesterle, “Die heimliche deutsche Nationalhymne.” 
 
89 Kaiser, “‘Sie wollen gar nicht, dass wir mit lauten Worten sie ‘Helden’ nennen,’” p. 77. 
90 Kaiser, “Performing the New German Past,” p. 31. 
91 On the continued usage of the song after WWII, particularly during observances of Volkstrauertag, Kai 
Kruse and Wolfgang Kruse write, “[T]he attempt to transform the military cult on Volkstrauertag to a 
pacifist one without distancing it from the traditional rituals honoring soldiers was not convincing from the 
start, especially since the still-played song “Ich hatt’ einen Kameraden” must have seemed as a mockery to 
the victims of National Socialist dictatorship to whom commemoration of Volkstrauertag is actually also 
dedicated.” See Kruse and Kruse, “Kriegerdenkmäler in Bielefeld. Ein lokalhistorischer Beitrag zur 
Entwicklungsanalyse des deutschen Gefallenenkultes im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert,” in Reinhart Koselleck 
and M. Jeismann (eds.) Der politische Totenkult. Kriegerdenkmäler in der Moderne. (Munich: Wilhelm 
Fink Verlag, 1994), p. 128. 
92 This compromise arrangement does not seem satisfactory to Kaiser, who writes that most participants at 
the ceremonies know the lyrics and that even the history of the song’s use implicates it. See Kaiser, “‘Sie 
wollen gar nicht, dass wir mit lauten Worten sie ‘Helden’ nennen,’” p. 77. Indeed, the program for Tag der 
Heimat 1951 in Leverkusen includes the song’s full text. 
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           Throughout its existence, however, the song has been claimed and used by 
Germans of all social groups and political stripes. The explanation for the widespread 
usage of this song lies at the heart of my analysis. Oesterle attributes the lasting 
popularity to its capacity to be contemporized and adapted to new circumstances. Though 
the situation changes, the “ur-comrade” (Urkamerad) always remains recognizable. 
“Uhland’s song became, so to speak, a song to write over (Überschreiblied), a palimpsest 
hymn like the writing templates of the Middle Ages, which could be scratched off and 
written on again even though the old writing was still legible under the new.”93 The still-
visible traces of the past are of course why the song, despite its popularity in most circles, 
remains contentious in others. In her attempt to analyze the song’s prolonged 
pervasiveness, Eschebach opines that in contrast to the majority of other songs played at 
commemorative ceremonies, “Ich hatt’ einen Kameraden” contains no “vision of 
community” (Gemeinschaftsvorstellung). Rather, she claims, at the core remains an “I” 
who speaks to the dying comrade as “he” then as “you.” She writes, “This presentation of 
war death as a personal experience is possibly the reason that this song has proven to be 
resistant to all the political ruptures of recent German history. The mourning is not 
directed toward an abstract collective of fallen soldiers but instead toward the individual 
whose death, in a late-Romantic gesture, is described as a harmonious farewell scene.”94
           Both of these explanations seem plausible but neither explains entirely why this 
song has been serially intoned at the commemorative ceremonies of the expellees. Indeed 
 
The grief symbolized by the playing of this melancholy melody is thus singularly applied 
to individual soldiers.  
                                                           
93 Oesterle, “Die heimliche deutsche Nationalhymne.” 
94 Eschebach, Öffentliches Gedenken, p. 85. 
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it seems particularly strange, to say the least, that a song with a decidedly military theme 
would be performed in that setting. After all, though fallen soldiers are frequently 
mentioned, the primary focus of remembrance at expellee events is almost exclusively on 
civilians—on their deaths, and on their lost homelands. Building on both theories, my 
explanation would also tend to emphasize the personalized nature of the song, which in 
my opinion has enabled contemporary mourners to see themselves in either the fallen 
comrade or his surviving friend (or both). Reversing Eschebach’s proposal, therefore, I 
would suggest that the mourning—as depicted in the lyrics of the song—emanates from 
an individual, a single soldier who bewails his loss. Directed toward individuals, the 
mourning is also conducted by individuals who lament their losses. In that regard also, it 
is personalized, one-sided. As such, “Ich hatt’ einen Kameraden” is in keeping with the 
expellee organizations’ historical interpretations and with those of all other Germans who 
wish to commemorate their losses. Thus the song’s original mood and compositional 
motivation corresponds to the mood and motivation behind the commemorative 
ceremonies of the expellees—even though its explicit themes do not. 
 
CONCLUSION 
          It should be noted that while they display some striking continuities over time, the 
expellees’ chief commemorative ceremonies and the days of commemoration on which 
they are held have proven to be very adaptable. The organizers of these events have been 
adept at responding to altered political circumstances, shifting social climates, and the 
emergence of new historical interpretations.95
                                                           
95 It is certainly true that these commemorative ceremonies resonate differently than in the past. In general, 
they no longer draw tens of thousands or even thousand participants. Instead, numbers of attendees are 
 That said, when taken together, the rituals 
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performed on all levels during the commemorative ceremonies of the expellees have 
framed historical understandings in a way that highlights German wartime suffering. The 
ceremonies that make up Tag der Heimat and Volkstrauertag—the most important days 
of commemoration for the expellee organizations—show in thought, word, and deed that 
even though the victims of the Nazis are usually mentioned in a rote and perfunctory 
way, the commemorative focus has remained primarily if not exclusively on the German 
experience of WWII and its aftermath. Analysis of the chief days of expellee 
commemoration and of some of the key elements of those ceremonies—their proscribed 
liturgical organization; the related, direction-giving slogans for Tag der Heimat; the 
practice of reciting a Totenehrung; and the performance of “Ich hatt’ einen 
Kameraden”—demonstrates this. Thus, like their local monuments, the expellee 
organizations’ commemorative ceremonies reflect and generate postwar narratives which 
decry the forfeiture of Germany’s eastern territories and accentuate the singularity of the 
suffering inflicted by the loss of Heimat, as well as which paint the expellees as 
collectively innocent victims. Seen in a different light, the ceremonies reinforce and echo 
the historical interpretations already articulated by the monuments.  
           More than just an exploration of the expellee organizations’ key days of 
commemoration and the rituals of which they are comprised, however, what I have 
                                                           
more likely to be in the hundreds or even dozens. Winter and Sivan have written about the natural attrition 
of commemorative groups and the difficulty of sustaining such memory communities: “In this and other 
areas, agency is arduous. Its opportunity costs—time, money, effort—are substantial. And it rarely lasts. 
Other tasks take precedence; other issues crowd out the ones leading to public work. And ageing takes its 
toll: people fade away, either personally or physically. The collective remembrance of past warfare, old 
soldiers, and the victims of wars is, therefore, a quixotic act. It is both an effort to think publicly about 
painful issues in the past and one which is bound to decompose over time.” Jay Winter and Emmanuel 
Sivan, “Setting the Framework” in Winter and Sivan (eds.) War and Remembrance in the Twentieth 
Century. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 10. Nevertheless, the expellee organizations 
continue to congregate for annual commemorative ceremonies and other activities. As we have seen, these 




endeavored to accomplish here has been to demonstrate the important role played by 
monuments in vivifying these German-centered accounts of the past. To be sure, the 
monuments have a significance that goes beyond merely standing silent and overlooked 
in a cemetery or a municipal courtyard. Here, monuments help bring historical narratives 
to life. As Klaus Neumann writes, “[A] memorial’s visibility also depends on how and 
when people talk about it, or more generally, on how it is used.”96 The best place to 
observe how monuments and other memorials are used, I would argue, is at the 
commemorative ceremonies which take place there. As we have seen, the ceremonies 
constitute the key moments when historical narratives are put into motion. 
Concomitantly, it is precisely during these ceremonies when monuments are most closely 
engaged with and (re)interpreted. Expellee monuments provide the physical space for this 
to occur. Thus, the ceremonies bring the monuments to life in ways otherwise impossible 
and add an additional dimension to their mnemonic capabilities.97
                                                           
96 Klaus Neumann, Shifting Memories: The Nazi Past in the New Germany. (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2000), p. 231.   
 As such, as the staging 
area for many of the observances of Tag der Heimat and Volkstrauertag, local expellee 
monuments are central loci of remembrance for the expellee organizations.    
97 According to Jeismann and Westheider, commemorative ceremonies offer insight into how monuments 
are perceived in the years after newness wears off. They write, “Monuments are quickly forgotten. […] Not 
until ritualized, extraordinary acts—forming a cultic-auratic ensemble—are conducted there, does 
commemoration of the dead become the cult of the dead (Totengedenken zum Totenkult). Individual 
mourning is not bound to a certain day or to public ritual even when these can serve as a cause for it. This 
is different from the collective, political cult of the dead, which first takes flight in the ritualized recurrence 
of commemoration. […] The annual, ritual commemorations offered the opportunity to modify the political 
interpretation of the experiences of war and death and to adapt it to contemporary needs for justification.” 
See Michael Jeismann and Rolf Westheider, “Wofür stirbt der Bürger? Nationaler Totenkult und 
Staatsbürgertum in Deutschland und Frankreich seit der Französischen Revolution,” in Koselleck and 









LOCAL EXPELLEE MONUMENTS: 
COMMEMORATIVE IN TONE, POLITICAL IN INTENT? 
           This dissertation is an all-encompassing examination of local expellee monuments. 
In particular, I investigated the historical narratives that these monuments have made 
expressed. My study had three parts. In the Introduction, I presented my topic, 
enumerated the central arguments and formulated the study’s key question, discussed the 
sources and methodology, and laid out my study’s overall organization. This I followed 
with Part I in which I contextualized my work theoretically and historically. In Chapter 
One, I defined local expellee monuments and showed in general how monument initiators 
use them to construct historical counternarratives. Here, I also situated my work within 
larger debates on the mnemonic capabilities of monuments. The focus of Chapter Two 
was on an historical framework for my subsequent interpretations of expellee 
monuments. To this end, I periodized perceptions of the expellees and the expulsion in 
Germany in light of changing political and cultural contexts to explain why expellee 
monuments have taken the forms and employed the rhetoric they have. In the process, I 
directly addressed the first of my central arguments that German wartime suffering has 
never been taboo.  
           Part II constituted the empirical core of my analysis. Here, I presented evidence 
that substantiate my second and third central arguments: First, that local expellee 
monuments have been part of efforts to shape discussions of WWII victimhood; and 
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second, that the monuments facilitate and promote the construction of German-centered 
historical narratives. The two dominant subjects of the more than one thousand expellee 
monuments in reunited Germany correspond to the major themes of these narratives. For 
this reason, I categorized the monuments into two overarching thematic clusters: (A.) 
“Loss of Heimat and Territorial Claims,” and (B.) “Aesthetics of Innocence.” I then 
created categories of distinct monument groups within each cluster, which formed the 
basis for individual chapters.  
           Part III consisted of a single chapter in which I examined the expellees’ key rituals 
and remembrance practices involving local monuments, particularly those held on Tag 
der Heimat and Volkstrauertag. Here, I explored these chief days of expellee 
commemoration and discussed how the commemorative ceremonies performed on them 
bring the monuments’ historical narratives to life.  
 
*****        
          In a provocative essay published in 2005, Michael Schwartz—a leading historian 
of the expulsion and its societal ramifications, and whose work I have cited repeatedly in 
this dissertation—takes to task a number of scholars who challenge the legitimacy of 
expellees’ assertions of victimization.1
                                                           
1 Michael Schwartz, “Dürfen Vertriebene Opfer sein? Zeitgeschichtliche Überlegungen zu einem Problem 
deutscher und europäischer Identität,” Deutschland-Archiv Vol. 38 Issue 3, 2005; pp. 494-505. 
Specifically, Schwartz criticizes Constantin Goschler, Philipp Ther, as well as Eva and Hans Henning 
Hahn. 
 These writers, Schwartz claims, level unfair and 
insensitive criticism at the expellees’ desire for recognition of their suffering, particularly 
in the form of a national Center Against Expulsions. He contends that such authors 
rationalize and justify the expulsion as a warranted form of “collective punishment” 
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meted out primarily against women, children, and old people.2 Schwartz concedes that 
not all expellees were “innocent.” Nonetheless, as he states, “not every member of the 
Nazi party was automatically a Nazi perpetrator.”3 Schwartz argues that today the most 
vocal advocates of the Zentrum and the acknowledgement it would bring are those who 
experienced flight and forced migration as adolescents. In other words, they are even less 
likely to have been tainted by a Nazi past. In addition, he points out that those same 
people and their descendants have experienced similar kinds of psychological issues as 
those of Holocaust victims and their offspring.4 Schwartz calls attention, moreover, to the 
fact that the status as victim brought about no real advantages and was actually a sign of 
“weakness, abuse, and humiliation.”5 He points out other neglected aspects in current 
debates over memory culture in modern Germany as well, such as the often antagonistic 
relationships between local Germans and the expellee newcomers, particularly in the first 
fifteen years after the end of the war.6
                                                           
2 Ibid., p. 496. 
 Above all, expellees seek today the historical 
recognition of their suffering not only from their Polish, Czech, and other Eastern 
European neighbors but also from their own countrymen. This type of acknowledgement 
will in no way overshadow the victims of German atrocities during the Third Reich, 
Schwartz maintains. “At present, it is not about an alternative, but rather about a 
complementary consideration of memory (eine ergänzende erinnerungspolitische 
3 Ibid., p. 496. 
4 Ibid., p. 496 & 497. 
5 Ibid., p. 497. 
6 Ibid., p. 500. On this point, see also Kossert, Kalte Heimat. Schwartz states that envious local Germans 
countered expellees’ demands for material aid with the reproach that the expellees were themselves at fault 
for what had befallen them because of the Germans from the East were supposedly even more ardent 
followers of National Socialism. 
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Berücksichtigung) of German victims of war and its aftermath. This addition is overdue 
and ought to be seen less as a danger than as an opportunity.”7
           Schwartz clearly has a problem with how certain historical facts are overlooked in 
contemporary debates and believes that all expellees are painted with a single brush. The 
essay’s title takes the form of a question: Dürfen Vertriebene Opfer sein? (May expellees 
be victims?), which he answers affirmatively. Despite all the criticism in this dissertation, 
my reply to the question is also a resounding “yes.” As I have stated throughout, I do not 
contend at all that German expellees did not suffer on their westward treks toward the 
end of the war, or during their forced transfer after the conclusion of WWII. Nor do I 
believe that they deserved to lose their homes, their possessions, or their lives. As I hope 
to have made clear, my arguments in no way aim to diminish the human suffering 
experienced by ethnic Germans from the eastern territories. It is easy to feel empathy for 
the suffering of the expellees when one encounters them on an interpersonal level. 
Indeed, it is undeniable and understandable that many of them still must endure trauma 
precipitated by great loss, including the deaths of family members and other loved ones.  
 
           The problem with Schwartz’s stance, however, at least in the context of this study, 
is that the historical facts of flight and expulsion are not as important as the quality of 
their representation. In most cases, the monuments represent expulsion experiences as if 
the German people, in particular, the expellees, bore no responsibility for what happened. 
True, assigning collective guilt or pursuing collective punishment is wrong and morally 
unjustifiable. Suggesting the collective innocence of millions of Germans from the East, 
as so many local monuments do, however, is also a mischaracterization of the facts. 
Schwartz seems to make it impossible to criticize the expellees and their interpretations 
                                                           
7 Schwartz, “Dürfen Vertriebene Opfer sein?” p. 495. 
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of history, or their representations of the expulsion, without being what he labels an 
“apologist of the expulsion.”8 I, on the other hand, see no problem with criticizing the 
way expellees—and, particularly, their political and cultural organizations—have dealt 
with their fate and how they have elected to portray and commemorate it in the hundreds 
of local monuments that dot the landscape not only of Germany, but also its neighboring 
countries, as well as farther flung locales such as Windhoek, Namibia or Olmsted Falls, 
Ohio.9
           Few would contest the expellees’ right to commemorate their dead. For me, 
however, it is a matter of how the expellees have conducted their mourning. Therefore, 
the guiding principles of this analysis have centered on the questions: How have the 
expellee organizations commemorated and represented the expulsion on their local 
monuments? Do the commemorations and representations treat the events as isolated 
occurrences unconnected to the Second World War? Do they suggest any causality? Do 
 In no way should a critical assessment of these local monuments be incompatible 
with recognizing and condemning the criminal excesses inflicted on Germans during or 
after WWII. Nor must it be construed as the expression of a lack of compassion for those 
who suffered.  
                                                           
8 Ibid., p. 502. Citing Adam Krzemiński, Schwartz writes that “generally, apologists of the expulsion who 
consider it a ‘peace solution’ should comprehend that their argument is cynical and the retaliatory thoughts 
behind it are inhumane vis-à-vis the expellees…”  
9 The front side of the monument standing in the memorial garden next to the Danube Swabian German-
American Cultural Center in this suburb of Cleveland bears a large coat-of-arms along with the inscription 
DONAUSCHWABEN (Danube Swabians) with the text ZUM GEDENKEN UNSERER TOTEN IN DER 
ALTEN UND NEUEN HEIMAT (An English translation is also included: In memoriam. In remembrance 
of our loved ones here and abroad). The inscription on the back side is only in German: ZUM GEDENKEN 
DER OPFER DER KRIEGE UND DER UNSCHULDIGEN DIE IHR LEBEN LASSEN MUSSTEN NUR 
WEIL SIE DEUTSCHE WAREN, AUF DER FLUCHT, IN DEN LAGERN VALPOVO, MOLIDORF, 
GAKOWO, JAREK, MITROVITZA, KRNDIJA, RUDOLFSGNAD, KRUSCHIWL, U.A. SOWIE IN 
DER BARAGAN UND IN RUSSLAND. (In commemoration of the victims of the wars and the innocents 
who had to lose their lives only because they were Germans while fleeing and in the camps Valpovo, 
Molidorf, Gakowo, Jarek, Mitrovitza, Krndija, Rudolfsgnad, Kruschiwl, et al., as well as in the Baragan 
and in Russia). The monument was dedicated in 1990. Danube Swabians who left their homelands after 
WWII founded the “Society of the Danube Swabians” in Cleveland in 1958. A number of such 
organizations exist in the USA, primarily in the Great Lakes and Upper Midwest regions.  
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they imply German responsibility? Do they include other victim groups? To be sure, local 
expellee monuments are but one manifestation of a variety of such representations (other 
examples might include portrayals in literature or in television and film). Nevertheless, 
the results of how expellees have represented their experiences with local monuments are 
unmistakable.  
          In my effort to investigate and interpret the monuments, two distinct though related 
thematic patterns emerged, which I grouped into clusters. Cluster A (Chapters Three 
through Six) pertained to the large number of monuments which commemorate and 
represent the loss of Heimat. Because they lost their homelands, these monuments seem 
to say, the expellees suffered the worst of all German victims. Noticeably absent, of 
course, are direct references to other victim groups or to the war that precipitated the 
territorial loss. The expellee organizations erected these monuments in the pursuit of 
what one could call “concrete politics,” i.e. the desire for official political and cultural 
recognition, material compensation, and the reacquisition of lost territories. Above all, 
these monuments express the expellees’ desire to get their land back and bemoan the loss 
of German power over Eastern Europe. Inherent in the narratives conveyed by the 
monuments, therefore, is a territorial claim. Accordingly, the expellees erected the vast 
majority of cluster A’s monuments—with some noteworthy exceptions, e.g. those of the 
Southeast European Germans—during the first three decades after WWII. This was when 
the permanence of the Oder/Neisse border was at least somewhat in doubt.  
          The expellee organizations erected the monuments of cluster B to achieve other 
goals. After Ostpolitik ended hopes of border revisions, and after official historical 
narratives centering on the Holocaust became predominant, the monuments were 
332 
 
constructed in the pursuit of what one could call “symbolic politics,” i.e. societal 
acknowledgment of the collectively innocent suffering of the expellees. According to 
cluster B’s monuments, the expellees were brutalized for no other reason than their 
cultural background and ethnicity, not unlike the victims of the Nazis. Put another way, 
these monuments portray the expellees as the guiltless victims of events over which they 
had no control. What is more, because these monuments proclaim the collective 
innocence of the expellees—by employing religious symbolism, the female form, and 
subsumption—they are exculpatory. Indeed, these monuments have much to say in 
general about discourses of guilt and culpability in the Federal Republic since the 1970s 
and must be interpreted in light of the emergence of Holocaust-centered narratives. Once 
again, other victim groups are not usually mentioned by name on these monuments. Even 
when they are, however, the wartime and postwar experiences of the expellees are at the 
forefront.   
          In sum, the monuments articulate an ahistorical, German-centered narrative. With 
very few exceptions, the representations of flight and expulsion on local monuments 
commence at the end of the war as if nothing precipitated these events. It is as if 
everything started in 1945. In addition, the monuments do not treat the expulsion and the 
loss of the eastern territories as consequences of the Nazis’ genocidal war. These 
commemorative sites dissolve causal links between WWII (not to mention all kinds of 
Nazi atrocities, including the Holocaust) and the expulsion. Moreover, the self-pitying 
inscriptions are an indication of the unwillingness of a significant portion of the West 
German populace to recognize and accept German responsibility for the expulsion. 
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           Furthermore, expellee monuments reflect an immediate and sustained effort to 
shape postwar debates over victimization and guilt. It seems that acknowledgement of 
German suffering in the form of local expellee monuments leads, at a minimum, to 
comparability, and in many cases suggests German suffering eclipses and effaces the 
suffering of other victims. Most of the time, the strategy of distancing and disconnecting 
glaringly omits all others who suffered during the Third Reich. Most monuments make it 
look as if the expellees were the only ones who suffered. Indeed, it appears that the 
initiators of the monuments have sought to go beyond simply commemorating their 
losses and instead have endeavored to contest any official postwar narratives which did 
not have German experiences, particularly those of the expellees, as their centerpiece. 
The point is not that expellees should not commemorate their dead, but rather that by not 
acknowledging other victim groups and not connecting the expulsion to Nazi Germany’s 
actions, the historical accounts depicted on the monuments are distorted and de-
contextualized, and give the impression that their initiators have sought to relativize—and 
even exculpate—what happened in Germany’s name. Even monuments with conciliatory 
inscriptions, for example, those which quote the Charter of the German Expellees, remain 
self-centered. The lessons which the expellees claim to have learned are based on what 
was done to them, not what Germans did to others. 
           As such, the monuments offer compelling evidence that emphatically refutes the 
widely-held commonplace that commemoration of German wartime suffering was taboo 
in the sense that it was not allowed or somehow muted. Expellee monuments have been 
erected in every decade after the end of the war and stand in every Land of reunited 
Germany. They are located in bustling big cities and quiet small villages, in peaceful 
334 
 
cemeteries and churchyards, as well as well-visited town squares and city halls. 
Moreover, as public art, the monuments provide snapshots of how the recent past was 
perceived—particularly by expellee activists10
           It would be unfair and inaccurate, however, to suggest that the views and opinions 
of millions of expellees have ever been monolithic. Clearly, there is the potential for 
disparity between the attitudes of expellee organization members and those of other 
unaffiliated Germans from the East.
—at the grassroots level at certain points in 
time, and illuminate the divergence between official historical narratives focusing on the 
Holocaust and local narratives focusing on German suffering.  
11
 
 Nevertheless, memorialization of the expulsion has 
been and will remain controversial because of its politicization by the expellee 
organizations, chief among them the Bund der Vertriebenen. It seems that for the 
expellee organizations, political objectives—both concrete and symbolic—have in so 
many cases trumped commemorative goals. Quite clearly, with the monuments that form 
the empirical core of this dissertation, the expellee organizations have sought to ensure 
that their interpretations of WWII and its aftermath found—and continue to find—an 
enduring place in public memory. This pertained particularly on the local level. As my 
study shows, the expellee organizations often linked commemoration of the expulsion to 
political objectives. What was commemorative in tone was without question political in 
intent. 
 
                                                           
10 Claiming personal victimhood and projecting onto Hitler and his Nazi coterie all responsibility for 
National Socialist atrocities is not a prerogative only of the expellee organizations. Wide swaths of German 
society have done and continue to do the same. 
11 The number of BdV members has always paled in comparison to the actual number of expellees. Though 
this expellee umbrella organization claims to have approximately two million members today, most 
observers believe that number is inflated. They believe membership peaked at around that number in the 












Main inscription: DEN TOTEN DER HEIMAT 
Dedication: October 1950, expanded 1984 
Asperg (cemetery) 
Main inscription: DER ALTEN HEIMAT ZUM GEDENKEN 
– DEN TOTEN ZUR EHRE – DER NEUEN HEIMAT ZUM 
DANK – DEN LEBENDEN ZUR MAHNUNG 1945-1985 
Dedication: September 22, 1985 
Backnang (schoolyard, formerly a refugee camp) 
Main inscription: DER ALTEN HEIMAT ZUM 
GEDENKEN, DER NEUEN HEIMAT ZUM DANK 
Dedication: Tag der Heimat 1976 
 
Blaubeuren (cemetery) 
Main inscription: UNSEREN TOTEN 




Böblingen (street intersection) 
Main inscription: BÖHMEN. GEDENKT DER HEIMAT 
Dedication 1981 
Erbach (cemetery) 
Main inscription: UNSEREN TOTEN IN DER HEIMAT 
Dedication: 1956, expanded 2008 
Essingen (cemetery) 
Main inscription: DEN TOTEN DER HEIMAT 
Dedication: October 8, 1959, expanded 1980 
 
Faurndau (hill overlooking town) 
Main inscription: UNSERE 
KIRCHENGEMEINDE ENTSTAND NACH 
DEM ZWEITEN WELTKRIEG DURCH DIE 
VERTREIBUNG UND ALL DIE HIER IHRE 





Freiburg (street intersection) 
Main inscription: UNVERGESSENE HEIMAT 
Dedication: 1968/1969 
Freiburg (cemetery) 
Main inscription: DEN TOTEN DER HEIMAT 
Dedication: 1949 
Geislingen (hill overlooking Geislingen) 
Main inscription: OSTLANDKREUZ & DEN TOTEN 
SÜDMÄHRENS  




Göppingen (city park—Mörikeanlage) 
Main inscription: None 
Dedication: July 26, 1980 
Göppingen (city park—Mörikeanlage) 
Main inscription: History of Banat Swabians which 
concludes with SIE WERDEN UNS UNVERGESSEN 
BLEIBEN. MÖGEN SIE RUHEN IN FRIEDEN. 
Dedication: Spring 1977 
Göppingen (city park—Mörikeanlage) 
Main inscription: DEN TOTEN DER HEIMAT. DEN OPFERN DER 
VERTREIBUNG 





Main inscription: GEDENKSTÄTTE DER GEFALLEN UND 
VERSTORBENEN LANDSLEUTE. LANDSMANNSCHAFT 
DER DOBRUDSCHA DEUTSCHEN 
Dedication: May 20, 1982 
Heilbronn (cemetery) 
Main Inscription: DEN TOTEN UNSERER 
HEIMAT. 1945 – DIE HEIMATVERTRIEBENEN 
Dedication: unknown 
Heilbronn (city square) 
SEE CHAPTER NINE 
Herlikhofen (cemetery) 
Main inscription: WIR GEDENKEN JENER IN 
GLASERHAU SLOWAKEI AM 21.9.1944 VON 





Heubach (along street) 
Main inscription: SOLL ICH EUCH ERST DER DRANGSAL KUNDE SAGEN, DIE DEUTSCHES LAND 
SO OFT AUS OSTEN TRAF! MAHNUNG AN DIE HEIMAT VON 17 MILL. DEUTSCHEN. 
ERRICHTET 1961 
Dedication: Tag der Heimat, 1961 
Hüttlingen (cemetery) 
Main inscription: ZUM GEDENKEN AN DIE TOTEN IN 
DER FRÜHEREN HEIMAT UND AN DEN TOTEN VON 







Main inscription: DEN MILLIONEN DEUTSCHEN, DIE DURCH 
GEWALTSAME VERTREIBUNG, FLUCHT, INTERNIERUNG UND 
VERSCHLEPPUNG IHR LEBEN VERLOREN, ZUM EHRENDEN 
GEDENKEN 
Dedication: November 19, 2000 
 
Karlsruhe (cemetery) 
SEE CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Kornwestheim (cemetery) 
Main inscription: DEN TOTEN UNSERER 
HEIMATVERTRIEBENEN 
Dedication: unknown 
Laichingen (cemetery wall) 
Main inscription: VERLORENE HEIMAT-DICH 
SUCHET DIE SEELE-TOTE DER HEIMAT-EUCH 
BIRGT UNSER HERZ. DEN TOTEN DER 
HEIMATVERTRIEBENEN, DIE IM KRIEG UND AUF 









Main inscription: DEN OPFERN DER VERTREIBUNG UND DER  
TOTEN DER HEIMAT & 1945 
Dedication: unknown 
Marbach (cemetery) 






Main inscription: IM GEDENKEN AN DIE TOTEN IN DER BÖHMERWALDHEIMAT. VÖLKER HÖRET. DIE 
OPFER DER KRIEGE, VON FLUCHT UND VERTREIBUNG MAHNEN. LEBET IN FRIEDEN. 
Dedication: 1981 
 
Murrhardt (city park) 
Main inscription: DIE HEIMAT BLEIBT UNVERGESSEN 
Dedication: Tag der Heimat, 1991 Pforzheim (Haus der Landsmannschaften) 




Plüderhausen (next to church) 
SEE CHAPTER THREE 
Oberdischingen (private property) 
Main inscription: DEM 
GEDÄCHTNIS DER DEUTSCHEN 
HEIMAT IM OSTEN UND UNSEREN 
DORT RUHENDEN TOTEN 
Dedication: 1984 
 
Rechberg (on hill overlooking town) 
Main inscription: NEUEIGEN GROSS DITTERSDORF 1946 – 1988. 
DIESER GEDENKSTEIN HIER AM RECHBERG—IM JAHRE 1988 
ERSTELLT—SOLL STETS AN UNSERE „UNVERGESSENE HEIMAT“ 
ERINNERN, DIE GANZ NAHE AN DER ODERQUELLE IM 
EHEMALIGEN LANDKREIS BÄRN IM SUDETENLAND LIEGT UND 






Main inscription: UNSEREN TOTEN ZUM GEDENKEN. 
DIE GEMEINDE TSCHEB a.d. DONAU 
Dedication: unknown 
Reutlingen (cemetery) 
Main inscription: SACKELHAUSEN BANAT. UNSEREN 




Main inscription: NEU-PASUA. 1790-1945. 
VERGESSET UNSER NICHT. 
Dedication: 1976. 
Reutlingen (cemetery) 
Main inscription: FRANZFELD IM BANAT. 1792. 







Main inscription: UNVERGESSENE HEIMAT 
Dedication: April 15, 1984, moved November 24, 2001 
Schelklingen (along bike path) 
SEE CHAPTER THREE 
Schwäbisch Gmünd (cemetery) 
Main inscription: HEIMAT DER DEUTSCHEN AUS DEM 
OSTEN 
Dedication: October 14, 1989 
Schwäbisch Gmünd (cemetery) 
Main inscription: DEN TOTEN DER HEIMAT 





Main inscription: DER UNVERGESSENEN HEIMAT UND IHREN TOTEN. BUND DER VERTRIEBENEN 
Dedication: 1982 
Sindelfingen (on hill near school) 
Main inscription: GEDENKT DER BRÜDER UND SCHWESTERN, DIE OPFERND FÜR UNS IHR LEBEN 
GELASSEN, DIE SCHULDLOS GEMORDET, IM ELEND VERSTORBEN, DIE FORTAN NOCH WEILEN 
IN HERBEM VERMIßTSEIN, DIE FERNE AUCH RUHEN IN VERLORENER HEIMAT. 




Stuttgart (in front of inner courtyard of the Neues Schloss) 
Main inscription: VERSTÄNDIGUNG STATT VERTREIBUNG. VERSÖHNUNG STATT VERGELTUNG. IM 
ANGESICHT DER VERHEERUNGEN VON KRIEG, FLUCHT UND VERTREIBUNG WURDE VON DEN 
DEUTSCHEN HEIMATVERTRIEBENEN UND FLÜCHTLINGEN AM 06. AUGUST 1950 VOR DEN RUINEN 
DES NEUEN SCHLOSSES DIE CHARTA DER DEUTSCHEN HEIMATVERTRIEBENEN ÖFFENTLICH 
VERKÜNDET. AUS IHRER LEIDVOLLEN ERFAHRUNG SOLL KÜNFTIGEN GENERATIONEN EIN 
GEEINTES EUROPA, WELTWEITE VERSTÄNDIGUNG UND EIN INTERNATIONAL ANERKANNTES 
MENSCHEN- UND HEIMATRECHT ERWACHSEN. 
Dedication: August 21, 2002 
Stuttgart (park) 
SEE CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
Stuttgart (cemetery) 
Main inscription: DEN TOTEN IN DER ALTEN HEIMAT UND 
IN ALLER WELT. IM 13. JH. AUS DEM DEUTSCHEN 
SÜDWESTEN AUSGEWANDERT. AB 1825 DIE DEUTSCHE 
GEMEINDE GEGRÜNDET, 1944/1945 VERTRIEBEN. IN 
DEUTSCHLAND, ÖSTERREICH, UND IN ALLER WELT NEU 
BEGONNEN. DIE ÜBERLEBENDEN, DIE NACHKOMMEN 
UND DIE PATENSTADT STUTTGART 






Main inscription: EIN EHRENDES GEDENKEN.  
Dedication: 1987 
Ulm (Donauschwabenufer) 
SEE CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Ulm (Donauschwabenufer) 





Main inscription: VON WILLKÜR VERBANNT, AUS UNSERER 
VÄTER LAND. NUR LIEBE DIE DEN HASS VERPÖNT, ZEIGT 
AUF DEN WEG, DER DANN VERSÖHNT. 
Dedication: 1995 
Winnenden (on hill at street intersection) 
Main inscription: BRÜCKE ZUR HEIMAT 
Dedication: September 15, 1965 
Winnenden (cemetery) 
Main inscription: ZUM GEDENKEN AN 
UNSERE HEIMAT UND UNSERE TOTEN. 






         Berlin 
Bischofswiesen (church wall) 
Main inscription: 1945. DEN TOTEN DER HEIMAT. SUDETENDEUTSCHE 
LANDSMANNSCHAFT 
Dedication: September 25, 1949 
Berlin (Theodor-Heuss-Platz 
Main inscription: FREIHEIT RECHT FRIEDE. DIESE FLAMME 
MAHNT: NIE WIEDER VERTREIBUNG! 





Ahlen (parking lot) 
SEE CHAPTER EIGHT 
Bad Oeynhausen (cemetery) 
Main inscription: FERN DOCH TREU 
Rededication: July 16, 1995 
Bielefeld (cemetery) 
Main inscription: DEN TOTEN UNSERER OSTDEUTSCHEN HEIMAT 




Bielefeld (entrance of civic administrative building 
Main inscription: ZUM GEDENKEN AN DIE VERTREIBUNG 
DER DEUTSCHEN AUS IHRER HEIMATSTADT WANSEN 
IN SCHLESIEN AM 7. AUGUST 1946 
Dedication: September 14, 1996 
Bielefeld (end of street) 
SEE CHAPTER EIGHT 
Bielefeld (city park) 
Main inscription: DER ELCH ALS SINNBILD 
OSTPREUSSENS WURDE FÜR DIE PATENSTADT 
GUMBINNEN DURCH DIE STADT BIELEFELD 




Bonn (near the Beethovenhalle) 
Main inscription: DIESE 
PATENSCHAFTSBÄUME STEHEN HIER 
ZUR ERINNERUNG AN DIE LÄNDER UND 
STÄDTE… 
Dedication: October 1972 
Dortmund (park) 
Main inscription: WIR ERINNERN AN DAS 
SCHICKSAL DER ÜBER 15 MILLIONEN 
FLÜCHTLINGE, VERTRIEBENEN UND 
DEPORTIERTEN AUS SCHLESIEN, 
OSTBRANDENBURG, POMMERN, DANZIG, 
WEST- UND OSTPREUSSEN, DEM 
SUDETENLAND, UND DEN 
SIEDLUNGSGEBIETEN VON DEUTSCHEN IN 
OST-, MITTEL- UND SÜDOSTEUROPA, DIE 1945 
HIERHER KAMEN. MEHR ALS 3 MILLIONEN 
VERLOREN DABEI IHR LEBEN – DIE 
HEIMATVERTRIEBENENVERBÄNDE- 
Dedication: 2004 
Düsseldorf (side of street) 






Main inscription: DER ALTEN HEIMAT ZUM GEDENKEN. 
DER NEUEN HEIMAT ZUM DANK 
Dedication: 1981 
Düsseldorf (park) 
SEE CHAPTER ONE 
Euskirchen (entrance of old city hall) 
Main inscription: HEIMAT UNVERGESSEN  
1302-1945-2002 
Dedication: September 14, 2002 
Euskirchen (cemetery) 
Main inscription: ZUM GEDENKEN DEN OPFERN DER FLUCHT 





Euskirchen (outside county administration building) 
Main inscription: NAMSLAU SCHLESIEN UNVERGESSEN 
Dedication: June 15, 1958 
Hagen (park) 
SEE CHAPTER THREE 
Hemer (park) 
Main inscription: ZUM GEDENKEN 







Main inscription: ZUM GEDENKEN DER VIELEN OPFER DIE DURCH FLUCHT UND VERTREIBUNG  
IHR LEBEN VERLOREN 1945-1948 
Dedication: September 18, 2004 
Hille (entrance of city hall) 
Main inscription: ZUM GEDENKEN AN FLUCHT UND 
VERTREIBUNG. BUND DER VERTRIEBENEN 
Dedication: July 16, 1995 
Herne (music school) 
Main inscription: GEGEN KRIEG UND 
VERTREIBUNG. ALTE HEIMAT IN 
















Main inscription: DEN TOTEN DER 
OSTDEUTSCHEN HEIMAT. 8.X.1950 




Menden (war memorial) 
Main inscription: 82 ANGEHÖRIGE DER 
HEIMATVERTRIEBENEN LIESSEN IM WELTKRIEG 1939-1945 
UND IN FOLGE DER VERTREIBUNG IHR LEBEN 
Dedication: unknown 
Menden (cemetery) 
Main inscription: IN CHRISTUS IST HEIMAT 
Dedication: 1954 
Minden (entrance of city hall) 
Main inscription: ZUM GEDENKEN AN DIE 2 MILLIONEN OPFER DURCH FLUCHT  
UND VERTREIBUNG 1944-1948. GESTIFTET VON DEN LANDSMANNSCHAFTEN UND DEM BdV 1998 
Dedication: November 15, 1998 
Lippstadt (cemetery) 






SEE CHAPTER NINE 
Minden (park) 
Main inscription: WEST- u. OSTPREUSSEN. POMMERN-
OSTBRANDENBURG. SCHLESIEN-SUDETENLAND 
Dedication: August 8, 1985 
Münster (city square) 
Main inscription: DEN DEUTSCHEN FLÜCHTLINGEN UND 
HEIMATVERTRIEBENEN IN MÜNSTER SEIT 1945 
Dedication: April 5, 2003 
Neuss (city square) 




Porta Westfalica (side of street) 
SEE CHAPTER FOUR 
Oberhausen (Schloss Oberhausen) 
SEE CHAPTER NINE 
 
 
Schloß Burg (Gedenkstätte des deutschen Ostens) 
Main inscription: DEN VERTRIEBENEN IN  
EUROPA ZUM GEDENKEN 
Dedication: October 21, 1951, expanded June 2, 1962 
Soest (BdV meeting rooms in former NATO barracks) 
Main inscription: VERGESST DIE HEIMAT NICHT. DIE OPFER 


















































Soest (exterior wall of city hall) 
Main inscription: ZUR ERINNERUNG AN GROSS-STREHLITZ 
OBERSCHLESIEN. DIE PATENSTADT SOEST 
Dedication: unknown 
Soest (exterior wall of city hall) 
Main inscription: VERGESST DIE HEIMAT NICHT. DIE 
OPFER DER FLUCHT VERSCHLEPPUNG UND 
VERTREIBUNG INFOLGE DES KRIEGES 1939-1945 
Dedication: 1989 
Soest (BdV meeting rooms in former NATO barracks) 
Main inscription: DIE HISTORISCHEN DEUTSCHEN 
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